

The conspiracy collapsed only with the death of Santos. Cabo and Francisco Inca intended to restore the Inca empire, but they were soon defeated and executed. Farfán and his followers resisted the new taxes by means of lampoons and protests, although unfounded rumors spread that they wanted to crown a king in Cuzco. Secret meetings were held and a conspiracy was planned, which was revealed to the authorities, but the leaders were put to death before it really materialized.

The disturbances in Arequipa in the same year, 1780, are treated briefly, as is the revolution of Tomás Catari in Chayanta (1780). The same may be said of the rebellion of José Gabriel Túpac Amaru in Tinta, but the author has reserved this subject for another volume. After the Inca's death, the revolution under Diego Cristóbal Túpac Amaru, Tupac Catari, and Andrés Mendigure is treated very incompletely, yet there is an abundance of material on this phase of it. The book is a contribution to the history of Peru and attempts to make known to the public an exceedingly interesting phase of eighteenth-century development.

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*Descubrimiento y conquista de Chile.* By FRANCISCO ESTEVE BARBA. [Historia de America y de los pueblos americanos, Tomo XI.] (Barcelona-Buenos Aires: Salvat Editores, S. A., 1946. Pp. xi, 532. Plates and illustrations.)

Spain's conquistadors were an interesting lot. The adventure, versatility, hardships, courage, and persistence of that handful of Spaniards, traversing two continents almost at will, over apparently insuperable obstacles, never fail to arouse wonder and admiration in the student of history. Dr. Esteve Barba's book deals with the conquest in Chile and he has aptly summed it up in one phrase: "On the one hand, difficulties of every sort imposed by the circumstances of the penetration; on the other, in order to surmount them, a tenacity almost superhuman and, in the end, victorious."

The book would be eminently worthwhile even if the author had confined himself to the exploits of the three men—Diego de Almagro, Pedro de Valdivia, and Don García Hurtado de Mendoza—who explored and finally conquered Chile. But he has gone far beyond that and presents a skillful analysis of the unusual factors present in the Chilean conquest, giving an excellent description of the geography and natives of the country. His picturesque and vigorous style adds spice to his observations.

In the first place, Esteve Barba points out the unusual geographical obstacles in the way of the Chilean conquest. That forbidding country, "long and narrow like the scabbard of a sword," could only be reached through Andean passes and over thirsty deserts or by the unruly Pacific constantly whipped by the cold, Patagonian winds blowing up the coast. Since ships in Peru were small, costly, and scarce, the conquest was primarily conducted by land, though supported and supplied by such vessels as could be had. The result was a series of hardships of cold, hunger, and thirst which would have defeated men with less confidence in their "manifest destiny."

A second obstacle lay in the fact that the natives of Chile had never achieved political unity—nor had it thrust upon them—and there was, therefore, no key political figure whom the Spaniards could seize and make their puppet. Cortés had Moctezuma; Pizarro, Atahualpa; but the conquerors of Chile had one hostile chieftain after another opposing them, forcing them to piecemeal conquest. Long after the tribes north of Santiago were serving in *encomienda*, the Araucanians to the south were virtually untrammelled. Valdivia lost his life trying to subdue them. Don García Hurtado de Mendoza brought them to the point where Esteve Barba can write: "At the end of the government of Don García Hurtado de Mendoza one is able to say that the conquest is complete. The Indians will again rebel a hundred and one times, even as the phoenix rises from its own ashes . . . Nevertheless, the foundation of Chile has been so well cemented . . . that there will be no misfortune capable of ultimately preventing its mounting growth."

The Chilean conquest was further hampered by Chile being tied, politically, to Peruvian apron strings. Valdivia, the real founder of the state, went to Chile as the lieutenant of Francisco Pizarro. The great distance between Peru and Chile, the barriers to transportation and communication, the premature report of Pizarro's death (brought by the natives) apparently leaving Chile without official government made autonomy imperative. The Cabildo of Santiago tried to meet the situation by electing Valdivia governor—a measure that would surely have been regarded by Pizarro as rank insubordination but for the civil war in Peru and Pizarro's subsequent death. Only after Valdivia had returned to Peru and had helped Pedro de la Gasca reestablish order there, was Chile officially recognized as a separate government.

A fourth difficulty lay in the frequent and persistent dissensions among the Spaniards themselves. On the eve of Valdivia's departure from Peru, Pedro Sancho de Hoz appeared, claiming to carry from Emperor Charles V a royal *cedula* giving him permission to colonize Chile. Pizarro, fearful of making a false step in choosing between them,

persuaded the men to form a partnership. Valdivia took the men he had and went on. Hoz was to join him en route with certain supplies. Unable to obtain the supplies, Hoz nonetheless joined Valdivia at the entrance to the Atacama desert with the evident intention of murdering him and taking command of the expedition. Though the attempt at murder was circumvented by the resourceful Inés de Suárez—the Spanish woman who accompanied Valdivia—nevertheless, from that moment, there were two factions in camp. Constant intrigue, unpleasant incidents, and even open disobedience were the order of the expedition until the execution of Hoz by Villagrán during Valdivia's absence.

Another distinct contribution of Dr. Barba's work is the excellent bibliographical information contained in the introduction. The author cites, compares, and evaluates his sources in a scholarly manner which provides a real guide to students who wish to read further. There are also a bibliography and footnotes at the end of each chapter. The detailed table of contents and the topical arrangement of material, though suggestive of a textbook, make the volume readily usable as a reference book.

I would not wish to conclude without mention of the format. It has been a long time since a work so mechanically perfect has come to my hand. The paper, the printing, and, above all, the excellent illustrations make the book a pleasure to read.

I heartily recommend, then, with both pleasure and conscience, the reading of Esteve Barba's book to all who would understand better those courageous men who moved forward with the cry of "Cristo y Santiago!" on their lips.

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*Las ideas políticas en Argentina.* By JOSÉ LUIS ROMERO. [Colección Tierra Firme, 25.] (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1946. Pp. 236. Paper.)

Anyone who knows modern Argentina has noted the apparent contradictions in its national life. On the one hand is a personal individualism which verges on lawlessness: on the other, an authoritarian concept of government which finds the state meddling in the minutest details of daily life. To the North American, it is hard to comprehend that those elements which are least liberal should represent the aspirations of popular democracy, as we understand it; while those who have been political liberals, who created Argentina's fine free press and respect for individual liberties, have been the bitter-end enemies of democracy.

José Luis Romero's lucid history of political ideas in Argentina does