

inaugurated by the Republic a larger portion of state revenues remained at home, and states exercised a greater degree of autonomy than under the Empire. This enabled the oligarchy to expand the militia into an effective state army and provided funds which could be lent to the hard-pressed central government. The military and economic support of the coffee planters made it possible for them to exact concessions from the Floriano Peixoto regime which led eventually to the restoration of civilian rule.

The monograph is based on manuscript collections in the archives of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Petrópolis and on a wide range of contemporary printed sources. Secondary materials are comprehensive and pertinent. Organization is effective; the style is lucid; and the ideas are coherent. The result is a readable, authoritative treatment of a crucial period in Brazilian history.

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The Shaping of Modern Brazil. By MANOEL CARDOZO *et al.* Edited by ERIC N. BAKLANOFF. Baton Rouge, 1969. Louisiana State University Press for the Latin American Studies Institute. Tables. Figures. Notes. Index. Pp. xviii, 164. \$6.50.

In February 1967 Louisiana State University sponsored a colloquium on the "modernization of Brazil." Eric Baklanoff has gathered the seven papers under the provocative title *The Shaping of Modern Brazil*. The contributors attempted somewhat unevenly to span the five hundred years from 1500 to 2000, and Manoel Cardozo had the difficult task of summarizing the 308-year colonial period in 15 pages. He did an admirable job, providing a succinct introduction to Brazilian history and one of the two best papers.

The other was Kempton Webb's look into the future by analyzing the geography of modernization. He writes with authority derived from much field work and a sensitivity for the Brazilian milieu. Webb predicts that the success of Belo Horizonte, Brasília, and the new highway system will lead to other bold ventures in which the Brazilians will put "their imprint upon their landscape with even greater confidence" (p. 156).

Eric Baklanoff exudes less confidence in his "External Factors in the Economic Development of Brazil's Heartland: The Center-South, 1850-1930." Writing almost entirely from materials in English (the exception being the *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil*), he gives major credit for Brazilian development to foreigners and for-

eign capital. Perhaps his emphasis is correct, but it would seem that the Brazilian leaders were not entirely passive. At least they should be given credit for understanding their nation's needs and seeking or allowing foreign help. If not, then the papers between Baklanoff's and Webb's fail to explain the obviously great change in Brazilian mentality.

John W. F. Dulles' paper is a good summary of the contributions of Getúlio Vargas. Unhappily, he has an incorrect quotation in the first paragraph which he would have avoided by using Vargas' own words in *A nova política do Brasil*, [Vol. X (Rio, 1944), p. 61] instead of Morris L. Cooke's paraphrase in *Brazil on the March* [(N.Y., 1944), p. 56].

James L. Busey would have profited from reading Dulles' work before writing his own. He mars an interesting paper emphasizing the role of the moderating power in Brazilian history with references to Vargas' fifteen-year dictatorship, with far too many words and expressions in Portuguese, with citation of secondary sources where primary ones are easily available, and with mention of the nonexistent "President José de Morais Barros" (p. 64). Vargas was not dictator fifteen years. The Estado Nôvo (officially called Estado Nacional after 1942) extended only from 1937 to 1945. Before that Vargas had been in turn provisional president (1930-1934) by virtue of revolution and constitutional president by virtue of election (1934-1937). There is no reason to use *atos institucionais* (p. 62), when "institutional acts" serves just as well. The unnecessary use of Portuguese can create awkward tautologies such as when the president decrees *decretos-leis* (p. 67).

While Busey compares events since 1964 with those of the imperial years, he fails to cite such works as Thomas Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964* (N.Y., 1967); Manuel de Oliveira Lima, *O império brasileiro* (São Paulo, n.d.); João Camillo de Oliveira Tôrres, *A democracia coroada, teoria política do império do Brasil* (Petrópolis, 1964); Nelson Werneck Sodré, *História militar do Brasil* (Rio, 1965); or Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, *História geral da civilização Brasileira*, Vols. 3, 4, 5 (São Paulo, 1962, 1964, 1967). The mysterious president on page 64 is actually Prudente de Morais. He could also be referred to as Prudente [see for example Pedro Calmon, *História do Brasil*, Vol. 6 (Rio, 1959), pp. 1920-1925] but not Morais Barros. Admittedly the Brazilians are not consistent in name usage, but such references indicate a lack of familiarity with the subject. In Busey's defense,

he was following Clarence Haring's *Empire in Brazil* [(Cambridge, 1966), p. 170], which was incorrect.

The other two papers by Donald Huddle on the economics of "Postwar Brazilian Industrialization" and John V. D. Saunders on the relationship of education and modernization, though copiously illustrated with charts and dealing with important subject matter, are unexciting reading.

Conferences such as this are useful, but not all papers written for oral presentation and discussion are suitable for publication. Because most of the ones in this volume could not stand as single articles, their publication collectively does not seem justifiable.

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As relações entre a Austria e o Brasil, 1815-1889. By EZEKIEL STANLEY RAMIREZ. Translated by AMÉRICO JACOBINA LACOMBE. São Paulo, 1968. Companhia Editora Nacional. Brasileira. Notes. Index. Pp. 260. Paper.

Ezekiel Stanley Ramirez chronicles the rise and fall in diplomatic relations between Brazil and Austria, beginning with Metternich's interest in the Portuguese colony as a bulwark against the forces of illegitimacy. Austrian interest in Brazil reached its high point at the time of the marriage of Pedro and Leopoldina in 1817. This marriage was designed to link the royal houses of Austria and Portugal, to lead Portugal out of its dependence on England, and to support the forces of conservatism and legitimacy in South America.

The decline in relations began almost immediately following the wedding. Metternich found that Austria could in no way effectively inhibit English influence in Portugal and Brazil. The independence of Brazil, followed soon after, and, despite the accession of the royal prince as emperor of the new nation. Independence was a blow to Metternich's defense of legitimate European rule in the New World. Even the royal marriage terminated after only nine years with the death of the bitterly unhappy Empress Leopoldina. While Metternich maintained some continuing interest in Brazil until his resignation, the limitations on his concern were revealed by his indifference to the requests of Pedro II for assistance in finding a suitable consort. The importance of Austria in Brazilian foreign policy from 1843 to 1889 was suggested by the fact that the Brazilian mission in Vienna was for many years headed by *chargés d'affaires*.

After detailing diplomatic relations between the two nations,