

society that had emerged by the late colonial period. Drawing on archival sources, she focuses on the Comunero rebellion in the Llanos to show how revolt arose, not from imperfectly hispanicized Indians, but from whites and hispanicized Indians who, through closer integration into the colonial economy and more exposure to the pressures of church and state, had developed distinctive economic grievances. Second, she demonstrates that, despite the expulsion of the Jesuits and the crown's increasing preference for soldiers rather than missionaries, the missions continued to play a central role in the region. Indeed, the very paucity of the military presence helps to account for the disproportionate importance of the Llanos during the wars of independence. As a concluding comparison of the Venezuelan and Colombian Llanos reveals, however, the realities of isolation quickly reasserted themselves after the war, and the Colombian Llanos reverted to the margins of national life, marooned in a state of neglect more akin to the eastern borderlands of Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia than to conditions in the physically more similar but economically dynamic grassland regions of Venezuela and Argentina.

As a consistently interesting and lucid account of the Colombian Llanos in a formative period, this book makes a valuable contribution to Colombia's historiography and complements the regional studies of Ann Twinam on Antioquia, William Sharp on the Chocó, and Germán Colmenares on the Cauca Valley. Moreover, as a study of a Spanish American frontier region, it will also be of interest to all those concerned to understand the varieties and disparities of European interpenetration and interaction with native American cultures on the frontiers of Iberian society in the New World.

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Miners of the Red Mountain: Indian Labor in Potosí, 1545–1650. By PETER BAKEWELL. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985. Illustrations. Notes. Figures. Map. Appendixes. Glossary. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvi, 213. Cloth. \$19.95.

For four hundred years, "Potosí" has been synonymous with unimagined riches and the quintessential symbol of exploitation. From Luis Capoché's condemnation of the mine as the "harsh executioner" of Indians through Theodor de Bry's lugubrious propaganda to modern work, opinion has agreed that here, in the *cerro rico*, the most naked forms of colonial oppression could be found. Indeed, one would have to go back to the ancient world, or perhaps beyond to Egypt, to find a parallel to the Spanish success in turning a peaceful rural people to non-agricultural ends on such a massive and brutal scale. As Peter Bakewell says, the Black Legend hangs heavily around the town's history. Just why recent judgment on Potosí as well as opinion on other kinds of oppression and exploitation now

seem to be changing is an interesting question. Of course, people are asking different questions of diverse kinds of evidence; but is it not true that different questions are asked, in part at least, because in these postemancipation years the optimism of both modernizers and revolutionaries has faded? The touching belief that if only the villains are unmasked, the oppression will end, is long gone. It is less certain who the oppressors are. Without attributing any of these dark thoughts to Bakewell, one clearly sees that his study fits into a recent trend that seeks to understand rather than to condemn. The closer one looks, the more one sees that rich and poor alike do, in fact, make their own history, even if in neither case exactly as they might choose.

In this book, Bakewell develops the idea that throughout most of its history, silver mining at Potosí depended not so much upon the draconian mita as upon a dual labor system in which more-or-less free men worked alongside the more-or-less coerced. In the beginning this duality was represented by the large number of yanaconas, described by Bakewell as “freelance,” who worked for profit, responded to incentive, and were free to come and go, together with Indians held in *encomienda*. These were of course compelled to work; but given the choices available and the deeply engrained culture of labor dues to the state, service at Potosí was by no means an unmixed horror. This account of early Potosí, based to a large extent on Capoche and the remarkable inquiry carried out by Polo de Ondegardo in 1550, is not new; but Bakewell subjects the evidence to informed and skeptical discussion that illuminates our understanding. The most important section of the book—chapter 4—shows in detail just how the Andean rural population found a way, in effect, to subsidize a wage labor system in the mine. As shafts deepened and ores became poorer at the same time that imperial stakes grew, the mita was organized to channel men into the mines. This system, however, successful for a few short years, soon came up against the intractable opposition of the native people and their leaders, who resisted not so much mine labor but mine labor at the statute wage. Soon, Indians began to buy their way out of labor service through payment in silver to the mine operators. With this subsidy a much higher wage could be offered to attract the large numbers of free workers who gathered around the burgeoning economy of the *cerro rico*. At this point Bakewell’s story should mesh nicely with the work of C. S. Assadourian, but he does not explore these questions. By the end of the sixteenth century then, the dual system was perpetuated with forced *mitayos* alongside an increasing number of voluntary, wage-earning *mingas*. Bakewell’s discussion of all this is not nearly so simplistic as it may sound from this brief review; it is filled with caveat and careful qualification. His explanation takes into account the deeper structures of Andean culture and the effect of assimilation to European values, and there is a brief comparison with Mexican practice. And of course he understands that everything operated within a framework of colonial domination.

This is only a section of a much larger work and it consequently is a more modest effort than the prize-winning book on Zacatecas; but out of scant, difficult, and disparate materials Bakewell has produced a thoughtful, and in its understated way, a provocative essay.

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NATIONAL PERIOD

Latin America and the Second World War. Vol. 2: 1942–1945. By R. A. HUMPHREYS. London: The Athlone Press, 1982. Notes. Indexes. Cloth. \$38.00.

R. A. Humphreys's second and concluding volume on *Latin America and the Second World War* begins with the period following the Rio conference in January 1942 and finishes at the end of the global conflict. The author uses a topical approach and starts with the Caribbean region. Humphreys focuses on the area's overwhelming reliance on United States economic, military, and cultural assistance; he also discusses internal politics of authoritarian rulers like Jorge Ubico, Fulgencio Batista, and Rafael Trujillo. The author discusses Mexico's economic dislocation created during wartime and its support for the Allies by sending troops into combat. Brazil experienced many of Mexico's problems. The regime of Getúlio Vargas and his removal from office, however, added another dimension to that country's critical role in hemispheric diplomacy. The remaining South American nations, excluding Argentina, are briefly mentioned. Humphreys highlights essential domestic and international problems, like Bolivian nonrecognition, the Ecuadorean-Peruvian border dispute, and severance of relations with the Axis.

Argentina takes up almost one-third of this book. The author explores this major story from a British perspective and seriously questions many of the theses assumed as fact in Randall Wood's *The Roosevelt Foreign Policy Establishment and the "Good Neighbor."* Humphreys rejects the idea that Great Britain supported Argentine neutrality or interfered with the United States' initiatives in hemispheric diplomacy. Quite to the contrary, Humphreys insists that the British supported the State Department's efforts toward Argentina, but that Secretary of State Cordell Hull rejected any offers of aid as attempts at interference. In fact, the author stresses that the British actively supported United States efforts while Argentine and Axis forces tried to create Anglo-American hostility. Major disagreements did emerge. Hull, toward the end of his tenure, moved aggressively against Argentine neutrality as well as the emergence of Juan Perón. While the