

to represent the most typical portions of Cuba's principal type-of-farming areas. Finally, the book itself gives evidence that he devoted a great deal of time and effort to a study of the existing literature, including the historical and geographical materials.

The scope of the work is revealed by a consideration of the titles of the thirteen chapters into which the volume is divided. The first of these sets forth the Cuban paradox, "Rich Land—Poor People," and the second summarizes the demographic materials under the title "The Cuban People." A concise description of the geographic setting is included as Chapter III, "Land, Climate, and Seasonal Rhythms," and this is followed by the presentation of the materials dealing with "Locality Groups and the Settlement Pattern." Two other chapters, "Land Division, Measurement, and Registration" and "Systems of Farming," complete the analysis of the highly important relations of man to the land. That Nelson attributes great significance to the class system would seem to be indicated by the fact that two of his thirteen chapters are on that subject, Chapter VIII being entitled "The Social Class Structure," and Chapter IX, "Social Stratification in Rural Cuba." "The Cuban Family," "The Level of Living," "Education and the Schools," and "The Rural Prospects" complete the list. In addition, there are two appendixes, the first of which is "A Brief Description of Areas Covered by the Special Surveys," and the second an analysis by Alejandro Fernández de Cueto of "General Social and Economic Conditions in the Cienfuegos-Trinidad Survey Area." A glossary, a selected bibliography, a subject index and an index of names are also included. Ten charts add greatly to the presentation, and the tables, fifty-four in number, were carefully designed.

One can find little in the volume to which legitimate criticism might be directed, but it does seem unfortunate that a chapter on religion and the church was not included.

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Ideological Differences and World Order; Studies in the Philosophy and Science of the World's Cultures. Edited by F. S. C. NORTHROP. [Published for the Viking Fund.] (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. Pp. vi, 486.)

Scholars have always been advocates of unity and order, and among contemporary students of the problem of peace scientists have taken a leading role. Robert Oppenheimer, for example, has insisted that if we seek world order we must first discover "those areas which we have in common with the peoples of the world everywhere." Only by doing

so can we exploit the possibilities of reason. Only then can we use those "things of common knowledge and common experience" creatively in an effort to establish security and freedom.

Professor Northrop and his collaborators have assumed a share of this responsibility in the present volume. They seek to examine the *possibilities* of world order against the background of *ideological differences*. Accordingly, the first contribution of this volume is the validity of its approach. There is a clear recognition that no matter what we share in common, we also participate in ancient and profound differences which separate us. And now is certainly the time, as Justice Holmes remarked in another connection, to elaborate upon the obvious. If it is clear that the East differs from the West, it is no less clear that blueprints for the salvation of mankind not only assume unities where none exist, but they also assume that the same influences everywhere produce the same cultural results. Oliver Wendell Holmes, again to quote him, suggested that "the mode by which the inevitable comes to pass is effort." Certain social processes are doubtless irreversible, but the inevitable consequences of economic revolution have not by themselves made for unity any more than the inevitable consequences of the discovery of atomic destruction has by itself shocked humanity into peace. The airplane connotes the machine and the assembly line to citizens of industrial communities but planes whirl over the land of Yemen where the folkways are more closely akin to King Saul's Israel than to Walter Reuther's Detroit.

Coöperative human effort alone can reorder such parts of the contemporary context as are capable of being reordered. Spinoza once cautioned us to remember that men who do not wish to remodel the universe are knaves and those who seek to do so are fools. The writers of this volume have approached the issue of world order in the spirit of Spinoza. They yearn to see the world reordered in the image of our desires and according to the pattern of our needs; but they would first see where and how it can be done. The impossible is never made to masquerade as the probable.

No less significant is the perspective of the editor and his associates. "If the . . . institutions and proposals [for world peace] are to be effective, . . ." writes Professor Northrop, "less attention [must] be paid momentarily to the goal of world order and . . . greater attention . . . (a) to the ideological differences which present obstacles in the way to that goal and (b) to the methods suggested by the contemporary social sciences and the philosophy of culture for the removal of those obstacles." Whether we must first evolve the plans and formulate the goals or whether we must first appreciate the obstacles which prevent their

realization is a nice academic question. It is significant to record that for the most part these academics ignore it. More important is their joint awareness that we have to know about both, and that to ignore the obstacles is to court frustration. Likewise significant is their insistence that ideas are more than mere weapons, that ideologies are living parts of a total culture which conditions change at all levels of existence. Moreover, cultural contexts are antecedent to contemporary alterations of whatever kind and intensity. Thus, changes incident to the machine and the city on the pattern of family relations produce one set of cultural problems in China, another in the United States.

Just as vital as the historical antecedents of culture groups is the social function of ideas. Ideas and value systems, said Karl Marx, merely reign; productive systems actually govern. These authors are not unmindful of the influence of productive systems, but they are anxious to discourage a too easy reliance upon unitary causation. Cultural anthropology is not hospitable to the unitary view of social causation, and these scholars, moreover, are devoted to discriminations. They are not only concerned with conceptual distinctions but with temporal distinctions and logical priorities as well. They are particularly concerned with the influence exerted by the intrusion of events upon *continuing processes of culture*.

The contributors to this symposium are as much impressed with the role of reason in human affairs as with the role of ideas in social change. Aside from the specific contributions of analysis and synthesis, this constitutes the most noteworthy feature of the study. This is an effort to restore the current intellectual equation, for change is evaluated in terms of stability and stress is given to total cultural processes rather than to segments of it. Above all, the writers of this volume avow their faith in reason. They believe in methods of analysis, in the application of coöperative, human, intellectual effort to the persistent problems facing mankind. Other scholars will disagree with given emphases. Others, again, will dissent from certain evaluations and conclusions. But only those who have already surrendered the claims of reason, and hence the hopes of man, can fail to applaud the unequivocal reliance placed upon "the methods suggested by the contemporary social sciences and the philosophy of culture." There will (and should) be much disagreement as to what constitute the methods of social science and the philosophy of culture and how they have been employed in this venture. But scholars cannot abjure the uses of reason. The scholars who have written this book also believe in the social efficacy of the advancement of learning.

The editorial performance conforms to the objective implied by the

title. This is a real collaboration. The East and the West are, of course, well represented; America is represented by citizens of Argentina, Mexico, and the United States (death prevented the inclusion of a section of Moslem and Hindu culture, while illness interfered with what would have been an even wider representation). Equally broad is the scope of the subject matter. Among the many subjects treated are: philosophy and science, the arts and literature, anthropology, economics, politics, and law.

There is hardly another single volume with which this study may appropriately be compared. Historians, reminded of *The Quest for Political Unity in World History*, edited by Stanley Pargellis (Washington, 1944) will perceive many points of resemblance. Yet the two are not strictly comparable. *The Quest for Political Unity* is composed of thirty-one relatively brief essays; *Ideological Differences and World Order* contains twenty-one relatively long ones. Size, however, is not the major difference. The former is the work of historical specialists, virtually all of whom were trained in the western tradition; the latter was written by scholars stemming from a wide variety of cultural backgrounds. In addition, the latter draws upon a much richer diversity of learning. Among the contributors there are specialists in philosophy, anthropology, physics, aesthetics, English and French literature, zoology, the philosophy of law, sociology, and economics. The omission of a historian is incomprehensible and is cured only in part by the inclusion of philosophers, philosophers of history, and anthropologists. No single individual could have written this volume; no single individual can fully and critically appraise it.

The volume opens with a suggestive essay by Roscoe Pound, one-time Dean of the Harvard Law School. Pound presents a brief for a new *jus gentium* and the part that the universities must play in achieving it. Unfortunately, however, Dean Pound does not tell us how it can be done. Can any analysis of world law succeed without a parallel analysis of power? While Pound is less vulnerable than others, the subject involves a paradox all too commonly met. Although power is a component of domestic law, it is often assumed that "the moral law" can be made to operate in international spheres. As long as we confine our activities to the realms of time and space, we shall not escape from power. Even "the moral law" has a power component.

One group of studies, permitting a temporary classification, investigates items on the contemporary cultural scene or aspects of its immediate background. Professor John N. Hazard of Columbia's Russian Institute evaluates the assumptions of Soviet law and T. V. Smith, professor at the Maxwell School of Citizenship of Syracuse University treats of the New Deal. Mr. Smith seeks to place the leading features of the

Roosevelt administrations in the sweep of historical change, an effort he has already made in previous writings. Mr. Hazard cogently separates the ideological differences which condition the premises of Soviet jurists on the one hand and Anglo-American jurists on the other. Students who deal in conceptual stereotypes might find a brief extract from his conclusion illuminating.

The difference of opinion seems to be deeper than the relationship of the state to the individual. Both schools feel that they are striving to benefit the individual. Both believe that it is the function of the state to participate in that effort. But at this point the Soviet jurists evidence more faith in the individual than the Anglo-Americans are prepared to manifest. The Soviet School believes that it has found a pattern in the historical development of society and that by progressing as swiftly as possible . . . the goal of maximum benefit to the individual can be achieved. The Anglo-Americans doubt that any such pattern . . . is really there. They expect that society will continue to evidence changing relationships. . . .

Lord Lindsay's discussion of the Labor government in Britain is one of the best short pieces to be found on this subject. Since the philosophy of British socialism involves the issues of democracy in an industrial setting everywhere, it has a pointed suggestiveness for workers in the democratic vineyard—especially for those who believe that the grapes of wrath are stored only in the vineyards of their neighbors. Lindsay is, of course, the Master of Balliol as well as a member of the House of Lords. While the United States has some lords of labor, it has few labor lords. And when scholars holding comparable positions respond to the call of politics (in the sense in which Aristotle used the word and which remains its only true sense), they are declared to comprise a "brain trust." This is also a cultural diversity which invites exploration.

Leopoldo Zea, a young Mexican philosopher, does for Mexico what Lindsay does for Britain. Students of culture north of the Rio Bravo and elsewhere, unfamiliar with the Spanish language, will find little beside the work of Rex Crawford to compare with it.

Only a modern Aristotle could accurately weigh these essays in the scales of learning, but no ordinary reader can avoid his preferences. Two are particularly commendable. One by Henri Peyre; the other by Percy Bridgman. Peyre, chairman of the French department at Yale, writes of literature and philosophy in contemporary France. With a combination of clarity and subtlety rarely matched, he relates the seemingly remote strands of current French intellectual life to larger historical processes. The general student, seduced by existentialism, will profit by his insights; those who have borrowed the cliché that French thought derives from Descartes will find themselves corrected.

Professor Bridgman, Harvard physicist, writes under the most arresting of titles¹ and has produced the most arresting of essays. "If the

¹ "The Potential Intelligent Society of the Future."

human race," he suggests, "is ever going to integrate itself, the first and the foremost consideration has got to be of truth, and the other emotional needs will have to adjust themselves to that. I believe that we have the techniques in hand for making this adjustment. An exceedingly important factor in making it will be the rearing of a generation of educators with the vision that the human race is now treading paths it has never trod before and the destiny of the race lies all before it." This affirmation—lucidly developed against the tightly woven background of the logic of science and its implications for society—could easily have served as the intellectual motto of the whole enterprise; it is certainly its spirit. Skeptics in the social studies will take intellectual courage from his ideas, for there is more hope in the empire of learning—and on better grounds—than even Bacon dared to believe. It is only fair to add that those who have been nurtured on Whitehead and his followers rather than on Eddington and his school will have a better chance of finding it.

Julian Huxley's summary of the function of UNESCO bears more intimately on the challenge of the present. Likewise, Manuel Sandoval Vallarta, Mexican physicist associated with the College of Mexico and the National University, explores the immediate dangers implied by planned research sponsored by governments under cover of secrecy.

A second classification of studies, still reflecting the shadow of the future, encompasses a wider arc of meaning. Fung Ya-Lan, distinguished philosopher and Dean of the College of Liberal Arts at Tsing Hua University at Peiping, treats of the underlying concepts of Chinese philosophy. Gracefully written and scholarly, the essay does not come to grips with the problems posed by the study, yet it is extremely informative to those who are not versed in the subject and suggests the conflicts which the new ways of the world have induced. Charles M. Bakewell of Yale, one of the Lindsays of the United States, has long been famed as a student of classical philosophy. It is appropriate that he should write of the philosophical roots of western culture which he accomplishes with the erudition and grace marking his previous contributions. He not only assesses the connections between Greek philosophy and the spirit of Christianity, but he puts his scholarly finger on one of the weaknesses of the western attitude. "There is a provincialism that comes from isolation in time which can prove a more formidable obstacle to understanding than that which comes from isolation in space." Students of Oriental thought and representatives of oriental cultures do not need to be reminded that Greek philosophy is modern philosophy. We who stem from the occidental world need constantly to recall, in Whitehead's words, that western philosophy is a footnote to Plato.

Matila Ghyka, student in the field of aesthetics at the University of Virginia, is the author of "The Pythagorean and Platonic Scientific Criterion of the Beautiful in Classical Western Art" and Robert Grinnell of the English faculty of the University of California wrote "Franciscan Philosophy and Gothic Art." Both these articles, while scholarly and interesting, are somewhat narrow in historical scope. They certainly add to an awareness of the cultural diversity of Western European traditions, but the connection of either to the issues of world order is certainly not made explicit. This is especially true of the first which in addition to being more or less esoteric raises the fundamental question of a rigidly mathematical aesthetic.

Pitirim Sorokin, Harvard sociologist, presents an incisive portrayal of the "Lasting and Dying Factors in the World's Cultures," according to the theories and methods which he has already made familiar. Similarly, Clyde Kluckhohn, also of Harvard, gives us a mirror of Navaho man, a subject upon which he is one of the leading anthropological experts. All investigators will find the comments of Francisco Romero, noted philosopher of Argentina, rewarding. The following brief quotation indicates why. "Out of the many cultures which have appeared in history, only three survive—the Indian, the Chinese, and the Occidental—. . . In my judgment, this superiority consists in the fact that the three, in contrast to all others, contain an answer (each a radically different one, of course) to the most profound and permanent questions and needs of man." This intimation of philosophical and historical sweep is borne out by the contents.

Resembling Professor Romero's essay in breadth and suggestiveness are two other chapters; one by Overton Taylor, lecturer in Economics at Harvard, the other by David Bidney, associated with the research staff of the Viking Fund. Taylor's "Philosophies and Economic Theories in Modern Occidental Culture" is a classic of what is called interdisciplinary synthesis. Mr. Taylor does what he sets out to do expertly, and the abandonment of many conventional notions adds to the stimulation of the reader. He has provided a model for other social scientists to emulate. It is only to be regretted that space limitations prevented the amplification of many obscure points. Mr. Bidney emphasizes the patent need for relating the contributions of cultural anthropology in a more inclusive framework. It can no longer be doubted that if there is to be a twentieth-century science of man, the particulars of specialized research must be generalized into meaningful social science hypotheses. The language of social science must, of course, be precise. There is danger, however, in creating more linguistic problems for semantics to solve.

The editor's essay, "Ideological Man and His Relations to Scientifically Known Man" is in the Northrop tradition. Every social scientist must take account of his suggestions many of which are extremely fertile. While it is imperative to take ideologies into consideration in any synthesis of social causation, the synthesis is destroyed when ideas are conceived as governors. Max Radin's comment in his review of this volume is certainly extreme. It is well, however, to repeat his warning. If it were possible to attain world order on a robot level, it would not be worth having.

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L'Enseignement de l'histoire en Haïti. By CATTS PRESPOIR. [Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia, Publicación Núm. 102, Comisión de Historia, Núm. 16, Memorias sobre la enseñanza de la historia, III.] (Mexico City: Editorial Cultural, Talleres Gráficos, S. A., 1950. Pp. xiii, 73. Appendix, index. \$10.00 Mex.)

The teaching in Haiti of general history began as early as 1819 but the teaching of the history of Haiti had to wait until the 1840's. As late as 1950 the texts used in the general history courses, in the public as well as in the parochial schools, reflected the influence of the Catholic Church. They vigorously denounced protestantism and emphasized the history of France. The Middle East was studied only as a part of ancient history and the information about the Far East was "summary." As for Africa, only Egypt, Carthage and North Africa were included. Therefore, "the young Haitian finds in these texts nothing about the past of the black race and its evolution." A course in the history of Black Africa was offered for the first time by the Institut d'Ethnologie, founded in 1938 by Dr. Price Mars. About ten years later a course in the history of Asia was begun at the Ecole Normale Supérieure. "American History" is still confined almost entirely to the history of the United States. The author therefore concludes that "it is high time that a work of local inspiration provide a general history text conforming to our intellectual needs as Negroes and as citizens of the American continent."

The first important national history of Haiti, by Thomas Madiou, appeared in 1848, the same year that the teaching of the subject was prescribed by law. Beaubrun Ardouin's eleven-volume *Etudes sur l'histoire d'Haïti* (Paris, 1853-1860), based in considerable measure upon archival materials in Paris, is still the principal source for histories and texts of Haiti. In my opinion it is at least the equal of most of the national histories of the other Latin-American republics. But Haitians