

pantheon. Whether Haya also sought to impart a sense of dedicated patriotism and a commitment to elevate the Peruvian masses remains a matter of controversy. Clearly, though, he did not much concern himself with the economic technicalities of statecraft.

Under García, Apristas did make an effort to integrate certain pockets of the marginalized urban poor into society. They drew the line, though, at genuine participation. Conditioned by Aprismo's authoritarian streak and messianic approach, García and his cohorts, as Graham depicts them, preferred manipulative, clientelistic politics to participatory democracy. As the economy declined precipitously after a tantalizing upturn during García's first two years in office, the president faced increasing opposition even from party stalwarts. Haya had died in 1979, and attempts to maintain party unity through veneration of his cult foundered. One aspect of Haya's indoctrination of youthful acolytes succeeded, however. Haya managed to impart to his successors an interest in dialectics rather than practical economic skills. An old-fashioned Latin American caudillo produced old-fashioned followers. Whether, in the long run, yesterday's dreamers prove any more ineffectual than today's technocrats remains to be seen.

Alan García and his colleagues understood that orthodox International Monetary Fund approaches to inflation and the balance of payments do not adequately solve the complex problems—social, economic, and political—arising out of underdevelopment; but they proved that alternative solutions grasped at by ideologues and politicians on the make are equally futile. Salvador Allende in Chile, as Graham observes more than once, understood and proved the same things. No Latin Americanist would have trouble expanding the list.

FREDRICK B. PIKE, University of Notre Dame

*Peru: The Evolution of a Crisis.* By JAMES D. RUDOLPH. Westport: Praeger, 1992. Photographs. Maps. Tables. Figures. Notes. Bibliography. Index. xii, 166 pp. Cloth. \$42.95.

In this timely book, James Rudolph skillfully examines the political, economic, and social problems that have devastated Peru since the restoration of civilian, democratic rule in 1980. Peruvians almost universally refer to this painful experience with the shorthand phrase *la crisis*. The coauthor of a score of "country studies" (including the 1981 volume on Peru) prepared by the foreign area studies staff of the American University, Rudolph has lived and taught in Peru since 1986. Informed by firsthand experience, he has synthesized a wide range of Peruvian and English-language sources to produce a solid consensus interpretation of contemporary Peru.

The first half of the book provides geographic, social, and historical background. Rudolph is generally a reliable guide in this survey of Peru's political

evolution, although he adds credence to the now-discredited claim that APRA founder Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre was cheated out of the presidency in the 1931 election. More important, Rudolph provides an excellent overview and analysis of the 12-year Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (1968–80). While maintaining that the *docenio* produced some benefits, Rudolph finds the proximate roots of the current crisis in the errors of the military regime.

Rudolph explains how the neoliberal economic policies of Fernando Belaúnde (1980–85) failed to replicate the “miracles” touted of them in Chile and Argentina. Instead, Peru was ravaged by climatic disasters, plummeting trade terms, and a dysfunctional austerity program dictated by the International Monetary Fund. Rudolph faults Belaúnde for failing to nip the nascent Sendero Luminoso in the bud, then giving free rein to the armed forces, whose brutal disregard for human rights alienated the peasants but did not stop the spread of the Sendero insurgency. While sabotage repeatedly darkened Lima, the insurgency became entangled with the international drug industry in the Huallaga Valley. Belaúnde passed on to his successor a nearly moribund domestic economy, a suffocating foreign debt, an escalating “dirty war” against Sendero, and a booming drug industry that fostered debilitating official corruption.

Rudolph’s most important contribution is his two-chapter treatment of the 1985–90 administration of Aprista Alan García. The author is sympathetic toward APRA. He emphasizes the extremely difficult challenge García faced and acknowledges the successes of the regime’s first two years. Nevertheless, Rudolph holds García primarily responsible for the incredible *desgobierno* that pushed Peru to the brink of disaster by 1990. García’s political ineptitude and personal failings brought wrongheaded policies toward the economy and the insurgency; these policies dramatically eroded the quality of life for the middle class and brought incredible suffering to the nation’s poor. Overall, Rudolph introduces readers to the current Peruvian conundrum with both sensitivity and admirable objectivity.

DAVID P. WERLICH, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale

*Shining Path of Peru*. Edited by DAVID SCOTT PALMER. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Maps. Notes. Glossary. Bibliography. Index. xvi, 270 pp. Cloth. \$45.00.

David Palmer notes in his introduction to this volume that the many prominent Shining Path watchers represented herein do not exhaust the list of serious analysts of Peru’s 12-year violent insurgency. But the volume does provide, in Palmer’s words, multiple “windows” on the complex and contradictory phenomenon called Sendero Luminoso.

Though they develop quite different explanations for Sendero’s strength and endurance, Tom de Wit and Vera Gianotten, Carlos Degregori, Billie Jean Isbell,