

to a principal result of that policy—the enduring dictatorship of the Somoza family from 1936 to date.

The book's last sentence leaves us in the air: "It is clear from this episode in our diplomatic history that United States intrusion may end a crisis, but limited intervention and a few supervised elections cannot guarantee the political stability and well-being of a nation" (p. 236). He hopes what happened in Nicaragua will not happen again. In view of this last sentence, are we to infer that "unlimited" intervention would guarantee stability and well-being? Presumably not, although he does not say so. He does not seem to favor another alternative, since he states that in the 1920s "total non-intervention seemed to lead nowhere except to chaos—a condition of course unacceptable to the United States" (p. 234). Perhaps the problem is a semantic one, since there are other undefined expressions here and there, such as "thoroughgoing intervention" (p. 232) or "outright intervention" (p. 234), whose fuzziness impedes the analysis.

Finally the author makes a brief reference to a subject which he seems to think is noncontroversial. He states flatly that in the 1920s, "although the Republican administrations did not forswear the right to intervene, they laid the groundwork for good neighborliness" (p. 1). The author thus joins other historians who have made a similarly dubious claim in no less dubious terms. One might as well say that Louis XVI "laid the groundwork" for the French Revolution, or George III for the American. The difference here is that the author and his colleagues seem to be claiming some credit for the Republican administrations in founding the Good Neighbor policy. If that is their intent they should try to make a case rather than take refuge in rhetoric. The author has expressed the hope that the Nicaraguan episode would not be repeated. If that episode is "the groundwork for good neighborliness," the Republican administrations are going to need more cautious and more persuasive defenders as bricklayers for the house that Franklin D. Roosevelt designed and built.

Social Science Research Council

BRYCE WOOD

The Panama Story. By JEAN GILBREATH NIEMEIER. Portland, 1968. Metropolitan Press. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xi, 303. \$5.95.

Journalist Jean Gilbreath Niemeier emulates the late Jules Du-bois' *Danger Over Panama* in presenting copious quotations tied to-

gether by her own thoughts and paraphrases from secondary works. In this manner she endeavors to create a history of Panama, of U.S.-Panamanian relations, and of the newspaper *Star & Herald* by offering a chronology of news stories, editorials, and materials from the unpublished papers of Albert Victor McGeachy, the Panamaborn editor of the *Star & Herald*.

Her treatment of isthmian commerce in the period from 1849 to 1900, which is stressed, proves enlightening, but the work lacks balance. The era of independence and the diplomacy and political intrigue of 1903-1940 are glossed over lightly. Important issues such as Panama's sovereignty are undeveloped. Outstanding U.S.-Panamanian problems, current canal difficulties pertaining to relocation, conversion to sea level, and the use of nuclear explosives are attenuated. Recent attitudes on U.S.-Panamanian relations are reflected without thorough analysis. For example, the 1964 crisis is handled superficially despite the availability of documentation for extensive research.

Although the book deals with U.S.-Panamanian diplomacy the *Foreign Relations* series is omitted in an extensive bibliography, which cites a nonexistent work, ostensibly written by the political scientist John Martz at age three. The author rarely presents sufficient evidence upon which to base conclusions, and when she takes a position, it is often ill-grounded. For instance, she tries to determine whether relinquishment of U.S. interests in Panama would give rise to more communist agitation or quell a source of anti-imperialist propaganda. She bases her conclusion in part on predictions of Congressman Daniel Flood, who is an unreliable source, once voted "Public Enemy Number One" by Panama's National Assembly. Also it is difficult to reconcile the writer's repeated professions of empathy for Panama and her agreement with a recent study which suggests that "the United States should simply terminate negotiations, withdraw arrangements for shared canal operation, reassert sovereignty, and abandon all plans for a new canal" (p. 254).

As a history of the *Star & Herald* and newspaper publishing on the Isthmus, the book has merit. Otherwise, contrary to claims on the dust jacket, it lacks perspicacity. It might be of value to the general reader, but only if the historical gaps were filled in.

University of Akron

SHELDON B. LISS