Lasnik and Saito (1992) (henceforth, L&S) claim that both (2) and (3) are possible answers to (1) when every student takes wide scope over what. In this interpretation (1) is asking, with respect to each individual student, what that student bought. This is roughly represented as in (4).

I thank Sigrid Beck, Željko Bošković, Dave Braze, Howard Lasnik, and William Snyder for comments and suggestions on this work. I am also grateful to an anonymous *LI* reviewer for substantial suggestions that helped me make the argument of this squib clear and concise.

1 I will use the universally quantified NP every student and avoid using the word everyone/everybody, although everyone/everybody is often employed in the literature on quantifier/wh interaction. The reason for this choice is the following. Everyone/Everybody allows another interpretation that would induce an unnecessary complication for the point I will make in this squib: the nonquantificational group interpretation (Williams 1986, Lasnik and Saito 1992). Everyone bought a book can be interpreted as ‘everyone together as a group bought a single token of book’, as well as ‘everyone individually bought a different token of book’. The first reading (‘the group purchase reading’) is not available with other universally quantified NPs like every student. Note that, although the nonquantificational group interpretation of everyone/everybody is not directly relevant to the point of this squib, the existence of such an interpretation is a nontrivial issue that is sometimes overlooked and/or causes some confusion in the literature.

2 L&S’s (p. 153) actual example is Everyone bought Max a book, but the change from everyone to every student does not affect the point in the present discussion.
(4) for each x, x a student, what is the identity of y, y an individual, such that x bought y

It seems that the intuition behind L&S’s view is that (3) is a subcase of the pair-list answer; that is, (3) is an abbreviation of \{John bought a book, Mary bought a book, Bill bought a book\}, where \{John, Mary, Bill\} exhausts the students in the discourse.

May (1985, 1988), on the other hand, claims that a single answer like (3) is anticipated when what takes wide scope over the universal quantifier in (1), although he argues that (2) is anticipated when the universal quantifier takes wide scope in (1).\(^3\) Therefore, although L&S and May agree with respect to the interpretation of (1) when (1) anticipates a pair-list answer such as (2), they do not agree with respect to the interpretation of (1) when (1) anticipates a single answer such as (3).

In this squib I will first show, using syntactic evidence, that L&S’s view cannot be maintained. I will then argue that May’s view is also insufficient for making (1) and (3) a consistent question/answer pair. Finally, I will argue that in order to make (1) and (3) a consistent question/answer pair, we must assume that what can quantify over kinds/properties, as well as individuals, a claim that Heim (1987) makes on independent grounds.

Let us first examine L&S’s claim that (3) is an anticipated answer to (1) when every student takes wide scope over what in (1). There is empirical evidence to reject this claim. Consider (5), which shows that both a pair-list answer (5b) and a single answer (5c) are possible even when the object what in (1) undergoes long-distance movement.

(5) a. What do you think that every student bought?
   b. I think John bought a book, Mary bought a pen, and Bill bought a tie.
   c. I think that every student bought a book.

Now, building on an observation by Longobardi (1987) and Cinque (1990), Saito (1995) shows that when what crosses a wh-island as in (6),\(^4\) a pair-list answer such as (7) is no longer possible.\(^5\)

(6) ?What do you wonder whether every student bought?
   (7) #I wonder whether John bought a book, Mary bought a pen, and Bill bought a tie.

\(^3\) This is what May would claim for (1) and (3), as far as I can see from his (1988:122–123) discussion, although he uses everyone (instead of every NP), which invites the group purchase interpretation, as well as the interpretation that is relevant here (see footnote 1), and makes the situation look more complicated.

\(^4\) (6) is slightly degraded because of the Subjacency violation, which is irrelevant to the present discussion.

\(^5\) See Saito 1995 for Saito’s account of why a pair-list answer like (7) is not a possible answer to (6).
(7) is good as an independent statement, but it is not an acceptable answer to (6). Observe now that a single answer like (8) is still a good answer to (6).

(8) I wonder whether every student bought a book.

Therefore, although (6) cannot anticipate a pair-list answer like (7), it still can anticipate a single answer like (8). If both (7) and (8) can be anticipated only when the universal quantifier takes wide scope over what in (6), why they differ in grammatical status as answers to (6) is mysterious. There must be an interpretation of (6) that is compatible with (8) but not with (7). The most natural candidate for such an interpretation is that what takes wide scope over the universal quantifier in (6); this is May’s claim, which I will examine momentarily. This strongly suggests that a pair-list answer like (2) and a single answer like (3) need not respond to the same interpretation of the quantifier/wh question in (1), either; a single answer like (3) is not necessarily an abbreviation of a pair-list answer [John bought a book, Mary bought a book, Bill bought a book]. Therefore, we can reasonably conclude that a single answer like (3) and (8) can respond to an interpretation of a quantifier/wh question that differs from the interpretation the question has when it anticipates a pair-list answer, contrary to what L&S claim.

Let us now examine May’s claim that (2) and (3) correspond to different interpretations of (1). Recall that May claims that a single answer like (3) is anticipated when what takes wide scope in (1). Therefore, (1) might be represented as in (9) when it anticipates a single answer like (3) (cf. (4)). (I have intentionally left the restriction on y unspecified for a moment.)

(9) for what y, y . . ., is it the case that for each x, x a student, x bought y

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6 As an LI reviewer points out, although the contrast between (7) and (8) argues that (3) can respond to (1) when what takes wide scope over the universal quantifier in (1), it does not necessarily reject the possibility that (3) can also respond to (1) when the universal quantifier takes wide scope over what in (1), because for (1) with no wh-island intervening, a pair-list answer like (2) is also possible. Shortly I will propose a theory that accounts for both (8) and (3) in the same way and makes L&S’s theory for (3) unnecessary.

7 A note is in order regarding (5a) and (5b). If a pair-list answer is anticipated when the universal quantifier takes wide scope over what, as May (1985, 1988) claims, the fact that (5b) is an acceptable response to (5a) means that every student can take wide scope over what in (5a); May (1988) explicitly says that it can so do by Quantifier Raising (QR). However, it is also often claimed in the literature (e.g., Williams 1986, L&S, Larson and May 1990) that QR is tensed-clause-bound. If this claim is correct, the acceptability of (5a) and (5b) is problematic in a QR-based analysis of quantifier/wh interaction, because there is no way for every student to take wide scope over what in (5a), and thus (5b) should not be a possible answer to (5a). Since this is not the issue here, however, I will not discuss it any further in this squib. See Chierchia 1992, for instance, for an interesting alternative that is free from this problem.
However, if what in (1) in this interpretation is simply asking for the identity of an individual (i.e., if the domain of y in (9) is restricted to individuals), (3) does not provide the information relevant to the wh-question, because a book in (3) does not represent any single individual; hence, there is a discrepancy between the question and the answer. To solve this problem, I propose that what can inquire about the identity of a kind of an individual/property of an individual (as well as the identity of an individual). Therefore, the interpretation of (1) that anticipates a single answer like (3) can be informally represented as in (10).

(10) for what P, P a property, is it the case that for each x, x a student, x bought something that has P

Therefore, it is not sufficient to say that what takes wide scope over the universal quantifier when (1) anticipates a single answer like (3). We must say, in addition, that what in (1) inquires about the identity of a kind/property, in order to make (1) and (3) a consistent question/answer pair.

In this squib I have shown on empirical grounds that what in a quantifier/wh question like (11) takes wide scope over the universal quantifier when the question anticipates a single answer like (12).

(11) What did every student buy?
(12) Every student bought a book.

Further, I have shown that in the relevant reading, what in (11) must be interpreted as asking for a kind of an individual/property of an individual. If this argument is on the right track, it provides new, independent support for Heim’s (1987:30) idea that what can quantify over kinds/properties.

References
The English Middle and Agentivity

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1 The Middle, Agents, and for-Phrases

The English middle construction has long been assumed to be agentive. Some kind of logical subject, or agent, has been argued either to be present at some (lexical-) semantic level (e.g., Ackema and Schoorlemmer 1995, Condoravdi 1989, Fagan 1992, Zribi-Hertz 1993) or to be syntactically realized (e.g., Stroik 1992, Hoekstra and Roberts 1993).

I address two questions raised by these analyses: Why is the middle’s agentive subject not syntactically active? And why is it that agent-related phenomena are acceptable in some middles but not in others? As I will show, these two questions are related and are answered by the proposal in this squib: that there is, in fact, no logical subject argument associated with the English middle construction at any level and that, moreover, the English middle is not even inherently agentive.

Ackema and Schoorlemmer (A&S) (1995), in arguing that there is no evidence for a syntactically present agent phrase in the middle, deal with the fact that many middle sentences can contain a for-PP whose argument seems identical to the logical subject (agent) argument of the middle verb. This is illustrated in (1) (adapted from A&S’s (15)).

(1) a. French books read easily for educated people.
   b. Latin texts do not translate easily for Bill.

Such sentences have been argued to constitute evidence for the presence of a syntactic agent phrase. Stroik (1992), for example, claims...