

A fourth source of documentation apparently was not consulted. It is the large collection of correspondence between Comonfort and Santiago Vidaurri in the Archivo General del Estado in Monterrey, N.L.

Probably limitations of space restricted the documents included to those considered to be significant. In any such choice the frame of reference of the author is apparent, but this does not take away from the quality of the selection. Few documents of major importance were eliminated.

Curiously only one letter from Comonfort to his daughters was included; yet there are several others which describe the period of his exile. One in particular is both interesting and significant, detailing the dangerous maneuvering necessary to cross the Rio Grande and reenter the country in 1861.

In summary, the volume is a valuable though incomplete contribution to the scholarship of the early Reform Period. The study of Comonfort's influence and that of the moderate Liberals upon that movement has yet to appear in print. Whoever undertakes the task will be deeply indebted to Rosaura Hernández for the significant points made in her biographical study and particularly for the availability of the documents collected in this volume.

University of Georgia

RAY F. BROUSSARD

The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914. The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict. By PETER CALVERT. Cambridge, 1968. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge Latin American Studies. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. ix, 331. \$9.50.

In this study Peter Calvert provides an excellent analysis of British diplomacy in the Anglo-American conflict over Mexico during the period from 1910 to January 1914. Thoroughly grounded in British sources, he carefully examines British objectives and the formulation and execution of British policy throughout the period.

The volume does not purport to be a history of Mexico, despite its title. The author explains that his object is confined to assessing the Anglo-American conflict, and consequently he deals with Mexican events only as background for the diplomatic dispute. This explains his greater attention to British sources. Calvert's Mexican research focuses particularly on the 1910-1912 period. Although he employs Isidro Fabela's *Historia diplomática de la Revolución Mexicana*, he fails to cite the more significant *Documentos históricos de*

la Revolución Mexicana. While he does use Madero's archive, the failure to consult either the Archivo Histórico Defensa Nacional or the Archivo Relaciones Exteriores Mexicanas leaves a notable gap, particularly in a diplomatic study.

Calvert's grounding in American sources is not as thorough as his extensive use of British materials. While citing some collections of private papers, and the State Department Decimal Files, he employed neither Post Records nor the files of other government departments. There are no references to the four-volume collection of "Correspondence of Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan with President Woodrow Wilson," which contains significant exchanges not found in the papers of either. As a result, Calvert's volume is useful chiefly for its analysis of British policy in the Anglo-American conflict. Since the volume focuses mainly on British actions, it is rather striking that the conclusion devotes considerable attention to American objectives. The decision to terminate the study in January 1914 results in an abrupt ending. Whether that month constitutes a breaking point, as the author contends, is open to debate.

Calvert views British actions benevolently. In analysing the interaction between the leading British concessionaire in Mexico, Lord Cowdray, and the Foreign Office, he contends that the government was not influenced by Cowdray, but acted out of larger policy objectives. Cowdray is depicted as the innocent victim of skulduggery by Standard Oil. While contemporary newspaper attacks on Cowdray were certainly exaggerated, the argument that he provided his views only when requested to do so by the Foreign Office seems a bit overdrawn. Calvert's conclusion that the British withdrew their admiral from Tampico solely to place full responsibility for any action upon the American commander, rather than in response to the United States government's insistence that he yield his seniority (p. 282), appears strained. As evidence, he quotes Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey's memorandum to the Admiralty, directing the withdrawal. The note is precisely the type of explanation which one would expect from a diplomat of Grey's ability to salve the feelings of the Admiralty.

Calvert's study provides a valuable and much-needed analysis of British policy in Mexico during this crucial period, though viewing events through British eyes. The United States and Mexico are considered only as they affected British policy. The weaknesses in the analysis of American and Mexican events do not detract from the value of the book as a study of British policy formulation and ob-

jectives. All students of this period who are interested in British diplomacy in Mexico will find the book valuable.

Wisconsin State University,
Oshkosh

KENNETH J. GRIEB

Organized Labor and the Mexican Revolution under Lázaro Cárdenas.

By JOE C. ASHBY. Chapel Hill, 1967. University of North Carolina Press. Notes. Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x, 350. \$7.50.

This study is the only published comprehensive survey of labor politics during the crucial 1936-1940 period, when the union structure and government-labor relations became established so firmly that they have survived to the present day. It fits nicely after Marjorie Clark's *Organized Labor in Mexico* (Chapel Hill, 1934).

Ashby explains the formation of the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM) and its relationship with the government. He covers the "labor theory" of the regime apart from a chapter on leadership and includes chapters on the three major expropriations which grew out of labor controversies: the railroads, the Laguna farm lands, and the oil industry. There is an additional chapter on other labor developments, but unfortunately it precedes the chapter on the major labor controversies. By dividing labor developments into separate aspects, each of which is traced throughout the Cárdenas period, the author obscures the interaction between the labor events and their impact on politics.

The book's major strength is in its wealth of information on government-labor relations during the growth of the CTM. The role of the Communist Party and of Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Cárdenas' labor boss, are somewhat clarified. Ashby gives little evidence for the importance which he attributes to Lombardo Toledano as a theoretician.

The book's major weakness is the contradictory way in which the author handles the ideological questions which he poses as crucial to an interpretation of the Cárdenas period. He tries to use his labor focus to clarify the extent to which the Cárdenas government was socialist and to explain why the government and its "Marxist" labor leadership moved away from revolution and socialism. Unfortunately the author cannot reconcile the anti-labor positions taken by the later Cárdenas government with the pro-labor orientation which he imputes to it. For instance, Cárdenas completely rejected labor demands that the government take action against price increases which