

## BOOK REVIEWS

*Doctrina de Monroe y Cooperación Internacional.* By CAMILO BARCIA TRELLES. (Madrid: Compañía Ibero-Americana de Publicaciones (S.A.) Editorial Mundo Latino, 1931. Pp. 741.)

What is the justification for a new work on the Monroe Doctrine? Has not everything worth saying already been said about this famous declaration? Has it not been reviewed repeatedly in every possible light, and from every possible angle? Has not its every facet been illuminated? Assailed by such apprehensions one is likely to take up the book of Barcia Trelles—especially if one is unfamiliar with the author's antecedents—with little expectation of finding within its covers anything more than the conventional gloss or the hackneyed recital of facts long since familiar to every student of American diplomacy. But one meets with a pleasant surprise. The author, a Spaniard, views the subject from a fresh point of view. Not only that, he brings to bear upon it a trained and well-informed mind. American readers will be favorably impressed by his sincerity and by the depth of his understanding, though it is doubtful whether they will in every case fully acquiesce in his interpretation of the facts.

The title is significant. The doctrine, though a national policy of the United States, is international in outlook, and it is to this external aspect that the author devotes the major part of his attention. He allots relatively little space to the part of the story in which Rush, Canning, Adams, and Monroe were the central figures. Even on that familiar ground he avoids treading too much in the beaten track of those who have gone before. The basic idea of the doctrine—the author calls it the intangibility of America—did not originate with the declaration of Monroe, nor with Jefferson's earlier suggestion of a "meridian of partition", nor even with John Adams's treaty draft of a still earlier date. It first found expression, we are told, in a principle set forth early in the sixteenth century by the Spanish publicist, Francisco de Vitoria, who contended that the new lands could be annexed by the discoverer only in case they were *res nullius*. But America, according to Vitoria, was not *res nullius*, for it was occupied by the Indians who were reasonable beings with a polity of their own.

It followed, therefore, that rightful title to it could not be acquired by Spain nor by any other European power. This early advocacy of America for the Americans, we know, produced no effect. Yet Charles V. a little later promulgated a law which declared Spanish America to be inalienable; that is, a law which asserted intangibility, not in favor of the Indians but in favor of Spain against the rest of Europe. The doctrine of the two spheres, found special application in the treaty of 1750 between Spain and Portugal. By the terms of this convention it was agreed that Brazil and the Spanish provinces in South America should remain at peace regardless of any state of war that might arise between the principals on the other side of the ocean. Thus, according to Barcia Trelles, the two-sphere invention was Spain's; the patent only Monroe's.

The point seems a bit labored, but the author does not dwell upon it. He is concerned with immediate effects rather than remote causes. Specifically, he is interested in inquiring to what extent the Monroe Doctrine is an obstacle in the way of international coöperation. Moved by that interest, he has gone to great pains to present the situation which confronted the United States during the two or three years immediately following the famous pronouncement. Then it was that the government at Washington, in the face of demands for continental action, chose to maintain the declaration as a national policy. No one else has set forth so fully and so clearly the facts relating to this problem. No one else has examined so minutely or weighed so carefully the questions raised in those years by Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and Argentina. No one else has discussed with greater penetration the bearing of the Panama Congress on the Monroe declaration. Whether the United States committed a grave error, as the author maintains it did, in failing to welcome the proffered coöperation of the Hispanic-American countries, is a point upon which opinions will differ. There is much truth in his contention that the United States stood in a peculiarly advantageous position at the time; that by winning a diplomatic victory over England the American republic had gone far toward the establishment of a moral ascendancy over its neighbors; that the rising states were friendly and eager for joint action; that the moment was highly opportune for laying the foundations for continental solidarity. But it does not follow that so simple an expedient as changing a national declaration into a continental compact would

have fixed the unity which seemed to hover for a moment over the new world a hundred years ago.

From Panama the story leaps to Versailles. The intervening period holds little of interest for the student of international coöperation. With the entrance of the United States into the Great War things changed. There were signs of a new era. The utterances of Woodrow Wilson gave ground for the belief that the foreign policy of the United States was now to be liberalized, that isolation was to be abandoned and international coöperation adopted in its stead. But Wilson's generous impulses, the author thinks, were so attenuated by opinion at home that he ended by introducing into the league covenant Article XXI, which in effect not only reasserted the line of division between the old world and the new, but deepened the cleavage between the Anglo and the Hispanic sections of the new world itself. Attaching great importance to the article, the author dilates upon it. The events leading to its adoption, the discussions upon it at Versailles, the attitude of the various nations, public sentiment in the United States, the debates in the senate—every phase of the subject he considers in detail. The unfavorable culmination in the senate, he attributes to our unwillingness to depart from our traditional policy, even with reservations; and this leads him to inquire whether any permanent collaboration between the United States and Europe can be hoped for. In an effort to answer this question he considers, also at great length, the bearing of the Monroe Doctrine on two other important questions: first, the Permanent Court of International Justice; and secondly, the Kellogg Pact. In regard to the first he is skeptical. He sees incompatibility between devotion to isolation and adherence to the court. In regard to the second, he notes a like incompatibility, the pact being a measure for the outlawry of war, and the Monroe Doctrine an essential feature of the military system of the United States.

Toward the end of the book the author reverts to the Monroe Doctrine as a problem in inter-American relations. One of the objects of his inquiry is to discover to what extent the Hispanic nations have recognized the doctrine in recent times. His point of departure now is the Venezuelan incident of 1902. It was on that occasion that the Argentine minister of foreign relations, Luis M. Drago, wrote the famous dispatch in which he expressly recognized the Monroe Doctrine and proposed that it be so extended as to preclude the forcible collec-

tion of debts by European powers from American States. To this proposal of the Argentine government, Barcia Trelles attributes, curiously, two evil consequences: first, the gradual abstention of Europe from making loans in Hispanic America, with the consequent rise of the United States to financial ascendancy in that region; and secondly, in place of an occasional armed intervention by European powers, the regular and systematic use of force by the United States. The result, in short, was "dollar diplomacy" for which, says the author, Drago wrote the prologue and Knox the epilogue. Developing the subject further, the author adverts to the express recognition of the league of nations in the Tacna-Arica question. He mentions another unqualified recognition—that of President Leguía on the occasion of Hoover's visit—and then passes to a consideration of an attempt at collective recognition in the fourth Pan-American Conference at Buenos Aires in 1910. He next discusses various proposals for a conditional recognition, particularly the efforts of Honduras, Salvador, and Costa Rica to obtain a new definition of the doctrine; and finally, he reviews at length the pertinent discussions in the sixth Pan-American Conference held at Havana in 1928.

At last, bringing his long disquisition to a close the author states his conclusions substantially as follows: (1) The Monroe Doctrine as it is interpreted by the United States not only separates the old world from the new, but divides the new world itself into two sections—the United States on the one hand and Hispanic America on the other. (2) The efforts to remove by codification the causes of misunderstanding between these two sections have proved fruitless. (3) The expressions Monroe Doctrine and international solidarity are antithetical. (4) The expressions Monroe Doctrine and American solidarity are equally antithetical. (5) Although the doctrine was formulated to prevent threatened intervention on the part of European powers, it is now employed to justify interventions consummated by the United States.

The work ought to be widely read in this country. It would be of especial value to all who are in any way concerned with the formulation of our foreign policy or the conduct of our foreign relations. Written in Spanish, unfortunately, it will remain a closed book to many of those who might profit most from its perusal. It is to be hoped that the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to whom

the author was indebted for a subvention to enable him to prosecute studies in the United States, will now lend its support to an edition in the English language. By no other means could so much be done to remove the misunderstandings to which the Monroe Doctrine has given rise.

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*Letters of John III, King of Portugal, 1521-1557.* The Portuguese Text Edited with an Introduction by J. D. M. FORD. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931. Pp. xxx, 408.)

Among the recent acquisitions of Harvard University is a large part of the library of the Portuguese scholar, Fernando de Palha, who died in 1897. Included in the treasures of the Palha collection are 372 letters of King John III. of Portugal, whose reign covers the years 1521-1557. The text of these letters has been edited with meticulous care by Professor Ford of the Department of Romance Languages of Harvard. Professor Ford is also responsible for the scholarly and engaging introduction.

The vast majority of these letters are addressed to Dom Antonio de Ataide, John's chancellor of the exchequer (*vedor de sua fazenda*), and at various times ambassador to the courts of France and Spain. Owing to the important posts held by this official and the unlimited confidence the king reposed in him, the letters touch upon almost every affair of state in which Portugal was involved during the second quarter of the sixteenth century. The question naturally arises: to what extent do these letters shed new light on the reign of John III.? Most of the information hitherto available on this period is derived from two seventeenth century chronicles, one by Francisco de Andrada, printed in 1613, and the other by Frei Luiz de Souza which, though written during the years 1627-1632, was not published until 1844. Andrada was apparently unfamiliar with the letters in the Palha collection. Souza sought and obtained somewhat of the first-hand information contained in the letters but he did not actually use it in his *Annaes*. Any historian, therefore, who essays to write authoritatively on the reign of John III. will find it necessary to place under requisition the letters assembled by Palha as well as the works of the two chroniclers just mentioned.