

Editors' Note

With this issue, International Security marks its twenty-fifth anniversary. Much has changed in international relations and the field of international security studies since 1976. The agenda has shifted dramatically, and the list of security problems examined in these pages has evolved accordingly. What has not changed is this publication's commitment to, as the editors put it in the journal's first issue, "timely analysis of these issues through contributions that reflect diverse points of view and varied professional experiences" using a "broad range of methodologies and perspectives." The editors thank the many authors, readers, and reviewers who have contributed to the success of International Security during its first twenty-five years. In the next quarter-century, we plan to continue to pursue the objective of the journal's founding editors: to "contribute to the disciplined discourse that distinguishes a profession."

In this issue, Thomas Christensen of MIT reflects on whether China will present a security threat to the United States and its East Asian allies in the next several decades. Christensen argues that simple realist notions about the importance of power in international politics have limited utility in assessing this threat. China need not catch up to the United States "by an overall measure of national military power or technology" to pose a significant challenge to U.S. interests in the region. Were China to acquire certain weapons capabilities and adopt coercive tactics, Beijing elites might conclude that a cross-strait conflict involving Taiwan, and even the United States, could serve China's interests.

Supporters of NATO enlargement contend that it will promote the spread of democracy, which in turn will lead to greater stability in Europe. Dan Reiter of Emory University disagrees. Reiter maintains that the historical record—during and after the Cold War—fails to establish any correlation between NATO membership and the expansion of democracy. He also suggests that the costs and risks of NATO enlargement greatly exceed the potential benefits. Adding new members will only exacerbate tensions with Russia and diminish the likelihood of cooperation on a host of pressing security issues, including arms control and peacekeeping.

Sarah Mendelson of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy explores the success of Western nongovernmental organizations in fostering democratic institutional development in Russia. Mendelson's assessment is decidedly mixed. Although Western NGOs have contributed to the establishment of local-level democratic institutions and election practices, these achievements have been limited by nondemocratic practices and human rights abuses. Mendelson concludes with some suggestions for how

local activists and Western NGOs can promote democratic activity at the national level.

Daniel Byman of RAND and Kenneth Pollack of the National Defense University challenge scholars to reconsider the role of individuals in international relations. Asserting that the time has come “to rescue men and women, as individuals, from the oblivion to which political scientists have consigned them,” Byman and Pollack use five case studies to debunk standard explanations for why individuals do not “matter” in international affairs.

Richard Falkenrath, on leave from Harvard University, discusses the evolution of the United States’ domestic preparedness program since the mid-1990s. The program, designed to prepare the country for a domestic terrorist attack with chemical or biological weapons, suffers from a variety of difficulties. Falkenrath traces one of the program’s largest problems—a lack of integration—to its origins as a series of multiple, loosely related programs that developed through “a fragmented, often chaotic policymaking and budgetary process,” rather than a coherent national strategy. He concludes with several recommendations for addressing this situation.

We close with two sets of letters. Anna Simons comments on John Mueller’s article “The Banality of Ethnic Warfare” (Summer 2000). Mueller replies. Susan Martin counters Scott Sagan’s proposition in “The Commitment Trap” (Spring 2000) that the U.S. policy of “calculated ambiguity” is flawed. Sagan responds.

NOTE TO CONTRIBUTORS

International Security welcomes submissions on all aspects of security affairs. Manuscripts should be typed, double-spaced, with notes double-spaced at the end. All artwork must be camera-ready. A length of 5,000–10,000 words is appropriate. To facilitate review, authors should send these copies to the Managing Editor with a brief abstract, should refrain from identifying themselves in their manuscripts, and should follow the *International Security* stylesheet, available from the journal’s editorial offices: fax (617) 496-4403 or e-mail <IS@harvard.edu>. For more guidance, see “How to Write for *International Security*: A Guide for Contributors” (Fall 1991).

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