

Some information regarding the Janney loan contract is given, but it is admitted that full data from Cuban sources could not be obtained. Further, there is the intimation that part of these funds was used to secure votes in Congress favorable to the Cuban cause at the time the Teller resolution was passed. After a detailed discussion, without references to the *Congressional Record*, of the debates leading to the passage of this resolution, the author rephrases the essence of his thesis as follows:

In this manner then, we are able to see that the Joint Resolution of the 20th of April 1898, destined to put an end to the bloody Spanish despotism in Cuba and to aid in the establishment of a free people, in respect to which, from time to time they are reproached from the United States for a supposed lack of gratitude, was the object of criticism, contempt, and incomprehension of the American statesmen of the period: Cleveland, Platt, Reid, and many others. What right exists, therefore, to demand from the Cubans that they shall be grateful for a declaration of American international policy which, only because of the tenacity of the *Mambises* in not surrendering their arms without becoming independent and because of the noble sympathy of some citizens of the United States and because of the egotisms and interests of the remainder, did not serve to make them change masters and limited itself to recognize for them their rights, natural to every man, which with heroism they had demanded and reaffirmed during many years of struggle against the Spanish power and against the pro-Spanish neutrality of the United States?

Primary sources utilized in the volume are mostly records of the Department of State, and secondary works, especially certain ones critical of the United States, are depended upon to a greater degree than in the earlier volumes. The book is bilingual in character and has numerous illustrations which add to its value. Dr. Portell Vilá has presented a vivid account of an interesting period of Cuban-American relations.

ROSCOE R. HILL.

The National Archives.

The Huancavelica Mercury Mine. A Contribution to the History of the Bourbon Renaissance in the Spanish Empire. By ARTHUR PRESTON WHITAKER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941. Pp. xiii, 150. \$2.00.)

This little volume, the result of research in the *Archivo General de Indias*, and in the printed literature both source and secondary, is an outgrowth of an earlier study of the career of Antonio de Ulloa who held the post of governor of Huancavelica for a trying period of six years. Certain inconsistencies—such as Ulloa's early condemnation of the *mita* and his later attitude of tacit approval and “. . . the decline

of the vitally important mine of Huancavelica . . ." coincidentally "with the climax of the Bourbon renaissance, which in Spain and other parts of the empire outside of Peru, produced political reforms and scientific talents that, if applied to Huancavelica, might have saved it . . ."—suggested problems of major importance. This monograph, then, is not a history of the mine, but rather a detailed study of its failure to share in the general advance of the Bourbon period.

In two brief chapters the author sets forth the importance of the mercury mine of Huancavelica to South American mining in general, from its discovery in 1563 to the early years of the eighteenth century. Attempts at reform, along lines suggested by the successful operations at Almadén in Spain, were only partially successful. The story of Ulloa's valiant effort at reform, unsuccessful though it was, due to failure of support at Court in Spain, is detailed most convincingly. As in most other cases of drastic effort at reform in the Indies, the Spanish government included Huancavelica in its great series of 1765 with a threat to discontinue operations. As this was never carried out, the unfortunate visitador-general, José de Areche's well-intentioned attempt to wrest control from the greedy *gremio* of miners, brought an end to the *gremio* system, but disaster to himself and to the mine. The period of government operation, the Nordenflicht mission, the introduction of free enterprise, with a brief period of recovery, all led to ultimate collapse in the years after 1813 to the close of the colonial era. The volume closes with a summary analysis of the factors involved in the unhappy failure of a once great enterprise.

The brochure, the result of solid research which its size belies, should be a stimulating point of departure for a number of similar studies in a neglected field. It has an index, an appendix of documents, a good bibliography, and an excellent series of supporting notes.

ARTHUR S. AITON.

The University of Michigan.

Nuestra América é la Guerra. By MANUEL SEOANE. (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Ercilla, 1940. Pp. 211. \$15.00 m/n.)

Sr. Seoane has charted a course for Latin America through the world chaos. The present war is, he says, a struggle of imperialisms, but since "Hitlerian imperialism appears as the most dangerous and enslaving," Latin America must range herself on the side of the Anglo-Saxon powers. But subject to conditions that will offer the desired guarantees. First comes the unity of Latin America. This is a simple problem—to Sr. Seoane. The Latin Americans are "brothers in the