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Understanding the Conventional Arms Trade*

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Abstract. The global conventional arms trade is worth tens of billions of dollars every year and is engaged in by every country in the world. Yet, it is often difficult to control the legal trade in conventional arms and there is a thriving illicit market, willing to arm unscrupulous regimes and nefarious non-state actors. This chapter examines the international conventional arms trade, the range of tools that have been used to control it, and challenges to these international regimes.

INTRODUCTION

In March 2015, Saudi Arabia and coalition partners intervened militarily in Yemen in an effort to restore the Hadi government. Now in its third year, the ongoing campaign is largely characterized by air strikes and attacks against Houthi rebels. The campaign has been heavily criticized for repeated strikes against civilian targets – destroying schools, factories, markets, and hospitals, among other targets. Saudi Arabia’s campaign is supported by arms sales from major global exporters, including the United States and the United Kingdom and has prompted a growing debate about the risks of providing more conventional weapons to an ongoing conflict amid civilian harm and an increasingly dire humanitarian crisis.

While arms sales to Saudi Arabia have repeatedly generated international headlines, conventional arms deals and their relevance to larger strategic and international security issues are often ignored. However, conventional weapons are responsible for significant challenges to the global order, causing hundreds of thousands of deaths a year, facilitating the continuation of deadly conflicts, and contributing to instability and insecurity worldwide. The global conventional arms trade is a multi-billion-dollar business that affects every country in the world in some way.

Every country is involved in some aspect of the international arms trade. Although the risks and consequences of the conventional arms trade impact countries in a variety of devastating ways, they are often essential components of national–security apparatuses, and thus their control is often challenging. Because conventional arms have legitimate military, police, and civilian uses, their outright ban is not an option. Governments must therefore be creative in trying to regulate and control the proliferation and use of conventional arms.

This chapter examines the international conventional arms trade and the range of tools that are used to control it. Conventional arms range from guns to sophisticated fighter aircraft and naval ships, in other words, the conventional weapons of war.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRADE

There are five aspects of the conventional arms trade that help explain the challenges of regulating global conventional arms transfers.

First, conventional arms are profitable. Conventional arms transfer agreements worldwide amounted nearly \$80 billion in 2015, according to the most recent Congressional Research Service Report.¹ This total only accounts for

* Parts of this chapter appear in my book, *The International Arms Trade*, co-authored with Suzette Grillot (Polity Press, 2009) with the permission of the publisher.

the legal trade in arms. There is a thriving black market trade in arms, as well as a robust grey market. The global trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) is an important sub-category of conventional weapons – weapons which, from a control perspective in particular, are dealt with separately from their heavier counterparts. Small arms and light weapons are those that can be carried by one or two people, mounted on a vehicle, or carried by a pack animal. The majority of fighting in the post-Cold War world has been conducted with small arms. According to the Small Arms Survey (SAS), a Geneva-based NGO that monitors global flows of SALW, nearly 875 million small arms are in circulation around the world.² Small arms can be purchased in legal markets from an increasing number of suppliers. More than 1,200 companies in over 90 countries produce 8 million new SALW annually.³ While the small arms trade is nowhere near the value of the heavy conventional weapons trade, its value is estimated to be \$7.1 billion annually. There is also more than \$1 billion in illicit small arms sales annually. In short, the global conventional arms trade, including small arms and light weapons, can impact national and global economies.

Second, the supply and demand for conventional weapons, both legal and illegal, ebbs and flows as international crises emerge and/or are resolved. Significant shifts in the conventional arms trade are marked by major world events, such as World Wars I and II, the Cold War, the 1991 Gulf War, and the post 9/11 War on Terror. Moreover, national and international political and economic issues more generally affect the international trade in arms and numerous factors influence weapons supply and demand.

Third, in many cases, short-term priorities outweigh long-term interests in arms transfer decisions, and national security considerations supersede human security concerns. The resulting unrestrained trade of conventional weapons leads to significant consequences. From deaths and injuries, to the undermining of human security, the uncontrolled conventional arms trade has put peacekeepers in danger, diminished national and multinational business opportunities, impeded the ability of humanitarian and relief organizations to conduct their efforts, hampered sustainable development, and overall negatively affected global peace and security.

Fourth, the control of and trade in conventional weapons are more complicated than that for other weapons systems. Unlike weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms do not primarily serve a deterrence function, but are tools that can be legitimately used by governments, militaries, police forces, and civilians. Indeed, Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations recognizes the inherent right of all States to individual or collective self-defense and thus the right to manufacture, import, export, transfer, and retain conventional arms toward that end. Thus, regulating and controlling the trade in conventional arms poses additional challenges for States and the international community.

Fifth and finally, conventional arms controls are underdeveloped and face significant challenges. One of the most immediate challenges is that some of the primary exporters have not supported nor participated in proposed and existing controls.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL OF THE PAST

While existing control mechanisms for regulating the conventional arms trade are relatively new (that is, within the last 25 years), informal controls on the arms trade date back centuries and formal controls were first considered in the 1890s in the context of regulating the slave trade. Yet the Cold War brought renewed interest in pursuing meaningful conventional arms controls.

One of the first international organizations to focus strictly on trade control issues emerged in 1949 when NATO members (with the exception of Iceland) and Japan created the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) to control the sale of strategic goods to Communist bloc countries.⁴ After the Cold War ended, COCOM was replaced by the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies – the only multilateral organization that today focuses on conventional weapons and critical dual-use items.⁵

Most significant were the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks of 1977 and 1978 between the United States and Soviet Union. Although the talks failed, they led to progress in controlling conventional arms in the 1980s.

In 1980, UN Member States adopted the UN Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (also known as the Inhumane Weapons Convention or CCW). The Convention currently has five annexed protocols. The goal of the CCW is to ban or restrict the use of those weapons that cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or affect civilians indiscriminately – in and outside of situations of international armed conflict. There are protocols on non-detectable fragments, the use of mines, booby traps and other devices, and the use of incendiary weapons, the use of blinding laser weapons, and responsibilities surrounding the clearance, removal, or destruction of explosive remnants of war.

One of the most significant conventional arms control treaties of the 20th century emerged near the end of the Cold War. The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty) was signed in November 1990 by 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The agreement was meant to bring parity, enhance transparency, and increase stability regarding conventional forces in Europe. Covering the area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, the CFE Treaty outlined limits for five categories of conventional weapons systems, including armored combat vehicles, battle tanks, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, and large artillery. The limits were set at 30,000 armored vehicles, 20,000 tanks, 20,000 pieces of artillery, 6,800 aircraft, and 2,000 helicopters. Limits were set for each individual country within the Treaty area, and no one state could possess more than 1/3 of the total limit in each category. All weaponry in excess of these limits were to be destroyed within 40 months of the Treaty entering into force, and a rigorous verification and inspection regime was established to oversee the process. Not all of the weapons that exceed Treaty limits, however, have been removed and destroyed. Disagreements between state parties have emerged and former Soviet weapons in Moldova and Georgia, for example, remain today. Moreover, due to Russian concerns about the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system and the placement of U.S. military bases in Central and Eastern Europe, the Russian Duma voted unanimously in November 2007 to suspend the country's implementation of the CFE Treaty, leaving the future of this ground-breaking conventional arms treaty in question.⁶

21ST CENTURY CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

In the 21st Century, governments have attempted many different types of conventional arms trade controls, with varying levels of success. First are controls relating to transparency. With transparency regimes, the belief is that greater understanding at a global level of which country is selling what weapon system to whom (and even for what purpose) can help increase security of the international arms trade. When governments and experts have such knowledge, they can take steps to secure their arms transfers and verify the conditions of transfers. For example, such procedures can contribute to better weapons tracking and facilitate identification of potential circumvention of controls already in place. Transparency also provides important assurances that weapons are being used as intended and, in turn, enhances accountability for individual arms transfers.

Second are controls related to the export of conventional weapons. At a national level, governments establish procedures that identify the rules about which recipients can acquire which weapons systems and through what processes. Such controls have the added benefit of assisting industry in ascertaining the requirements for specific arms transfers and can create accountability for governments to follow specific procedures when making arms transfer decisions.

Third are outright limits and/or bans of conventional arms. In some cases, certain categories of conventional weapons – such as landmines and cluster munitions – have been banned. In other cases, governments develop appropriate limits for arms transfers that can prevent abusive end-users from obtaining weapons technologies or relevant parts and components. Putting clear limits on state provision of conventional arms makes clear what behaviors and uses will not be tolerated and contributes to the development of global norms related to the arms trade.

Fourth are confidence- and security- building regimes. Such arrangements often encourage end-users to provide limits for acquiring certain weapons or a certain number of a given weapons systems in order to facilitate greater confidence in a region or with the international community.

Fifth are punitive measures that are put in place to address violations of conventional arms agreements or national obligations. In order to deal with violations of any national, regional, or international standards, States employ punitive measures for irresponsible or illegal arms transfers. However, without clear enforcement and civil, criminal, and administrative punishments, violators will continue to act with impunity.

Sixth are regimes focused on humanitarian concerns, including the protection of civilians. As policy makers try to address the direct, indirect, and consequential impact of the weapons trade, the focus has turned to “humanitarian arms control” to address enduring weapons threats to civilians. The human security framework has focused on lessening the impact of particular weapons systems on the lives and livelihoods of civilians.

Since the end of the Cold War, governments and civil society organizations have realized that there is no one solution to regulating the global conventional arms trade. Instead, several approaches to controlling conventional arms proliferation and misuse need to be undertaken simultaneously. National governments, local communities, regional organizations, and international organizations all have a role to play. National, regional, and global actors can develop and implement their efforts in a coordinated fashion.

NATIONAL ARMS CONTROL

National arms control efforts are ultimately the first line of defense in preventing the unchecked spread of conventional arms. But, despite the need for common practices to harmonize national laws and regulations, national controls have been implemented haphazardly. Some States have robust arms control systems and fully comply with internationally accepted standards, while others lack even basic control measures. There are several elements that make up a national control system, ranging from specific arms trade legislation to customs authorities and border controls.

Elements of a National Arms Control System

- **Arms Trade Legislation:** Legal instruments, in the form of laws or decrees, serve to provide government authorities the legal basis to register and license weapons producers, brokers, traders, transporters, and owners – as well as to authorize individual weapons transaction.
- **Licensing Procedures:** Licensing procedures work to control the export, import, re-export, transit, and transshipment of weapons into, out of, and through national territory, including brokering activities.
- **Export Criteria and Control Lists:** Arms control lists detail those weapons and weapons systems that are subject to licensing procedures and must be authorized by government authorities. Lists of controlled goods also include lists of proscribed destinations, such as those subject to an arms embargo. Export criteria based on international norms and standards help to determine whether a weapons transfer should be authorized. End-user criteria such as respect for human rights, involvement in armed conflict, involvement in terrorist activities, and level of democratic development are often considered when making licensing decisions.
- **Interagency Coordination:** Multiple parties within government work together to manage weapons licensing activities and jointly consider and approve arms transfers. Open communication and coordination among relevant agencies allow for an effective licensing process.
- **Customs Authority and Border Controls:** Border control agents and customs officers work to provide security at points of entry and exit, as well as to inspect and verify weapons moving into, out of, and through national territory. These officials need to be granted the authority to investigate arms activities and enforce breaches of the law.
- **Verification Documentation:** Arms transfers are verified with the use of standardized documentation. Import certificates, end-use and end-user statements, and post-delivery checks can all be required and their authenticity verified in order to confirm and validate the legality of weapons transactions.
- **Penalties and Enforcement:** Appropriate civil and criminal penalties can prevent illicit weapons activities and punish illegal actions. Appropriate authorities must enforce the law, investigate violations, arrest and prosecute offenders, and ultimately punish those found guilty of illicit arms transfers.
- **Transparency and Oversight:** Information regarding arms production, possession, trade and control is shared and reported domestically and internationally. Transparency in the arms trade allows for greater oversight in order to prevent destabilizing and dangerous weapons transfers.
- **Marking and Tracing:** Weapons producers stamp their wares with identifying marks in order to allow for the tracing of weapons that have been diverted and misused.
- **Stockpile Management:** Weapons storage facilities are secured and effectively managed to prevent loss and theft.
- **Collection and Destruction:** Unnecessary surplus weapons are collected from among the public (particularly after conflict has ended and reconstruction begins) as well as from official stockpiles and destroyed in order to prevent additional build-ups, loss, and theft.
- **Regional and International Cooperation:** Because the international arms trade is a trans-national issue, countries are engaged in regional and international cooperative activities regarding weapons transfers and controls. Collective, consistent, comprehensive, and compatible arms trade controls require multilateral engagement, guidance, and governance.

REGIONAL CONTROL EFFORTS

Regional organizations also provide a forum for conventional arms control, particularly because it is often easier for States with similar experiences to reach consensus and address region-specific issues. Several regions of the world that have been affected by armed conflict in the post-Cold War era – from the Americas to Europe to West Africa – have developed regional agreements and local mechanisms for addressing the arms trade. Moreover, these regional agreements have often served as models for state arms control behavior worldwide, as well as for arms trade discussions in global forums, such as the United Nations. The Organization of American States set a global example in 1997 when it adopted the first legally binding regional agreement on illicit firearms trafficking. The European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports is one of the most often cited arms control documents outlining standards of appropriate arms trade behavior, and the EU's Common position on the Control of Arms Brokering helps ensure compliance with UN, EU, and OSCE arms embargoes. West African States, which have been significantly affected by the spread, accumulation, and misuse of small arms and light weapons, established the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition, and Other Related Materials, which is intended to control and prevent the accumulation of small arms, promote trust and the exchange of information among member states, and to build the capacities of ECOWAS and its member states to control the spread of small arms.

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL EFFORTS

Globally, several measures have been undertaken to control conventional arms. The Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions both ban the use of specific conventional systems and were negotiated by like-minded governments.

For non-ban conventional arms controls, the United Nations has been the primary international governmental organization that has actively implemented international arms trade controls. In 1991, in the wake of the Gulf War, for example, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (United States, Britain, France, China and Russia) established guidelines for conventional arms transfers, including advance notification of arms sales, considerations of human rights consequences, and concerns for destabilizing arms build-ups. These guidelines, however, were never fully implemented because China opposed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and refused to abide by the guidelines until such sales ceased.⁷ Future discussions about the role and purpose of arms transfer guidelines continued, however, with the UN Disarmament Commission reiterating the importance of restraint in its 1996 report.⁸ Perhaps the most significant conventional arms control development of the 1990s was the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms in December of 1991, a global voluntary transparency mechanism where States annually report on their arms exports and imports.

On small arms, the UN adopted the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (known as the Firearms Protocol) in 2001. The Firearms Protocol supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and is the first international legally binding small arms control agreement. Ratifying States commit to adopting certain crime control measures and implementing domestic legislation to 1) make the illegal manufacturing or trafficking of firearms a criminal offence; 2) establish a governmental arms licensing system; and 3) create a system for marking and tracing firearms.⁹

The United Nations also adopted the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in 2001. The PoA establishes a voluntary process for Member States to take action on small arms at the national, regional, and global levels. UN Member States have pledged to enact at the national level small arms control measures such as export licensing procedures, brokering controls, and stockpile security practices; promised to create regional networks to share information and promote arms trafficking controls; and at the international level pledged to work with the UN to enforce embargoes, circulate data, and encourage international laws governing the arms trade.

Most notably, the first globally binding treaty on conventional arms is the Arms Trade Treaty, or the ATT. The ATT was adopted in 2013 and aims to regulate the cross-border trade in conventional arms, ranging from fighter aircraft and warships to small arms and light weapons. The treaty establishes common international standards for the trade in conventional arms that States must incorporate into their national control systems, and provides for oversight of the global arms trade by enhancing transparency and facilitating accountability, where States are responsible for ensuring their arms sales meet global standards and norms. For the first time in history, there is an outright ban on arms shipments that would be used to commit the horrors of genocide, war crimes, and attacks on

civilians. The ATT prevents irresponsible arms trading by stigmatizing arms transfers to war criminals; requires exporters to seriously take human rights into account before selling arms to dealers and countries; mandates signatories to close down safe havens exploited by rogue arms dealers to transfer arms to war criminals with impunity; and requires States to be transparent in their arms trade decisions.

There are also two significant multilateral conventional arms control regimes. The first is the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA), which was created in the early 1990s as a successor to COCOM. The Wassenaar Arrangement is the first and only multilateral organization that focuses on both conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.¹⁰ The organization seeks to prevent the accumulation of arms by promoting greater transparency and responsibility in the trade of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. While participating States have final say over their arms transfers, they have pledged to create national legislation to not allow arms transfers that would create international instability or insecurity. Forty-one States make up the Wassenaar Arrangement, including most major global arms exporters with the notable exceptions of Belarus, China, Israel, and South Africa.¹¹ Wassenaar's objective is to prevent countries or regions from amassing large stockpiles of weaponry and sensitive materials, or what Wassenaar members describe as "destabilizing accumulations." There are no specific countries that Wassenaar members are prohibited from selling arms and dual-use equipment to. Yet members are expected to work together to stop weapons stockpiling by countries or regions judged to be of "serious concern" because of their behavior or activities.

The Wassenaar munitions list comprises conventional weapons, such as tanks and fighter aircraft, as well as military explosives, toxicological agents, biocatalysts, and other specialized military equipment. It covers exports that are almost exclusively designed for war fighting purposes. Dual-use goods and technologies appear on a separate list, which is divided into two tiers of "basic" and "sensitive" with a subset of "very sensitive." Software, computers, machine tools, and radar technologies are the types of items that appear on the dual-use goods and technologies list.

The second multilateral conventional arms control regime is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It is presently the only multilateral effort dealing with missile nonproliferation, but has conventional application. It is not a treaty, but a suppliers' regime founded by the G-7 States in 1987. The MTCR is a politically binding, voluntary association of states sharing common interests in the nonproliferation of missiles, unmanned air vehicles, and related technologies. MTCR members undertake not to sell certain technologies to non-member states.

The MTCR focuses on ballistic and cruise missiles capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload to a range of 300 kilometers, the parameters required for a missile to deliver a nuclear weapon. While nuclear-capable delivery systems were the initial target of the regime, the MTCR members extended the guidelines to cover delivery systems involving all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in January 1993. This means that certain unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, are covered by the MTCR.

The MTCR consists of a Guidelines List and an Equipment and Technology Annex. Missiles and their delivery systems fall into one of two categories, with differing levels of protection regarding sales. Category I items include ballistic and cruise missiles and space launch vehicles. Even amongst MTCR-member states themselves, the export of Category I items is subject to "strong presumption of denial." Category II items include missile-related components; these can be exported with the approval of the individual MTCR-member government who is acting as supplier. Sales are at the discretion of the exporting members, who have agreed to restrict transfers for "acceptable end uses," provided end-use guarantees can be secured from the recipient state, or, in some cases, under government-to-government assurances.

Currently, the MTCR has 34 member states, which meet for discussions at least once per year.¹² Partners have equal standing, and all MTCR decisions are taken by consensus. Some non-member states such as Israel, Romania and Slovakia have agreed to abide by MTCR Guidelines. China pledged in November 1991 to adhere to the MTCR's original Guidelines, but later refused to adhere to the updated Guidelines implemented in January 1993. Consequently, many countries, such as the United States, do not consider China an adherent to the regime. At the 13th plenary meeting in October 1998, the MTCR members repeated their invitation to China to join, which China declined.

ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS

The regimes and instruments discussed in this chapter are for governments to implement. And, although States remain the primary actors involved in arms control activities, other stakeholders have become increasingly important in the control and regulation of conventional arms. Numerous nongovernmental organizations working individually and collectively have managed to inform the public and pressure governments to develop more responsible weapons

practices, such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Cluster Munitions Coalition, and Control Arms. NGOs play a role in encouraging states to adopt more rigorous arms transfer controls, raising awareness about irresponsible arms trade activities, and facilitating the development of international standards and agreements that limit state arms trade behavior. Industry has also become a key player in the international effort to regulate conventional arms. They play varying roles depending on the weapon systems relevant to the international agreement.

CHALLENGES TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROLS

Despite the many international, national, and NGO activities that have been undertaken regarding conventional arms control in recent years, numerous challenges and obstacles remain in enhancing arms control measures. The first challenge is the legitimacy of the weapons. Conventional weapons, unlike weapons of mass destruction, serve many purposes. They provide for the national defense and support policing activities – and small arms are regularly and legitimately used for sport and hunting activities. It is undesirable and unlikely to ban the majority of conventional weapons. The challenge, then, is to limit and constrain the trade in conventional weaponry to prevent destabilizing build-ups and misuse.

Because conventional arms serve legitimate purposes, a second challenge arises due to the role of arms producers and exporters. Many countries produce weapons, but the role of the major weapons producers and exporters cannot be understated. The United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France hold the lion's share of the global arms market – with the United States leading the way. Hesitance on their part to enhance conventional arms trade controls has a significant impact on the will and capability of the entire international community to engage in stricter arms trade practices.

A third challenge to the development of stronger arms trade controls goes beyond great power and major supplier concerns. Existing ideas and norms of state sovereignty, national self-defense, self-determination, and territorial integrity have an impact on political will more generally in the international community. Many recent international agreements on weapons control have, in fact, reiterated the norms of sovereignty, national self-defense, self-determination, and territorial integrity, which are grounded in the UN Charter itself.¹³ Moreover, Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome, which established the basis for the European Community and today's European Union, specifies that national governments have exclusive control over national arms industries, arms sales, and arms control decisions, providing additional hindrance to state interests in multilateral arms trade controls in Europe.¹⁴

Ultimately, the fourth and perhaps the primary challenge facing arms control today is the sheer complexity of the issue. The conventional arms trade is comprised of weapons both big and small and characterized by a multitude of issues such as supply and demand. Many factors affect demand and sources of supply to provide the arms that states, non-state actors, and individuals seek. It has become increasingly difficult to control the flow of weapons in a growing global economy, and even more difficult to reach all relevant arms trade actors and limit or constrain their behavior. Today, cross-border mergers and acquisitions spread weapons technology and governments become less able to control arms-producing corporations. Weapons are increasingly assembled in more than one country, making it hard to control the end product. Moreover, developing countries have improved their own weapons industries, lessening their reliance on traditional trading partners if avenues to arms are closed. In addition, a growing illicit trade significantly hampers the development and implementation of arms control measures. Furthermore, the economic benefits of arms sales are increasingly considered more important than the possible political consequences.

Despite the many challenges, there are also many prospects for the future of international arms trade controls. The past several years have indicated that increased attention and activity has focused on better regulating the international arms trade. Ideally, a more cooperative environment will emerge and states, NGOs, and relevant arms trade actors will work together to find common ground and agree to certain limitations on the arms trade that will meet everyone's needs in forums that are not necessarily based on consensus rule. The international community may also continue to use economic tools such as development assistance and trade, investment, and technology transfers as enticements when negotiating arms controls in the developing world, and individual governments can also use persuasion, through political dialogue, to help enact arms controls in a bilateral agreement.¹⁵ Moreover, other international, regional, and national measures regarding the protection of human rights, reform of security sectors, enhancement of the rule of law, and good governance will also have an impact on the international arms trade as safer and more secure environments emerge.¹⁶

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10. R. Smith and B. Udis, "New Challenges to Arms Export Control," in Paul Levine and Ron Smith, *Arms Trade, Security and Conflict*, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 94-110.
11. Wassenaar's 41 members are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.
12. The 33 current members of the MTCR are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.
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