

physical appearance is in all respects up to the usual high standards of the Clarendon Press.

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*Report on Cuba.* [Findings and Recommendations of an Economic and Technical Mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in collaboration with the Government of Cuba.] (Washington, D. C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1951. Pp. xxiv, 1040. Maps, charts, appendices. \$7.50.)

This voluminous work reports the findings of an economic and technical mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Cuban government. The mission, headed by the late Francis Adams Truslow, a corporation lawyer, president of the New York Curb Exchange, and at one time in charge of the United States war-time rubber development program, visited Cuba from August to September, 1950. The report was completed just before Mr. Truslow's death in July, 1951. It is the first comprehensive study of Cuba since that undertaken by the Foreign Policy Association in 1934. It differs from its predecessor in several respects.

It was made in the midst of a boom in sugar prices, reflected in all aspects of the Cuban economy, inclusive of public revenues. It is unusually comprehensive with respect to the range of products and types of business activities reported on. It is able to draw more extensively upon Cuban *expertise* in several directions, especially as to money and banking. In spite of the official limitation of its task to recommendations concerning specific economic fields, the mission explicitly takes into account a range of non-economic matters—e.g., educational deficiencies, bureaucratic corruption, and defeatism as important factors tending to keep Cuba from making the most of her economic opportunities. The report, however, is relatively free from concern with problems of foreign relations, and devotes only fifty pages to international economic matters, including tourism. The report is scarcely good propaganda for international financing.

While it is largely descriptive in contents, the report in form is presented as a diagnosis accompanied by recommendations for action. What is proposed is more largely a strategy of action than a program, a strategy formulating long-range goals and criteria to guide

rather than determine priorities in the choice of means. In more concrete terms the mission thinks that there is a crying need for a great deal of applied industrial and agricultural research, especially by private business organizations, and proposes the immediate establishment of a technological foundation under joint public and private auspices. Drastic improvement in the educational system at all levels is called for. In this respect Cuba seems actually to have deteriorated as compared with the twenties. The mission urges a reconstruction of the bases of labor-management relations (calling on employers, unions, and government to change their policies), improvement in the "civil service," comprehensive public action with respect to transportation facilities to save railway and highway systems from complete breakdown, and consistency in public economic policies toward the goals of increased productivity, diversification and innovation.

The mission discusses deficiencies in Cuban administration with calm but devastating candor. It is rather less perceptive about the "political" forces operative in Cuba; indeed it seems rather oblivious of them, except in the form of their consequences for policy and administration. Like previous surveys, this one is reticent about the army, for instance.

As its basic diagnosis, the mission holds that the insecurities generated in the Cuban economy and evident even in boom times encourage a vicious circle involving defensive rather than innovative behavior on the part of every one concerned in Cuban affairs. This can be broken only by resolute and courageous action at key points in the whole system. There is a fascinating comparison of the practical implications for various economic problems of a "status quo" policy versus a "dynamic" one. It is the absence of a dynamic attitude toward possibilities, phrased in terms of a general and far-reaching lack of confidence in Cuba and the Cubans, which the mission finds the salient feature of the Cuban situation. "The relatively static character of the Cuban economy is evidently not due to a lack of physical and human resources or—in recent years—of financial potential. It does not appear to be entirely due to the dominance of sugar, although this is a preponderant factor. Its causes must be sought also among prevailing attitudes of the Cuban people and the conduct of their institutions" (pp. 8-9).

It has been possible to identify only seven of the seventeen members of the mission, by resort to the usual works of reference. Besides the chairman, there were two economists, a research chemist, a chemi-

cal engineer, an economic geologist, and an agricultural chemist. The technical emphasis in the composition of the mission is borne out in the descriptive parts of the report, although all of it is written for the lay reader. In the light of membership of the mission, the overall character of its diagnosis is remarkable. But it is understandable that the Truslow report has little to say about how the Cubans are to go about changing their attitudes and institutions. The historian will take note of the Batista coup d'état, and wonder.

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*The Indian Caste of Peru, 1795-1940: a Population Study Based upon Tax Records and Census Reports.* By GEORGE KUBLER. [Smithsonian Institution, Institute of Social Anthropology, Publication No. 14.] (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1952. Pp. vi, 71. Maps, illustrations, bibliography, index. Paper.)

At the end of the eighteenth century, Spanish colonial legislation classified the free population of Peru into several categories designated by racial labels, each of which had a somewhat different legal status. The largest group, labeled "indios," constituted only about 57 per cent of the total population of a little over one million (excluding Puno). The rest of the population was made up of "españoles," "mestizos," and "mulatos y negros libres." Finer subdivisions were often made for social purposes, as in Mexico. By 1795, the categories of this system probably did not represent distinct racial strains because lower class women were subject to frequent abuse by higher class men, and at least some of the resulting offspring remained in the mother's category; e. g., many sons of Spanish fathers and Indian mothers did not get counted as mestizos but remained in the Indian group. The reality of the categories lay primarily in their legal status, although they were reinforced locally by differences of language, customs, dress, and social and economic position.

The primary division in the system was that between the "Indians" on the one hand and all other groups on the other. The mestizos and mulattoes formed lower classes complementary to the Spanish upper class in a single society which contrasted as a whole with the Indians, who had an upper class of their own made up of the families of the caciques, a numerous group whose claims to nobility