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HISTORY OF JAPANESE MIGRATION TO PERU, PART I*

TORAJI IRIE, translated by WILLIAM HIMEL

The translation that follows is taken from a *History of Japanese Overseas* by Toraji Irie, a two volume work on the history of Japanese migration throughout the world since the Meiji Restoration of 1868.¹ Much of the book deals with the western hemisphere. Chapters XIV and XV of Volume I and Chapters V, XIII and XVII of Volume II, pertaining to Peru, are presented in translation below.

The author, Mr. Irie, worked as a journalist for a number of years. At the time of publishing this study, he was engaged in research for the Japanese Foreign Office but, according to the title page of the book, was "not on the regular staff." At present he is employed in the same Ministry, Bureau of Control, Section of Overseas Japanese. He writes from a Japanese point of view, but with reasonable objectivity. His view is, of course, different from that of the immigrants who, like other transplanted peoples, have gradually become oriented away from the country of origin and toward the country of adoption.

Much of what has been written about Japanese migration and settlement in Peru—and in the rest of the Western Hemisphere—shows the influence of ethnic stereotyping, national and international politics and journalistic sensationalism² and may have stimulated certain wartime

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¹Toraji Irie, *Hojin Kaigai Hattenshi* (Tokyo: Iida Shoten, 1942, 2 vols., 538 and 546+8 pp.).

²Of over 1,000 items inspected, a surprisingly large number were of this sort. To cite a few examples:

Carleton Beals, *The Coming Struggle for Latin America* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1938), pp. 13-44.

Betty Kirk, "Mexico's War on Hidden Japanese," *Inter-American*, II, No. 1 (Jan. 1943), 14-16.

John W. White, "Japan's Amazon Dream," *Asia*, XLIII (October, 1943).

Stephen Naft, "Japan's Menace to the Americas," A Study Prepared for the Radio Division—Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs, 1943.

Ciro Alegria and Alfredo Saco, "Japanese Spearhead in the Americas," *Free World*, II (March, 1942).

Hugo Fernández Artucio, *The Nazi Underground in Latin America* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1942).

Sidney F. Mashbir, "I Was an American Spy," *Saturday Evening Post*, CCXX (March 27, 1948).

policies of the United States, Peru³ and other American republics. It appears that reliable or comprehensive studies in Western languages on the Japanese in Latin America are relatively few.⁴ The narrative presented here, although containing obvious limitations due to its rather general and somewhat popular approach, does offer many historical facts and statistical data which give evidence of extensive study and research. This material, which heretofore has not been readily accessible, should prove useful to interested scholars.

For purposes of clarity and logical English sequence, it was necessary to make numerous changes in the sentence and even paragraph order of the original Japanese text. Wherever possible, repetitions and excess verbiage were eliminated. Peruvian place and personal names were sometimes difficult to determine from the transliterations given. In cases of obvious doubt, the phonetic representations are placed in quotations. All footnotes are those of the translator.

This translation was prepared in connection with graduate study directed by Professor A. Curtis Wilgus at George Washington University. He supplied untiring encouragement, but is in no way responsible for any errors or shortcomings which this work may contain.

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CHAPTER XIV, BEGINNINGS OF EMIGRATION

PART I, INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS

Japanese interested in overseas affairs early turned their attention to South America. In 1889 Korekiyo Takahashi⁵ formed the Japan-Peru Mining Company to mine silver and embarked for Peru. A year later, 17 Japanese technicians, miners and mechanics were sent to operate the mine. But the project was suddenly discontinued, and Korekiyo

G. Salinas Cossío, "La infiltración japonesa," *Industria Peruana*, IV, No. 10 (October, 1934), 405-410.

Manuel Seoane, "The Japanese Are Still in Peru," *Asia and the Americas*, XLIII, No. 12 (Dec., 1943), 674-676.

³ It will be recalled that during World War II, the United States, in collaboration with Peru, brought more than 1600 allegedly dangerous Japanese nationals and Peruvians of Japanese ancestry from Peru and placed them in detention camps. To date, it appears that no evidence has been adduced to substantiate the allegation.

⁴ On the Japanese in Peru (and Brazil), there is a brief introductory study unfortunately based on a limited number of sources and produced with wartime haste: João F. Normano and Antonello Gerbi, *The Japanese in South America* (New York, The John Day Co., 1943). On Brazil, there are studies by competent scholars of that country. Under U. S. governmental auspices, factual reports were produced during World War II by trained observers.

⁵ Born in Tokyo, 1854; financier and politician; finance minister 7 times; prime minister; assassinated during February 26, 1936, incident.

and his whole group returned to Japan (from *Life Story of Korekiyo*). In 1894 Carlyle, an agent of the Preto Jordão Company of Brazil, came to Japan to entice immigrants to the State of São Paulo and made an offer to the *Nippon Kissa Imin Kaisha*.⁶ In the same year Sho Nemoto visited Brazil. Meanwhile, in 1893 Ikutaro Aoyagi had made a trip to Peru.

Ikutaro Aoyagi was born in Chiba-ken,⁷ went to the United States and, after graduating from the University of California, stayed on. Having read something of the history of the Inca Empire, he acquired a romantic impression of Peru, then the only South-American nation having treaty relations—dating from 1868—with Japan, and he visited that country between March and October 1893.

Aoyagi arrived at Callao on April 1, 1893 and, in the course of his trip, inspected two colonization projects—Perené and Chanchamayo. The former was British operated; the latter, a semi-official Peruvian project. At Perené, which he reached on April 12, he entered into what may have been the first talks on Japanese emigration to South America with one McKenzie, chief of the immigration section:

April 12—Arrived in the afternoon at the office of the Perené colony of the Peruvian Corporation (a British association composed of holders of Peruvian government bonds). Met Mr. McKenzie who spoke repeatedly of the fertility and vastness of the land and urged Japanese immigration . . . I raised the following questions:

Question: Didn't the contract of your company with the Peruvian government contemplate European immigration?

Answer: Yes. But if Japanese decide to immigrate, that can be satisfactorily arranged.

Question: What about products and the means of transporting them?

Answer: (With the aid of a newly made map). We wish to colonize these five hundred thousand hectares of land through which the Perené River flows. Let us assume that we planted coffee. The products can easily be sent to the European market. In the twinkling of an eye, they will go down the Perené to its junction with the Ucayali River and then, via Amazonas, across the Atlantic. Once this route is opened, the coffee of this region will have tremendous transportation advantages over that produced on the West Coast of Central and South America which must make the long, dangerous journey around Cape Horn. . . .

April 13—This morning I told Mr. McKenzie that although well-informed Japanese are concerning themselves over the necessity for Japanese emigration, as yet they have found few suitable outlets. Emigrants have already started to go to Hawaii and the United States, but the majority of them are only temporary laborers. The fact that capital has not accompanied them is partly due to the high interest rate in Japan, but more important is the fact that people in Japan have no thorough knowledge of conditions in other countries. As regards Peru, it is a long way off, and there is the previous failure of the Japan-Peru Mining Company. If I go back at this time and talk about emigration,

⁶ Japan Kissa Emigration Company. "Kissa" is a contraction of the surnames of the co-owners—Taijiro Kikkawa and Teichi Sakuma.

⁷ Administrative subdivision equivalent to a state or province.

they may consider me a fraud. I doubt if anyone would pay any attention. Sooner or later the public will awaken from its bad dreams and without doubt Japanese capital and people will flow into this area because the natural resources of Peru have long been famous and endless broad plains and 1,000 *ri*⁸ of fertile land still remain unused. The people of Peru are amicable; the direct ocean trip is not too long; and, what is more, Peru is the only South-American country with which Japan has a treaty. If your company would invite ten Japanese farmers from the United States, pay for their trip and give them a stipulated monthly wage, some would gladly come. After they arrive, let them work at clearing land. Then, after they have accumulated capital, give them the opportunity to engage in independent enterprises. Seeing the results, not only people but also capital from Japan will come, one after the other. In this way your company will make substantial profits, and the good example you set for immigration projects will long be remembered by Japanese.

McKenzie replied: "At present there are twenty Italians here who dislike Englishmen and cause us a lot of trouble. So we are planning to bring in people from India who are experienced in the cultivation of tropical plants. This matter must be decided definitely within a year. I shall give careful consideration to what you have said and will let you know.

However, no reply was ever received. Aoyagi continued his travels about the country. It was on this trip that he met the only Japanese residing in Peru at that time.

After arriving in Lima, I went to Chinatown and asked if any Japanese were there. They told me 'no,' but after two or three days I met Tatsu Ban—the only one. He had been brought to Peru by a German, Oscar Heeren. Heeren was sent to Japan in 1868 and had many prominent friends there. It was he who sold the silver mine to Korekiyo Takahashi and when he was sent as German Consul-General to Peru soon after the provisional treaty between that country and Japan was ratified in August, 1873, he took Ban with him. Ban invited me to his hotel and entertained me. Since he had not spoken Japanese for a long time, he asked me to overlook his errors, and we spoke freely. He said that he was some sort of technician for the Central Railway of Peru. Meeting Ban in Peru was a great pleasure. From him I gained much that was useful in my subsequent travels. (As told by Ikutaro Aoyagi)

Sometime later Aoyagi went back to Japan to devote his life to emigration activities and played a fairly large role in connection with Brazilian developments.

After 1893-1894 South America continued to attract the attention of those Japanese who felt it was to be an important area for Japanese emigration. However, the first groups did not enter Peru until 1899 and Brazil, ten years later.

PART II, TO THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE

After Aoyagi's trip to Peru, five years passed. Then, in 1898, when Teikichi Tanaka,⁹ an emigration agent for the Morioka Emigration Company,¹⁰ appeared in Peru, things suddenly began to happen.

⁸ Unit of distance. 1 *ri* equals 2.44 miles.

⁹ Born in Yamaguchi-ken, 1857; died 1905.

¹⁰ *Morioka Imin Kaisha*. Hereafter also referred to as Morioka Company or Morioka.

Tanaka, a onetime official of the Communications Ministry, had been sent to Brazil to promote emigration. But, soon after arriving there, he received an urgent telegram asking him to come to Peru. It was from Augusto B. Leguía who later became president of Peru and who was then general manager of a sugar manufacturing company. Tanaka, so the story goes, had met Leguía while studying in the United States, and Leguía called him because of this relationship. Although he had no background in regard to Peru, Tanaka set out without delay. It has been said—erroneously—that he went directly from Japan to Peru.

Leguía at this time was a leader in the sugar industry and gave indications of the unusual ability which later enabled him to become president and to hold that position for over ten years. When Tanaka arrived, Leguía made a concrete proposition. He declared that people in the sugar industry wished to bring in Japanese in large numbers, and quickly, for the canefields. To Tanaka, this was an unexpectedly large undertaking but, although the plan contained some unsatisfactory points as to the treatment of immigrants, he thought it could be arranged. He so reported to Makoto Morioka, head of the Morioka Emigration Company, who, believing that the project would be successful, asked the Foreign Office to add Peru to the areas to which he was authorized to send emigrants. Morioka was a former provincial official whose enterprises received financial backing from such individuals as the wealthy Kinzaburo Kada¹¹ of Yamaguchi-ken.

At this time, Japan's resident minister in Mexico was Yoshibumi Murota¹² who had been appointed to the additional post of minister to Peru in May, 1897, but had not yet gone there to present his credentials. Lacking information on Peru, the Foreign Office could not grant Morioka's application at once but ordered Murota to proceed there, present his credentials and make an investigation. If he found Peru suitable, he was to initiate the necessary measures.

Murota made a favorable report. However, since Peru was a country of "free" immigration, the way would have to be opened by diplomatic means if laborers were to be sent under contract. At the outset the Peruvian government pointed out: "Without consulting Peru, your government once seized our ship, the *María Luz*, claimed she was in the slave trade and freed over 200 Chinese on board. Thereafter, Peru has permitted the entry of "free" immigrants only. Now you want to send contract laborers to our country. This is a sort of slave trade and is contrary to our present policy. We cannot allow it."

¹¹ Born in Yamaguchi-ken, 1857; active in financial and commercial affairs; journalist; died 1922.

¹² Born 1847; diplomat, banker, industrialist; member of House of Peers.

The *Marta Luz* incident occurred in 1872. That ship, loaded with 230 Chinese destined for Peru, encountered a violent storm and entered Yokohama harbor. There, one of the Chinese escaped and sought help from local officials. In as much as he was a national of a country with which Japan had treaty relations, his plea could not be ignored. The Yokohama officials investigated and found the *Marta Luz* to be a slave ship. On instruction from the Japanese Foreign Office, all the Chinese were freed and sent home. The next year (1873), Peru sent Dr. Aurelio García as minister plenipotentiary to negotiate with the Foreign Office. He was assisted by the French minister to Japan. When no agreement could be reached, the two principals agreed to arbitration by the Czar of Russia who handed down his decision on June 13, 1873, approving Japan's action. Thus Japan saved face, but Peru's disappointment was great and she long remembered the incident.

Continuing the discussions, Murota contended that the contemplated immigration was not slave trade and not contrary to Peruvian policy; that the Japanese Law for the Protection of Emigrants seeks to prevent victimization by prohibiting the recruiting or overseas transportation of emigrants except by officially approved agents; and that the Japanese government considers contract emigration, by such means, sound.

In the presentation of his views to the Peruvian government and to interested individuals, Murota's words were interpreted into fluent Spanish by Zoji Amari who was then a counsellor of legation and who later became a first secretary of legation before retiring from the diplomatic service. He contributed much to the welfare of the Japanese in South America.

Meanwhile, Leguía continued to work through the agricultural association and directly with government officials to insure the success of Murota's negotiations and to prevent their almost completed plans from being dashed to pieces. Their efforts were so persistent that these officials were unable to sustain their objection that the project violated national policy. Moreover, as they listened to Murota and the others, they became greatly interested in the effect which the program would have on Peruvian industry, and a committee was appointed to study the tentative contract which Leguía and Tanaka were in the process of drawing up.

All these efforts were crowned with success, and a presidential decree was issued on September 19, 1898. The complete text follows:

Whereas the committee, which studied the tentative contract, and revisions thereto, relating to the immigration of laborers from the Japanese Empire as proposed by the Peruvian Foreign Office and drawn up by the Peruvian Agricultural Enterprises and the Morioka Company, reported that this contract does not conflict with present laws and regulations of the Peruvian Government, and

Whereas I believe that this will benefit Peruvian agriculture, I permit the immigration into Peru of contract laborers from the Japanese Empire. This decree will be published in the Official Gazette.

PART III, FIRST SHIPMENT OF IMMIGRANTS

On October 8, 1898, Makoto Morioka received permission to add Peru to his emigration area and to recruit a first group of approximately 798 persons. He got a total of 790 persons—372 from Niigata-ken, 187 from Yamaguchi-ken, 176 from Hiroshima-ken, 50 from Okayama-ken, 4 from Tokyo Fu¹³ and 1 from Ibaragi-ken.

None of these emigrants—mostly poor farmers or laborers—had ever concerned themselves as to the location of Peru. Their only interest was to earn higher wages than in Japan and to accumulate some savings so as to improve their condition upon their return home. They were brought together by this incentive. Yet, they were courageous pioneers who made a reality of a hitherto little-known area on the other side of the world.

Those recruited had to fulfill certain conditions. They had to be between twenty and forty-five years of age, physically fit for labor, and of good moral character. The essential points of their contract with Morioka were as follows:

1. The contract will run for four years. During this period the laborer will work at sugar plantations or sugar mills.
2. The wage will be 2 pounds 10 shillings per month to be paid in British currency or the equivalent in Peruvian money.
3. Daily hours of work will be ten in the field and twelve in the mills. Overtime will not exceed two hours, and for this an additional 2½d. per hour will be paid. There will be no work on Sundays and holidays.
4. For the first twenty-five months Morioka will deduct 8s. per month from the wages. The amount accumulated from these deductions will be applied to secure fulfillment of the contract and to pay for the expense of the return trip. In case a laborer runs away, the actual loss suffered by Morioka will be deducted from this, and any balance will be returned to the laborer. But, in case of a deficit, the laborer will be charged.
5. Plantation owners will pay all the travel expenses from port of embarkation in Japan to the place of employment in Peru, and will furnish housing, beds, and medical supplies.
6. At the time of departure Morioka will give each person a suit of working-clothes a hat, and a pair of shoes.

Thus, the immigrants had to bring only healthy bodies. Their monthly wage of £2. 10s. was about 25 *yen*.¹⁴ Although supplied with housing and beds, they paid for their own food. Estimating this at 10 *yen* a month for expenses, they could save 15 *yen* monthly. In four years they could accumulate 960 (*sic*) *yen*. Deducting 100 *yen* for the

¹³ Administrative district comprising Tokyo and vicinity.

¹⁴ Monetary unit. In 1900, the *yen* was worth about 50 cents U. S.

return trip, net income would be 860 *yen*. This was what they expected. It was certainly not a good proposition, but they did not appear to be concerned. Of great concern to them, however, was what would be done in case of accident or death. Article 4 of the contract between Morioka and the employers provided:

In case of accident or death incurred in the performance of work, or in case of permanent incapacitation, Morioka will collect £10 from the employer (in each case) and will pay the laborer (or dependents) this amount plus the accumulated monthly deductions and will cancel the contract. Thereafter, neither Morioka nor the employer will assume any obligation for any claim made by survivors or the injured party.

The employers agreed to pay Morioka £10 per immigrant for boat-fare, inoculations, medical supplies during the voyage, etc. (Contract between Morioka and employers, Art. 12), as follows: £4 upon receipt of a telegram from Morioka announcing the ship's readiness for departure, £3 upon arrival in Peru, and £3 six months thereafter. (This plan later caused Morioka difficulties.)

The emigrants were divided into groups of fifty, to which supervisors who understood English or French were assigned. Each supervisor was to be paid up to £8 per month—half by Morioka, half by the employer (Morioka—employer contract, Art. 12).

On February 28, 1899, 790 emigrants sailed from Yokohama on the specially chartered *Sakura Maru* of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha.¹⁵ After sailing 8,600 nautical miles across the Pacific in a south-easterly direction, they arrived at Callao on April 3. The following day, they began the coastal voyage to various plantations. About this, Ryoji Noda wrote:

The day following its arrival at Callao, the *Sakura Maru* began the coastal voyage to distribute the laborers to various plantations. It first went north to the port of Ancón and unloaded 130 destined for Puente Piedra, Caudevilla and Estrella, then 30 at Chancay for Palpa plantation. Farther north at Supe, 150 bound for San Nicolás and 50 for Huaito were landed. The ship continued northward and entered Salaverry harbor to unload 50 going to Pampas. At Pacasmayo, 50 for "Rurifuiko" were landed. The northernmost port entered was Eten. Here, 50 for Cayalti and 50 for Pomalea left the ship. Then the *Sakura Maru* turned south and went to Cerro Azul harbor, 72 nautical miles south of Callao. There the remaining 226 were landed for Casa Blanca plantation. On April 12 the ship returned to Callao. (from magazine *Kaigai*, No. 64)¹⁶

Of the eleven plantations, Casa Blanca, occupying most of the Cañete plain, employed the largest number. It formerly belonged to a wealthy Peruvian of British ancestry, but had been transferred to the British Sugar Company with which Leguía was connected. Most of the other plantations were owned by wealthy Peruvians. Plantations, owners, supervisors and numbers of immigrants assigned were as follows:

¹⁵ Japan Mail Steamship Company.

¹⁶ *Overseas*.

<i>Plantation name</i>	<i>Owner</i>	<i>Supervisor</i>	<i>Immigrants</i>
Caudevilla	"Panebaro" (Italian)	Tomoki Mori	50 (Hiroshima)
Estrella (also called Santa Clara)	Bryce (Peruvian)	Kannosuke Iida	50 (Niigata)
Puente Piedra	Giacometti (Italian)		30 (Hiroshima)
Palpa	Higuera (Peruvian)	Kichizo Kawaguchi	30 (Niigata)
San Nicolás	San Nicolas Agr. Ass.	Motoichi Saeki	150 (Yamaguchi)
Huaito	Canevaro (Peruvian)	Kozaburo Shigetomi	50 (Hiroshima)
Pampas	Wells (English)	Heiji Kumamoto	50 (Niigata)
"Rurifuiko"	Peruvian "Shú Esuteito" Co. ¹⁷ (British)	Isao Miyazaki	50 (Niigata)
Cayaltí	Aspillaga (Peruvian)	Katsusaburo Hayashi	50 (Hiroshima)
Pomalca	Gutiérrez (Peruvian)	Junichiro Hasegawa	13 (Niigata) 37 (Yamaguchi)
Casa Blanca	Swayne (Peruvian)	Fujikuma Aoki	50 (Okayama)
Santa Barbara		Yoshizo Nakano Nabekichi Kageyama	176 (Niigata)

Note: The remaining four persons were employed as house-boys by Peruvian families (Ryoji Noda notes).

CHAPTER XV, DIFFICULTIES SUBSEQUENT TO BEGINNING EMPLOYMENT

PART I, CAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTIES

Because the 790 new arrivals were the first group of Japanese to be sent to South America—an area of great potentiality—and because of previous unhappy experiences with others who went elsewhere, Japanese officials and others concerned hoped that no serious difficulties would arise. However, much depended on the attitude of the employers as to how these laborers, who were simple people, would make out.

Suddenly, on June 29, 1899, Tanaka sent a telegram to Murota in Mexico saying: "Feeling against immigrants strong. Contracts broken on flimsy grounds. Many have returned to Callao. Have been clashes with Peruvians. Situation out of control. Desire help of American consul at Callao." From this brief telegram, it was difficult to grasp the true picture. In reply, Murota directed Tanaka to seek aid from Guillermo Espantoso, honorary Japanese consul in Lima, and asked whether the immigrants or the plantation owners had broken the contracts. He then reported to the Foreign Office.

The great distance and the seven countries intervening between Peru and Mexico resulted in delays. Finally, on July 20, Murota received a report from Honorary Consul Espantoso stating: "Japanese immigrants were not understood. Difficulties due to language problem and failure

¹⁷ May be transliteration for Sugar Estates.

of both parties to compromise differences. Hard to find new jobs for discharged workers. Over 100 are sitting idly around at Callao.”

Two-and-a-half months later, on October 3, Murota received a detailed report, dated September 3, from Tanaka. He indicated that trouble arose first at San Nicolás plantation:

On April 25 I received a message saying that a strike was being called at San Nicolás and went immediately to investigate on the spot. The cause of the difficulty was that the plantation officials tried to prevent the immigrants from dealing with Chinese stores so that they could monopolize their business through the *tambo* (company-owned store). The immigrants wanted to buy their necessities from Chinese stores with cash rather than from the *tambo* with coupons, and they requested wage advances.

Because of language difficulty, suspicions were aroused on both sides. If voices were raised a little, it was immediately thought that there was a fight. If a few persons gathered around and talked, it was immediately feared that a mass uprising was taking place. It was rumored that the Morioka Company had brought 800 soldiers disguised as farmers who were planning to start a fight at an opportune time. Evidently believing these rumors, Mr. Pomar, company manager, had been on guard. Thinking that serious trouble had started, plantation officials armed themselves, and natives closed their doors. It is no wonder that the immigrants, who had no intention of doing the things of which they were suspected, were puzzled.

At the telegraphic request of the plantation manager, an officer and 12 soldiers were sent. Fearing a clash, the immigrants requested that the soldiers be withdrawn and explained that they had no intention of staging an uprising. The manager declared that the Japanese get angry about little things, are lazy, do not obey regulations and orders and regard Japanese supervisors and plantation officials as dogs and horses. He also said that approaching supervisors in a group constitutes an uprising and would set a bad precedent for the natives, unless punished. He wanted to get rid of 25 persons whom he considered instigators.

Seeing that it was entirely a case of misunderstanding, I explained things and cautioned all immigrants as to their future conduct. In the end, five persons from Hawaii who had been troublesome were expelled.

Temporarily, things became normal, but the evil root was not entirely swept away. The employer's attitude was somewhat unkind and hard to explain. He treated the workers severely and got angry when they demanded back-pay, saying he didn't like the way they asked for it, and then discharged the majority of them. Tanaka went on to say:

When the workers demanded back-pay, the San Nicolás manager regarded this as improper and decided to expel five persons whom he considered ring-leaders. After roll call the next morning these five were detained and the others sent to the fields. The latter, hearing that the five were to be secretly put on a steamer for shipment to Callao, gathered around the Japanese foreman to ask for an explanation. The manager thought there was going to be an uprising. Accompanied by ten or more other officials armed with machetes, he went into the fields, ordered the workers back to their quarters and told them they could get off the plantation if dissatisfied. Surrounded by the armed officials and natives, the workers packed their things. 114 were forcibly put on a steamer bound for Callao on June 10.

San Nicolás had originally been assigned 150 persons from Yamaguchi-ken. Adding the 10 leaders (5 previously discharged) to the 114 makes a total of 124 expelled. Only twenty-odd remained.

Immediately after this, 50 returned from Cayaltí. It is said that they left the plantation on June 17, boarded a ship the following day, and arrived at Callao the morning of the 24th. At the end of July, 77 persons came back from Pampas, and 50 from "Rurifuiko" in August. Adding those who came back in fives and tens from other places, the total reached 321. This did not happen because the immigrants were bad. It is true that there were a few trouble-makers among them, but the chief responsibility lay with the employers who failed to carry out their promises faithfully. Tanaka described the withdrawals from Cayaltí, Pampas and "Rurifuiko" as follows:

Cayaltí: The owner is the famous Aspíllaga, a well-known figure politically and commercially. The plantation argued that it could not pay the contract wage because Japanese do only one-third as much work as natives who receive lower pay and because they band together to intimidate better workers so as to lower the average level of work performed.

Immigrants say that the owner is harsh; the manager and some supervisors under his orders fraudulently record work performance; they are sometimes threatened with whipping, spoken to abusively, and generally treated as slaves. Under such circumstances, they do not want to remain another day, let alone four years.

It is clear that when the plantation tried to force the laborers, by threats, to do more work, they banded together to perform average work. I tried to negotiate with both sides, but the employers would not abandon their slave-handling habits. The plantation is a country unto itself into which national law does not enter; the owner, a potentate; and punishment, a matter of course. Even life and death are at the will of the plantation.

The contract provided for £2.10s. per month for a ten-hour day. The laborers persistently demanded this wage, regardless of the amount of work performed, as long as they put in ten hours. Bringing both sides together seemed hopeless. After long discussions with the owner, it was decided that he would overlook his initial expenditure and that Morioka Company would take back the workers. So, they were finally sent to Callao.

Pampas: This small plantation operated by the Englishmen, Wells and Aiken, is in the mountainous upper reaches of the Chicama River. Foodstuffs are scarce. Rice, meat and vegetables are brought in by rail from Trujillo. Through their foreman, the immigrants often asked what the prices were, but to no avail. The owners refused to tell. Many workers were bedridden with intermittent fever. Only slightly more than ten were in the fields and the same number at the factory. About half the group were constantly off the job. Under these circumstances, not enough work was done, and the owners would have suffered a great deficit by paying contract wages. This could not continue indefinitely. The owners proposed revising the pay method, basing it on the native *tarea* or piece-work system.

Investigation disclosed that the rigors of the climate and the general health habits of the laborers were also factors. Scanty clothes and inadequate food are common among people from Niigata-ken. Something might be said in favor of their very frugal traits, but it is impossible to stay healthy on one thin piece of salted fish and three bowls of rice a day for four or five years of hard labor. Moreover, the immigrants were homesick and

indicated that they would not be satisfied to stay on. The Japanese foreman did his best to bring workers and employers together, but was unable to get his ideas across because of language difficulty. The situation resulted in a strike on July 3. Previously, thirty persons discharged from San Nicolás were hired and arrived in the midst of the trouble. The newcomers joined the strike. Also, about this time there were two deaths from among the Niigata group and one from among the Yamaguchi group, a contributory cause of the strike.

The plan finally submitted by the employers was to pay 50 *sen*¹⁸ a day plus 1½ *sho*¹⁹ of rice and 1 *kin*²⁰ of meat. The workers did not accept, and all 77 were brought back to Callao on July 31, cancelling the contract.

"*Rurifujiko*": This British-owned plantation in the northern area hired fifty persons from Niigata. The reasons given for contract cancellation were that an insufficient amount of work was being performed which was due to illness and resulted in financial losses, and that the workers were disobedient and difficult to manage. Jones, the manager, at first assigned the Japanese light and easy work, but he was thrifty in nature, sometimes to the point of miserliness. Although he promised to install workers' cooking and toilet facilities, three months later this had not yet been done. Naturally, the area around the living quarters became filthy. Those who defecated promiscuously were whipped by the assistant manager, and anyone who interfered was seized and imprisoned. Morioka Company wrote a letter charging that this action was unlawful and declaring that the laborers should not be subjected to such treatment. The plantation replied that it could not use laborers whom it was not allowed to punish.

More than half were always sick, were given no medical treatment and were dragged out forcibly to work. Living quarters were located on a hill nine miles from a hospital staffed with a doctor and a pharmacist. Foodstuffs were scarce. Transportation to the main fields was very poor. The seriously ill could be sent to the hospital by train, but it was impractical to send the slightly ill, one by one, in this way. A promise was made that the doctor would visit the living quarters twice a week. However, he did not want to go there without an increase of pay, and the miserly manager wouldn't give it. Instead, he charged the immigrants with malingering and laziness. Unsuccessfully, the Morioka Company negotiated, asserting that the workers were not yet accustomed to the climate and that things should improve within two or three months. It is hard to say what would have happened to these people if left at such a plantation. All fifty were brought back to Callao on August 6. Negotiations continue.

The Peruvian plantation owners sustained their enterprises by using natives as virtual slaves. Having had long experience with slave labor, they did not know how to deal with workers in a civilized way. A promise is a promise, but they tried to slide out. Whatever the situation may have been, it must have been a dismal and sad experience to those immigrants who, so soon after their arrival in Peru in search of menial wages, had to face such realities.

PART II, PLIGHT OF THOSE WHO LEFT THE PLANTATIONS

The storm raged on.

Those who returned to Callao did not know what to do with themselves. Tanaka had to manage everything. He rented two houses

¹⁸ One-hundredth of a *yen*.

¹⁹ Unit of capacity. 1 *sho* equals 3.18 pints.

²⁰ Unit of weight. 1 *kin* equals 1.32 pounds.

near the Morioka Company office and, "because there was not enough time to construct beds, straw mattresses were hastily made and distributed to the individuals. Rice, meat, fish, and vegetables were supplied and each person allowed to cook to suit himself." Such conditions could not continue forever; the expense alone was enormous. To those plantations which dismissed only a few individuals, but did not cancel their entire contract, he sent replacements. To places where results had been comparatively good, he offered additional workers who were dispatched a few at a time. Twenty especially strong persons went to a coffee plantation in the montaña, and ninety-one to Bolivia, to become a problem later. Others became day laborers, and contracts were made with new plantations. Yet, approximately 150 persons were left unemployed. "It is planned to let them cultivate vegetables and fruit on their own at La Quebrada farm leased from Mr. Swayne of Cerro Azul; work under the *tarea* system; or engage in fishing. Younger individuals serve as house-boys in wealthy homes where the employer-employee relationship is very good."

Previously, when the immigrants began to return to Callao, a group of native laborers there started a clamor. From the first they had not favored bringing in Japanese. They were egged on by a group of schemers who disliked the existing Peruvian regime. It is said that they sent anti-Japanese petitions to the Callao government office. Although Tanaka asked that office for protection, trouble flared up:

The government posted police in front of the immigrants quarters. When nothing happened, the vigilance was relaxed. Later, groups gathered at night, shouted abuse and threw stones. The situation seemed to become alarming. The immigrants continued to follow faithfully the Morioka Company's firm advice which was to avoid conflict if possible and to take only measures of self-defense such as seizing offenders and handing them over to the police. One day when three Japanese were going along a street, one was stabbed in the back of the head with a knife. The three seized and held the attacker as passersby gathered and surrounded them. Someone fired a pistol; the shot went thru the hat of one of the Japanese. The three let go their man and chased the gunman, catching up with him in a tavern. Hearing the commotion, other Japanese ran up, and much fighting ensued. Police and soldiers arrived and, with drawn swords, finally separated both sides. They then withdrew with the stabber and the gunman. The next day, the Morioka Company's agent was called to the police station where the incident was investigated. The immigrants were unscratched, but the gunman was a pitiful sight with bruises on the face, arms and legs. Both sides stood firm, the gunman demanding an indemnity and the company that he be prosecuted. A day later, the gunman appeared at the company's office with a letter from the police chief and said he wished to settle out of court. A document, stating that neither party would hold any further grievance, was drawn up and signed by both parties, and the authorities were notified of the satisfactory conclusion.

As mentioned above, it was at this time that Tanaka had telegraphed Murota in Mexico, stating that he wished to ask the United States con-

sul's help. He probably desired this because Honorary Consul Guillermo Espantoso may not have sufficiently concerned himself with the problems involved or adequately shared the burdens with him. Unrest among the immigrants was becoming acute, aggravating the difficulties. Being in a position of direct responsibility, Tanaka worked incessantly. His was truly a heart-rending struggle, and he really deserves sympathy.

From the fact that discharged persons were coming back in small numbers from plantations other than the four which had broken their contracts, it was clear that all was not well at these places either. The trouble was not too serious, however, because replacements were accepted. Apparently, those discharged were unmanageable or difficult individuals. But, in general, it was the plantation owners who were responsible for the existing state of affairs. With one or two exceptions, they were unreliable and violated their contracts. Where things appeared peaceful on the surface, it was due to the fact that the workers tolerated conditions.

Contract violations involved chiefly failure to pay wages as promised. At Cayaltí and Pampas, employers claimed that the Japanese production rate was not satisfactory and that they could not afford to pay contract wages. They insisted on the *tarea*, or piece-work, system which they customarily applied to natives. The amount of work to be done was established on a day-to-day basis. Natives usually worked as hard as possible for one day in order to earn enough to spend two or three days drinking liquor. It was claimed that the Japanese output amounted to only one-third of the natives' speeded-up output. Some Japanese accepted the *tarea* system because they had to. Those who were dissatisfied and left Cayaltí and Pampas found the same system in effect elsewhere.

The real question was: what was the actual income under the *tarea* system? Rates varied according to plantation and type of work. In general, they were as follows: cane-cutting, 45 *sen* per ton; weeding, (3-10 rows depending on length of row), 30-70 *sen*; leaf-cutting, ditch digging, hand cultivation, stumping and planting, about 50-80 *sen* per *tarea*. Not being used to the work, most Japanese could do only one *tarea* a day. With experience, exceptional persons might do two. Since a day's food cost 30-40 *sen*, some persons would not make enough for subsistence.

The definition of a *tarea* was left to the judgment of the plantation managers. There was no accurate measurement. The amount differed from day to day and from person to person. As the laborers got used to the work, the amount of a *tarea* was purposely increased, but the pay was not. All this caused constant trouble. The laborers were really in a predicament.

At Casa Blanca where there were 226 Japanese, 70 *sen* per *tarea* of cane-cutting was decided upon. When he found that a person, after some experience, could do two a day, the manager, figuring that he had assigned too little work, doubled the amount but kept the pay at 70 *sen*. Since everything at Casa Blanca was done in this manner, it would have been strange if the immigrants had not become angered. There was serious trouble on four occasions. Eventually, however, when their protests brought no improvement whatsoever, they reluctantly submitted.

Immediately after the fourth incident at Casa Blanca Tanaka wrote the second report which he sent to Murota on February 9, 1900. In it he stated that only one or two plantations were still abiding by the original contract and that all others had adopted the *tarea* system. Besides the reasons for the trouble at Casa Blanca, he gave a full account of the sending of ninety-one persons to Bolivia.

For quarters at Casa Blanca, the immigrants had several old factories without a single partition. In large numbers they were dumped in helter-skelter. Two months after arrival, they became ill one after another. As a result, not more than 30 of the 226 were actually engaged in work. During May and June (1899) 40 persons died. The rest became demoralized. Those who recovered from illnesses and returned to work found that they could barely earn enough to pay for their food. The coldhearted treatment by the managers made frequent trouble unavoidable. When Tanaka came in the early part of September (1899), some of the workers declared that they did not want to remain there a day longer or be transferred elsewhere. They wanted to go home and asked him to make the necessary arrangements. Unable to evade the issue, he promised:

I consider that your request is due to unavoidable circumstances. Therefore, I shall take measures to put you on a Japanese ship sailing to Japan at the earliest possible date.

September 29, 1899.

Teikichi Tanaka,

Morioka Company Branch Chief.

Tanaka later claimed that he made the promise because those who demanded it were undesirable individuals and that it would be better if they were returned home. This was simply an excuse. The truth is that he did not know what to do and was stalling for time. He said "a Japanese ship at the earliest possible date," knowing that there was no such prospect in sight. When asked what he meant by "earliest possible date," he vaguely replied that it might be November or December.

November came, December came—but no ship. The immigrants had been tricked by Tanaka. The only thing now left for them to do

was to go to Callao and live at the expense of the Morioka Company until a ship arrived. On January 24, 1900, thirty-four persons ran away from the plantation. Twenty set out for Callao overland and fourteen planned to go by sea. Those who intended to take the sea route were detained at Cerro Azul by order of the harbor master who had been alerted from Casa Blanca. They were promptly taken back. The twenty who went overland arrived at Callao in threes and fives, but Tanaka, by smooth persuasion, induced them to go back. Having failed to accomplish anything, they resigned themselves to more days of hopelessness. This was the fourth Casa Blanca incident.

The continuous deaths drove the immigrants into a world of fear. This condition was not limited to Casa Blanca. Many deaths occurred elsewhere too. In his first report, Tanaka had said:

Although there were doctors, they were usually below average and poorly paid. Some took care of two or three plantations, generally visiting them twice a week. The workers distrusted them because they saw little result from the old-fashioned treatment administered. Because of complaints, the employers made some changes, but they refused to hire really good doctors. When there were many people ill, Morioka Company hired doctors on its own and paid them at least 150 *yen* a month. The seriously ill were brought to charitable hospitals in Lima and Callao. The Company maintained good-will by giving presents to attendants and nurses. It brought cemetery lots for those who died and buried them with appropriate services. This cost about 12 or 13 *yen*. Those who died at the plantations were buried there and the Company usually paid for flowers and grave markers of wood or stone.

As a result of the conditions described above, the number of dead had reached 124 by the end of October, 1900.

[To Be Continued.]