

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

GENERAL

Ensaio de história e crítica. By A. G. DE ARAÚJO JORGE. [Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Instituto Rio-Branco, Serviço de Publicações.] (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1948. Pp. 235.)

Short studies, reprinted from the *Jornal do Commercio* and the *Revista Americana*, by the Brazilian diplomat who is general editor of the Itamarati's new edition of the works of the Barão do Rio-Branco. Chapters on the cycle of discoveries; the diplomatic history of French Brazil and Dutch Brazil; Alexandre de Gusmão as a diplomat; the recognition of the Republic; Argentina and the Malvinas; *À margem da história* of Euclides da Cunha; and Ferrero's conception of history.

A. M.

Histoire de l'Amérique Latine. By PIERRE CHAUNU. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949. Pp. 126. Paper.)

This little volume is Number 361 in the popular French series, *Que sais-je?* As a work of this genre it has much to commend it to the general reader, but little to the serious student. It is readable, and, on the whole, accurate, within the demands imposed by simplification for the popular reader.

Numerous examples of compact, succinct summary of important historical movements within brief compass might be cited. The best, in the reviewer's judgment, is the discussion (pp. 39-55) of Spanish and Portuguese colonial institutions, life and economy. But the author falls into the common fallacy of confusing the precious metals and money with capital. On the other hand, the treatment of national political developments since independence (pp. 91-105) is so brief and sketchy as to give little real impression of the national history of twenty nations.

The statement (p. 21) that the success of the Spaniards in the conquest of America was the result, not of superior technology, but of superior men and *virtu* has an unpleasant sound, even though it appears subsequently that what the author means to point out is the importance of the spirit of individual enterprise among Spanish conquerors. In the comparison of the Spanish and English conquests the familiar, inaccurate clichés appear. The nature of the chapter devoted to Yankee expansion (pp. 117-124) is well indicated by the chapter title: *Le troisième larron: l'Oncle Sam*. Nor does one find the brilliant historical synthesis which has so often characterized this type of writing by French

scholars. Rather, the author seems to have leaned heavily upon the work of scholars of the United States for the more solid sections of his work.

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The Army Air Forces in World War II. Volume One, Plans and Early Operations January 1939 to August 1942. Prepared under the editorship of WESLEY FRANK CRAVEN, JAMES LEA CATE by OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. xxxi, 788. Maps, Illustrations. \$5.00.)

The projected work here begun, to be published in seven volumes, is conceived as "the story of our national effort exerted through the Army air arm." Altogether, this experiment in coöperative historical research and writing under semi-official supervision has commenced quite successfully. The ten authors combining to write this first volume were chosen for their competence in historical scholarship and close association with the Historical Office of the Air Force during World War II. A declaration is made in the foreword that responsibility for accuracy and completeness belongs to the editors and the authors, not to the Army Air Force or its Historical Office; however, this sort of work cannot be considered completely independent because of the intimate relationship which nonetheless exists between those responsible for the book and its subject. A definite advantage in this history is the editors' access to important source material: files of the Air Force offices, Air Force unit histories, captured enemy documents, interviews with staff personnel, and records of enemy interrogation. Other materials such as diaries, published documents, and the newspaper and periodical press have been utilized also.

Hemisphere defense is a problem which receives much scattered reference but meets with no satisfactory analysis as a political concept or in military strategy. Lack of arms limited practical defense nearly to the continental boundaries of the United States until after 1939. If the term means anything, hemisphere defense was not achieved until after it was outmoded both politically and technically. Even before 1941, United States grand strategy was directing the flow of arms to Europe as a better means of defense than building a hemispheric fortress and, militarily, hemisphere defense meant a "defense in depth" of the South American continent. Until after 1941 the defense of the western approaches to the hemisphere was limited only to planning for the Alaska-Hawaii-Panama triangle. Enemy attacks in 1941 and 1942 were made before hemisphere defense had gone much beyond the plan-