

sector suggests that it is divided into three factions: politicians, technicians, and specialists. He argues that these groups control certain government agencies. The separation between *políticos* and *Técnicos* in Mexican political analysis is currently in vogue, but Basáñez goes beyond this dual separation to establish criteria for a third group, the specialists. Essentially he uses *técnicos* as synonymous with economists, whereas he sees specialists strongly represented in such diverse institutions as Pemex, the public universities, and the army.

His careful analysis of the public sector is carried over to the private sector, where he again examines three factions: entrepreneurs, foreign investors, and financiers. Also, he explores their organizational affiliations, interest representatives, and the consequences of these ties among private-sector interests and their relationships with the state. His most original theoretical contribution is his argument that a third sector, a "dissident" sector, has as much importance as the private and public sectors. Within this dissident category, which does not have the natural logic shared by the other two, he lumps together opposition parties, the universities, and writers (really intellectuals). There is nothing original about classifying opposition parties as organizations of dissent, but Basáñez is the first general political analyst to give importance to the Mexican universities and to intellectuals in the context of their larger political role. Both subjects, especially intellectuals, have generally been excluded from North American scholarship.

Basáñez's arguments are not always fully developed, and his interpretations are subject to criticism, but his conclusion that the state is contradictory, that it has functioned in both authoritarian and nonauthoritarian capacities, provides evidence to support the revisionist notion that Mexico's political system is indeed unique and that it does not readily fit into an authoritarian model.

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The Challenge of Venezuelan Democracy. By JOSÉ ANTONIO GIL YEPES. Translated by EVELYN HARRISON I., LOLÓ GIL DE YANES, and DANIELLE SALTÍ. Foreword by JOHN D. MARTZ. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1981. Tables. Notes. Figures. Index. Pp. 280. Cloth. \$19.95.

Pity the poor Venezuelan businessman. He is misunderstood, unjustly slandered, and kept at arm's length in the process of making and

implementing public policy. If only political elites would abandon their ideologies and stop manipulating the masses, the nation's clear-eyed, pragmatic business leaders, free of ideology, could dramatically increase economic productivity and expand opportunity for the greater good of all. This, in a nutshell, is the thesis of José Antonio Gil Yepes's disappointing book.

The author purports to explain the origins and nature of Venezuelan democracy through examination of political culture, party system, and government. He then considers the organization of the entrepreneurial sector, the structure of business-government relations, and the nature of policy-making. He concludes with a number of general reflections on business, politics, and public policy and with speculations on the future of Venezuelan democracy. The author's social and political analysis is very poor and quite tendentious, grounded in a weak and heavily ideological set of ideas best described as a marriage of Ayn Rand with a combination of Talcott Parsons and Samuel Huntington, mediated by Theodore Lowi. Outdated and highly dubious notions of culture, modernization, and development derived from these sources are used to prop up what boils down to an exposition of the political and social position of the business sector in Venezuela. Not surprisingly, the most useful chapters are those concerning the organization of the business sector and its dealings with successive governments since 1958. Issues such as taxation, trade, and investment policy are discussed at some length. The worst chapters are those offering general social and political analysis, in which the author is both inaccurate and misleading.

Gil Yepes is perhaps best read as an insight into the mentality of the Venezuelan business elite. This mentality can be reduced to a number of related propositions. 1. The masses are lazy and easily misled by unscrupulous politicians. 2. This mass gullibility stems from an inherited political culture of dependence and paternalism. 3. There is too much politicization and mass participation in Venezuela. 4. There are no basic class conflicts—rather the interests of different social classes are complementary, and elites should work together harmoniously to incorporate “marginal” sectors into the “modern” economy. 5. Political parties, above all on the left, are ideological—business is simply realistic and pragmatic. These views are repeated throughout the book.

If this work offers reliable insight into the mentality of Venezuela's business elite, one must conclude that the commitment of these individuals and institutions to democracy in that nation is fragile at best. A leftist electoral victory or a major policy shift in a leftist direction would be clearly unacceptable. Toward the end of the book, Gil Yepes offers some

comparative judgments about Chile, and his evident sympathy for the military's version of events in that nation, and for the solution they imposed, bode ill for the democratic future of Venezuela.

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Legal Roles in Colombia. By DENNIS O. LYNCH. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1980. Notes. Tables. Pp. 124. Cloth. \$16.00. Paper. \$10.00.

This study is an exercise in legal sociology, emanating from the Yale Law School's Law and Modernization Program and the International Center for Law in Development. The central concern motivating it is how to make the legal profession a more positive force for social integration in developing nations.

The study takes as its point of departure, and as one of its points of reference, a program, initiated in 1969 and sponsored by AID and the Ford Foundation, to reform (i.e., americanize) legal education in Colombia, to make the practice of law more relevant to that country's economic and social problems. The present study reflects a subsequent awareness that the failure of the legal profession to serve as an agent of social reform had to do not merely with defective legal education but much more with deeper features of Colombian society and institutions.

Lynch's study begins with a brief historical sketch, which may be ignored as it is superficial and riddled with error. The heart of the book is in the subsequent chapters, based on interviews with random samples of 1950–51 and 1966–67 graduates of six Bogotá law faculties. Lynch, not surprisingly, finds a clear class difference between the graduates of two elite private universities (el Rosario and the Jesuits' Javeriana) and two universities offering night-school instruction (Universidad Libre and Externado). Graduates of the elite universities tended to have been born in large cities; many had fathers with university educations and who were professionals, public figures, private executives, or large landowners. And in their subsequent careers many became executives or served as legal advisers to corporations. Graduates of the Libre and Externado, by contrast, came predominantly from smaller towns; few of their fathers had university educations; and most of their fathers were medium-sized merchants or farmers. In their subsequent careers they for the most part ended up in the litigation of small cases for individual clients rather than being linked with large corporations.