

vieux grief fait aux églises catholiques (romaine et orthodoxes) que celui d'avoir accepté un grand nombre d'éléments païens. Or l'Eglise primitive avait déjà accepté et assimilé une grande partie du calendrier sacré pré-chrétien; les paysans mexicains, roumains, espagnols ou français, de par leur mode d'existence, ne sont (n'étaient) pas attirés par un Christianisme historique et moral, mais par un Xme "cosmique," pour citer Mircea Eliade. Il n'y a pas paganisation du Xme, mais christianisation de la religion des ancêtres. Le reproche fait par Quirk aux catholiques mexicains vaut pour le monde entier et au bout du compte seuls les théologiens y échappent (et encore!).

Surtout ce préjugé conduit à une deuxième thèse, qui n'est pas développée mais qui surgit de loin en loin: "when the Church came under attack, it could not count on the strong and united support of the rural majority" (p. 6). Or le mouvement insurrectionnel des *Cristeros* prouve le contraire. L'auteur ne voulait pas traiter ce sujet, mais, quand il y fait allusion il tombe sous le coup de ma critique. Il parle de la "Cristeros' moribund cause" à la fin de 1927 (p. 209) et de "small skirmishes in the West" en 1929 (p. 237), alors que Morrow accorde plus d'importance militaire à ce mouvement qu'à la rébellion des généraux du Sonora. L'attaché militaire américain compte 40,000 *Cristeros* en juin 1929, au moment des *arreglos*.

Une édition ultérieure devrait corriger quelques petits détails: la CROM a bel et bien provoqué la tentative schismatique de 1925 (pp. 139-140); l'interview du 4 février 1927 (p. 151) a été inventé par un journaliste ambitieux ou (et) provocateur; l'évêque du Sonora n'a rien à voir avec la guerre Yaqui de 1926 (p. 189); Gorostieta entre dans la guerre des *Cristeros* en 1927 et meurt en juin 1929 (pp. 191 et 237).

Sur ces lignes critiques s'achève une note résolument louangeuse.

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*Mexican Business Organizations: History and Analysis.* By ROBERT JONES SHAFER. Syracuse, New York, 1973. Syracuse University Press. Figures. Appendices. Bibliographic Note. Index. Pp. xi, 397. Cloth. \$15.00.

Professor Robert Jones Shafer's *Mexican Business Organizations* is a useful comprehensive study of federations of businessmen in Mexico, tracing their history from the Porfiriato to the present, and providing analysis in terms of selected concepts of institutionalization. As stated in the preface, it is the first sizable effort to deal with the history and

operations of Mexican business organizations. Professor Shafer was assisted by various grants permitting a considerable amount of field work. Almost half of the volume consists of extensive notes and appendices.

The first two chapters deal with the history of business structures and their legal position. A third chapter describes the complicated organization of these structures and their resources. Subsequent chapters describe the programs and the relations with government. Conclusions are reached in the final chapter in terms of various institution-building factors.

Much research can be judged simply on the basis of thoroughness and accuracy. In these terms, Professor Shafer has done a workmanlike job. But it would seem that the value of the research was somewhat reduced by the objectives sought and the methodology used. The purpose seems to have been to determine the degree and nature of institutionalization defined according to categories such as linkages, structure, leadership, resources, doctrine and program. What would have been useful merely on a general empirical basis was limited because of the attempt to view the facts through the restricting lenses of these categories.

Thus, in this reviewer's opinion, there was an excess of what might be called "surface research." For example, at several points it is stated that CNIT had jurisdictional differences with CONCANACO and that its policies were pro-governmental in contrast to the pro-private enterprise position of CONCAMIN. Since some of the most significant issues arising from the mixed economy of Mexico concern private versus public enterprise, one would have desired more research in depth here. Structures and formal arrangements are exhaustively described providing "what meets the eye," but what happens informally and behind the scenes in Mexican business is often more important.

Even factual distortion can result from this structural type of pre-occupation. It is evident in the historical chapter. No less an historian than Hubert Herring has said that after 1925 "Mexican political and economic life was ruled by a small group around Calles." No insight is provided throughout the historical chapter as to the role played by informal groups either in the time of Calles or in later periods. Nor does one get any clear impression of the powerful financial groups now largely controlling the Mexican economy.

In conclusion, one wonders whether Professor Shafer's study would not have been more useful if undertaken with broader objectives, less rigid methodology and with the assistance of institutionally- and historically-minded economists. Economic structures cannot be fully un-

derstood through historical or institutional analysis. Much investigation of the underlying economics and politics is required.

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*The Heroic Image in Chile: Arturo Prat, Secular Saint.* By WILLIAM F. SATER. Berkeley, 1973. University of California Press. Graph. Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. viii, 243. Cloth. \$10.50.

The hero, says the author, is never studied. "Instead he is accepted as if he were another historical fact, a man who personifies some historical event. . . . This is a serious error. We must question why and how a man reaches this status . . ." (p. 3). With this caveat Professor Sater begins the study of Arturo Prat's heroic image. Prat, it seems, has been Chile's "man of all seasons," the plastic hero who can be molded to meet the nation's needs in any crisis. Sater demonstrates convincingly that Prat's popularity and usage were shaped by internal conditions; as these changed his image was transformed to meet new needs. Heroes are thus made and remade.

Son of a Catalan immigrant, Prat graduated from the Naval Academy, earned a law degree, and taught in a free school for workers. His sense of dedication wedded him to the Navy. When the War of the Pacific began he asked for sea duty. Because the admiral did not like "literate sailors" he was assigned to the *Esmeralda*, an antique vessel already stripped of its ablest seamen and equipment.

At Iquique the Peruvian ironclad *Huáscar* hammered the unarmored *Esmeralda* for three hours then rammed her. When the *Huáscar* struck Prat gave the order to board, then leaped onto the enemy's deck and to his death accompanied only by a sergeant. When the *Huáscar* struck again a lieutenant and a dozen of the surviving Chilean seamen boarded it and were also killed. The *Esmeralda* sank with colors still flying.

Prat became a symbol of the nation's death-struggle, and Chileans renewed their efforts to win the war. Opposition politicians also used Prat's name to attack the administration. When a crisis arose over the parliamentary government's ineffectiveness and corruption, Prat's name became the symbol of dynamic leadership, spiritual superiority, and private morality. Later his name was associated with the movement for national unity, and the press invoked his image to prevent reforms. Socialists employed his name to harass the government for its economic failures. In the last presidential election *Clarín* asserted that if Prat were alive he would vote for Tomić or Allende.