

use of Calixto García's plan for attacking Santiago de Cuba without giving him due credit is pointed out, as is the fact that Cuban forces covered the landing of the forces from the North. Numerous incidents are listed in which American officers and men were snobbish or even insulting to Cuban fighting men, and a detailed account is given of General Shafter's refusal to permit Cuban's to participate in the victory march into the city after the Spaniards surrendered. Caustic comments are made about the difference in treatment accorded to Washington's "ragged" soldiers by Frenchmen as compared to that given to Cuban troops under similar circumstances. Nor has the careful avoidance of Cuban participation in the occupation of Cuba and in the peace negotiations been overlooked. It is worthy of note that this second edition was produced for use in Cuban centers of education because that of 1950 (Habana, Oficina del Historiador de la Ciudad) was out of print.

Time and space will not permit even the listing of a reasonable number of items scarcely connected with the war that have provoked resentment in Cuban hearts. These have been all too frequently passed off as fulminations of ultra-Cuban nationalists. One such will suffice to illustrate: Glory was given to Dr. Walter Reed for discovering the means of transmitting yellow fever, while publicists in the United States all but ignored for half a century the work of Dr. Carlos J. Finlay. Only under pressure did Dr. Reed agree even to consider his experiments and correct theory. As long as Dr. Reed's bust is in the Hall of Fame without honor being properly accorded to Dr. Finlay this will remain a festering sore that no sacrifice of businessmen or confession on the part of diplomats can heal.

Studies comparable to this are needed on all phases of United States—Cuban relations before a full understanding of the subject will be possible. Similar studies by Cubans of their own failures will also do much to iron out the difficulties between these two nations which so much need to be on good terms with each other.

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The Failure of Union. Central America, 1824-1960. By THOMAS L. KARNES. Chapel Hill, 1961. University of North Carolina Press. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 277. \$6.00.

For the past one hundred and thirty-odd years, an effective and lasting union has eluded the states of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. On no less than twenty-five different occasions their leaders have met in vain at the conference table to

discuss union. Why they have failed to implement this dream is the major question posed by the present study. Generally, union has failed because of defective representative government, Costa Rica's isolationist attitude, and nationalism—a lack of it in the earlier days and a surfeit, at the state level, in the more recent period. Other factors encouraging separatism have been poor communications, weak economic ties, a rugged topography, ignorance of the masses, an insufficiency of experienced leaders, and the jealousies and ambitions of rival municipalities and provinces. Small wonder indeed that Central Americans have even tried to unite at all, a tribute to their optimism.

In the beginning chapters, the author discusses the pertinent background for separatism, the step toward independence, and the Central American Republic (1824-1839)—its birth, life, and death. Chapter five evaluates the British impact upon Central America and especially the activities of Frederick Chatfield, the leading British representative from 1834 to 1852. Chapter six treats the eight attempts to re-establish the Republic from 1842 to 1863. And the final three chapters trace the unionist movement from 1871 to the present, including an excellent analysis of the American contribution in the twentieth century. In brief, this is a well-written survey—the first in English—on a key theme in Central America's history. Though by no means definitive, it is authoritative and useful, reflecting the level of scholarship in this particular field.

Considering the nature of the volume, the complexity of the topic, and the prejudiced materials involved, we can hardly expect this study to satisfy the specialist's thirst for depth and exactness. The sketch of constitutional developments during the Republic leaves much to be desired and reveals little awareness of the issues in the secession crisis of 1838-1839. For example, it shows no appreciation for Los Altos' role in the controversy over reforms and in the unionist movement of the 1840's. Moreover, the author minimizes the effect that the territorial disputes with Great Britain had upon the union movement. He does not mention the British occupation of Ruatán in April, 1839, the two blockades of 1842 and 1844, and the Francisco Castellón mission to Europe as a result of the second blockade—all crucial milestones in the unionist movement of Central America and in Chatfield's attitude toward it.

Dr. Karnes correctly refutes the long-standing assertion that Great Britain and Chatfield had helped to bring down the Republic. And it is also true that Great Britain never knowingly encouraged

a divide-and-conquer policy in Central America. But whether England knew it or not is beside the point since she did follow Chatfield's lead—the two blockades, for example. And from March, 1839, forward, the British consul very definitely pursued an anti-unionist policy and involved himself deeply in the internal affairs of Central America. Without question, he was one of the most clever and devoted career men in the foreign service, an imperialist *par excellence*. And the techniques he used to formulate policy on the grounds are little short of amazing. They cannot be ascertained from the general correspondence alone (F.O. 15); and that is the main failing of the chapter "Great Britain and the Federation." To understand Chatfield, it is imperative to consult additional materials in the Public Record Office, the newspaper holdings of the Bancroft Library in Berkeley, as well as the consular dispatches of French, Belgian, and American agents.

Criticism of this type, however, can be expected of any survey and especially one dealing with a highly controversial theme. Until new monographs correct the author's interpretations, this study will have to be accepted as the standard authority.

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