

Guest Editors' Introduction

The End of Area

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A Genealogy of Area Studies

The term *area* may have a variety of connotations, but the “area” that is the central topic of this issue of *positions: asia critique* is thematically determined within the historical context of what is generally referred to as *area studies*. Broadly speaking, area studies designates a group of academic disciplines, initially conceived of during the advent of the Second World War and later institutionalized under the political climate of the Cold War in the higher education arena in the United States—at universities, research institutes, associations, and public foundations—whose *raison d’être* was originally to produce knowledge that would serve the global strategy and policy positions of the United States of America. Each of the disciplines under this heading takes an area as its legitimate object, and the identity of an area serves as the principle of disciplinary integrity and specialization. This concept of “area,”

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therefore, used to constitute an object of inquiry in reference to which the disciplinary field measured its efficacy and improved its efficiency. In this protocol of disciplinary legitimation, area studies was not unusual or exceptional in comparison to other academic disciplines in terms of its internal epistemic constitution or its mode of self-legitimation.

Most academic disciplines in the natural and social sciences and the humanities organize and legitimate themselves around the specific objects of their inquiry. The configuration in the academic classification of disciplines is assumed to correspond on a one-to-one basis to the configuration of many aspects of human existence in the cosmology of the universe. The academic discipline of biology takes “life” as its object of inquiry; economics forms itself in reference to a putative object called “economy”; sociology legitimates itself by claiming to study the object of knowledge “society”; linguistics institutes its disciplinary protocols by competing over the most appropriate and efficient ways to study its own object “language.” Each of these disciplines constitutes its own domain of specialization by forming an exclusive field of knowledge and by policing the boundaries of this field. And yet we are aware that each of these objects, without which an academic discipline can be neither legitimated nor constituted, is historically contingent. The very formation of these academic disciplines must be historicized: “life” meant something entirely different until the early nineteenth century; “economy” acquired a new epistemic and social function when it was completely alienated from the distribution of resources in a household and the gift exchange in social relations regulated by the order of kin, feudal, or monarchical lineages; “language” began to invoke a different domain of humanistic knowledge when signs and things in the world were clearly differentiated and related in a framework of representation.

In the sense that the object of an academic discipline forms and serves to legitimate knowledge produced in that discipline, area studies is no different from other disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. It too legitimates itself by claiming to study its own object—area—and specialize in it.

However, area studies is distinct from other disciplines in two particular ways. First, the object of inquiry is not one aspect or another of human existence, but rather an area and the group of people inhabiting it. In this respect, the knowledge of area studies is specific with respect to the geo-

graphic “location” of the object-people. An area renders as representable a certain surface of the earth where a certain “people” live. In other words, an area makes it possible to “locate” a place. Area studies is explicit, or one might say even candid, in its commitment to sovereignty: by appealing to the word *area*, area studies does not hesitate to display its primary relationship to its object of inquiry, the defining relationship between the knower and the known for this academic discipline by locating the object-people. Unlike sociology or linguistics, which is concerned with some abstract aspect of the world, area studies targets the population of a certain location as its object of knowledge. In other words, the primary relationship to its object is to know how it ought to be located and described, how its future trends and tendencies could be predicted, how to generate the most rational responses to its compositional elements: in short, to know the object of area studies is also at the same time to know how to *govern* that particular population.

Of course, our contention is not to insist on the exceptionally political character of area studies. Every discipline of knowledge production entails the practice of power in more ways than one. We would never deny that a particular formation of economics or linguistics either attempts to institute certain rationalities for social conduct or serves to install a new pattern of subject positions to know. However, what is significant about area studies is that, by appealing to the classification of humanity according to areas of putative belonging and inhabitation, it does not hesitate to exhibit an imperialist will to sovereignty, and it does not conceal the manifestation of colonial cartography according to which the surface of the earth is divided into multiple segments for remote control, whose sense of remoteness and distance will be further discussed in this introduction.

Each of these segments retains its unity, but the principle of the integrity of this unity does not derive from the needs and demands of the population inhabiting the area but rather from the strategic conditions of those who catalogue data and produce knowledge about it *at a distance*. This is why an “area” must not be confused with a “territory,” as area studies has not been directly subject to the territorial state sovereignty. The integrity of this unity called “area,” therefore, is constituted in accordance with the logistic needs and demands of a *remote* control. Accordingly, an area does not coincide with a national territory clearly demarcated by national bor-

ders even though, to a large extent, the disciplinary formation of area studies accommodates and even reinforces the basic laws of national sovereignty in the modern international world. For while national territory is a space marked for national sovereignty, area is not. The sort of sovereignty in correlation with which an area is constituted is not national in the way that the state sovereignty of the nation-state is; it is a sovereignty of remote control, perhaps called more appropriately the “global sovereignty” of the superstate.

Instantly, it is obvious that area studies is implicated in intimate but insidious relationships with disciplines modified by national or ethnic genitives, *Chinese* history, *Russian* literature, *Indian* philosophy, or *Japanese* sociology. Very often the content of knowledge is identical between national disciplines and area studies. Area specialists constantly consult the archives of national disciplines. This assessment invites us to the second feature that distinguishes area studies from other disciplines, national disciplines in particular.

One of the key and constitutive features of area studies can be found in its regime of *separation*, by which the knower is always and necessarily located *outside and at a distance from* the object of knowledge.¹ But it is important not to confuse this “outside” with territorial or geographic externality. Even if an area specialist lives, works and publishes inside the geographic space of the area, he or she is located in a temporality and epistemic regime that is separate and distant from the time of the indigenous. Johannes Fabian’s famous formula is still pertinent here: “area” marks things and people for description, but these phenomena of description are deployed on the basis of the separation of two temporalities, of the time in which the known or the indigenous lives, and the time in which the knower or an area specialist narrates and positions him- or herself. That is, the “coevalness” of the knower and the known is denied (Fabian 1983: 31). The hierarchical organization of social relations, which Johannes Fabian sought to underline by his formulation concerning “the denial of coevalness” (32), persists and continues to determine how the knower positions him- or herself vis-à-vis the known in knowledge production in area studies. In essence, this separation is metaphysical in that it pertains to an area specialist’s endeavor to be simultaneously both in the “area” and not in the “area,” in a manner not entirely dissimilar to that of the missionary who is at the same time together with and separate from the local “natives” whom his or her mission is to proselytize.

It is in the sense of this disavowed “coevalness” that the knower is located *outside* the specialized area in knowledge production in area studies.

In contrast, national disciplines such as national history and national literature are built on an equally metaphysical presumption of *nationality*, a presumption of shared but empty temporality. To elucidate the metaphysics of the nation form, let us consult a classical definition of *nationality* offered by John Stuart Mill ([1861] 1972: 391): “A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively.” Nationality thus suggests a historically specific structure of communality, which refers to the gathering together of a “species” of people who share suffering as well as pleasure, the creation of a distinction between fellow countrymen and foreigners, the fostering of more cordial and stronger bonds with one’s countrymen than with foreigners. It is living under the same government, enjoying self-rule, and disliking the idea of being subject to foreign rule; it involves independence and responsibility for the welfare of one’s own country. With regard to the historically specific structure of communality, nationality means a modality of living together with one’s compatriots, whose features are given in aesthetic terms. Therefore, Mill talked of “the feeling of nationality” and the nation as “a society of sympathy” (391–98). In terms of feeling and sociability, nationality thus defines insiders against the outsiders and delineates the spiritual space of communal interiority in which one’s compatriots dwell. The communal interiority thus imagined is a spiritual space permeated by homogeneous and empty time: it is homogenous because it is nothing other than an abstract form of synchrony, not of simultaneity; it is empty because it is deprived of all the other concrete social qualities except for sharing.² Therefore, in national disciplines the knower and the known are not coeval either. This is precisely because the nation is an imagined community, in which each member of the nation is supposed to be copresent to other members in imagination, in the temporal modality of synchrony.

What nationality evokes is exactly opposite to what is implied by separation, which indicates the very absence of simultaneity and sharing, yet

nationality does not indicate coevalness either, for nationality is a replacement for coevalness or a sort of *counterfeit* coevalness.³ Precisely because both are alienated from coevalness, nationality forms a complementary symmetry with separation. And national disciplines are to foster this sense of spiritual communality without simultaneous participation, whereas area studies essentially belongs to the outsiders.

In the earliest phase of the development of area studies, it was portended that both North America and Western Europe would eventually be included in the list of areas for area studies (see Robert B. Hall et al. 1947). In its subsequent history, however, that prediction was never realized; neither Western Europe nor North America became areas around which the disciplinary fields of area studies were established. Interestingly enough, nominally European though its designation suggests, Eastern Europe was listed as an area, and we have seen the development of East European or Slavic studies as an area studies. What prevented Western Europe and North America from being postulated as areas are the power dynamics we refer to as “the discourse of ‘the West and the Rest’” (Hall 1996: 189). What is at stake for area specialists in determining whether or not a certain region and the people within it are designated as an area is the question of *positionality*. To thematically postulate a region and its people as an area is to non-thematically postulate the position of area specialists as the West. In other words, area specialists could not discard their desire to fashion themselves so as to occupy the position of “the Westerners” and so continued to identify themselves in the *schematism of cofiguration* (see Sakai 1997). At the end of the day, it will be revealed that what constitutes area studies is precisely the identity politics of the West.

Consequently, the following implications can be deduced from the fact that a certain population and the geographic region it inhabits are postulated as an area whereas a certain kind of humanity and their residential regions are never called “areas.” The first condition proceeds thus: two dimensions of the disciplinary identity are available for area studies, on the one hand, in terms of a particular aspect of the cosmology of the world, and, on the other hand, in terms of the provincial name of the place and its population. Thanks to this arrangement, area studies is formed as an *interdisciplinary* discourse. An area specialist may well be a sociologist or literary historian

according to the first dimension of classification, but he or she can be a specialist of South Asia, for instance, according to the second. From the outset, therefore, area studies was conceived of as an interdisciplinary formation precisely because of this doubled or two-tiered constitution of the discipline.

The second condition dictates that since such a postulation of an area is possible due to the working of the discourse of the West and the Rest, an area thus determined must be located on the side of the Rest, as an other to the West. Precisely because the knower and the known must be *separated* from one another and *located* in the West and the Rest respectively, North America and Western Europe could never be included in the list of areas. This is to say that the separation thus instituted is of a civilizational sort, between one civilization and another, and of an anthropological difference, between one type of humanity and another (see Solomon 2014). This explains why, in American academia, those in area studies quite often demonstrate intense antipathy and resistance to the potential merger of area studies with ethnic studies. Many of the area specialists specializing in East Asia, for example, do not hesitate to publicly announce their refusal to work together with specialists of Asian American Studies; they often insist on geographic distance, a gap in the degree of modernization, or civilizational difference that separates areas of East Asia from the North American continent.

When it comes to the question of their own positionality, area specialists not infrequently invoke—or tacitly assume—exoticist formulations such as “the East and the West never meet” or “East Asian heritage remains entirely heteronomous to American or European experience,” and so on. Do they want to say that the vast distance of the Pacific Ocean keeps the West separate from the East forever, whereas the equally vast distance of the Atlantic Ocean holds the West together on both shores of the Northern Atlantic? It goes without saying that what lies behind all these inconsistencies is the identity politics of the West.

Despite a constant appeal to various tropes of distance and separation, however, it is absolutely crucial to keep in mind that, in the final analysis, neither the West nor the Rest is a geographic entity; nor is it a substance that is cartographically identifiable. Therefore, it is not surprising that African Americans, for instance, are scarcely recognized as “Western-

ers” even though, for generations, they have received the same education—even within a segregated system—spoken the same language—even though clearly marked by dialogical difference—and believed in the same religion—even though they scarcely shared the same church space—with their family lineages going back much further in North American history than those of many white people. Supposedly North America is located in the West, but it suddenly gets disqualified as a geographic part of the West when the topic is African Americans, who undoubtedly have lived for many generations in the United States, a space recognized—largely since World War II—as part of the West or even as the center of the West.

Obviously the West and the Rest are always provisional markers depending on many contingent circumstances—involving a wide range of variables such as social class, race, cultural capital, religious affiliation, industrial wealth, and so forth—and the very dichotomy of the West and the Rest does not make any coherent sense unless we take into account the microphysics of the power relation operating in specific locales in which the West and the Rest are indicators of certain positionalities. Neither the West nor the Rest is, as a matter of fact, a geographic category, yet people act as if these civilizational identities were geographically determinable by ascribing them to points on the map of the world. It is in this posturing toward cartographic presentation in which places are determined as locations that the civilizational identities become geopolitically effectual. For this precise reason, we require—theoretically and politically—*the dislocation of the West (and the Rest)*. It is also for this reason that we cannot conflate an area with a territory, or area studies with national disciplines.

The dichotomy of the West and the Rest serves to distribute positionalities or different strategic positions among which certain conducts are routinized. The positionality of the knower, who fashions him- or herself as a Westerner, is constituted in a particular situation of interaction with the known. Even though the positionality of the knower is fantasized as separate and distanced from the positionality of the indigenous, it is performatively actualized simultaneously with the postulation of the known. The knower is identified as such only when the opposite positionality, the known, is postulated. Even though the exercise of control is somewhat imagined to be remote and indirect, the operation of the discourse of the West and the Rest serves to effectuate

ate the simultaneous actualization of the colonial configuration of strategic positions. However remote and indirect the known may appear in the gaze of the knower, the microphysics of the power relation works in the very institutionalized interaction of the knower and the known.

This is one of the reasons why we find the defining feature of area studies in its governmentality, in its will to know how to govern the population of an area. Yet knowledge production in area studies is not exclusively organized with a view to repress the initiatives of the indigenous or prevent them from having their identity. We do not simply believe that area studies must be denounced because it is repressive. What must be emphasized is rather the *productivity* of area studies, thanks to which the known are given their identities, encouraged to occupy the positionalities ascribed to the Rest—Asia, Africa, Oceania, or the Americas. It is precisely in this context that the question of area must be understood in conjunction with that of biopower. To govern the population is not merely to impose the knower's purposes on the known, force the known to act as the knower wishes, or oppress the will and aspiration of the known. On the contrary, what is at issue is the governmentality of the area—let us note that it is not the governmentality *over* the area—and this governmentality is actualized in the very postulation of the area; it can be discerned in the reaction of the known, in their resistance to the knower's gaze, in their endeavor to produce knowledge in their national disciplines in reaction to knowledge produced in area studies. The population of the area is objectified by the knower in area studies, postulated as a unified target of description, measurement, and assessment, and envisaged as a self-transforming agent whose collective behavior it is the task of area studies to decipher, interpret, and predict. Nevertheless, the governmentality of the area cannot be exhausted in the catalog of obligations that area specialists are expected to fulfill, for it is not a one-way operation exercised by the knower on the known. More importantly, area studies can affect and mobilize the population of an area through the production of knowledge about this population itself. In short, the governmentality *of* the area that can be discerned in area studies is *productive* rather than *repressive*, from the viewpoint of the known or the indigenous.

Elsewhere we have discussed the Orientalist mode of knowledge production in area studies and how it serves as a subjective technology by which the

knower, not the known, constitutes him- or herself as a subject (see Sakai 1997: 24–25).⁴ It is widely acknowledged that, as Edward Said amply demonstrated in his epoch-making publication *Orientalism* (1978), the Orient is postulated and generalized as an object of knowledge in the discourse of Orientalism and that, in this discourse, the Orient is expected to fulfill a number of requirements: its subordination to the Occident in terms of civilization and scientific rationality (the Orient is less civilized and incapable of expressing itself rationally); the Orient lacks rationality and therefore is mute, as far as its self-expression in rational language is concerned, so that it requires the Occident to speak on its behalf; its passive positioning vis-à-vis the gaze of the Occident (the Orient is exotic/mysterious and “feminine” for its passivity); a belated status in evolutionary teleology (for the reason of which the Orient is always bound to follow the Occident in progress); and so on. Undoubtedly these requirements, which the Orient is supposed to fulfill in its identification as the Orient, *are inverted forms of desire for the identity of the Occident*. Unless the Orient is postulated as such, the Occident cannot identify itself. In this respect, Orientalism is a subjective technology for the Occident; Orientalism is, in fact, Occidentalism turned on its head. In our critique of Orientalism in the past, therefore, the focus has been predominantly on the identity politics of the Occident. In this issue of *positions: asia critique* on the question of area and area studies, however, we are less concerned with the identification with the West on the part of the knower, those engaged in the production of knowledge in area studies. What we want to undertake is to examine how the known, not the knower, are also affected in Orientalism, how they react to and resist the imposed image of area by area studies, and how they voluntarily consolidate themselves as the population and thereby get incarcerated in the discourse of the West and the Rest. In short, in the rest of this introduction we want to pursue the way in which the known are implicated in the working of power as a result of the putative separation of the West and the Rest, how the indigenous form themselves as an integrated population in the gaze of the knower, and how the identity politics of the indigenous is complicit with the power of area studies’ will to knowledge. Of course, we are talking about what we have referred to elsewhere as *civilizational transference*.

The International World and the Schema of Civilizational Difference

Let us make no mistake. Our belonging to a place is neither merely factual nor existent on a descriptive basis; it has never been natural in the sense of a place just being there for us to belong to without our intervention and production. In belonging to a place, the place is constituted as a location in the very act of belonging. In other words, our location in a place is always of our own making-doing, of our *poiesis*.

Some readers might call into question the use of the genitive pronoun “our” here, its appropriateness and conceptual underpinnings in the context of a discussion of area. Can such an “our” or “us” be easily posited in the systematic distribution of positions characteristic of the apparatus of area that we have been investigating? Without delving deeply into this question, in which the problem of area would also be linked to the concept of the *common*, the genitive can be replaced by “one’s” for the moment. Thus we say here: “one’s belonging” instead of “our belonging.”

One belongs to a house, a town, a province, a country, and an area. All these places one might belong to are supposedly on the surface of the earth, existing as marked segments of land with locations determined in a configuration with other land markers and land posts. It is most likely that all of these places of belonging can be identified in terms of circumscribed territories on globally extended maps, whose scale may vary from the size of a land register—in the case of a house—to the size of a terrestrial globe—in the case of a country or an area (in the sense of area studies). Let us not forget that these places must be, above all else, on maps in order for them to be registered as locations determined in the system of coordinates. They are neither reflections nor reproductions of these shapes and relations that are found in themselves in nature; their determination cannot be subsumed under the principle of *tracing*, the goal of which is to describe the de facto state. Only through an act of *mapping* rather than *tracing* can these places emerge determined as locations on certain kinds of maps—let us not forget there are many different kinds of maps; in other words, there are many different ways to establish one’s relationship with a place.⁵ An area does not escape this general rule of territorialization, and it is in the formation of an area that the very mechanism of territorialization is visible. So, to

inquire into the formation of an area is to pay attention to the act of mapping through which a place of belonging in general comes into being, on the one hand, and the process of bordering by which a place is circumscribed and reintegrated into the order of the binary logic of global territorialization, on the other.

This is precisely where we see the significance of the concept of *nomos* and the importance of Carl Schmitt's inquiry into the appropriation and expropriation of the territorial surface of the earth for our study of area and area studies.⁶ As Schmitt (2006) outlined in his *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europæum*, the general rules of territorialization in the system of international law are the rules of what is understood as the *international world* in the last four centuries or so.

The international world is a name for the schema—image, figure, or plan—of a global geopolitics whose projection is determined by two constituent principles. Above all else, it is important to keep in mind that the international world is in the order of image and figure, but this by no means implies that this image or figure of the world is merely descriptive; rather it is prescriptive in the sense that it projects and institutes things according to predetermined directives. Together with the system of international law, the image of the international world has served as an assemblage of commands, norms, and standards, that is, as a regime. Hence, we do not argue that the international world came into being in the seventeenth century; instead we propose that the geopolitics of the world began to be transformed toward the ideal of the world projected by the schema of the international world that prevailed at the time. By the twentieth century, however, the international world was virtually everywhere on the territorial surface of the earth because a sovereign state that was not legitimated by international law could scarcely be viable by then.

The system of sovereign nation-states was first developed with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) during the initial period of the imperial-colonial era when the world was divided into two realms, one governed by international law and the other subject to the discretion of colonial powers. The first realm was then called *Europe*, which came into being as an *international* space. As the system of international law expanded to cover the entire globe,

Europe was also called *the West* while the second realm was equated to *the Rest* of the world.

The first of the two constituent principles is the spatial externality of one state sovereignty to another. It is important to note that the new modality of sovereignty, which initially appeared in the imperial-colonial era (sixteenth to nineteenth century), did not concern the national space; the national space was structured by the markers of distinctions such as class and rank rather than those of nation and ethnicity, but state sovereignty concerned first and foremost the international space of a global system. What first emerged in Europe in accordance with the *Jus Publicum Europaeum* (Eurocentric Public Law) was the modern state formation characterized as territorial state sovereignty. It is only in the eighteenth century that a few exceptional state sovereignties—namely the newly independent United States of America and the Republic of France—acquired a new form of legitimacy called “the nation,” and thereby justified themselves in terms of the specific form of the territorial national state sovereignty. Today the overwhelming majority of existent states legitimate themselves according to the model of sovereignty of the territorial national state, but the most crucial transformation brought about by the institutionalization of international law was the state’s relationship to other states, namely, the *international* relation. In this precise sense of an international space, the modern state became dominant.

By definition, the international space for international law was one of commensurability, a space in which different states were compared and mutually recognized. Only when states are juxtaposed and compared to one another in the space of commensurability is the state’s relationship to other states regulated and streamlined by the system of international law. Therefore, the first characteristic of the international world that we want to draw attention to is a space in which comparison is possible, the space of commensurability in which all the units of sovereignty are “countable” and “comparable”; the internationality of the international world is thus built on a comparative operation by which one state’s sovereignty is recognized by other sovereignties, and one state’s territory is marked and distinguished from the territories of other states. In this sense, it is not only that all units of sovereignty exist in a relation of countability between each other; the international world is a

regime in which the territorial national state and its particular form of sovereignty also comes to be internally measured, insofar as it “counts for one.”

From the spatial externality of one state sovereignty to another it follows that this space of commensurability is supposed to be regulated by a binary logic by which an inside is unambiguously distinguished from an outside. The binary logic is an organizational principle for *tracing* rather than for *mapping*.⁷ But was the generative rule for the international world nothing but the operation of mapping? What is suggested here is that the very formation of the international world through mapping is repressed and deliberately overlooked in the international world because it is this mapping that discloses its historicity and repudiates its fantasy of eternity. It is as if the divisions and segmentations of the international world were simply reflective of a naturally given regime, as if the order of internationality were merely descriptive. Area studies have legitimated themselves on this presumption or pretension of descriptive factuality or positivistic nonreflectivity. Our investigation of area and area studies will focus on this deliberate oversight, which has allowed an area to be misrecognized as a territory, and because of which an area has served as a mediation for anthropological difference and civilizational transference.

A space of commensurability is necessary for the supposed integrity of territorial state sovereignty, because the unit of counting cannot be constituted unless its inside is clearly marked from its outside. The internal cohesion of state sovereignty is brought about by a sort of *enclosure*—a classical Marxian term associated with what is generally called “primitive accumulation”—an operation of circumscribing a territory in an international space. What must be emphasized here is that an enclosure also was and is a comparative operation, and there must be a space of commensurability for comparison to be possible (see Walker 2011).

The interior of the sovereign territory is thus distinguished from its exterior, and the site of distinction is instituted as the national border (see Sakai 1991). Perhaps for the first time in history, the presumption was authorized that the juridical authority of the sovereign is to cover the entirety of an enclosed territory constituting a homogeneous space, and also that one place must be subjected exclusively to one state sovereignty. The system of international law does not tolerate any appropriation of a place to multiple states.

Prior to the introduction of the international world, there used to be many places belonging to multiple state sovereignties, but these ambiguous places were eliminated one by one. The best example of this can be found in the case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands that are disputed between the People's Republic of China and Japan. Taking the concept of national territory for granted, both sides claim that this group of small islands in the East China Sea must have belonged exclusively to one state sovereignty or another. Neither of them can afford to acknowledge the historical truism that just over one and a half centuries ago there hardly existed any consensus shared by the Qing Dynasty and the Tokugawa Shogunate about these islands belonging exclusively to one state sovereignty. The concept of national territory itself did not exist then. Clearly Okinawa or the Ryukyu Kingdom, which offered tribute to both the Qing Empire and the feudal domain of Satsuma, was another case. Many other similar cases in Western Europe and Southeast Asia are known.

It is not difficult to see a similarity between the integrity of national territory and the unity of a language. As we have elsewhere theoretically demonstrated in relation to this historical change, this is why the introduction of the international world carries an affinity with the transformation of the regime of translation (Sakai 1991). Besides territory, the question of language is indispensable for an understanding of internationality. Is language a unity that is "countable" and that can be juxtaposed with other unities of language? Here, we face the exact same question concerning the space of commensurability. The crucial point is the process of *bordering* in which a space of commensurability is constituted where one unity is compared to another. Of course, this process is generally called "translation" when the topic is language,⁸ but what is of decisive importance is that there are some regimes of translation in which language is not necessarily constituted as a unity, in which one national or ethnic language is not distinguished from another national or ethnic language and thereby the nationality or ethnicity of a language remains ambiguous or indeterminate.

The second of the two constituent principles is the very reason why the system of international law was called the *Jus Publicum Europæum* from the outset. The international space in which the juxtaposition of territorial state sovereignties was possible was marked as *Europe* or *the West*—as

opposed to the *Rest* of the world.⁹ Historically, until the twentieth century, the international space of commensurability did not immediately cover the entire territorial surface of the earth. On the contrary, it could be marked as such—initially as Europe and later as the West—only in contrast to excessive spaces in which the order of internationality was not valid. Yet the international space of commensurability assumed and anticipated the presence of these excessive spaces, and only based on the assumption of the anticipated subjugation of excessive spaces to the sovereign state of the international space of commensurability did it constitute itself as Europe.¹⁰ This particular modality of Europe's presence in relation to the rest of the world was later called *Eurocentricity*, and, as we know, Europe's dependence on the presence of the excessive spaces—the Rest—has been conceptualized as “modern colonialism” or the colonialism of the international world.

Consequently, we must discern two moments in the Eurocentricity of the *Jus Publicum Europæum*. First, the binary of Europe and the rest of the world is supposedly of geographic positionality, of geopolitical location projected onto the map of the globe. These two kinds of locations, Europe and the Rest, are assumed to be in the geographic order and are accordingly independent of each other. But they are not merely geographic locations. They are mutually determined. It is absolutely imperative not to overlook the mutual implication of Europe and the Rest. Second, therefore, Europe and the rest of the world are cofigured, implicated in each other, so that Europe cannot be identified as such without reference to the rest of the world. It goes without saying that, as the term *rest* clearly indicates, the rest of the world presumes and constitutes itself after the presence of Europe. It is in this sense of mutual implication and mutual constitution that Europe (the West) and the Rest are projected through the schematism of cofiguration. In other words, it is what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987: 424–73) called “capture” on a global scale.¹¹

By referring to “capture,” we are trying to underline that neither the West nor the Rest (of the world) can be talked about without reference to one another. This binary serves to project both identities—of Europe, or the West, and the Rest—by integrating a variety of social relations and locations into the global order of modernity by differentiating and contrasting them. In continually inserting a difference of civilizations—colonial difference

or anthropological difference—this regime integrates and structures the world. Not only by distinguishing Europe from the rest of the world but also by integrating them and projecting the potential appropriation of Europe in the Rest, this regime serves to structure the entire world around Eurocentricity. From this regime of configuration follow the accompanying notions of the West-as-a-normative-value and of modernity-as-an-unfinished-project. By explicitly calling into question the binary of the West and the Rest, therefore, we are advocating neither the rise and decline of the West nor its universalization or provincialization; nor does our perspective amount to the disowning of heritage from the past such as the rejection of putatively “Western knowledge” for the sake of local tradition. It would be very obvious that the West cannot be referred to even in the trope of an organic unity that grows or languishes. What is at stake in our inquiry into area and area studies is to dislodge both the West and the Rest from the identity politics of civilizational transference and from the logic of anthropological difference.

The modern era might be characterized as the time of the *Jus Publicum Europæum* in which this structure of Eurocentricity has been implemented, to the extent that it has been taken for granted not only in Europe but also all over the world. Since the aftermath of the Second World War, however, it is increasingly difficult to justify the Eurocentric posture of the international world. Let us not forget that, paradoxically, the internal decay of the Eurocentric system of international law was brought about by the very success of this system itself. In order to reject colonial domination, many peoples and regions began to adopt the basic premises of territorial national state sovereignty. Anticolonial independence movements, almost without exception, aspired to achieve the form of nation-states as their objectives. But through the extension of the *comity*—the formal legal reciprocity—of nations across the face of the globe, the supplement of exteriority known as *civilizational difference* has reached a point of saturation, which is also a point of crisis. Civilizational difference indicated, in its implementation in colonial governmentality, the economy of spatialized lawlessness that defined the West by separating its competitive rule of law from the Rest that was available for lawless, infinite violence. Although this lawless violence is still exercised by the United States and a few Western European countries such as Britain

and France, it is increasingly difficult to justify this use of colonial violence in many parts of the world.

The use of drones in such areas as Afghanistan best symbolizes the economy of spatialized lawlessness that used to separate the West from the rest of the world. Afghanistan is a reserved area of the Rest available for precisely this sort of extralegal violence without end. Unambiguously it shows that the *Pax Americana* marks not an end of colonialism but an extension of the schema of the international world, the continuation of which requires the maintenance of an economy of spatialized lawlessness. But this new “cramped space” in which the extension of the international world’s spatial schematic currently operates also involves (as always) the politics of knowledge.

In 2006, retired Major General Robert H. Scales wrote a text called “Clausewitz and World War IV” in the American *Armed Forces Journal*. This text, openly advocating a new orientation of military capabilities away from the direct stockpiling of munitions and toward a form of stockpiling of cultural knowledge, ends on the following note:

We are in for decades of psycho-social warfare. We must begin now to harness the potential of the social sciences in a manner not dissimilar to the Manhattan Project or the Apollo Project. Perhaps we will need to assemble an A team and build social science institutions similar to Los Alamos or the Kennedy Space Center. Such a transformational change is beyond the resources of a single service, particularly the ground services.

Thus a human and biological revolution will have to be managed and driven by the highest authorities in the nation. (Scales 2006)

This “harnessing” of the social sciences reached its zenith in the form of the US military’s program known as the Human Terrain System (HTS), a program devoted to the development of “a social science based research and analysis capability to support operationally relevant decision-making, to develop a knowledge base, and to enable sociocultural understanding across the operational environment” (quoted in Patterson 2016; see also Bartholf 2011). HTS expresses the new stage, the new modality of the operation of area studies, which has transitioned from an entirely practical, logistical orientation to a new ideational, strategic formation. By harnessing into one

productive space the reproduction of imperialism and the production of knowledge on the basis of area as a gradient of investment, HTS expresses in its formation the current stage of our politics of knowledge. In this sense, HTS—although it has now been discontinued as a project—exemplified precisely the transition from the traditional “strong” area studies, in which specialists would produce knowledge entirely within the university, and this knowledge would then circulate into policy circles, to a new mode in which the internal division between knowledge and application has been short-circuited. Today, the military and state no longer need to *indirectly* intrude into the production of knowledge by actively intervening in the university itself, because, instead, these instances of the hegemonic social relations now employ knowledge workers *directly* in the maintenance of imperialism. Just as the media was “embedded” with the Americans, so too now “area specialists” are literally members of the military. This situation, in which the old formation of area studies has been both superseded and perfected, requires us to think clearly about what possibilities and limits lie within the logic of “area” itself on which such knowledge is produced. HTS and its correlates beautifully illustrate how the superstate reterritorializes the schematic of the world, the cartography of civilizational difference in a new improvised way. It is not the case that the deterritorialization of capital has created an “untethered” world without borders—everything that is deterritorialized is also reterritorialized. Rather, the ongoing reterritorialization of the world schema of civilization is multiplying its instances of border drawing; it is an improvisational flow, the superstate’s overtone of mapping.

While this appears to be a scenario in which the multiplication of enclosures and confinements produces a dense and inescapable space, it is the very multiplication of these bordering instances that thereby produces a multiplicity of open and living productions of subjectivity. In thereby increasing our encounters and suspensions with respect to the reproduction of the social field as a bordered one, we are also constantly encountering *the bordering function as such*, that is, we are increasingly exposed to the creative-formative dimension of the existing order’s ongoing maintenance. This does not mean that politics has returned to the stage, so to speak, but rather exactly the opposite: as Paul Virilio has long pointed out, “The globalization of liberalism is a deterrence of politics” (Virilio and Lotringer 2002: 59).

Broadly speaking, therefore, it is hard to identify cultural and political markers by which the West can be *unambiguously* distinguished from the Rest today. Elements associated with “Western modernity” can now be found in places that have conventionally been excluded from the West—often in forms that are more “authentic” than those found in the West itself. Is the life style of upper-middle-class residents of Seoul less “Western” than that of the poor whites of Appalachia or in the southern states of the United States by virtue of the fact that they live in the non-West? Is the social infrastructure found in Bulgaria better adjusted to the pursuits of modern rationality than that found in Shanghai by virtue of the fact that Bulgaria is supposed to be in “Europe”? At the moment when the global expansion of the two universal forms of capitalism—the commodity and the nation-state—is finally accomplished, historically for the first time such civilizational distinctions as the West vs. the East and Europe vs. Asia appear as what they essentially are: void of any specific content and thus absolutely ideological (see Walker 2012a). Therefore, no longer are there any grounds whatsoever to substantiate the distinction between the West and the Rest. Or, put another way, it is no longer possible to continue to disavow that the West is floating and dispersing (with the tides of domination); but it is equally important to note that the West is *not* declining. Hence, our inquiry must be characterized as the dislocation of the West.

The End of Area and the Biopolitics of Investment

Under such historical circumstances, how do we assess the future of area and area studies? What has happened to the notion of area and to the disciplines of area studies? Allow us to present some preliminary answers first: what we mean is precisely the end of *area*, but not necessarily the end of its disciplinary expression, *area studies*. Area studies has not ended, but it instead becomes increasingly tied to a schema of the world that no longer exists (see Walker 2019, this issue). What is in question for us is not “the end of area” as in the end of the importance of specific knowledge, linguistic study, or historically particular circumstances; the end of area means just the opposite, the end of the *schema* area, the end of the *regime* area, the end of this epistemic poietic device through which knowledge is “nationalized” and thereby

rendered “inherent” and “natural.” It is this ending—and inherently, therefore, a new and possible *beginning* of another knowledge, another politics, another history—that animates this issue of *positions: asia critique*.

Unlike the situation of the 1990s, in which we frequently heard that the expansion of world capitalism and its accompanying neoliberal political consensus would be the guarantor of a new and open future, today almost nobody bothers to make such claims except the most determined right-wing ideologists. We are living rather through a moment in which the supposed closure of history has reopened. It is no accident that Francis Fukuyama (2012), who once famously declared the “end of history,” has suddenly now referred to our time as “the future of history,” calling into question the once-cherished “permanency” of capitalism and the international world—the world as constructed from the plurality of nation-states that are geographically external to one another. After all, it is now fully clear that political integration, the integration of national capitals, and the development of superstate forms of political direction have resulted in no substantive resolutions of “the national question.” In other words, whereas we used to hear that globalization was merely the name for an ongoing resolution of conflict on the basis of the nation-state, today we are exposed to the precise inverse of this logic: instead, globalization discloses that it is the raising of the national question to a set of political techniques not only for the governing of the domestic situation but for world capitalism itself. That is, our era is not one in which the political technology called “area” has been superseded in favor of a more open, more global form of governance—rather, the political force of “area,” which was previously one important principle of the system of the international world, has now been raised to *the* principle of the supposedly “integrated” world, its highest logical operating point. In an important work, Federico Rahola points out that rather than the “age of access” predicted by Jeremy Rifkin and others who theorized a glorious eclipse of the industrial sequence of history in the 1990s, we are living through a historical present which might better be described as an “age of excess” (Rahola 2003: 34), not in the sense of overdevelopment or something excessive, but rather in the sense that the techniques and modalities of the political governance of capital are increasingly concerned with humanity’s excess over its previously established boundaries, orderings, and zones of territorialization, excess over

the classification sustained by the system of the international world in which the territorial unity of the state is posited external to those of other states. When Rahola refers to our moment as the “age of excess,” he is also pointing to the Rest, the remainders or remnants, the leftovers. As we have suggested above, the Rest is no longer geographically located outside the West. The Rest is everywhere and inside the West as well.

In other words, what matters increasingly for capital and the nation-state (and the volatile amalgamation between them) is not “access,” the opening and freeing of the previous limitations and borders. Rather, capital and the nation-state derive a dynamism of operation from the *excess* that is generated by the enclosure of new ideational spaces, new temporal sequences, new sites of subjectivation, and the erecting of borders where previously there were none. It is this set of techniques, this *cartography* of capital and the nation-state, that furnishes the ground of the continuity of “area” as a subjective technology. Area is a quintessentially modern form of the classification and ordering of the world, and it is inseparable from the advent of the modern state. Prior to the beginnings of the modern state forms of organization of territory and population, we cannot speak about the sense of “area” that we mean. “Area” as a form of classification is not something primal or originary, it does not precede the state—it is important to distinguish area as an epistemological-political technique from the common-sense or everyday understanding of area as simple and self-evident spatial unit of measurement that is bounded and gathered improvisationally in terms of certain given social circumstances. Rather, “area” is a primordial move to capture people and places into the order of the regime of configuration, a synthetic operation by which to unify a population and a geographic region by differentiating according to the logic of colonial difference. Thereby, we want to give a specific social and historical meaning to “area,” that is, “area” as it appears in the phrase “area studies.”

But what is this specific sense of area? We intend by this formulation to indicate the undercurrent or substratum of the territorial grounding of the population through techniques of unification and semiotic effects such as “culture,” “language,” “ethnicity,” and so forth that are demanded by the system of the international world. In this respect, area cannot be confused with the territory of the territorial national state sovereignty. For specific historical

reasons, China, Korea, and Japan are conventionally recognized as areas and national territories, but apparently such areas as Southeast Asia and Latin America cannot be registered in the order of the international law.

In this sense, we want to develop a discussion of “area” as an essential operation for the internal cohesion of the governing capacity of the state in parallel to the question of “population,” a form of the investment of state power within life, what can be called, after Foucault, *biopower*. Yet, it is important to stress the remote position of the state in relation to the population it aims to govern. Perhaps the trope of the drone captures the essence of an area as it operates in area studies. Presumably the population in an area is always *separated* from the original source of the government just as the site of violence is distanced from the position of the pilot who maneuvers the drone and triggers violence. Therefore, an area constitutes neither a “nation” as a particular form of population nor a “territory” as a location for the territorial state sovereignty. Instead, an area always belongs to somebody else’s “nation.” For the practitioners of area studies an area does not mark their own belonging to a community or to a place. One cannot overlook this constitutive moment of *separation* between an area and a nation, between an area and a territory, for the operation of biopower.

On the other hand, in the disciplines of the humanities since the outset of modern universities in the eighteenth century, which we might as well summarily call the knowledge system of national translation (see Sakai and Solomon 2006), these parallel operations of articulation of “territory” and “population” are required by the state in order to give to itself an image of community called “nation,” an image that folds back into itself in order to naturalize the modern form of belonging to the nation-state and create a heuristic measuring device for “normal” and “exceptional,” that is, “majoritarian” and “minoritarian,” positionalities within it. But this arrangement of internationality essentially dictated by the first constituent rule mentioned above, an arrangement of configuration of one nationality external to other nationalities, cannot be extended to explain the features of an area. An area is a typical manifestation of the second constituent rule in which the focal point is not the identification of population as a nation but rather a differential integration of populations into the order of colonial difference.

Positions and identifications such as “the West” or “Asia” are not, in

essence, concrete entities; rather they are increasingly independent of geography and based in forms of “cultural capital” or certain relations of positionalities that are “performatively presented.” These supposedly regional identifications are a series of effects derived from the ways in which people invest in the acquisition of such qualifications. But the problem is, why do these temporary identificatory zones or grids of locatable identification always need to be retrospectively territorialized? Why does the logic of the specificity and explanatory power of “area” continuously renew itself? Why are the bordering effects of the modern forms of the internationality (increasingly identified with the “global police” function) reinforced precisely at the moment when the border itself becomes historically exceeded? What connections and lines of inquiry can be drawn between the bordering effects on the level of epistemology and the policing of the border so essential to the operation of contemporary biopower? This global biopower—an increase of disciplinary power that overflows the frontiers of the living—is a method of governing the foreign population and of controlling the biopolitical elements of human activity at a distance. This biopower grounds itself in the mechanism of area as a means to order, combine, separate, and classify life at a distance.

We know today that the form of area studies is increasingly irrelevant to the contemporary social reality we are living through, that it relies on an image of the world that is increasingly outdated; yet we nevertheless have to acknowledge the lasting power of “area” as a form of investment in knowledge production. Area has never been a substance but rather an intermediary zone of grounding between “*anthropos* (as against *humanitas*)” and “territoriality.”¹² What sustains the practice of area studies is the imaginary relationship among projected positionalities in terms of which the identities of the observer and the observed are figured out. In other words, area is a technology according to which elements—which may or may not have been thoroughly heterogeneous to each other—are gathered and redeployed as a point of reference for a variety of social—racial, class, religious, gender, and so forth—distinctions. More generally, however, area is the logic by which biopower is articulated to the geopolitical ordering mechanisms according to which the world image serves as a framework of cognition in the lived world.

This is why, for instance, we cannot escape the logic of area merely by identifying its fictive character—it is precisely *because of* its fictive nature that “area” has been a lasting force in the operation of identification. Area in this sense is the grounding movement itself, the most recent stage in the deployment of the society of control theorized by Foucault: it is a “state of government that is no longer essentially defined by its territoriality, by the surface occupied, but by a mass: the mass of the population, with its volume, its density, and, for sure, the territory on which it is deployed, but which is, in a way, only one of its components” (Foucault 2004: 113; 2007: 110; translation modified). In general, he identifies the transition in mechanisms of discipline to those of control in their origin from “pastoral power”—this shift can be understood too as a shift toward the management of something wholly different: the population.

Population is a name for a sequence of strategic deployments that are concatenated through a process of articulation between state territoriality, the socioeconomic attempt to fix the role and supply of labor, and the process of the formation of national language as regulative regime. Marx, for instance, locates this total operation of articulation within what the tradition of English political economy referred to as the process of *primitive accumulation*, an entire field of problematics intimately related to the formation and maintenance of the territorial state. We should not underestimate Marx’s location of the origins of capitalism in the process of primitive accumulation’s establishment of racial hierarchy—Foucault emphasizes exactly this same point in the development and deployment of biopower, that is, he repeatedly shows how racism became inscribed as the basic mechanism of power in the form of the modern state system and internationality. In fact, the form of national sovereignty itself can scarcely function without becoming involved in and complicit with racism (see Walker 2012b: 122–147; Walker 2016, esp. chap. 1).

Today, many of the most incisive critiques of contemporary biopower and its accompanying geopolitics tend to misread or ignore the theoretical problem of how our current moment requires us to consider not only the persistent inequalities of the world order but also *how* this order or civilizational difference was itself formed, as well as *how* and *why* it is maintained and managed. Too often, responses to contemporary *globalization* refuse the

logic of imperial nationalism in the name of another state project (whether European, pan-Asian, etc.) and end up reproducing the rhetoric of civilizational or anthropological difference—but we argue that only through a properly biopolitical response to contemporary biopower can we create new forms of encounter, new engagements in sociality that do not rely on the process of identification constantly renewed by the logic of area. Precisely because old civilizational differentiations are totally devoid of empirical bases are urges to reconstitute the West and the Rest all the more intense. At the historical juncture where the future of area studies is most uncertain, the history of area studies in North American and European universities must be revisited from this perspective. Moreover, the formation of national disciplines—national literature, national history, and so forth—in Asian universities must be reviewed also from this perspective. We are concerned with the initial formation of area studies in the United States, but we are overlooking neither its precedent histories—how US area studies was reconstituted out of the European studies of colonies and geopolitics and Japanese colonial scholarship—nor its consequent histories—how nativist knowledge was formed in reaction to the area studies about the local tradition. We want to inquire into not only why area studies was able to actualize US imperialist policies but also how it laid the cornerstones for the nationalisms that are complicit under the Pax Americana.

In other words, it is not enough to identify and criticize the “tendency” aspect of area studies: many knowledge workers are today aware that area studies is tendentially becoming irrelevant in the world, superseded by the emergence of new relations and forms of relation in the nexus of socially available knowledge, density, and concentration of technical factors and the emerging superstate level of sociality. As we frequently hear, the expansion of global capital and its concomitant supporting forms of social relation have superseded many of the old boundaries, dislocating the identification of wealth and territoriality that characterized the moments of the imperialist stage and its immediate aftermath. The logic continuously put forward within the terms of globalization tend to assume that this process, the inevitable expansion of markets, transformation of former comprador positions into “indigenous” capitalists, mutation of national boundary solidity, and creation process of a new supranational financial class, has fundamentally

destroyed the former “Eurocentrism.” But we should not be too quick to assume that the order of the world has fallen away, has given birth to something entirely new. As we can see today, the discourse of the “clash of civilizations,” the substantialization of the “civilizational difference,” is in fact being strongly reinforced. When we understand this “Eurocentrism” in a dynamic way, that is, not in relation to some mythic fantasy of physiological substantiality or as something located in a specific territorial configuration but rather as a *gradient of investment*, we can understand that the logic of hierarchy in the formation of bordering effects, boundaries, classifications, and so forth around specific nodules of intensity has by no means been replaced by a fluid world—rather, capital and the system of nation-states are in a process of transformation and reorganization, formulating and deploying new mechanisms of the same ideational flows that form these identificatory gradients themselves. Thus, as we have emphasized continually, this “tendential” aspect of dislocation by no means indicates that area studies has ceased to be a problem, that it is “inevitably” or “necessarily” withering away. Rather, it simply demonstrates that area studies is increasingly sundered and separated from the historical tendencies and social composition of forces that produced it in the first place. As a result, it is simultaneously *increasingly* a question of investment.

It is not that “area studies” is dead or that it must be rejected or endorsed. The very concept of “area” has ended—it has atrophied and changed its function: what can area studies do when its object, area, has detached itself from the realm of geopolitics and entered also into the realm of biopolitics? How can area studies possibly turn into a critical and transformative knowledge production when it is no longer possible to legitimate itself in terms of area? Thinking through this question from the standpoint of the constitution, maintenance, and reproduction of this intense zone of effects called “area,” and attempting to negotiate its logic on the level of theory and history, can be one clue as to how we might remap ourselves and our relations, how we might sketch new “cartographies of desire” for ourselves and for the possibilities of our lives beyond the limits of area: to begin such a project is the goal of this issue of *positions: asia critique*.

Notes

We owe many thanks to Felix J. Fuchs for his editorial assistance.

- 1 For a discussion on the concept of the regime of separation, please refer to Sakai 2009, 2012.
- 2 It is well known that Benedict Anderson described the formation of the nation-state by referring to a specific form of imagined community sustained by what Walter Benjamin called “homogenous, empty time” (Benjamin [1968] 1973: 265; quoted in Anderson 1983: 24). It is noteworthy in this context that synchrony must be clearly distinguished from simultaneity since what Fabian discussed in terms of coevalness is a modality of simultaneity, while essentially synchrony is *not* about time. As Peter Osborne (1995: 27–28) has argued, synchrony is atemporal and irrelevant to time. It is not a temporal category.
- 3 In Johannes Fabian’s analysis of the erasure of coevalness, this point is left unspecified. Anthropological discourse introduces two temporalities, but the temporality of *Western* anthropologists does not necessarily guarantee that the anthropologists and their readers of the West share a homogeneous time, even though they are manifestly *separated* from the natives of a non-Western location.
- 4 In contrast to the conventional comprehension of technology by which the subject manipulates and transforms the object for a predetermined objective, subjective technology implies a different conception of technology whereby the subject transforms, reconstitutes, and manufactures itself.
- 5 For the difference of mapping and tracing, see Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 1–25.
- 6 In this respect, we follow the perspective of Naoki Sakai and Jon Solomon (2006: 1–35) that directed their introduction to *Translation, Biopolitics, Colonial Difference* in which Carl Schmitt’s (2006) discussion of the system of international law in *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum* played one of the guiding roles.
- 7 What is suggested here is that, in the international world, its very formation through mapping is repressed and deliberately overlooked. It is as if the divisions and segmentations of the international world were simply reflective of the naturally given, as if the order of internationality were merely descriptive.
- 8 In their discussion of the formation of the state in primitive societies, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987: 432) state, “The appearance of a central power is thus a function of a *threshold or degree* beyond which what so anticipated takes on consistency or fails to, and what is conjured away ceases to be so and arrives.” It is precisely in this regard that the integrity of state sovereignty and the unity of a language are comparable to one another. “Speech communities and languages, independent of writing, do not define closed groups of people who understand one another but primarily determine relations between groups who do not understand one another: if there is language, it is fundamentally between those who do not speak the same tongue. Language is made for that, for translation, not for communication” (430).

- 9 The conflation of Europe and the West belongs to recent history. Until the end of the nineteenth century in Western Europe the term *the West* was rarely used to connote Europe. Not only do these two geopolitical designations have many and varying denotations, they also have a wide range of variations in connotation in different languages. The terms that might be rendered as *Euro-America* and *Western Europe* are often used as synonyms for *the West* such as in the languages of Northeastern Asia. However, particularly since the Second World War, the conflation of Europe and the West has been institutionalized in discussions on cultures, civilizations, ethnicities, and races, in short, on issues pertaining to anthropological difference in general.
- 10 International law actually defined the procedures of land appropriation—a seizure of land whereby to give what Schmitt calls “nomos” land-based order and orientation—through which a space outside the international space was subjugated to the sovereignty of a state within the international space (see Schmitt 2003; esp. chap. 5 and part 2, “The Land-Appropriation of a New World,” 80–138).
- 11 For an extensive development of this concept of “capture” in relation to the schema of the West and the Rest, see Walker 2018.
- 12 For a brief explanation about *humanitas* and *anthropos*, see Chakrabarty 1993; also see Nishitani 1998: 287–88; Sakai and Nishitani 1999: 20–22, 1038; Sakai 2000: 71–94.

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