

tenure and the marketing of agricultural products drove many frightened peasants into the arms of the Contras. In 1984 the government began a policy of “flexibilization,” but an agrarian policy that was “excessively centered on state farms, state control of commerce, and the authoritarian methods of government technocrats had embittered relations between a segment of the peasantry and the revolution” (p. 243).

An important aspect of the work is that it does not shrink from addressing the major criticisms leveled against the Sandinista regime by its opponents, such as the army’s role as a “party army” (p. 132), the Marxist character of the FSLN (pp. 101–4), the antagonizing of segments of the peasantry by the agrarian reform (pp. 233–43), human rights abuses (pp. 276–78), press censorship (pp. 281–82), and the orientation of the Sandinista press (p. 357).

Walker states that an international “learning dialectic” was also going on. Revolutionaries (in Nicaragua and elsewhere) learned a number of techniques for consolidating power and implementing change, while the U.S. and its counter-revolutionary allies learned how to destabilize revolutionary regimes (pp. 3–4). It is also clear that a “learning dialectic” took place between bureaucratic and pluralistic political practices within the FSLN itself. It will be interesting to see which lesson has been learned if and when the Sandinistas return to power.

The third edition of Walker’s *Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino* makes the more detailed material in *Revolution and Counterrevolution* accessible to a wider audience. The clearly written historical chapters provide the background for the chapters on the country’s economic, political, and social systems and its place in the international system. Attention is given to the first year of the Chamorro regime. The book also contains useful material on the evolution of the UNO and recent reform currents in the FSLN.

Each of these books is a useful and meaty contribution to the field of contemporary Nicaraguan studies. *Revolution and Counterrevolution* is written primarily for the scholar, however; *The Land of Sandino* is an excellent introduction for the beginning student.

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To Lead as Equals: Rural Protest and Political Consciousness in Chinandega, Nicaragua, 1912–1979. By JEFFREY GOULD. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990. Photographs. Maps. Tables. Appendix. Notes. Bibliographical essay. xi, 377 pp. Paper. \$14.95.

The Nicaraguan Revolution has come to be seen largely as a morality play, with aggrieved middle-class youths battling a vicious family dictatorship propped up by the United States. Jeffrey Gould’s book suggests a different reading of that episode. In a well-written and richly documented volume, Gould brings to the

foreground social conflict in the northwestern province of Chinandega from the turn of the century to the late 1970s, showing how disparate segments of the rural poor came together in an increasingly coherent, long-term resistance to the local oligarchy and the state.

On one level, Gould's is a classic story of agrarian rebellion. The book opens with the early protests of Chinandegan artisans, small entrepreneurs, and mill and field workers on the region's largest sugar plantation. But the action soon shifts decisively to the settlements of smallholders, tenants, and peons at the edges of the traditional *latifundia* around midcentury. Agricultural modernization, particularly with the expansion of cotton and cattle production, threatened the customary paternalistic symbiosis of lord and peasant in such places as San José del Obraje, Tonalá, and *Rancherías*. Conflicts over land led to a round of protests, culminating in the crucial *campesino* support for the Sandinista insurgency in the 1970s.

Gould, however, thickens the plot by exploring the political and ideological roots of these agrarian struggles. He situates the evolution of protest in the Chinandegan countryside in the context of competing elite interests locally and nationally. A dense political history details how the Somoza clan, through the 1940s and 1950s, relied on a populist strategy to check rival oligarchs and consolidate its power in the countryside. Nicaragua's variant of populism not only raised the expectations of the rural poor but also schooled them in legal challenges, encouraged them to defy local landowners, and provided a template for organization through the official trade union movement. In the 1960s and 1970s, first seeking alliances with oligarchical factions and then attempting to monopolize power, the Somozas violently turned on their former peasant allies. But the National Guard's repression could not undo the *campesinos'* experience of what the author refers to as the long march through the institutions of *Somocismo*, which well prepared them for their involvement in an ultimately successful rebellion.

Gould does not consider this political journey to be overdetermined by the penetration of the market and the proletarianization of these country folk. By vivid use of oral testimony, he shows convincingly that the inhabitants of these hamlets used a constellation of class, community, and ethnic identities to craft for themselves a resilient oppositional culture capable of defying both landed elites and *Somocista* authorities. In the process, the *campesinos* appropriated and transformed elite political ideologies, from Zelaya's volatile late nineteenth-century mix of liberal nationalism to *Somocista* populism. The resulting amalgam of *obrerista*, republican, and communitarian ideas and practices allowed them to address local concerns with great skill, and to achieve occasional successes. What's more, it would eventually lead Chinandega's rural poor to common ground with the middle-class Sandinistas, while ensuring that theirs would not be unqualified support once the largely city-oriented revolutionary regime was in place.

This ambitious book occasionally falters, as in its quick-brushed history of the relations between the *campesinos* and the FSLN. Nevertheless, it represents a

major contribution to the literature on Nicaragua and provides a generous, spirited tale that advances our knowledge of the origins and nature of the insurgency and its aftermath. This work also marks the culmination of research on nineteenth- and twentieth-century agrarian history by a generation of Latin Americanists, and a departure as well. *To Lead as Equals* attends fully and wisely to the structural conditions that shaped social relations in Chinandega, yet simultaneously it addresses the problems of consciousness and agency through a considered use of contemporary social theory and anthropological method. In this manner, Gould succeeds admirably in enhancing the narrative power of a book that demonstrates the limits and the possibilities of campesino politics in the face of this most cruel episode of agrarian capitalism in Latin America.

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International

Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965. By BRUCE PALMER. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1989. Maps. Graphs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. xii, 226 pp. Cloth. \$23.00.

Bruce Palmer, a retired four-star U.S. Army general, commanded U.S. forces in the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic. His book is an unabashed defense of U.S. diplomacy and military involvement—especially that of the U.S. Army—and an overt, somewhat defensive retrospective attempt as a military man to counter the views of civilian authors (virtually all of them, he says) who condemned U.S. actions. He sees the affair as a unique event in which the United States drew its hemispheric allies into an Inter-American Peace Force, resulting in the “rare feat” of settling a civil war. His operational descriptions, military and political, are authoritative.

Palmer contends “that the Dominican Republic in a political sense has been a success story for the more than 20 years since” the intervention (p. 1). While Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker’s salvaging of the situation in 1966 was an extraordinary diplomatic achievement, subsequent Dominican political developments offer highly mixed evidence for any claims of long-term success. Palmer does not address the broader consideration that U.S. strong-arm multilateral diplomacy at the time set off a sharp decline in the mutual security and peaceful settlement functions of the Inter-American System, evident after 1979 when those functions were peripheral to Central American conflict, and during the 1983 U.S. military intervention in Grenada, when they were irrelevant.

Palmer’s assessments of “lessons learned” (he compares the Dominican and Grenadan interventions and analyzes the Panama Canal treaties) have an anachronistic ring. They do not refer to trends that were leading to the end of the Cold War and consequent implications for inter-American relations, especially in the