

systematic destruction frightened the royalists. The king sent Morillo to pacify the royalists, not to conquer the patriots.

When Boves held Caracas he carried into effect his theory of social equality, yet he was uneasy, and not because the social pyramid was inverted. He saw that with peace would come a return of royal authority. Only in conflict could he maintain his supremacy, so he returned to the battlefield, and was killed at Urica.

When Morillo arrived with his 11,000 troops—all white—the real fight for independence began. Morillo's officers made fun of the ragged llaneros, treated them as inferior humans, forgetting that it was they and not Spaniards in brilliant uniforms who had destroyed the republic of Bolívar. The troops of Boves little by little joined the patriots and fought against the Spaniards.

One cannot read this study of Uslar Pietri without being profoundly disturbed. What is its lesson for the present?

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JANE DE GRUMMOND

*Peru.* By R. J. OWENS. London, 1963. Oxford University Press. Royal Institute of International Affairs. Notes. Maps. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 195.

The small but presentable books on Latin American countries written under the sponsorship of the Royal Institute of International Affairs are unquestionably useful. Naturally some are better than others and the reviews in the *HAHR* are of varied enthusiasm. For example, the Mexico tome by Cline has sparked a powerful review by Simpson (*HAHR*, May, 1963). The Cline book and the Simpson review are exciting. I am afraid that the Peru tome cannot excite the same response. The author is a Lecturer in the English Department at the University of the West Indies. From 1950 to 1956 Dr. Owens taught in Lima at Markham College and St. Paul's College.

One can find only a minor number of factual errors, which is to the credit of the author. Some interpretations are controversial and APRA enthusiasts might not like the statement, "The old role of APRA . . . has been taken over by a new movement, called Acción Popular and led by Fernando Belaunde Terry . . ." The historical part is far too sketchy, which leads to dangerous oversimplification. One wonders if a good Latin American history textbook is not a better source for acquaintance. As in many of the other volumes the economic part—development, finance, production, trade, investment, communications—is heavy with statistics. We all know the shortcomings of statistics when dealing with Latin America. Furthermore,

the book will soon be out of date—indeed it is already. For myself, I think that the book should have had a chapter dealing with literature, art, or culture in general. For example, there is not a word about Ricardo Palma, García Calderón, Ciro Alegría, and many others. The style is monotonous—the whole book is dull. But I repeat, the book fulfills a useful purpose. Perfection is impossible in this kind of book but it could have been better—some other books in this series are.

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CHARLES W. ARNADE

*30 años de historia argentina.* By JUAN JOSÉ REAL. Buenos Aires, 1962. Ediciones Actualidad Prólogo. Notes. Index. Pp. 254. Paper.

It is rare to find an Argentine political figure engaged in extensive self-criticism but such is the case in this thought-provoking volume devoted to Argentine politics since 1930. Its author, now a printer by trade, was for many years a militant in the Argentine Communist Party and a member of its central committee. Expelled in 1953 for advocating unity with the Peronists, he withdrew from all political activity and devoted himself to studying the national scene and re-examining his basic position. The result is this volume directed to the younger generation and particularly to Argentine workers with whose interests the author identifies himself.

The book itself is a combination historical analysis and political tract, with occasional autobiographical references. In reviewing (rather than reconstructing) the events of the past thirty years, Real sees basic continuities at work and a repetitive pattern in the overthrows of Yrigoyen, Perón, and Frondizi. Each of these men, regardless of differences, was the leader of a movement with popular and nationalist roots; each in turn was opposed by a league of rightist and leftist groups and in each case the movement fell, yielding power to what the author calls the antinational oligarchy.

Real regards the popular nationalist movement as a permanent force in Argentine politics regardless of the external forms it has taken, yrigoyenismo, peronismo, frondicismo. Heterogeneous in social composition and vague in specific program, this movement has nevertheless represented the true interests of the workers, he argues, because those interests lie in the growth of a balanced national economy based on the development of power resources and heavy industry as well as agriculture. That the Argentine workers failed to appreciate this and through their passivity contributed to the ultimate collapse of Yri-