

ing that any biography of Mariano Moreno must savor of the panegyric, he supplies this ingredient in generous proportions.

The author sees his subject as the inspiration, the guide, and the chief executor of the May junta. He lauds his nobleness, patriotism, and purity of spirit. He seeks to recreate his soul, his personality, his tremendous energy, and his incontestable will. He fits him into the "noble triumvirate" of Argentina's great civilian patriots: Moreno, who laid the bases for Argentina's culture and progress; Rivadavia, who struggled for their perpetuation; and Sarmiento, who realized them.

Neither in analyzing the slow evolution of Moreno's insurgency, in describing his sudden intrusion into the actions of the revolutionary junta, nor in underscoring his meteoric career as a founder of Argentine institutions does Galván Moreno proceed as innovator or revisionist. Rather, utilizing the researches of Ricardo Levene and others, he seeks to portray "a real and complete image" of a much-neglected patriot.

As the biographer of Rivadavia, Monteagudo, San Martín, O'Higgins, and Martí, Galván Moreno is well prepared, both in mind and spirit, for the eulogistic approach. For modern Argentines, his life of Moreno may serve as a useful antidote to post-Perón disillusionment; for American students, the scholarly works of Levene remain more useful.

State University of New York,  
Buffalo

HAROLD F. PETERSON

*Ideario de mayo.* Compilation and preliminary study by NARCISO BINAYÁN. Buenos Aires, 1960. Editorial Kapelusz. Index. Pp. lxvii, 565. Paper.

From the *Gaceta de Buenos Aires* and other contemporary published sources Narciso Binayán has selected a useful collection of documents relating to the revolution in Buenos Aires from 1810 to 1816. They deal with the outbreak and course of the Revolución de Mayo, its political principles, constitutional experiments, and its conflicts with the provinces. Materials are also included bearing on the educational ideals of the revolution, its attitude toward Indians and Negroes, and policies of revolutionary governments toward immigration, regulation of trade, and taxation. The broad scope of the collection is noteworthy. In most cases entire documents are printed rather than fragments and citations are always provided to the sources from which they were taken. Many of the items included are articles

written by Mariano Moreno, Gregorio Funes, Bernardo Monteagudo, and Camilo Henríquez.

The editor's introductory essay attempts to relate the Revolución de Mayo to a secular struggle in Europe between "germanismo" (liberty) and "romanismo" (authority). This section might well have been omitted, but Binayán proceeds to discuss interestingly such controversial aspects of the revolution as the influence of Francisco Suárez (it is minimized), the "máscara de Fernando VII" (pretense is denied), democracy in the revolution (it was carried out by a minority). The desire to avoid Napoleonic domination at a moment when the absence of the monarch brought to the fore long-latent notions like those of the *comuneros* in sixteenth-century Spain and their predecessors in the tradition of medieval Castilian constitutionalism, is given as the principal reason for revolt in 1810. On the whole the essay defends a moderate liberal interpretation of the revolution against recent revisionism.

Vassar College

CHARLES C. GRIFFIN

*Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century.* By H. S. FERNS. Oxford, 1960. Oxford University Press. Index. Pp. 517. 63s.

Professor Ferns' dispassionate account of the Anglo-Argentine connection between 1806 and the financial crisis of the 1890s is an effective answer to those nationalist Argentine historians who like to ascribe all their country's ills to the machinations of British imperialism. The author is as harsh on the irresponsibility of the Barings and on the "foolishness and greed" of some British capitalists as any patriotic *porteño* could wish. But he also demonstrates that the really large profits from ranching, commercial agriculture, and speculation in rural and urban real estate went to native Argentines; in some areas the price of farm land rose more than one thousand per cent in less than a decade. To the British were left the "less rewarding and more demanding" construction of railways, gasworks, sewers, and electric power plants, and unfortunate investments in government bonds. A few foreign companies made spectacular profits, but on the whole the results were bleak enough to justify the "stern and repeated warnings" of *The Economist* against Argentine securities.

As Professor Ferns also demonstrates, Argentina, unlike some other Latin American nations, never lost her political sovereignty. The Foreign Office, following Castlereagh's wise precedent, repeatedly refused to come to the rescue of unlucky investors; as Salisbury bluntly told a bondholders' committee in 1891, "Her Majesty's Government [is not] in the least degree disposed to encroach on the func-