

perspective. Events are rarely placed in their Latin American setting, and policy debates among Americans are examined in the light of their personal experience in the area rather than in the context of Latin American development. Consequently the disputes are viewed with the same insularity that characterized the participants. The author emphasizes the desire of United States army officers to "reform" Cuba socially and economically, and regards this objective as more desirable than the civilian goal of merely restoring political stability. Thus he unconsciously condones the attitude of American superiority and the resulting "teacher" outlook inherent in such proposals. Millett does not consider the practicality of broad reforms, for he assumes that remaking Cuba in the image of the United States would improve it.

Comparisons are limited to previous United States experience in Cuba and the Philippines. The Cuban constitution is compared to its United States counterpart, rather than to other Latin American constitutions. While the effects of the Cuban experience on Roosevelt's policy in other portions of Latin America are noted, Latin American reaction to the intervention receives scant mention. United States military reports frequently characterized Cuban leaders as men whose ability was comparable to that of Porfirio Díaz. This is a striking statement, but Millett does not analyze its implications. He does provide a perceptive comment on the United States Army's parochialism and isolation, mentioning the officers' conviction of its superiority to the rest of American society. He might have commented on the remarkable similarity of this attitude to that of the Latin American military, or the relation of this conviction to the officers' desire to "reform" Cuba.

The careful analysis of American policy-making during the Cuban intervention of 1906-1909 provided in this study deserves attention from all those interested in American diplomacy during the Roosevelt years. The absence of the Latin American context renders the volume essentially a two-dimensional study, but does not lessen its value in those dimensions. As an examination of American policy-making it provides a thorough consideration of the techniques and theories involved.

Wisconsin State University,
Oshkosh

KENNETH J. GRIEB

Cuba. The Making of a Revolution. By RAMÓN EDUARDO RUIZ. Am-

herst, 1968. University of Massachusetts Press. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 190. \$6.00.

This work consists of a series of essays that trace various trends in Cuban history, mostly since 1898, as an explanation of the Castro revolution. It is beautifully written, thoughtful, and sound, but the entire lack of documentation cannot be justified for a book that so largely depends on quotations or paraphrasings of other writers. In the introductory chapter Ruiz presents a fine summary of the Cuban paradox. He stresses the comparatively advanced state of Cuba and not its misery as the setting for revolution. According to him, Castro was probably not a Communist prior to his attainment of power, but, determined to break away from American domination, he turned to the Soviet Union despite the initial friendliness of Washington. Ruiz holds that Cuban society was fluid and immature, given to self-pity. Because only the Communists had a useful organization as well as a program embodying previous frustrations, he feels that Castro made a deliberate choice.

In sketching the roots of Cuban nationalism, Ruiz sets forth the Cuban version of history. According to this, the United States wrenched victory away from the rebels of 1898 and imposed a tutelage that gave Cuba an inferiority complex and distorted her economy. A provocative chapter on José Martí shows how the earlier hero established a mold for Castro's 26th of July movement. Machado and Batista receive fair consideration. The refusal of the United States to recognize Ramón Grau San Martín in 1933 seems fateful to the author, for the revolution was blunted, and Cuba's dependence on the Americans became intensified. The pattern was not to be broken despite many social welfare measures and the constitution of 1940. Hence Cuba's uneven prosperity mainly benefited upper income groups tied to the United States, while the formless middle sectors strove for luxuries like those which the rich enjoyed. Meanwhile rural unemployment grew, organized labor became corrupted, and intellectuals were bitter and alienated. Socialism, long a factor in Cuban history, became more attractive, and the Communists developed a good organization, sometimes with Batista's aid.

Ruiz ably describes the middle groups, who did not really constitute a class. The Church was very weak, and the army did not play the familiar Latin American role. The blacks he depicts as more depressed than most writers have regarded them. Strident nationalism, uniting with old revolutionary traditions and exploiting accumulated frustrations, took a militant form without any important resistance. Institu-

tions were weak and unstable; corruption saturated all aspects of life; and political leaders had no moral authority. Thus the politically gifted Castro was able to topple the regime and give the island an altogether new orientation.

Useful as this book is, the absence of documentation cannot be excused. At times Ruiz asserts too confidently what popular opinion was. He tends to favor the Cuban interpretation of events over the American, and he does not realize that foreign ownership of the Cuban sugar industry declined sharply long before Castro came to power. Nor does Ruiz show much compassion for the very large number of Cubans killed, mistreated, or exiled by the present regime. His statement that massive economic development and the expansion of the middle sectors failed to deter the revolution should unsettle policy-makers. The small community of Cuban experts will discover little that is original or new, but others should find this work a splendid introduction to a complex subject. Of course, neither this book nor any other can truly explain to general satisfaction why the Castro revolution happened.

New York University

JOHN E. FAGG

Dagger in the Heart. American Policy Failures in Cuba. By MARIO LAZO. New York, 1968. Funk and Wagnalls. Notes. Index. Pp. xviii, 426. \$5.95.

Castro's revolution, the Bay of Pigs, and the missile crisis have spawned hundreds of books and articles, some of which are informative, imaginative, or challenging, but too many of which are polemical and repetitive. Mario Lazo's book falls easily into the latter category. By comparison it most clearly resembles the 1962 anti-State Department attack of Earl E. T. Smith, *The Fourth Floor: An Account of the Castro Communist Revolution*, which blamed the Castro debacle on the proselytizing activities of liberal intellectuals, the lesser bureaucrats of Foggy Bottom's fourth floor.

Lazo, who managed a Havana law firm for thirty-five years, was born and educated in the United States and served in the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I in France. His Cuban legal office represented major American companies, and he naturally looked with suspicion on the bearded warrior of the Sierra Maestra. (His title, incidentally, was suggested by a statement of Senator William Fulbright in his memorandum of March 1961 to President Kennedy: "The Castro regime is a thorn in the flesh; but it is not a dagger in