

pendes on and supports development in the core region. At each turn he urges us to break up the old formulations for issues into their component parts. Just as he opposes planning based on the idea of "multipurpose regions," so he rejects thinking on the basis of multipurpose slogans such as "balance v. imbalance," or "concentration v. dispersal." He urges us to stop concentrating all our concern on the global figures in national accounts, and to think more qualitatively about the kind of growth we are fomenting. Here he is reminiscent of Albert Hirschman, at any rate to a non-planner and non-economist. Friedmann even hopes that planners who adopt his approach can transcend the issue of "growth v. welfare." That would be quite a political achievement, since that issue (or, as he might say, pseudo-issue) has been the foundation of so many careers and central to so much politics, as, for example, in Brazil of the 1950s and 1960s.

This last suggestion points up the fact that in his theoretical section Friedmann purports to leave out the "political dimension" of regional policy, even though he recognizes its importance. "It belongs," he declares, "to another realm of discourse" (p. 19). But in a theory about spatial organization—the "where" of development, as he would say—it is very hard to omit political considerations. For every "where" we can read "who." That Friedmann is aware of these political issues is clear from his discussion of the Venezuelan experience. The "structural" change implicit in the Guayana project and its smaller counterparts elsewhere in the country suggests a very substantial political change as well, as he recognizes.

Consigning politics to another realm of discourse in the theoretical discussion may be the result of the author's modest refusal to intrude in someone else's professional core region. But his excellent treatment of the political dimension in Venezuelan development policy shows that no such modesty is necessary. In fact only one really gloomy thought emerges from reading this rather free survey of the social sciences. When we finally do reach the day of just one social science, that science will be Social Planning! (Sigh.)

University of California
Los Angeles

KENNETH L. KARST

Archivo Epistolar del General Mosquera. Correspondencia con el General Ramón Espina, 1835-1866. Edited by J. LEÓN HELGUERA and ROBERT H. DAVIS. Bogotá, 1966. Editorial Kelly. Illustrations. Notes. Glossary. Index. Pp. 487. Paper.

In his biographical sketch of General Tomás Cipriano de Mos-

quera, León Helguera states correctly that four leaders—Bolívar, Santander, Mosquera, and Núñez—were influential in the shaping of national development in nineteenth-century Colombia. Helguera also notes that aside from literary endeavors and brief character studies by Rafael Núñez, Raimundo Rivas, Antonio García, Joaquín Tamayo, and Joaquín Estrada Monsalve, no major documented study of Mosquera has been written. It is significant therefore that Helguera and Robert H. Davis have dedicated themselves to editing the Mosquera Archive.

The work reviewed here is the first of a projected twelve-volume collection of Mosquera's correspondence with Colombian political figures. Having completed this volume of Mosquera's correspondence with General Ramón Espina, the editors plan to publish correspondence with Lino de Pombo, Manuel Murillo Toro, Mariano Ospina Rodríguez, Pedro Alcántara Herrán, and José Antonio Páez, to mention only a few. The significance of the task becomes apparent when we consider that they will make available to students of Colombian history documents which cover a period from 1820 to 1878.

For this volume of correspondence with General Espina, Helguera has written an excellent analysis of Mosquera's personality along with an essay on his friendship with Espina. Also helpful to the investigator is a description of the Mosquera Archive in the Archivo Central de Cauca in Popayán. Viewing the forces which shaped Mosquera's personality, Helguera concludes that he suffered from an inferiority complex for not having had the opportunity to participate directly in the *Patria Boba*. He was also overshadowed in his early life by his father and an older brother. After years of studying the *Gran General*, Helguera finds it impossible to distinguish between his personality and his official actions. What other writers have seen as contradictory in Mosquera's behavior, Helguera finds logically consistent.

Davis makes a great contribution in bringing to the reader a biographical study of the little-known but important military and political figure, General Ramón Espina. Both Helguera and Davis point out the influence of the Mosquera-Espina friendship. Davis shows, however, that Espina was apolitical and professional in his military conduct, while Mosquera adhered to a personalistic philosophy. Davis concludes that Espina was a precursor of the more professionalized militarist which has appeared in twentieth-century Latin America.

The correspondence between Mosquera and Espina has been edited with extensive notations which will prove invaluable to researchers. Such documentation points up the enthusiasm and dedication

with which the two editors have undertaken their important contribution to Colombian historical study.

University of Arizona

GEORGE A. BRUBAKER

Agrarian Reform in Colombia. By ERNEST A. DUFF. New York, 1968. Frederick A. Praeger. Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development. Map. Tables. Figure. Notes. Appendices. Glossary. Bibliography. Pp. xi, 240. \$14.00.

The question posed in this book, at least implicitly, is: can agrarian reform be carried out successfully without a sweeping sociopolitical revolution? Duff is doubtful—a surprising answer from a former Foreign Service officer. The Colombian agrarian reform is often pointed to as a reassuring token of compliance with the requirements of the Alliance for Progress, but in fact it has gone forward very slowly. The budget of INCORA, the agrarian reform agency, has been only a fifth of the amount stipulated in the land reform law of December 1961. And the emphasis in the program has shifted from land redistribution in densely populated areas to the politically easier course of colonizing marginal lands. Duff concludes that the reform has gone and will continue to go slowly—in part because of opposition from conservatives in the Colombian political and economic elites, but even more because of half-heartedness among those who supposedly favor the program.

This book, a sequel to Albert Hirschman's chapter in *Journeys toward Progress*, is more skeptical about the possibility of engineering fundamental social change from the top. Hirschman described the process of agrarian reform to mid-1962 as a "revolution by stealth," a reform carried out by a small part of the elite without the support of widespread public pressure. He ended his study with the anticipation that INCORA would now need to develop "that direct support from public opinion which had not been invoked earlier." Writing four years later, Duff concludes that INCORA has failed—indeed has not even tried—to develop a constituency for change in an organized, politically involved peasantry. He believes that INCORA and the Liberal proponents of agrarian reform have not attempted to arouse peasants to support the program because they fear that the campesinos, once awakened, might prove a political Frankenstein's monster. Ultimately the reform has been stifled because both its supporters and its opponents have a primary common interest in the continuance of political control by the upper class.

One is inclined to accept the fundamental truth of these observa-