

is included, probably for the good reason that little if anything exists in this sector. Most of us, however, would have welcomed a bibliography of the historical and sociological sources which the author has distilled with such skill.

Angel Rojas can speak of the Ecuadorian novel with professional authority, since he himself is one of the most substantial of the contemporary generation of novelists in his country. Unfortunately he has not yet gained as much international fame as his confrères, Jorge Icaza and Enrique Gil Gilbert. Rojas' latest novel, a well-knit account of rural life, *El éxodo de Yangana*, was published in Argentina last year.

As one who has lived in Ecuador, I am especially amazed by two aspects of this study: (1) It is difficult to conceive how anyone can make such solidly good sense, in terms of social development, from the monotonous and complicated maze of revolutions and counter-revolutions which has characterized Ecuador's political history. And yet Rojas has done it very convincingly, insisting that a pattern of ideology runs through the chaos. (2) Although it is apparent that Rojas is a leftist liberal in his own political thinking, he has done a remarkably objective job as he deals with the turbulent conflicts of Ecuadorian political and social history.

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Joaquín de la Pezuela virrey del Perú: 1816-1821: Memoria de gobierno. Edición y prólogo de VICENTE RODRÍGUEZ CASADO y GUILLERMO LOHMANN VILLENA. [Publicaciones de la Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla, XXVI (N.º general), Serie 3.ª: Memorias, relaciones y viajes, N.º 3.] (Sevilla: Talleres Tipográficos de Editorial Católica Española, S. A., 1947. Pp. xlvii, 912. Illustrations.)

There were twenty bulls, five in the morning and fifteen in the afternoon, in the *corridos* with which Lima welcomed its new viceroy, the most excellent Señor Don Joaquín de la Pezuela. His promotion from general-in-chief of the Army of Upper Peru had been merited by three great victories over the insurgents who were trying to wrest their independence from the king. After winning renown in the French revolutionary war, he had been sent to Peru to reorganize the artillery. From Lima he had ascended to the *altiplano* and to glory by order of Viceroy José Fernando de Abascal who, ill and

disgruntled, gave his successor neither information nor counsel on how to conduct the highest office in Spanish America.

Pezuela's first duty was to set the finances of the viceroyalty in order, for an annual deficit of 600,000 pesos was accumulating. Military expenditures were growing ever more burdensome; the Plata River provinces had not been pacified, and it was well known that José de San Martín was preparing for an invasion of Chile. More than four and a half million pesos of gold and silver were turned out by the Lima mint that year; the problem was how to turn some of them into channels which would preserve the royal dominions. The viceroy later looked back with pride on his record of extracting from a reluctant populace between the years of 1816 and 1821 graduated salary taxes and loans with which to carry on the government and maintain a growing, though inadequate, army and navy without using force.

It was a thankless task. Lacking funds to carry on the war in 1820, Pezuela complained that not even the king could recompense a viceroy who for four years had been compelled to put up with ill-bred, niggardly, and scarcely loyal subjects; he alleged that reams of paper could be filled with examples of the apathy and indifference of the Lima inhabitants. The cause of Spain in subduing its rebellious colonies grew steadily worse. Direction of the military policy was gradually taken over by the Junta Directiva de la Guerra, in which the viceroy had but one vote. Reverses in Chile were disastrous, and when Lord Thomas Cochrane, though outnumbered three to one, took the port of Valdivia, Pezuela considered it disgraceful. The refusal of the king to accept Pezuela's resignation was of little significance since a small group of military men headed by Marshal José de la Serna conspired to oust the viceroy and did so on January 29, 1821. At that moment San Martín was knocking at the gates of Lima, and Pezuela retired rather than permit loyal officers to restore his rule through the shedding of blood.

The three *cuadernos* included in this book add many pertinent details to a picture that is well known. The influence of sea power is shown to be paramount. Pezuela realized that when the Chilean navy gained control of the Pacific coast the fate of Peru was at stake. He looked in vain for a squadron from the Peninsula which never came to break the blockade. Bitter were his denunciations of the vessels of neutral nations which rendered assistance to the insurgents. A number of foreigners in Callao were killed or wounded when the swift sailing frigate *Esmeralda* was captured by the Chileans while anchored within the chains of the harbor. It was alleged that help

in the capture was given by an English and an American warship.

The aid which the viceregal government received from the United States is well portrayed. More than thirty American-registered vessels are listed as visiting or doing business in Callao. Several were permitted to engage in the coastwise trade. Through the incoming ships useful military information was secured by the viceroy, and the captains of two vessels actually served as his spies. Spanish Minister Luis de Onís in Washington forwarded three shipments of some eleven thousand muskets and considerable other war supplies such as pistols, sabres, bayonets, and powder.

In the appendix is Pezuela's own account of his meeting with San Martín on the United States warship *Constellation* in the port of Callao. The deposed viceroy had taken passage on the American *Brun*, which had run the blockade, but he was forced to find refuge on the *Constellation*. San Martín came aboard to see an entertainment that the sailors were staging, and Pezuela was chagrined at having to be courteous to a man whom he did not trust. The former would not grant the latter's request for the *Brun's* safe departure but pledged his word of honor that as soon as Lima was in his possession the erstwhile viceroy could go wherever he chose. Without the Spanish officials, the *Brun* was permitted to sail, and it picked Pezuela up at a little place south of Callao and took him to Rio.

The valuable prologue places the book in its proper setting. It evaluates the work of Pezuela and compares him with Abascal and La Serna. The topographical and onomastic indices are carefully prepared. A reading of this *diario* will give those who are prejudiced in behalf of South American independence a more sympathetic understanding of Spain's effort to conserve its empire.

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Juegos y alegrías coloniales en Chile. By EUGENIO PEREIRA SALAS. (Santiago de Chile, Empresa Editora Zig-Zag, S. A. 1947. Pp. 341. Illustrations. Cloth.)

A widely accepted myth, emanating from the long-standing *leyenda negra* of Spanish despotism in the New World, is the alleged rigidity and monotony dominating the social and community life of the crown's overseas subjects. In the popular imagination there still persists an impression that an ascetic gravity and a brooding sense of dread inspired by a sinister Inquisition and a frowning officialdom overhung colonial existence in Spanish America, and that only a small viceregal