

The Power of Democratic Cooperation

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The influence of democracy on foreign policy and world politics is one of the most hotly debated issues in the field of international relations. The proposition that democracies are better equipped to win in war is no different in this respect: It is a provocative thesis that contrasts sharply with some well-received theories of international politics. In his article “Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters,” Michael Desch raises several challenges to this proposition.¹ He critiques the empirical methodologies, theoretical explanations, and historical evidence that some scholars say explain democratic victory in war and concludes that, in the end, democracy has “no particular advantages or disadvantages” (p. 8).²

In examining five causal mechanisms offered by “democratic triumphalists” to support the military effectiveness of democracy, Desch argues that “none of them is logically compelling or has much empirical support” (p. 25). In this article I do not attempt to respond to all the points Desch raises. Instead I focus on one of his critiques—namely, whether democratic allies can be more effective than nondemocratic allies in wartime and whether they are more likely to achieve victory. My goal is twofold: first, to offer an alternative theoretical explanation for the relationship between alliance behavior, the role of domestic political institutions, and their effect on war performance to explanations that Desch attributes to democratic triumphalists; and second, to provide quantita-

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1. Michael C. Desch, “Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters,” *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 5–47. Additional cites to this article appear parenthetically in the text.

2. Studies exploring the democratic victory thesis include David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24–37; Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, “Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, No. 2 (June 1998), pp. 377–389; Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Christopher F. Gelpi and Michael Griesdorf, “Winner or Loser? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–1998,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, No. 3 (September 2001), pp. 633–648; and Ajin Choi, “Cooperation for Victory: Democracy, International Partnerships, and State War Performance, 1816–1992,” Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 2001.

tive and qualitative empirical evidence in support of this alternative explanation. Although I concur with Desch that explanations for democratic victory based on “selection effects” and “military effectiveness” arguments are not completely satisfactory, I disagree with his claim that “regime type hardly matters” in determining war outcomes. Indeed my research suggests that democracies are formidable players in the international arena and that the sources of democracies’ military prowess are entrenched in their political institutions.

This analysis proceeds in five steps: First, I summarize Desch’s criticism of the impact of democratic alliance behavior on war performance; second, I present an alternative explanation for this behavior; third, I offer statistical evidence that supports my explanation; fourth, I illustrate the statistical findings with historical cases; and fifth, I conclude with some final observations regarding the influence of democracy on military effectiveness.

Democratic Alliance Behavior and Military Effectiveness

Democratic triumphalists, Desch argues, contend that democracies can be more reliable allies than nondemocracies because democratic leaders are more concerned than nondemocratic leaders about the possibility of punishment by the public if they fail to implement their states’ international commitments. This concern is derived from James Fearon’s argument that democratic leaders pay greater domestic audience costs than nondemocratic leaders when they retreat from their public declarations.³ Triumphalists also suggest that democracies with shared norms are more likely to form alliances and are better able cooperate with one another.

Desch contends that the audience costs logic does not sufficiently explain the military effectiveness of democratic allies, noting that “there is considerable evidence that democratic publics are not particularly attentive to” foreign affairs. This suggests that audience costs do not play a significant role in the calculations of their leaders (p. 31). Therefore “democratic leaders are not necessarily constrained by” their states’ international commitments (p. 32). Because of this, he concludes, there is little reason to believe that democratic allies should be more effective than other types of allies in waging war.

Desch also argues that the military effectiveness of democratic alliances based on shared norms and ideological affinity has neither theoretical nor em-

3. James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and Escalation of International Disputes,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 577–592.

pirical support. He claims that collective action problems among democracies can be more serious in wartime because “bonds of friendship” may lead some democracies to pay less than their fair share in a war. He also points out that historically there have been few purely democratic coalitions; rather most have been mixed or exclusively nondemocratic. To support this claim further, Desch argues that Israel, a democratic state with an impressive record of wartime success, should be an easy case for the triumphalists. But according to Desch, Israel has not consistently had democratic allies, and it did not begin to develop strong ties to the United States until 1970. Moreover, Washington has maintained its political and military support for Israel not because Israel is a democracy but because of U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East (pp. 28–32).⁴

The Effectiveness of Veto Players and Transparent Political Systems

Putting aside the domestic audience costs explanation, whose validity Desch seriously doubts, why might democracies make better wartime partners and thus be more likely to win their wars? The common feature of all democratic states, regardless of whether they have presidential or parliamentary forms of government, is the existence of “veto players” and their influence in the decisionmaking process. Veto players, according to George Tsebelis, are “individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo.”⁵

Coalitions of democratic states are better able to maintain their wartime commitments because their domestic institutions include veto players whose decisionmaking processes can produce highly stable domestic preferences over time. Due to competing preferences and diverse interests, democratic states may find it more difficult to enter into international commitments. However, once these commitments are made and ratified through democratic institutional mechanisms, institutional constraints make them extremely difficult to reverse.⁶

4. In response to Desch’s claims about Israel, I suggest that democratic states do not necessarily go to war either alone or with allies to save other democracies. Instead, they go to war to defend their values or national interests. The important point is that, once fully committed to fight, democratic states are better able to work with their allies when waging war. In this sense, U.S. behavior toward Israel that is motivated by American strategic interests does not contradict the triumphalists’ expectation of democratic victory.

5. George Tsebelis, “Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 93, No. 3 (September 1999), p. 593.

6. Kurt Gaubatz, “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations,” *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 109–139.

In contrast, domestic institutions exert less influence over nondemocratic states, where a single leader or small group of leaders usually makes the major decisions. Nondemocratic states may therefore be able to respond more quickly to allies' requests than can democratic states, but for the same reason, their ability to maintain commitments may be less reliable or more unpredictable. As Mancur Olson has written, the promises of nondemocracies are "not enforceable by an independent judiciary or any other independent source of power. . . . Because of this and the obvious possibility that any dictator could, because of an insecure hold on power or the absence of an heir, take a short-term view, the promises of an autocrat are never completely credible."⁷ This implies that even if a president, prime minister, or branch of government in a democratic state seeks to change the status quo in war, these efforts could be effectively blocked by other government entities. Given the role of veto players, the reliability and cohesion of democratic allies in warfare no longer relies on the audience costs logic. Rather decisions are the product of governmental checks and balances—a process embedded in democratic political institutions.

Another important element in winning a coalition war is the ability of member states to coordinate their efforts and resources. In contrast to Desch's claim that democratic coalitions are less effective because their bonds of friendship may induce an incentive to free ride, I argue that compared to nondemocracies with their closed political systems, democracies, with their open, transparent political systems, can more effectively promote wartime cooperation.

One way to achieve cooperation and reduce levels of uncertainty is to increase the quantity and quality of interstate communication. As Robert Keohane has written, states that seek cooperation with other states need "not merely information about the other government's resources and formal negotiating positions, but rather knowledge of their internal evaluations of the situation, their intentions, the intensity of their preferences, and their willingness to adhere to an agreement even in adverse future circumstances."⁸ Moreover, increased communication facilitates a democratic coalition's ability to monitor its members and, if necessary, punish transgressors. From this perspective, democracies have a greater capacity than nondemocracies for communication and accessibility, and thus are more preferable partners.

7. Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), p. 571.

8. Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand of International Regimes," Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 162–163.

Statistical Results of the Impacts of Democratic Allies on Victory

My research shows that the larger the number of democratic partners a state has, the more likely it is to win in war (controlling for such variables associated with war outcomes as a state's military capabilities, the capabilities of wartime allies, and which state initiates the war). According to the results of the marginal impact analysis presented in Table 1, the number of democratic partners variable increases the probability of winning a war by 62 percentage points as this variable moves from its minimum to maximum value and all other variables are set at their mean or modal values. The number of nondemocratic partners variable, on the other hand, decreases the probability of winning by 44 percentage points under the same conditions.⁹

Desch suggests that the democratic triumphalists misaggregate some wars, thus inappropriately favoring their own arguments. To avoid this, I conducted a set of sensitivity tests to determine whether my coding rules might affect the results of the statistical analysis. For these tests, I continued to use State War Performance Model 2 to determine how the coefficient on the number of democratic partners variable changes: Removal from the data set of all the U.S. and Israeli cases yields coefficients of ($b = 0.541, p = 0.000$) and of ($b = 0.57, p = 0.000$), respectively; I then eliminated Australia, Canada, and New Zealand ($b = 0.554, p = 0.000$); next, I removed all World War I ($b = 0.475, p = 0.000$) and World War II ($b = 0.591, p = 0.000$) cases; finally, I included only the periods after 1900 ($b = 0.851, p = 0.000$), 1918 ($b = 0.754, p = 0.000$), and 1945 ($b = 1.673, p = 0.003$) in the data set. As shown by the coefficients and p -values, the signs of the coefficients for the number of democratic partners variable are always positive and statistically significant across all the models, although the size of the coefficients changes slightly across the models.

To confirm these findings, I replicated Dan Reiter and Allan Stam's main model and ran their model including the number of democratic and nondemocratic partners variables.¹⁰ According to the results of this test (presented in the right-hand column of Table 1), these two variables have a significant impact on war outcome: The number of democratic partners variable is positively related to the probability of winning ($b = 1.748, p = 0.005$), whereas the number of

9. These statistical findings were first generated in 2002 in Ajin Choi, "Democratic Synergy and Victory in War, 1816–1992," War Performance Model 2, Table 1, n. 15.

10. Reiter and Stam, "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory," p. 385.

Table 1. Number of Coalition Partners and Its Impact on War Performance.

Variable	Choi's Model 2		Reiter and Stam's Model 5	
	Coefficient Standard Error	Marginal Impact	Coefficient Standard Error	Marginal Impact
Number of democratic partners	0.55*** (0.11)	62%	1.75** (0.62)	75%
Number of nondemocratic partners	-0.16** (0.06)	-44%	-0.34* (0.16)	-43%
Alliance contributions	1.64*** (0.48)	52%	5.65*** (1.26)	89%

NOTE: The table presents only the results of the three variables related to wartime alliances, not those of all variables in the two original models. These computations were performed using *Intercooled Stata*, version 7.0; and Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King, *CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results*, Version 2.0 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, June 1, 2001), <http://gking.harvard.edu/>. All tests are two-tailed.

* $p < 0.05$

** $p < 0.01$

*** $p < 0.001$

nondemocratic partners variable continues to be negatively associated with this probability ($b = -0.338$, $p = 0.041$).

Further analysis of the statistical results reported in Table 1 yields several other interesting findings. First, according to realists, states form wartime coalitions to increase their capabilities; the importance of these capabilities to the war effort and the likelihood of victory have been a consistent theme in realist literature. In his article, Desch compares the capabilities of winning coalitions with those of their adversaries and shows that coalitions with overwhelming capabilities won their wars (pp. 10–16). Indeed, as Desch correctly points out, the difference in capabilities between wartime coalitions is an important predictor of war outcomes. As the models in Table 1 show, the probability of winning a war increases by 52 and 89 percentage points, respectively, as the alliance contribution variable moves from its minimum to its maximum value, all else being equal.

Second, this finding suggests that two coalitions with the same level of military capabilities could experience different levels of cooperation, and thus different outcomes, depending on their members' regime type. That is, in addition to capabilities, the level of cooperation among coalition members is an im-

portant determinant of victory in war; more specifically, the high level of cooperation among democratic allies significantly contributes to winning.

Third, the results in Table 1 speak to a point Desch raises regarding the effects of mixed coalitions. Desch contends that “there are cases of democracies winning wars as members of mixed alliances” (p. 10). In these cases, writes Desch, it is hard to conclude that the democratic state contributes to winning because “the nondemocracy accounted for the majority of the winning alliance’s military strength” (pp. 11–12). He also states that nondemocratic members are more willing to pay their share of the war effort and that, in the case of World War II, the Soviet Union led the Allies to victory by defeating Germany on the eastern front (pp. 13–14).

If nondemocratic states were militarily stronger or if nondemocratic coalitions were less plagued with free riding, it could be that with each democratic partner added to a coalition, the probability of winning decreases, whereas with each nondemocratic partner added to a coalition, the probability of winning increases. In contrast to this expectation, however, the probability of winning increases with each democratic partner that joins a wartime coalition, whereas the probability of winning decreases with each nondemocratic partner that participates in a wartime coalition (see Table 1). In addition, if Desch’s claim is right, it could be that the proportion of military victories by mixed coalitions is much lower than the proportion of victories by purely nondemocratic coalitions. According to my additional research, however, 78 percent of mixed coalitions won their wars from 1816 to 1992, whereas only 50 percent of nondemocratic coalitions won their wars.

Furthermore, given the importance of Lend Lease and other Allied aid programs during World War II, it is hard to conclude that the Soviet Union was the only major contributor to victory in 1945. As John Mueller points out, “While holding off one major enemy, it [the United States] concentrates with its allies on defeating another enemy . . . it supplied everybody. . . . If anyone was in a position to appreciate this, it was the Soviets. By various routes the United States supplied the Soviet Union with, among other things, 409,526 trucks; 12,161 combat vehicles (more than Germans had in 1939) . . . and over one-half pound of food for every Soviet soldier for every day of the war.”¹¹ Soviet wartime aid to its Western allies, however, totaled only \$2 million.¹²

11. John Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,” *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), pp. 60–61.

12. Hubert Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941–1945* (New York: Greenwood, 1989), p. 182.

Both Britain and the United States complained of this lack of Soviet reciprocity. On the other hand, reciprocity between the British and the Americans was significant. The United States devoted 4 percent of its domestic output to Britain through Lend Lease, while Britain provided 3 percent of its output to the United States.¹³

In sum, my findings of a strong, positive correlation between the number of democratic coalition partners and the likelihood of victory in war, in addition to a strong, negative correlation between the number of nondemocratic coalition partners and the expectation of victory, challenge Desch's conclusions about war contributions in mixed coalitions. From the statistical results presented in Table 1, it is possible to infer that coalitions with a larger number of democracies are likely to experience a synergistic effect, whereas coalitions with a larger number of nondemocracies are likely to suffer from collective action problems. The historical record confirms these findings.¹⁴

Historical Evidence

Given the theoretical expectation and statistical finding that democratic states are more effective partners in warfare, I conducted in-depth process tracing by examining how three variables—democracy, wartime cooperation, and war performance—interact and how they generate certain outcomes in specific historical contexts. First, I compared the level of commitment that Britain and Austria-Hungary accorded to their respective allies during World War I, and illustrated how veto players account for war performance. Second, I compared the levels of cooperation for joint air force operations among the Allies during World War II, and demonstrated how transparency and openness in democratic political systems allowed them to collaborate more closely with their coalition partners.

BRITAIN VERSUS AUSTRIA-HUNGARY IN WORLD WAR I

As World War I moved into its third year, states on both sides began to consider ways to break the stalemate through entering into separate peace negoti-

13. Richard Overy et al., "Co-operation: Trade, Aid, and Technology," in David Reynolds, Warren F. Kimball, and A.O. Chubarian, eds., *Allies at War* (New York: St Martin's, 1994), pp. 209–211.

14. Additional statistical evidence supports this finding about the number of democratic partners: First, controlling for other factors such as war duration, expected war outcome, and leadership change, democratic states are less likely than nondemocratic states to abandon their partners during war. Second, controlling for other factors such as threat, coalition size, and hegemony, democracies are better able than their nondemocratic counterparts to coordinate their war efforts and related resources. See Choi, "Cooperation for Victory."

ations. If successful, such negotiations would have seriously harmed the war's other participants, however. Believing that Germany could avoid defeat if it could convince Britain to take itself out of the war, Berlin proposed separate peace negotiations with London on September 18, 1917.

Britain's prime minister, David Lloyd George, expressed interest in the proposal despite the likely costs to its allies, arguing that "if Russia went out of the war . . . [Britain] could see no hope of the sort of victory in the war we desired. In these circumstances, it might be necessary to make a bargain with Germany."¹⁵ Given the stalemate on the western front and the likelihood of continuing Russian withdrawal on the eastern front, he thought that Britain should consider accepting Germany's peace terms.¹⁶

Upon bringing the proposal to the War Cabinet, Lloyd George encountered stiff opposition. Cabinet members warned that, in accordance with the 1914 Pact of London, no negotiations should be undertaken before consulting with Britain's allies. In addition, they worried that a separate peace would leave Germany strong, allowing it to threaten Britain later on.¹⁷ Following heated debate in the War Cabinet, the British government decided to inform its allies of Germany's proposal and to renew its commitment to remain in the war until the Germans were defeated. This decision was not made based on the will of Lloyd George or the exclusive leadership of any War Cabinet member, but rather on the bargaining that occurred between them. To ensure the survival of his government, Lloyd George had to consider the positions of the War Cabinet's members. He needed the cooperation of the Conservative Party, which at that time constituted the majority in the House of Commons.¹⁸

In contrast, Emperor Karl could initiate a separate peace despite some strong opposition in the Austro-Hungarian government because of the absence of effective veto players. Austria-Hungary started the war against Serbia on July 28, 1914, with German assurances of diplomatic and military support. It did not, however, anticipate that the conflict would evolve into world war or that it would last so long. When Emperor Karl ascended to the throne in November

15. War Cabinet minutes, May 9, 1917, CAB23/13, in David Woodward, "David Lloyd George: A Negotiated Peace with Germany and the Kuhlmann Peace Kite of September 1917," *Canadian Journal of History*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1971), p. 80.

16. David Lloyd George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, Vol. 4 (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1934), pp. 2093–2097.

17. Woodward, "David Lloyd George," pp. 79, 88–89.

18. John Turner, *British Politics and Great War: Coalition and Conflict, 1915–1918* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 194–226; and David French, *The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916–1918* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 13–17.

1916, he began to think about separate peace negotiations, believing that the conclusion of a separate peace at the earliest possible moment—even at the expense of alliance with Germany—would preserve not only Austria-Hungary’s monarchy but also its status as a great power.¹⁹

The majority of members in the government, however, insisted that pulling out of the alliance would result in immediate invasion by Germany and revolt in the German-populated areas of Austria-Hungary, which in turn could lead to the disintegration of the monarchy itself. Instead of agreeing to separate peace negotiations, the majority held firmly that Austria-Hungary should hold out for a comprehensive peace within the framework of continued alliance with Germany. In so doing, Austria-Hungary would strengthen its bargaining position vis-à-vis Germany in any future peace negotiations.²⁰ In the end, the veto players’ constraints on their leader were not effective; members of the Austro-Hungarian government failed to prevent the emperor from pursuing separate peace negotiations.

ALLIED COOPERATION IN JOINT AIR FORCE OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

During World War II, Europe’s theaters of operation were highly dispersed. Thus one of the most effective forms of military collaboration among the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union involved air force operations. Negotiations over the deployment of air power were a crucial element of U.S., British, and Soviet cooperation. Although the Allies attached tremendous value to the importance of coordinating their air force operations, they sometimes could not reach political consensus. As a result, they failed to implement some joint operations at critical stages of the war.

Operation VELVET, a joint Allied air force effort proposed in 1942 to destroy Germany’s oil route in the eastern front, failed to materialize because of Josef Stalin’s last-minute rejection. Stalin’s decision was based more on political than military considerations. He worried that U.S. and British aerial domination would tarnish Soviet prestige on the eastern front. He was also concerned that if an air base were established on Russian soil, there would be great pressure for military and political interaction between Russian personnel and their Western counterparts. In Stalin’s view, such a situation would have been dangerous because it could result in “political contamination” and thus

19. Gary W. Shanafelt, *The Secret Enemy: Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance, 1914–1918* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 104–115.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 112–116, 137–148.

threaten domestic political stability.²¹ Evidence of this fear was reported by Britain's delegate to Moscow for the VELVET project, Sir Air Marshal R. Drummond, who indicated that the primary reason for the failure of VELVET was the Soviets' "almost fanatical urge to keep foreigners out of Caucasia"—not to mention Stalin's message to his Western allies that "I should be most grateful if you would expedite the dispatch of aircraft, especially fighters, but without crews."²²

This apparent Soviet fear over contact with British and American personnel stands in stark contrast, for example, to the U.S. use of military bases in Britain. Even before the United States and Britain had decided on a plan to invade Europe, the U.S. buildup in Britain (code-named BOLERO) had begun. The buildup was based on a U.S.-British agreement at the 1942 Arcadia Conference to pursue a "Germany first strategy." As a result of BOLERO, about 3 million U.S. troops poured into Britain between 1942 and 1945—the equivalent of 7 percent of the combined prewar population of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.²³ Using these air bases, Britain and the United States were able to engage in a successful joint offensive air-bombing operation against Germany.²⁴

Conclusion

Michael Desch has raised one of the most serious challenges to the democratic victory thesis. Arguing that the thesis rests on shaky theoretical and empirical grounds, he concludes that state war performance can be fully explained without consideration of regime type as a variable. Although I disagree with Desch's main claims on this matter, his challenge makes an important contribution to the democratic triumphalists' research program: It identifies the theoretical and empirical weaknesses of their explanations and, in so doing, creates an opportunity to develop new, more persuasive explanations.

21. Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973* (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 319.

22. "Note on Moscow Conference, November 27, 1942," in Richard Lukas, *Eagles East: The Army Air Force and the Soviet Union, 1941–1945* (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1970), p. 163; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, *Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt, and Truman, 1941–1945*, Vol. 2 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1958), p. 45.

23. David Reynolds, *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942–1945* (London: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 89–126.

24. For the development of this operation, see Wesley Craven and James Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, Vols. 1–2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949, 1951); and Maurice Matloff and Edwin Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1959).

In this article, I have provided new theoretical logic and empirical evidence of cooperation among democracies in war. I agree with Desch that the audience costs argument does not sufficiently explain the link between allies, democracy, and victory. Nonetheless, I contend that democracy, wartime cooperation, and war performance are connected. This connection is to be found in the very features of democratic political institutions. Due to the presence of effective veto players and to the transparency and openness of their political systems, democratic states are better able to cooperate in wartime, which in turn results in their winning more wars. This finding is supported by both statistical and historical evidence.

Scholars now know that democracy matters significantly in the international arena, and that it is a strong predictor of successful war performance. A recent study reports that despite their military competence and triumphs, democratic states are more likely to be the target of military challenges.²⁵ After the end of the Cold War, the international environment has not been largely favorable or peaceful. In fact, the United States has confronted a variety of serious military challenges, and it is engaged in a long and difficult war against terror. Under these conditions, the lesson of democracies' military victories over the last 200 years should not be forgotten: The strength of democracy is to be found in the power of democratic cooperation.

25. See Christopher F. Gelpi and Joseph M. Grieco, "Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and Targeting of Military Challenges, 1918–1998," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 6 (December 2001), pp. 794–815.