a skillful examination of the overall military situation in the Southwest, Hall concludes that the Confederate campaign never had more than an infinitesimal chance of success. Perhaps more than two paragraphs could have been devoted to Reilly's mission to Chihuahua and Sonora, for even momentary Confederate diplomatic successes were a rarity, but this is a minor criticism. This unbiased, carefully researched volume is a solid contribution to the literature of the Civil War.

THOMAS A. BELSER, JR.
Auburn University


Despite the solemn promises on the dust-jacket and in the preface that this volume would give all aspects of the Civil War—economic and political—and would assess the interplay between civil and military power, the book relates exclusively (with but the most casual, and often inaccurate, references to other things) to military events. The point of view, as might be expected from two retired colonels, are those of tactics and strategy. It is not a compact history. It is, however, a convenient reference work for battle details, number of soldiers, equipment, movement, and placement of troops in campaigns. It is, too, a revelation of the narrow concepts of war that prevailed among professional soldiers during the Civil War.

WILLIAM B. HESSLELTINE
University of Wisconsin


Future generations will regard 1952-1960 as the era of one-volume biographies of Lincoln. Several of considerable merit appeared prior to Luthin's, and attracted a great deal of public attention. Luthin's Lincoln differs from the others in being the most thorough, comprehensive, and scholarly of the lot. His bibliography and notes are unbelievably complete. He used everything, old and new, published and unpublished. As the title indicates, the author's approach to his subject is realistic. Taking nothing on faith, he attempts to portray Lincoln as he actually was. Most Lincoln biographers labor under the strong pressure imposed by the reputation of the nation's leading hero. McClellan therefore gets blamed for most of Lincoln's troubles in 1861 and 1862. Luthin's account of that affair, however, comes close to making Lincoln responsible for McClellan's military failures.

The author spent fifteen years on this biography. He would have produced an imposing masterpiece had he spent a year or two more eliminating small factual errors, stylistic clichés—elections, for example, always 'rage,' while actually political campaigns do that—deleting unnecessary repetition and verbiage, and adding literary polish.

WILLIAM E. BARINGER
University of Florida


Originally presented as the Commonwealth Fund Lectures, this work by Professor Van Alstyne is a convincing attempt to deal with the growth of the United States within a framework of modern nationalism and, particularly, within the continuity of nationalistic drive toward an American empire.

Van Alstyne contends that the viewpoint of the 1898-1914 period of imperialism as a temporary aberration in the American tradition improperly removes this era from its logical position as a culmination and consolidation of the American drive to empire. En route to this contention, the author