

officials and lobbyists in Washington, D. C.

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The Land Divided, The World United.

By PAUL RINK. New York, 1963.
Julian Messner, Inc. Index. Pp. 189.
\$3.95.

There must be some mistake. This book was sent to me to review, but a more appropriate addressee would be my eleven-year old son. But, *no importa*, my son says the book is "neat," and I have had a chance to look over a young peoples' history of a subject very close to my heart. Wisdom tells me to end the review here because I am not qualified to comment upon children's literature, whereas as a historian I might say some unkind things about an author who, from the description on the book jacket, is apparently pleasant, sincere, and honest. I am compelled, however, to comment that the book is heavily indebted to Gerstle Mack's *The Land Divided* for more than its title and that there are loud echoes of Miles P. DuVal (*Cadiz to Cathay, And The Mountains Will Move*), Tracy Robinson (*Fifty Years at Panama*), and Andre Siegfried (*Suez and Panama*), among others. Aside from its reliance upon secondary sources (all of which are at least twenty years old), there are some serious inaccuracies, for example, the description of William Nelson Cromwell as an employee of Philippe Bunau-Varilla. I wonder, really, if we should not raise our standards and insist that even (or especially) young peoples' histories cite sources properly and introduce their readers to the wonderful world of documentation.

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La revolución cubana. By CLAUDE JULIEN. Translated by MARIO TRAJTENBERG. Montevideo, 1961. Ediciones Marcha. Index. Pp. 259. Paper.

Claude Julien is the justly renowned correspondent of *Le Monde* for the Western Hemisphere. His first-hand ac-

count of the Cuban revolution covers the period from early 1958, when Castro was only a thorn in Batista's flesh, to late 1960, when he had become a fixation in the American mind. This defines the scope of the work: it is but a journalistic account, and it covers its subject only in part.

But within these limitations the book discharges its purpose quite well: it retells the main events of the period and it offers a reasonable interpretation thereof. Julien's thesis—not an indisputable one, of course—is that the Cuban revolution, being unduly pressed by the American government to choose between alignment with Russia or alignment with the United States, was forbidden neutralism, the only policy under which Cuba could have simultaneously achieved her economic emancipation from and maintained friendly ties with the United States. The author accounts, in turn, for this American policy by the executive and legislative powers' inability to adapt themselves rapidly to changing world conditions.

The book is noteworthy in two respects. First, it pays attention to the internal conditions, particularly those created by the Catholic Church, which tended to reinforce the American pressures. Second, though it does reach conclusions and evaluations, it is sufficiently detached and cool-headed to merit the scholar's attention. Its concern, clearly, is to try to understand—a rare finality in a subject in which most writers have contented themselves with trying to fix the blame.

LESLIE DEWART
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Cuba no es una isla. By SOL ARGÜEDAS. México, 1961. Ediciones Era, S. A. Illustrations. Index. Pp. 205. Paper.

In racy journalistic style Sol Argüedas writes with passion of the invasion of the Bay of Pigs. She tells of being the only woman and one of the few Spanish-speaking foreign newspaper representatives to be invited by Castro's Ministry of Communications to go to the combat zone. Proceeding to

the battle front, the author witnessed some of the flotsam and jetsam of conflict: the dead, the wounded, prisoners, and weary *milicianos*. From them she extracted personal interest stories of bravery, of disillusionment, and of patriotism. The invaders' previous training in the United States, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Puerto Rico is described, including speeches to the volunteers by President Ydígoras of Guatemala. Training maneuvers were led by Lithuanians and Hungarians. A parachutist, for example, experienced only one practice jump—off a barrel—before returning to native Cuban soil as a fighting man.

The book is replete with messages of support for Castro from "the Chinese people," from Uruguayan labor unions, and reports of demonstrations of sympathy in Vietnam, France, and Czechoslovakia. The author is quick to defend against any criticism of the revolutionary regime, as when she writes: "the revolutionary government prevented a blood bath in Cuba by punishing the criminals and not permitting the people to take the law into their own hands." She declares that she heard "hundreds" of sincere Catholics pray for the health and long life of Castro and demanding that falangist priests be sent to the wall! In its conclusion this polemic claims a Cuban victory over imperialism, hunger, illiteracy, clericalism, and tyranny. The theme—Cuba is not an island—is that in each country Cuba's victory will not fail to have its influence.

WILLARD F. BARBER

Washington, D. C.

Strike in the West. The Complete Story of the Cuban Crisis. By JAMES DANIEL and JOHN G. HUBBELL. New York, 1963. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Index. Pp. 180. \$3.50.

Addressing themselves to the October, 1962, phase of the Cuban problem, the authors endeavor to unfold the confused events. They report that Khrushchev seemed intent on a trip to the United States to resolve the Berlin issue. At the U. N. "advocates of a deal felt that it would be easier for Kennedy to sell out

West Berlin." Meanwhile, the wily Russian secretly strengthened his hand by pouring military equipment and missiles into Cuba. Daniel and Hubbell mention the warnings which this action evoked, and they include the official denials of an enemy buildup. The authors explain well the deadly seriousness of the Soviet threat in Cuba: falling behind in ICBMs, the Russians intended to narrow the gap with IRBMs strategically positioned in the Western Hemisphere.

Once the extent of the peril became clear, the president's anger is told movingly. Robert Kennedy emerges as the major opponent of a military solution, while Adlai Stevenson is absolved, and Senator Fulbright is presented as an actionist. Regardless of the shifts in position taken by his advisors, the president, of course, ultimately was responsible for policy. He led from the tremendous strength of a fully alerted military establishment, the mobilization of Latin American support, and unity of the NATO partners.

The authors unfortunately have nothing to contribute to the information already available to any assiduous reader. They have no explanation for the slowness of the administration in recognizing danger, but they lodge the blame in the White House rather than with intelligence reporting. They praise the performance of the armed forces, for, indeed, Cuba was a valuable exercise, but they have no elaboration for the assertion that already, on 26 September, General LeMay ordered the Tactical Air Command to be ready for action by 20 October. They raise many questions but answer none. The narrative builds nicely to a climax of the mighty "good guy" getting the drop on the villain and staring him down. But then the crisis is portrayed as generating false hopes of liberation inside Cuba.

The title is taken from the eighth century advice of the Chinese Tu Yu to "make a noise in the East, and strike in the West." Tu Yu was commenting on the pioneer 500 B.C. military treatise of Sun Tzu, but Daniel and Hubbell never make clear the connection between their cute title and the contents