

important is—or was—the trade component of U.S. imperialism. Professor Healy considers the question, but shies away from attempting an answer on the very sound ground that “to separate [the components] is in one sense arbitrary, for they were but differing aspects of an integrated body of assumptions . . . all were mutually reinforcing, and can be completely understood only in terms of their mutual relationships” (p. 5). To demonstrate these relationships, Healy offers a series of case studies of publicists for expansion—Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, James Harrison Wilson, Charles Denby, Charles A. Conant, the missionaries and the NAM lobby—which will be useful to students of American expansion. On balance, this is a sound, commendable book. My criticisms are two. First, in his concern for establishing the “mutual relationships” of causes in the writings of each man or group there is considerable repetition from one chapter to another, which results in a *mélange*. After a while it is hard to keep straight the relationships among the players and even harder to make any judgment at all about the process of causation. Second, Healy does not achieve his most ambitious objective: to explain the expansionist surge at the end of the century which caused Mahan to marvel at “the almost instantaneous readiness with which a seed of thought germinates when it falls upon mental soil prepared already to receive it” (p. 67), by studying the publicists who “prepared the soil.” The link is never firmly established between the thoughts of certain individuals and the formation of a national consensus or of policy during the crucial decade. Root and Roosevelt, for example, may have been expansionists before 1898, but they acted out their beliefs only after 1898. Nor is it clear how Conant, Denby, or Wilson altered the thinking of other Americans or influenced the policy of the government.

University of North Carolina

JOSEPH TULCHIN

La Revolución intervenida: Relaciones diplomáticas entre México y Estados Unidos, 1910-1914. By BERTA ULLOA. México, 1971. El Colegio de México. Centro de Estudios Históricos, Nueva Serie, 12. Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xii, 395. Paper.

Slowly but surely the official documents of the major countries are being researched and the results incorporated into studies such as the one under review. Professor Berta Ulloa has utilized a previously untapped source of important documents, the papers from the Spanish Embassy in Mexico City. Perhaps even more important, she has given us the first in depth look at the material from the *Archivo de la Secre-*

taría de Relaciones Exteriores de México for the period in question. She has, of course, also used the various collections of private papers and government documents in the United States. While the German documents and the publications based upon them by Friedrich Katz are missing, she has employed several studies which utilized the British Foreign Office papers. Thus, Professor Ulloa has provided a four-dimensional look at U.S.-Mexican relations: Mexican, United States, Spanish, and British.

In spite of its announced scope, the focus of events in this book is primarily from the *Decena Trágica* of February, 1913, through the Veracruz landing and the ABC arbitration fiasco of April-June 1914. Few books dealing with Woodrow Wilson and Mexico have managed to remain completely objective. As might be imagined, Professor Ulloa's account is decidedly pro-Mexican, but it is not a polemic. Most of the major facts will be familiar to those who have been at all interested in this period of the Mexican Revolution; however, some of her conclusions may be new. For example, Professor Ulloa presents John Lind as having had a far greater influence upon President Wilson's decision to invade Mexico than others have assigned to him. Did Lind's counsel really influence Wilson? A second interesting interpretation regards the Tampico incident. Did the U.S. precipitate it in order to provide the excuse needed to intervene in Mexico? Obviously, not all will agree with her conclusions, but this study is a refreshingly new look at an old and oft told story.

Other aspects of the book warrant mention. A number of documents—some old some new—are quoted throughout the text. In addition, twenty documents are included in the appendix. Some of these materials from the Mexican Foreign Relations archives will be new to most readers. Documentation is substantial. There are eighty-eight pages of footnotes, many of which are explanatory.

Professor Ulloa was selective regarding the episodes which she decided to cover in detail. Events in northern Mexico, the Tampico incident, and the ABC mediation efforts are given proportionately the most consideration. Zapata and southern Mexico are virtually ignored. More information on certain persons and their part in the events which impinged significantly on U.S.—Mexican relations, e.g., the British Minister F. W. Stronge, Lord Cowdray, Admiral Cradock, etc., would have given the study better balance. There were a few minor slips. Badger was only a rear admiral at Veracruz in 1914, not a vice admiral. Also, there is an obvious mixup on footnotes at the conclusion of

Chapter VIII. But these mistakes detract little from the overall quality of the study. This is an excellent addition to the literature on the field.

University of West Florida

WILLIAM COKER

Emilio Kosterlitzky: Eagle of Sonora and the Southwest Border. By CORNELIUS C. SMITH, JR. Glendale, California, 1970. Arthur H. Clark Company. Pen and ink sketches by the author. Illustrations. Map. Notes. Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 344. \$12.50.

The beguiling name, Emilio Kosterlitzky, dashing romantically but ever so fleetingly across the literature of Mexico's Sonora and the U.S. Southwest at the turn of this century, has long intrigued viewers of that epoch. These brief written glimpses have molded the man into a despotic "fighting Tartar," who exercised the "mailed fist" of Díaz along the border. Now the evasive Kosterlitzky has been caught in a full-length biography by Cornelius C. Smith, who dispels some of the myth surrounding the individual, but at the same time creates new (or reinforces old) illusions about Díaz and his quest for domestic peace.

Kosterlitzky (sometimes spelled Kosterlitsky), a nineteen-year-old Russian naval cadet, jumped ship in Venezuela and reached northwestern Mexico in time to join the rebellion that in 1876 brought Díaz the presidency. As a soldier in Sonora's national guard, the immigrant, who became a Mexican citizen, somehow (it would be interesting to know precisely how) caught Díaz's eye, and in 1885 won the president's appointment as the commander of a mounted rural constabulary called a *gendarmería fiscal*, which functioned in northeastern Sonora. Residents of the district, and subsequent historians, loosely referred to the corpsmen as *Rurales*, confusing Kosterlitzky's local troop with the famous federal force that proved so instrumental in cementing the Díaz regime throughout much of Mexico. Kosterlitzky's unit was also referred to as an *Acordada* (Smith uses the colloquialism *Cordada*), but the relationship, if any, between the nineteenth-century Sonoran outfit and the *Acordada* of Mexico's colonial past is not explored. The *gendarmería*, says Smith, was a dependency of the federal treasury department, while the Ministry of Domestic Affairs directed the genuine *Rurales*. Local governments and even private individuals financed *acordadas*. Kosterlitzky's service record at the National Defense Archives in Mexico City (apparently not consulted by Smith) has Kosterlitzky assigned to the Military Colony of Sonora. In short, myriad security units, from the federal army to privately sponsored patrols, operated during the *Porfiriato*. The precise nature of and the interplay