

Interesse nacional e política externa. By JOSÉ HONÓRIO RODRIGUES. Rio de Janeiro, 1966. Editôra Civilização Brasileira. Retratos do Brasil. Notes. Appendix. Index. Pp. 232.

The volume under review is the latest in a series of studies by José Honório Rodrigues calling for a reassessment of Brazil's current domestic and foreign policies in the light of his reinterpretation of the nation's past. It draws heavily upon his *Brasil e Africa, outro horizonte* (1961); *Aspirações nacionais, interpretação histórico-política* (1963); and *Conciliação e reforma, um desafio histórico-político* (1965). It also shares many of the strengths and weaknesses of these earlier works. Like the latter two it is a compilation of articles and essays published at different times in response to changing circumstances and thus suffers somewhat from repetition and lack of chronological unity. Above all it is a coherent, well-argued polemic designed to stimulate discussion, to influence Brazilian policy makers, and to justify a highly nationalistic approach to Brazil's international relations.

The author's thesis is clear. He maintains that Brazil can and should pursue its own independent, wholly sovereign foreign policy, but that it has never done so, except briefly under Quadros and Goulart. The traditional foreign policies were formulated and executed by a few ministers of extraordinary intelligence and an admirable capacity for improvisation. However, as he seeks to demonstrate, they have seldom been fully adequate to advance the permanent national interests of the Brazilian people, which he lists in order of importance. Rodrigues credits Brazil's foreign policy successes—as in the settlement of boundary questions—to her own efforts, while attributing responsibility for failures or shortcomings in the field of foreign relations to the blindness, selfishness, and traditionalism of the ruling elite minority and to the undue influence of the Great Powers, chiefly Great Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth.

The student accustomed to detached, objective analysis of the historical process may well be disturbed by the frequently impassioned tone of this volume and may question some of the author's assertions and omissions. But he cannot fail to be impressed by the mass of evidence Rodrigues presents to buttress his thesis. Some of the material is new, and most of it is examined in a new light. The book is comprised of seven sections, each of which deals with a broad aspect of Brazilian foreign policy or of Brazil's relations with other countries or geographic areas. The succinct review of relations with the United

States to 1930, found in section 4, and the numerous commentaries on the more recent period scattered throughout the text will be of particular interest to historians in this country. The book's major new contributions to the body of knowledge about Brazilian diplomatic history are the lengthy chapter on relations with China since the colonial period, which occupies one-fifth of the text, and the appendix, a previously unpublished letter of May, 1944 from Ambassador João Neves in Lisbon to Getúlio Vargas, which illuminates an aspect of the Estado Novo's wartime policies.

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A opção brasileira. By MÁRIO PEDROSA. Rio de Janeiro, 1966. Editôra Civilização Brasileira. Notes. Pp. 311. Paper.

Brazil's Option or Crossroads for Brazil might be an appropriate title for this penetrating study of the problems facing Latin America's awakening giant. Written by a prominent and popular political-economic analyst, it is a companion to an earlier work entitled *A opção imperialista*. The book comprises six essays covering major aspects of what the author believes to be Brazil's dilemma—whether to continue as a dutiful satellite in the orbit created by “yankee imperialism” or to strike out for herself with a genuine national socio-economic revolution.

In the author's belief, his nation has yet to experience that coordinated effort of all national sectors which could promote a genuine progressive reform of its ills. To him the movement of April 1964, which displaced President João Goulart in favor of a military government, represented a middle-class spasm of fear toward Goulart's ultra-liberalism intensified by foreign interests. He feels that the movement did not and can never become the true revolution which it has been called, and that its main result has been the firm attachment of Brazil to the United States in the “war of ideologies” to contain Communism. He argues that his thesis is proven by Marshal Castelo Branco's swift agreement to send Brazilian troops to Santo Domingo a year later to support a revived American-sponsored policy of hemispheric intervention. Such actions, he asserts, have betrayed and sidetracked the movements for agrarian and industrial reforms which he alleges to have reached a peak during the Goulart regime. He finds ultimate hope for the future, however, in the growing millions of Brazil's youth—a sector which he believes will never accept