

fall of the dictator Augusto B. Leguía, and the onset of the Great Depression. Adam Anderle, a Hungarian Marxist historian, focuses on this and other important problems in an award-winning (1981) book from the Casa de las Américas.

This is no plodding, thinly researched, overly ideological work on Latin America from the Communist bloc. Anderle has done his archival homework, and, on the basis of exhaustive research, has produced a highly sophisticated interpretation of Peruvian politics between the wars, a period that has received, at least after 1930, scant attention from historians. The book fills still another void by comprising the first detailed analysis of the formation and evolution of the Peruvian Communist party whose early foundations were laid by José Carlos Mariátegui. And it is perhaps here that Anderle makes his most significant contribution, as he analyzes the failure of the Communist party in 1930 to assume the leadership in mobilizing the Peruvian masses, thereby leaving the way open for APRA to emerge as *the* party of the masses.

Anderle argues that the Communist party, under the failed leadership of Eudocio Ravines, incorrectly assessed the 1930 political situation. Underestimating the widespread nationalist (anti-American) and democratic sentiment among the working and middle classes, the party, according to Anderle, adopted a totally unrealistic sectarian policy which prematurely stressed imminent revolution by means of class war and the seizure of power by the workers. No efforts were made to broaden the party's appeal towards the peasantry on the land question or sectors of the distraught middle classes via a strategy of "united front." The subsequent suppression of the Communist-led, but largely spontaneous mobilization of miners in Cerro de Pasco in November 1930, which reverberated in popular unrest throughout the country, left the party and its future possibilities bankrupt. APRA proceeded to successfully exploit this failure by skillfully diffusing its broader message of anti-imperialism, antilatfundism, nationalism, and democracy to a much larger segment of the country's dislocated population.

The argument is persuasive and well documented, and constitutes a significant contribution to the literature on twentieth-century Peru.

George Washington University

PETER F. KLARÉN

*Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions.* Edited by J. SAMUEL VALENZUELA and ARTURO VALENZUELA. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Tables. Notes. Index. Pp. xi, 331. Cloth. \$35.00.

This collection of articles by a group of well-known specialists on Chilean politics, society, and economy is an excellent synthesis of the origins, policies, and consequences of the military dictatorship in Chile from 1973 to the early 1980s. Based on papers delivered at a workshop sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson

International Center in 1980, the articles deal with the neoconservative economic experiment, liberalization of foreign trade policies, and changes in the economic functions of the Chilean state, in addition to specific consideration of party, labor, and church opposition to the military government. A final chapter discusses Chilean foreign relations after 1973.

The individual articles in this collection are of high quality and summarize an important segment of the literature on military rule in Chile since 1973. Taken together, they offer theoretical and comparative analysis of authoritarian regimes in Latin America, as well as a solid description of events in Chile from 1973 to approximately 1982.

Although emphasizing that the Chilean military regime has been more "the dictatorship of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces than a military dictatorship *per se*" (p. 7), the editors and most of the contributors make a consistent effort to compare and contrast the Chilean case to other Latin American military dictatorships since 1964. In addition, the editors offer some interesting parallels between the experience of opposition to Franco in Spain in the immediate post-war years and the dilemmas of opponents to Pinochet in Chile during 1973–80.

Over 50 tables, ranging from macroeconomic indicators (covering the years 1970–82) to specialized data on the agrarian reform and counterreform processes, sources of tax revenues, and housing policy, make the volume a valuable reference for the first decade of the Pinochet regime. At the same time, detailed discussion of the ideological orientation and policies of the military and civilian leadership, as well as of the reactions of major opposition groups, provide a clear and critical view of authoritarian rule in Chile.

Due to the unfortunate lag between the original conference and publication of this volume, the contents of several of these articles have been published elsewhere, or in different versions. Nevertheless, the theoretical contributions of Valenzuela and Valenzuela, Garretón, Foxley, and Vergara remain of great value. The editors' central thesis in the article "Party Oppositions under the Authoritarian Regime" ("[T]he long-dominant Chilean party system will not be obliterated as easily as the military government sympathizers hope or as government detractors fear"—p. 186) remains a key element in understanding the character of regime opposition in Chile to the present. Likewise, the editors' insistence on the need to understand authoritarian regimes in the context of the "historicity" of parties and interest groups before the advent of the dictatorship is essential for anyone wishing to comprehend the difficulties of forging a coherent, viable alternative to replace the Pinochet government. In this respect, the editors do not attempt to distinguish between opposition to Pinochet, opposition to the authoritarian project, support for restoration of some sort of formal democracy in Chile, and the continuing desire by some for a *via hacia el socialismo*, but their general methodological prescription certainly alerts the reader to look for these sorts of problems in analyzing the dilemmas of the opposition to Pinochet.

As the editors recognize in their introduction, this volume is not a comprehensive study of the military dictatorship. It is, however, a volume which should be of great use to all those interested in Chilean politics and society since 1973 and in the more general phenomenon of military rule in Latin America since 1964.

San Diego State University

BRIAN LOVEMAN

*Los tenientes de gobernador de Jujuy en el período independiente.* By EMILIO A. BIDONDO. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Culturales Argentinas, 1983. Appendix. Notes. Sources. Pp. 372. Paper.

This is not a volume that one would sit down and read straight through, although its very unpretentiousness makes the reading easier. Bidondo does not claim to give an exhaustive account, and his purpose is to render posthumous justice to provincial *próceres* rather than to prove or disprove an explicit thesis. His implicit thesis, of course, is that Jujeños of the independence generation were on the whole a worthy lot, and that their deeds made a positive contribution to the development of the Argentine nation.

A competent local historian of the traditional school, Bidondo relates primarily political, military, and administrative events. He does so chiefly on the basis of published primary and secondary sources, supplemented at times by archival citations. He begins with an analysis of the position of *teniente de gobernador*, showing its descent from that of *subdelegado* in the intendancy system. The body of the work is then devoted to a discussion, in chronological order, of the 34 individuals or corporations—including royalist intruders and several who served more than once—who held the position from 1810 to 1834. In the latter year, Jujuy, which had been a dependency of Salta, became a province in its own right, and *teniente de* was dropped from the title. Each of the 34 is treated in exactly the same format, with separate sections entitled “Noticia biográfica,” “Asunción del cargo,” “Gestión de gobierno,” “Causas de la finalización de su mandato” (often just an elegant way of saying reasons for his overthrow), and “Actuación posterior.” This orderly presentation of data is a positive feature. There is also a certain sameness in the data, as one *teniente* after another faced much the same kind of factional squabbles and outside meddling. Bidondo, though, maintains an air of serene detachment, suggesting implicitly that things never got as bad in Jujuy as in certain other provinces. There was definitely no Mazorca.

University of Florida

DAVID BUSHNELL