

order to complement the legal and sentimental triumph of Peru. And then he asserts that all the suffering of the people of this land is merely a part of what the whole country suffers in general due to the absence of a real democracy and a sound public administration.

On the other hand, and in regard to the international situation and the present war, Eguiguren claims that in the same manner that the war is being fought on the far battle fronts in defense of the democratic principles, it is also necessary to fight for them in the Western Hemisphere or, in other words, to clean out our own backyard.

Consequently, Eguiguren's book is not only a documentary proof of Peru's rights in her dispute with Ecuador, or a source of information about Peruvian history, but also an accurate defense of the principles for which the civilized men of our day are fighting.

ALFREDO M. SACO.

Washington, D. C.

*A política exterior do Brasil (1930-1942)*. By JAYME DE BARROS. 2a. Edição correta e aumentada. (Rio de Janeiro: Zelio Valverde, Caixa Postal 2956, 1943. Pp. 308. Paper.)

This is the second edition of a pretty disappointing book on diplomacy under President Vargas. Most of it seems to have been written from memory by a journalist who has the knack of the well-rounded though empty phrase. His sources are nearly all printed and official, and consequently very little of his narrative tells anything new or off the record. Only occasionally does he cite a document from the Itamarati Archive or give a personal observation. He gives vent in his introduction to sweeping generalizations that leave the historian aghast. The *Paulistas*, for example, were responsible for "toda a grandeza do Brasil"; Brazilian diplomacy began with Alexandre de Gusmão; a great gulf separates America from Europe: Long live America! Rio Branco appears as the paragon of diplomats, incapable of doing anything not dictated by facts; yet the baron's stubbornness in the handling of the dispute with Britain is not explained. Glibly the author tells us that Snr. Vargas has given new life to Brazilian diplomacy. The old school, which produced such men as Joaquim Nabuco and Oliveira Lima, has given way to the new; henceforth ministers and ambassadors will in the main look after Brazil's export business. Snr. Barros makes a fetish out of the messianic mission of the New World, and believes that Brazil, by cutting itself off from Europe, will be able to make an original contribution to civilization. Obviously, Snr. Barros shares

the current Brazilian "mistica do progresso" which, among other things, is making of Volta Redonda, the new steel mill outside Rio, a sort of national shrine where the modern *sebastianistas* confidently await the coming of their saviour. He looks forward to a future shaped by the new diplomacy of economists, and the showering upon Brazil of all the material blessings of modern society.

This undistinguished book is not, of course, entirely without value. There is considerable information on such topics as the reorganization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1931 and again in 1938, Brazilian economic diplomacy, the Leticia incident, the Chaco War, Brazil and Pan-Americanism, Brazil and the Monroe Doctrine, the Lima Conference, relations with the United States, Brazil and the European War, the Panama Conference, and the Peruvian-Ecuadorian boundary dispute. There are also some interesting sidelights on Dr. Vargas's visit to Buenos Aires in 1935. But in his attempt to reduce history to his own patterns, Snr. Barros has uttered many half-truths that cannot remain unchallenged.

MANOEL DA SILVEIRA CARDOZO.

The Catholic University of America.

*América ante la crisis mundial.* (La Habana: Comisión Cubana de Cooperación Intelectual, 1943. Pp. 301.)

This volume contains the proceedings of the round table, attended by some fifty intellectual leaders from the Americas and Europe, held under the auspices of the Cuban Commission on Intellectual Cooperation in Havana, November 23-26, 1941. Following closely upon the sessions of the Second American Conference of National Committees of Intellectual Cooperation, the round table was to discuss the question of the Americas and the World War. Less a round table than a formal body in which set speeches and rhetorical indulgences predominated generally, the meeting nonetheless evinced a sense of urgency and concern somewhat unusual among professors and writers. The great majority decried any thorough, scholarly investigation of the topic; Rome was burning and European civilization hung in the balance. Action of a positive and militant sort must be taken. Consequently, without examining seriously the character of the world crisis, problems of the Americas, problems of peace, etc., the assembly denounced the Axis powers and all their works and clamored for united action against threatening or existing dangers. Some of these sentiments were embodied in a formal declaration adopted unanimously on November 26, 1941. Besides condemning American neutrality and Axis aggression, it proclaimed the obligation of all