

development problems, and (b) political contests between the PAN and the PRI. Basically this is a qualitative study in that in his research the author emphasized non-standardized interviews, attendance at local organization meetings, and study of official acts; however, he does present some limited data which indicate, for example, that although local PRI and PAN leadership is one-third worker-based in each party, the PAN finds its greatest concentration (55%) of leaders among businessmen and merchants, whereas the PRI also looks to professionals and semi-professionals for its leaders.

There are several strengths and weaknesses in the study. On the one hand, Ugalde shows that central planning in Mexico City often is blind, insensitive, and inefficient with respect to the needs of Ensenada. Also, he finds that membership in the PRI frequently is a mere formality and that its union strength includes (without much protest) employers as well as employees. On the other hand, he suggests that a disproportionate amount of local expenditure is absorbed by wages and salaries (which implicitly involves a distinction between current and capital expenditure), but he does not indicate how the wages were distributed by function (which is more pertinent for understanding the social role of the PRI about which the author is concerned). In addition, Ugalde does not substantiate his assertion that Mexican development is not limited by scarce financial resources. In the same vein, he discusses several conflicts (e.g., pp. 43, 143, 147) without any assessment of outcomes.

On balance, the work is useful and makes it increasingly clear that community studies can be undertaken successfully without the need for clumsy attempts to hide the name of the place studied, attempts for which no convincing justifications have been forthcoming. Furthermore, Ugalde calls into question results found in other studies of Mexico at the local as well as national level.

University of California,  
Los Angeles

JAMES W. WILKIE

*An Economic History of Colombia, 1845-1930.* By WILLIAM PAUL MCGREEVEY. New York, 1971. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge Latin American Studies, 9. Tables. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Pp. xiv, 330. Cloth.

This is a competently written and, in parts, highly interesting study of the economic development of Colombia from 1845, when the government began to adopt liberal policies, until the international economic

crisis that arrested Colombian growth in 1930. As the outgrowth of a doctoral dissertation (M.I.T., 1965), the narrative is interspersed with a series of exercises in techniques of the "new economic history," and thus is not a fully connected or comprehensive historical account. In the course of these analyses the author derives some new statistical data that may be useful to the general historian as well as to the model builder.

McGreevey first establishes the setting of Bourbon economic policies in the late colonial period, which continued with little modification during the early republican era after the former Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada achieved political independence. It was a period of slow internal change, little affected by outside events.

After 1845, with the accession of Liberals to power, Colombia entered the world network of trade and experienced a tobacco boom. In the name of agrarian reform, Liberal governments broke up many of the Indian reservations (*resguardos*) and established regional concentrations of large landholdings devoted to commercial tobacco and cattle production. However, the remoter regions remained almost untouched by these events. McGreevey considers that on the whole the policies initiated by the Liberal reformers were detrimental to Colombian development until about 1890. The expansion of free trade injured the domestic artisan class, the redistribution of land subjected the rural poor to the mercy of the landowning elite, a decentralized government was unable to maintain public order, and attacks on the Church contributed to seventy years of civil conflict. McGreevey conjectures that more appropriate policies for long-range development would have provided selective protection for urban artisans, preserved small landholdings in the fertile valleys, and placed less reliance on tobacco as a single export crop.

In the period from 1890 to 1930, Colombia achieved the transition from a subsistence to a commercial economy, and McGreevey describes this as a successful period of development in which three elements stand out: the cultivation of coffee by an army of small landholders and its emergence as Colombia's major export product; the native initiative shown by a group of businessmen in the region of Antioquia; and the railways that opened the highlands of Antioquia and Caldas after 1885. Coffee exports supplied the engine of growth by affording ample investment funds and by distributing income widely enough to increase the general level of demand. On this base, the Antioquians were able to build.

A particularly stimulating section of the book is McGreevey's review

of the "myth of the Antioqueños," as interpreted by a variety of investigators who have been fascinated by the peculiar role of this group in initiating industrial activity in Colombia—a phenomenon that has distinguished Antioquia as one of relatively few indigenous growth zones in Latin America. The problem is difficult to handle by the methods of the new economic history, and McGreevey concludes that no special psychological or cultural explanation is necessary; the Antioqueños, as well as some other Colombians, simply saw their opportunities and they took them! The subject will no doubt continue to elicit attention.

Throughout the book one is struck by the paucity of indigenous technological activity on the basis of which an integrated economic process might have taken place. McGreevey points out the key importance of the river steamboat in stimulating commercial tobacco production, barbed wire in facilitating cattle raising, and the railway in opening the coffee economy. These few cultural borrowings were of critical significance, yet even after the introduction of manufacturing, the technical resource base for economic expansion has remained so narrow that in the intervening four decades since the terminal data of McGreevey's study Colombia has not attained the "take-off." This raises a question: In what sense can the growth period from 1890 to 1930 be called successful?

Rutgers University

JAMES H. STREET

*Estanislao López y el federalismo del Litoral.* By JOSÉ LUIS BUSANICHE. Buenos Aires, 1969. Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires. Facsimiles. Appendix. Pp. 174. Paper.

In this book, José Luis Busaniche, a fecund Argentine historian of the 1920s and 1930s, offers a collection of his earlier articles and essays concerning Estanislao López. The pieces were assembled frankly to vindicate the *santafecino*, who, according to the author, has historically suffered from the dichotomy posited in Sarmiento's "civilización y barbarie."

Busaniche argues that the dichotomy is false, for it equates Civilization with Buenos Aires and Barbarism with the interior. According to the author, López and other provincial caudillos arose in a power vacuum created by the ouster of Spain and the clumsiness of Buenos Aires in trying to replace the metropolis as the dominant political force in the region. Far from being reversions to barbarism, the caudillos were instead responses on the part of the Argentine people to *porteño*