

the heart." But Lazo, it is only fair to say, was also critical of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship, although he swears that it was never as bad as the "liberal intellectual establishment" in the American press contended. Like Smith, he believes that an unknown Castro was publicized by a sympathetic press in the United States, particularly the *New York Times* and, of course, Herbert Matthews.

Dagger in the Heart does not end, however, with Castro's triumphant entry into Havana in January 1959. Lazo remained in his Cuban law practice, trying to adjust to the regime's laws of nationalization and defending the foreign companies' interests. Being suspect to the new government, he was harassed by Castro's officials, and during the Bay of Pigs invasion he was one of the many Cubans arrested. Convinced that he was to be shot, Lazo gave up all hope until his family managed to procure his release. He still does not know why he was freed. Since April 1961 he has lived in the United States and Spain, warning against the communist menace so close to American shores and writing his account of United States-Cuban relations.

Lazo assigns the major responsibility for the Cuban 'sore—or wound—to Americans who misjudged Castro or who failed to act decisively to overthrow him. His favorite targets are Herbert Matthews; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who arrogantly condemned the military for the Bay of Pigs as a cover for his own failure as "court historian" (p. 249); Robert McNamara, who was too dovish in the missile crisis; and John F. Kennedy, who demonstrated twice (during the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis) that he lacked the will to finish off Castro's communist government.

Dagger in the Heart will be read with suspicion by scholars, who cannot accept Lazo's conclusions about Castro's rise to power. It will be welcomed, unfortunately, by many others, who, in the aftermath of Castro's affiliation with the Soviet bloc, have not stopped screaming: "I told you so!"

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The Dominican Revolt. A Case Study in American Policy. By THEODORE DRAPER. New York, 1968. Commentary. A Commentary Report. Notes. Pp. viii, 208. \$5.50.

Slightly less than four full days elapsed between the beginning of the revolt in the Dominican Republic against the government of President Donald Reid Cabral on April 24, 1965, and the landing of

American military forces in the Republic on April 28. Theodore Draper deals mainly with events during these four days and has limited himself, in his words, "to behind-the-scenes political action and decisions" relative to American policy. Thus he does not consider such matters as the assassination of Rafael L. Trujillo in 1961, the election and overthrow of Juan Bosch, military action during the American occupation, or the withdrawal of American troops.

The present publication is derived largely from articles written by the author for various journals during 1965-1966, and particularly from an article in *Commentary* in 1965. Additional material has come from personal interviews, from the memoirs of several people who were involved in the affair of 1965, and from speeches in the United States Senate by members of the Foreign Relations Committee. Since the earlier articles were based primarily on the contemporary news media, the work suffers considerably from a lack of access to official sources. But it suffers more from the author's method of mixing verified with alleged facts, and from surmises and judgments about both men and events. The thread of the story is often lost in its unwinding, and the reader is left uncertain about the relevance of a fact or the conclusion intended. Nevertheless, the main thrust of the account is reasonably clear.

According to Draper, the revolt against the Reid government began as a movement to overthrow a weak regime, ineffective in dealing with the problems of the Dominican people and not wholly divorced from the reactionary social and economic policies of the Trujillo era. The revolt had the objective of restoring Juan Bosch to office, was not Communist dominated, and might have been successful if the United States had encouraged the rebels or even remained neutral. American leaders were convinced, however, that Juan Bosch was either in alliance with Communists or would be dominated by them. Accordingly, the American government aided the opponents of the rebels, tried to establish a military junta, and, failing that, sent in troops under the pretext of safeguarding American lives and the lives of other foreigners in the Republic. Subsequently United States officials, including the president and the Secretary of State, gave ex parte, garbled, or tendentious accounts of their decisions and the alleged facts on which they were based.

Draper admits that the whole story of the American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 must await the availability of further evidence. Meanwhile he has pieced together some of the

story and has added to what he calls "the incalculable mass of words written about the Dominican crisis."

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El curso venezolano y las misiones de Irvine y de Perry en Angostura.

By JOSÉ RAFAEL FORTIQUE. Maracaibo, 1968. Privately printed. Bibliography. Pp. 86. Paper.

This brief study of the Venezuelan missions of Baptist Irvine and Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry suggests several new interpretations. United States historians of early inter-American relations have usually noticed the abortive errands of the Baltimore journalist (1818) and the War of 1812 hero (1819) only as routine incidents in evolving American policy toward the Spanish American wars for independence. To the Venezuelan historian, José Rafael Fortique, however, the missions assume wider and subtler meaning. They helped to shape the outlook of a nation in the making and to mold the legal thought of its leader, Simón Bolívar.

The author sandwiches his analyses of the two missions between an introductory commentary on Venezuelan privateering and his own translation of Perry's journal describing a riverine journey to Angostura. The privateers, argues Fortique, amply fulfilled the duties assigned them by Bolívar and, to a considerable degree, were responsible for his improved military fortunes after 1817. When they captured two American vessels, John Quincy Adams selected Irvine to seek redress from the Venezuelan government—an appointment the secretary later regretted. One of very few North Americans ever to confer with Bolívar, Irvine summarily appraised him as "a Don Quixote with ambition, but without military talents." To Fortique, the agent's conduct was aggressive and inflexible. Stimulated by this obstinacy, the Liberator composed a lengthy series of letters in which he articulated his views on neutral rights and other aspects of international law. (On this exchange, see Lewis Hanke, *HAHR* [August, 1936, 360-373 and May 1941, 258-291].)

Perry's mission, in the author's view, erred in another direction. The appearance before Angostura—300 miles up the Orinoco—of a Yankee man-of-war, bearing a renowned naval officer of high rank, compelled Venezuelan officials to negotiate under the threat of force. The incident violated the nation's sovereignty and, in Bolívar's absence, exposed the weakness of its diplomacy. Fortique views the diary of this mission—recorded by a young naval chaplain, John N.