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To the Editor:—We read with interest the investigation revealing causes of nitrous oxide contamination in operating rooms.1 The authors observed occupational exposure to trace amounts of a waste anesthetic gas, nitrous oxide, and showed a number of sources that were responsible for abnormally high workplace concentrations. In addition to insufficient or lacking air conditioning systems and scavenging devices, inhalational mask induction and leakage during use of uncuffed tubes have widely been proved as the most important factors with regard to exposure to both nitrous oxide and volatile agents.2,3 However, we feel some points of the recent study require further discussion. The air samples were taken at the air conditioning exhaust grill at a distance of approximately 3 m from the sources of contamination. Therefore, the measurements only reflect air contamination at a given point, not actual exposure of an individual, which is far more important in the evaluation of workplace safety and eventual health hazards. Actual exposure to an individual was not measured because anesthetic gases are distributed within the room and thus—depending on the distance from the source of contamination—are diluted in significant manner.3,4

To estimate dilution of nitrous oxide, we checked leakage 62 wall-mounted gas outlet sockets (Dräger, Luebeck, Germany) that provide nitrous oxide from the high-pressure central gas system to the anesthesia machines in 17 operating rooms in our hospital. All rooms were well air conditioned by laminar flow and an air exchange rate ranging from 19.2–21.3/h without recirculation of exhaust air. Measurements were taken continuously for 6 min with a directly displaying infrared

Yale University School of Medicine
New Haven, Connecticut 06510

References

In conclusion, we believe that parental presence during induction of anesthesia may have a place in a child’s perioperative experience, but significant work is needed to determine what role parents should play and how best to prepare parents to be most helpful to their children in the operating room setting. As it stands, parental presence increases parental satisfaction but does not affect a child’s immediate perioperative anxiety or long-term behavior.

Zeev N. Kain, M.D.
Departments of Anesthesiology and Pediatrics and Child Psychiatry
Maura B. Hofstadter, Ph.D.
Department of Anesthesiology
Linda C. Mayes, M.D.
Department of Pediatrics and the Child Study Center

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Causes of Nitrous Oxide Contamination in Operating Rooms

To the Editor:—We read with interest the investigation revealing causes of nitrous oxide contamination in operating rooms.1 The authors observed occupational exposure to trace amounts of a waste anesthetic gas, nitrous oxide, and showed a number of sources that were responsible for abnormally high workplace concentrations. In addition to insufficient or lacking air conditioning systems and scavenging devices, inhalational mask induction and leakage during use of uncuffed tubes have widely been proved as the most important factors with regard to exposure to both nitrous oxide and volatile agents.2,3 However, we feel some points of the recent study require further discussion. The air samples were taken at the air conditioning exhaust grill at a distance of approximately 3 m from the sources of contamination. Therefore, the measurements only reflect air contamination at
spectrum (Bruel & Kjaer 1302, Naerum, Denmark) at a distance of 1 cm from the sockets. To determine the baseline contamination of the operating rooms, levels of nitrous oxide were measured in the middle of the rooms, approximately 3.5 m away from the sockets.

Our measurements revealed that no socket was absolutely gas-tight. Mean leakage was 181.6 ± 624.0 ppm (range, 1.6–4,730.2 ppm). Despite high concentrations of nitrous oxide close to the sockets, overall room contamination was low, which can be attributed to dilution. In the center of the operating rooms, nitrous oxide levels were only 4.38 ± 2.30 ppm and showed that at a distance from the leakage comparable to that in which Kanmura et al. took their air samples, the concentrations were approximately 40-fold lower than those measured close to the leakage. Therefore, in the recent study, exposure of personnel who worked close to the sources of contamination could have been much higher than the concentrations actually measured at the exhaust grill.

Although having already undergone distribution and dilution, concentrations of nitrous oxide at the exhaust grill were disproportionately high when compared with recent studies conducted in equally climatized operating rooms. Such high exposure may be plausible only in cases of undetected massive leakage from the central gas system or malfunction of air conditioning or scavenging devices, which resulted in relatively high baseline contaminations of the operating rooms close to the 50-ppm threshold set by the authors. During use of nitrous oxide, relatively low concentrations from anesthesia itself added to the high baseline level and triggered alarm. Furthermore, high concentrations may result from the careless use of nitrous oxide by anesthesiologists.

Nonetheless, the recent study shows that there is still a lot of work to be done from the standpoint of occupational health and workplace safety. Furthermore, our results show that there are undetected sources of leakage that led to occupational exposure. Because exposure to naturally produced nitrous oxide is estimated to be only approximately 0.31 ppm, occupational exposure in contaminated rooms caused by leakage in our study was approximately 12 times as high. Thus, air-conditioning systems and scavenging devices, as well as anesthetic equipment, should be checked in short intervals to prevent or repair malfunction and leakage. Only increased awareness of this problem will keep occupational exposure as low as possible.

Christian Byhahn, M.D.
c.byhahn@em.uni-frankfurt.de
C. Klaus Westphal, M.D.
Assistant Professor for Anesthesiology
Department of Anesthesiology
Intensive Care Medicine and Pain Control
J.W. Goethe-University Hospital Frankfurt, Germany

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Minimizing Venous Air Embolism from Reinfusion Bags

To the Editor—Drs. Ho and Ling’s excellent Medical Intelligence article, “Systemic Air Embolism after Lung Trauma,” provides an important teaching service to the anesthesia community. However, one totally preventable and recurring cause of potentially fatal venous air embolism that was not mentioned in the article (particularly in the last section entitled, “Other Causes of Air Embolism in Nontraumatic and Traumatic Clinical Setting”) is externally pressurizing a reinfusion blood bag that has been filled with blood from a surgical field scavenging-blood processing system. In most of the Haemonetics blood scavenging-processing models (Cell-Saver; Haemonetics Corp., Braintree, MA), the unit sends an 80-ml column of air ahead of the first column of blood into the reinfusion blood bag. If the reinfusion blood bag, which contains air, is then externally pressurized, a venous air embolism may occur. The obvious, but life-saving, take-home message of these considerations is that reinfusion blood bags that have been filled with blood from an autotransfusion system should never be externally pressurized.

The old warning on the Haemonetics Cell-Saver reinfusion bag of “Do Not Use With Pressure Cuff” was changed to “Do Not Use Pressure Cuff. The Use of Pressure Cuff May Lead to Fatal Infusion of Air” in 1995 for obvious reasons. However, I am aware that the practice of externally pressurizing Cell-Saver reinfusion blood bags is still common and widespread. Consequently, other additional solutions to minimize the risk of fatal venous air embolism appear to be desirable and necessary. The potential solutions include insertion of a air bubble detector with an audible alarm in the infusion line to the patient, routine use of a double reinfusion bag (transfer pack) system, redesign of the processing unit to exclude air from being sent to the reinfusion bag (mandatory use of a purge mechanism), and insertion of a nondependent air escape valve in the reinfusion bag. All these solutions involve an additional response to the problem by the manufacturer. Certainly any two in-series solutions (e.g., the printed warning on the reinfusion bag plus one of the above suggestions) for the air in the reinfusion bag problem will greatly minimize the risk of venous air embolism.

Jonathan L. Benumof, M.D.
Professor of Anesthesia
University of California, San Diego Medical Center
San Diego, California

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