

sources dealing with the problem of Jews and *conversos*. The word *marrano* is more than once translated as "swine, a term of opprobrium" (e.g., p. 270), without mentioning the possibility of a two-fold derivation of this word (from the Hebrew *mar'e*, "apparent," meaning the crypto-Jews, and from the Arabic *muharram*, "forbidden," for swine meat).

The study ends with an appendix intended to disprove the claims of Américo Castro and C. Sánchez Albornoz that the Jews contributed to the development of Spanish racial and religious fanaticism as well as to the policies frequently adopted by the Inquisition in Spain. Baer concentrates on one legalistic point, the use of the *pesquisa* and informers (*malsines*) in the inquisitorial processes. He ignores, however, all other more prominent arguments—for example, that Torquemada, the Great Inquisitor, was of Jewish descent, as was the head of the Order of St. Jerome, Alonso de Oropesa.

Thus, because of a certain partial attitude, Baer's conclusions cannot be regarded as a definitive judgment of this period. The role of the Jews in the development of Spain is far more transcendental and complex than the present study shows.

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VICENTE CANTARINO

La España que conquistó al Nuevo Mundo. 2nd ed. By RODOLFO PUIGGRÓS. Buenos Aires, 1965. Ediciones Siglo Veinte. Bibliography. Pp. 222. Paper. \$2.10.

This Marxist interpretation of sixteenth-century Spain was written by an Argentine historian whose previous studies have dealt with the economy and party politics of the River Plate. Puiggrós argues one principal thesis: that the discovery of the New World was for Spain a major disaster, since it provided the moribund Castilian aristocracy with the resources for crushing the bourgeois and democratic elements which were carrying Spain from medieval "feudalism" into modernization and progress. In a series of essays averaging from three to five pages and virtually uncontaminated by footnotes, Puiggrós first seeks to establish the conditions existing at about 1492. By then, he states, a prolonged class struggle by townsmen and serfs against the nobles had resulted in the latter's defeat; the country had been unified; and it had arrived at the take-off point into capitalism.

The acquisition of the Indies radically transformed this whole

picture. Despite the key role of the Catalán-Aragonese bourgeoisie in launching Colón's voyages and its recognized expertise in Mediterranean techniques of commerce and banking, it was barred from Castile's America. This permitted the previously vanquished Castilian "feudalism" to revive, monopolize the wealth and power of the New World, and reimpose its reactionary, parasitic grip upon the Spanish people. With Charles V, an alliance of Crown and nobles crushed the uprising of the Comuneros, a bourgeois-democratic movement that could have anticipated the English and French Revolutions by creating in Spain the first modern middle-class state. The result was the decadent Spain of Charles V, the prey of Fugger and Welser exploitation, sunk for centuries to come in poverty and apathy.

This often inaccurate and misleading account fails to convince, for it grossly oversimplifies the effects of the *Empresa de las Indias* upon Spain. Puiggrós, indeed, despite his six-page bibliography, shows himself inadequately equipped to bring off such a radical reappraisal of the Siglo de Oro. In many respects his book represents a curious amalgam of outdated scholarship, traditional prejudices, and Catalan-Aragonese bias against Castile. He also shows a horror of unbalanced budgets, deficit financing, and international borrowing that would do credit to an economic conservative and a doctrinaire formulism that compares unfavorably with recent more skillful Marxist analyses.

There are many other misconceptions. To claim that it was the nobles who largely enjoyed the profits of the American empire is to misunderstand the nature of Spanish absolute monarchy and its controls over wealth and power overseas. To imagine that barring the Catalán bourgeoisie meant turning the Indies over to the reactionary aristocracy is to ignore the significant native and Italian middle-class trading and financial elements in Castile. It is not surprising that the bibliography omits the works of Lapeyre, Verlinden, and Chaunu. A simplistic nineteenth-century view of the Comuneros as champions of progress, liberalism, and nationalism can no longer be accepted in the face of abundant evidence of their regionalist, traditionalist, and isolationist motives. Charles V's policies are often open to criticism, but any balanced appraisal of this reign would note also the demographic, urban, and commercial growth, the striking religious, intellectual, and cultural advances, and the astonishing display of Spanish energies in Europe and America by many social groups ranking well below the high aristocracy.

This work was first published in Mexico in 1961. The second edi-

tion appears without change except for a prologue in which the author reaffirms his contentions. But while properly informed and competent Marxist scholarship can be expected to yield fresh and provocative results, Puiggrós' polemic does not measure up to such a standard.

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Guns, Sails, and Empires: Technological Innovation and the Early Phases of European Expansion, 1400-1700. By CARLO M. CIPOLLA. New York, 1965. Pantheon Books. Pantheon Studies in Social History. Illustrations. Notes. Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 192. \$5.00.

This book is an introduction to what the author calls the "Vasco da Gama era." One may contest such a name for an epoch whose outstanding deed was the discovery of the New World. What the author treats is West European expansion to the Far East. He discusses the military means by which the Far East was successfully conquered, rightly declaring that motives and determination which may be traced as far back as the thirteenth century could not be realized without certain material means. The book studies at length the technical advancement of these means—artillery, sea vessels, and the combination of both, the armed ships. Heavy artillery used for besieging cities was followed by light and more maneuverable field artillery. Heavy "floating fortresses" moved by oarsmen gave way to light sailing vessels, the galleons. Arming these light ships and replacing oarsmen with sails and soldiers with guns gave the European powers the tools for conquering the Far East.

According to the author, this development can be credited to the cooperation of the West European powers on the Atlantic. The Mediterranean countries, including Spain, stuck to their traditional form of vessels and warfare, so that they were excluded from participating in the conquest of the Far East. Relying on fleets rather than on large armies, these powers could not penetrate the inland of conquered countries, limiting themselves essentially to the occupation of ports and strongholds. Although the Moslems were aware of the evolution which was taking place in the Christian countries, they never achieved a comparable development, either in guns or ships. The same was the case in India and China. Thus, argues Cipolla, underdevelopment in sea warfare brought about the ultimate defeat of these countries.

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