

to come to grips with the question of an enforceable solution. In Washington, the administration's determination to rid Nicaragua of the Sandinistas contributed to its rejection of any solution short of that objective. Bagley suggests that Reagan's only option thus became a military one. In January 1989, the new president of the United States will be confronted with the same issues that confounded the Contadora process, and with the Iran-Contra episode now past, will the only option remain a military one?

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Guerra de baja intensidad: Reagan contra Centroamérica. By LILIA BERMÚDEZ. Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1987. Notes. Tables. Glossary. Bibliography. Pp. 229. Paper.

The most distressing thing about this book is that, because of the language barrier and its limited availability, few instant Central American "experts" will ever read it. For serious students of the Reagan administration's Central American policy, however, Lilia Bermúdez's work is must reading. It is a thoroughly researched and balanced analysis of the formulation and implementation of Reagan's low intensity conflict policy in Central America. Actually, Bermúdez attempts more than simply an analysis of Reagan's Central American program. Rather, she set out to write a critique of the current administration's response to pro-Soviet movements throughout the Third World, with Central America as the focus. In a clearly written style, refreshingly free of social science jargon, Bermúdez admirably succeeds in her effort.

Bermúdez traces the evolution of the low intensity conflict concept to the mid-1970s and the development of what she refers to as the "Vietnam syndrome." She argues that the prolonged and politically unpopular war in Southeast Asia forced conservative military and civilian geopolitical strategists to search for a viable alternative to invasion and traditional counterinsurgency doctrine to confront pro-Soviet forces in the Third World. The essence of this new theory was to be flexibility. The ultimate aim of the low intensity conflict doctrine was to defeat Marxist forces in the Third World through a multidimensional approach employing economic aid, antiterrorist training, logistical support, psychological warfare, and the use of military surrogates. In short, invasion and prolonged occupation by U.S. military forces were to be postponed, and, it was hoped, completely avoided.

The laboratory for low intensity conflict theory was, of course, Central America. Bermúdez emphasizes that El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras have unquestionably been pawns in the Reagan administration's global sparring with the Soviet Union. The massive Big Pine exercises in Honduras, for example, were not only designed to establish the military infrastructure for subsequent Contra operations in Nicaragua but also to "neutralize" a potential base of operations for the

Salvadoran FMLN and the Sandinistas. Here the lesson of the Vietcong sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos has been directly applied to Central America. In the case of Nicaragua, Bermúdez concludes that Reagan's policy is clearly designed to test the viability of his "rollback" initiative, which seeks the overthrow of not just the Sandinistas but the Marxist regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, and Afghanistan. Bermúdez sees the Reagan policy in Central America floundering on all fronts, largely because of its inability to gain the necessary political support in the U.S. Congress and the Central American nations themselves. General Manuel Noriega's nose thumbing at Washington underscores this book's increasingly evident conclusion.

Although this is a work of broad perspective, Bermúdez fails to properly place Reagan's Central American policy in the context of his overall relations with Latin America. While this is a significant flaw, it does not fundamentally detract from what is unquestionably a most important and provocative study.

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Haiti's Influence on Antebellum America. Slumbering Volcano in the Caribbean.

By ALFRED N. HUNT. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988. Notes. Photographs. Index. Pp. xiv, 196. Cloth. \$25.00.

The subtitle, *Slumbering Volcano*, refers to the successful slave revolution in Saint-Domingue. It served as a symbol onto which antebellum Americans projected their acute sense of the potential of insurrection and race war inherent in slavery. Alfred Hunt juxtaposes manipulation of this symbol by white southerners and northern abolitionists, the former to defend slavery as necessary to contain the ever-present potential for violence, the latter to condemn slavery as the source of an inevitable bloody retribution if allowed to continue. Among abolitionists, reactions ranged from that of advocates of colonization, who accepted in effect the premise that emancipation without removal of blacks meant race war, to black nationalists for whom Haiti furnished a model of revolutionary action. Similarly, Hunt contrasts the various ways U.S. observers stereotyped Toussaint Louverture and the nation of Haiti that emerged from the revolution.

A secondary theme is the impact of Saint-Domingue refugees on the U.S. South. Largely on the basis of their influence on creole society in Louisiana, Hunt adopts the perspective that the lower South was the northern extremity of Caribbean culture. This theme clashes with the failure of schemes to promote emigration of U.S. blacks to the "alien environment" of Haiti (p. 181). As for the refugees, recognition of their social and racial heterogeneity does not prevent Hunt from characterizing them as the "dominant force in the French-speaking community" of New Orleans (p. 83), a generalization that slights natives of Louisiana and does not even take into account the European French. Nowhere does