

capabilities of the nation involved, and a discussion of current policies and likely future directions. The authors are more concerned with current than historical matters, but these are political scientists employing their methodology with skill.

In the lead chapter, Michael Erisman discusses United States policy and generally attributes the diminishing influence of the United States to its essential failure to understand that the unrest in the Caribbean is caused by local problems, not by external meddling. While not contradicting this argument, Jiri Valenta, a specialist in Soviet affairs, asserts that Soviet policy in the Caribbean is more active and is not simply exploiting ready-made situations. Both he and Raymond Duncan, who writes about Cuba, however, insist that the United States' position in the region is still awesome. Valenta suggests that geopolitics seriously limit Soviet moves in the Caribbean, whereas Duncan affirms that Cuba's influence is actually declining, because its economic failures have made it a poor model.

The real challengers appear to be Venezuela and Mexico. John Martz discusses Venezuela and, while acknowledging its potential, is cautious, pointing out that the growing rivalry between its two major political parties is making it difficult for Venezuela to pursue a consistent foreign policy. In writing about Mexico, Edward Williams projects a larger role for that nation, but suggests that Mexico's "revolutionary dimension" is tempered by its "prudential dimension," which is another way of saying that its bark is worse than its bite. The final two essays deal with the objects of this influence, Central America and the Caribbean microstates, and are written by Neale Pearson and Marvin Will, respectively. Both present their arenas of interest deftly, but Will is especially useful, probably because of the paucity of good studies about the small island states of the Caribbean. In the conclusion, the editors agree with Williams that Mexico is the nation to watch in the Caribbean in the years ahead.

Predicting, of course, is difficult. No one could foresee the Malvinas war and its powerful effect upon Caribbean politics, especially upon Venezuelan policy, or the balance-of-payments problems of Mexico in late 1982, despite its oil wealth. Nonetheless, good scholarship is never dated. Whatever the particular interest, term paper or policy paper, these studies provide a base.

Pennsylvania State University

CHARLES D. AMERINGER

*Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Myth and Reality in Foreign Policy Analysis.* Edited by RONALD R. POPE. Washington, D.C.: Uni-

versity Press of America, 1982. Notes. Chronology. Maps. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xi, 283. Cloth. \$20.75. Paper. \$11.25.

In the selected bibliography attached to this volume there are at least twenty titles on the October crisis published by Western scholars. Meanwhile, Soviet scholars have produced a single work, which is reproduced here, together with Khrushchev's Report to the Supreme Soviet, December 12, 1962, and excerpts from *Khrushchev Remembers* concerning the eventful episode. The editor suggests one explanation for such sterility: "it appears that other Soviet scholars are either forbidden to write on this subject or choose not to do so because of its sensitive nature" (p. 153). Cuban specialists find it difficult to accept the authenticity of Khrushchev's memoirs, at least regarding Cuba. After stating that Soviet leaders had a very fuzzy notion of the Cuban situation when Castro entered Havana, Khrushchev continues: "the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Cuban Party had even resigned from the Party in order to join Castro in the hills." The secretary of the Cuban Party, appointed in 1934, was Blas Roca. He never visited "the hills," and even less resigned his job. Roca was a member of the Executive Committee of the Komintern until 1943, and later was a watchdog of Soviet interests in the Caribbean, including Central America. Cuban Communists rarely missed a Congress of the Soviet party, they often visited Moscow, and some stayed there for long periods. It is hard to believe that Khrushchev, at least since he was promoted to the top position in the Soviet leadership, could be so misinformed as he appears in the memoirs attributed to him. The three pieces of Soviet thought included here are well analyzed in the extensive annotations by the editor. As happens in most of the literature on the crisis, the Cuban side of the story is the weakest. A Cuban defector who worked for Cuban intelligence until the 1970s, Mariano Vivés, has recently added new touches to the Soviet-Cuban connection during the crisis. Alexei Adzhubei, who is identified here as Khrushchev's son-in-law and editor of *Izvestia* also was, according to Vivés, a colonel in the KGB and a member of the Soviet-Cuban Commission for the Exchange of Intelligence. The first supplies for the clandestine operation, always under the KGB's control, arrived in Cuba on May 17, 1962. The role played by the KGB, not only during this period, seems to have been much more decisive than has been generally appreciated by Western scholars.

Altogether, the Soviet contributions, the ten messages exchanged between the two leaders during the crisis, and the extensive annotations by the editor make this volume a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the first atomic confrontation.

University of Florida

ANDRÉS SUÁREZ