

the battle front, the author witnessed some of the flotsam and jetsam of conflict: the dead, the wounded, prisoners, and weary *milicianos*. From them she extracted personal interest stories of bravery, of disillusionment, and of patriotism. The invaders' previous training in the United States, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Puerto Rico is described, including speeches to the volunteers by President Ydígoras of Guatemala. Training maneuvers were led by Lithuanians and Hungarians. A parachutist, for example, experienced only one practice jump—off a barrel—before returning to native Cuban soil as a fighting man.

The book is replete with messages of support for Castro from "the Chinese people," from Uruguayan labor unions, and reports of demonstrations of sympathy in Vietnam, France, and Czechoslovakia. The author is quick to defend against any criticism of the revolutionary regime, as when she writes: "the revolutionary government prevented a blood bath in Cuba by punishing the criminals and not permitting the people to take the law into their own hands." She declares that she heard "hundreds" of sincere Catholics pray for the health and long life of Castro and demanding that falangist priests be sent to the wall! In its conclusion this polemic claims a Cuban victory over imperialism, hunger, illiteracy, clericalism, and tyranny. The theme—Cuba is not an island—is that in each country Cuba's victory will not fail to have its influence.

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Strike in the West. The Complete Story of the Cuban Crisis. By JAMES DANIEL and JOHN G. HUBBELL. New York, 1963. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Index. Pp. 180. \$3.50.

Addressing themselves to the October, 1962, phase of the Cuban problem, the authors endeavor to unfold the confused events. They report that Khrushchev seemed intent on a trip to the United States to resolve the Berlin issue. At the U. N. "advocates of a deal felt that it would be easier for Kennedy to sell out

West Berlin." Meanwhile, the wily Russian secretly strengthened his hand by pouring military equipment and missiles into Cuba. Daniel and Hubbell mention the warnings which this action evoked, and they include the official denials of an enemy buildup. The authors explain well the deadly seriousness of the Soviet threat in Cuba: falling behind in ICBMs, the Russians intended to narrow the gap with IRBMs strategically positioned in the Western Hemisphere.

Once the extent of the peril became clear, the president's anger is told movingly. Robert Kennedy emerges as the major opponent of a military solution, while Adlai Stevenson is absolved, and Senator Fulbright is presented as an actionist. Regardless of the shifts in position taken by his advisors, the president, of course, ultimately was responsible for policy. He led from the tremendous strength of a fully alerted military establishment, the mobilization of Latin American support, and unity of the NATO partners.

The authors unfortunately have nothing to contribute to the information already available to any assiduous reader. They have no explanation for the slowness of the administration in recognizing danger, but they lodge the blame in the White House rather than with intelligence reporting. They praise the performance of the armed forces, for, indeed, Cuba was a valuable exercise, but they have no elaboration for the assertion that already, on 26 September, General LeMay ordered the Tactical Air Command to be ready for action by 20 October. They raise many questions but answer none. The narrative builds nicely to a climax of the mighty "good guy" getting the drop on the villain and staring him down. But then the crisis is portrayed as generating false hopes of liberation inside Cuba.

The title is taken from the eighth century advice of the Chinese Tu Yu to "make a noise in the East, and strike in the West." Tu Yu was commenting on the pioneer 500 B.C. military treatise of Sun Tzu, but Daniel and Hubbell never make clear the connection between their cute title and the contents

of their volume. The authors have written an interesting book, but it has no more weight than a morning newspaper. Far from being "a brilliant reconstruction of one of the central events of our time," as the flyleaf proclaims, this is but an entertaining pedestrian account.

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Historia diplomática de Colombia, 1810-1934. By RAIMUNDO RIVAS. Bogotá, 1961. Imprenta Nacional de Colombia. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Bibliography. Indices. Pp. 812. Paper.

A century and a quarter of Colombia's diplomatic history, from the inception of the independence period (1810) to 1934, forms the substance of this work. Nineteen chapters of narrative, chronologically arranged, then topically by nation, and a concluding essay take the reader, in a fairly succinct fashion, through the maze of boundary disputes, difficulties with the United States and the major European powers, and, by 1934, the peaceful settlement of the bulk of Colombia's major historic diplomatic problems. Space does not permit a detailed description of the wide range of topics, incidents, claims, and counter-claims which are covered in this book.

Although possessing one of the richest foreign ministry archives in the Americas, Colombia has not seen fit to permit any scholars, save a very few nationals and a handful of foreigners, access to it. Thus, any book drawn from sources in the Archivo de Relaciones Exteriores is more than welcome. In this case, it is doubly so, since Raimundo Rivas (1889-1946) not only spent much of three decades (1913-1946) in the archives but, thanks to his earlier *Relaciones internacionales entre Colombia y los Estados Unidos. 1810-1850* (Bogotá, 1915) and his edition of *Escritos de don Pedro Fernández Madrid. Tomo I* (Bogotá, 1932), had clearly established himself as Colombia's leading diplomatic historian. Yet, despite Rivas' eminence as a student in

this field, and despite his several important diplomatic missions for Colombia, the book, which he had completed in 1935, was not to see publication for a quarter of a century, again illustrating the timorousness of Colombian officialdom regarding its diplomatic archives.

In the main, these apprehensions are without basis. As Rivas' book so clearly shows, Colombian diplomacy from 1810 to 1934 was based on policies of national self-interest and selfless idealism, with the latter predominating. Colombia's consistent adherence to the principle of peaceful arbitration of disputes and to the grand Bolivarian design of an Inter-American system of cooperation are eloquent testimony to the lasting influence of the statesmanship of Pedro Gual (1783-1862), Pedro Fernández Madrid (1817-1875), and Manuel Ancizar (1812-1882).

Students of intra-Latin American relations, as well as those concerned with the relations of the United States and Colombia, will profit much from this book. Colombianists can hardly afford to ignore it. For those interested in the internal history of Colombia, Rivas renders an important service. He clearly demonstrates the basically negative attitudes—intrinsically isolationist—of the legislative power and does much to strengthen the impression that very few executives (save Santander, Mosquera, and Rafael Núñez) really wielded much influence over Colombian foreign policy but, rather, followed the lead of their foreign ministers.

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Cuatro años de democracia. By ISAÍAS MEDINA ANGARITA. Prologue by ARTURO USLAR PIETRI. Caracas, 1963. Pensamiento Vivo, C. A. Pp. 176. Paper.

One of the major points of controversy in recent Venezuelan political history is the October, 1945, Revolution and the events surrounding it. The 1963 presidential campaign revived the controversy, and it has been extended by the posthumous publication of this auto-