

Opatrný draws these several threads into a single fabric through his treatment of concrete annexationist plans and actions in both Cuba and the United States. All this is highlighted from 1848 to 1851 by the dramatic but misguided heroics of Narciso López, who would pay for his faulty political judgment before a firing squad. The volume closes with the final echoes of the noisy but always flawed annexationist movement. Cubans turned to more appealing ideals, conveyed through a growing sense of nationalist awareness; and the United States, its internal divisions inhibiting further expansion southward, prepared to test the viability of nationalism on another level.

Opatrný shows that annexationism, though it had temporary appeal for some Cubans, never enjoyed broad intellectual endorsement and won even less popular support. Annexation seemed to offer economic advantages and the hope of guaranteeing the stability of the island's social system. But the gulf between Cuban and U.S. culture was simply too great. Nevertheless, by advocating a break from Spain, the intellectual ferment fostered by annexationism "was one of the stages on the road which led Cuban society to national emancipation" (p. 253). This ambitious volume bears witness as well to the intellectual vigor currently reemerging in Central Eastern Europe.

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Cuba banca y crédito 1950–1958. By ENRIQUE COLLAZO PÉREZ. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1989. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. 93 pp. Paper.

The Cuban Communist party has been rewriting the history of Cuba for many years now. This recent attempt is of greater interest than most because it focuses on economic matters, whereas historiography since 1960 has been weak. The author is a historian trained at the University of Havana and currently a junior researcher at the Institute of History of Cuba's Academy of Sciences.

This short volume examines a critical period for banking and credit in Cuba. These years saw the creation and early development of the Central Bank (Banco Nacional de Cuba or BNC), the Bank for Agricultural and Industrial Development (BANFAIC), and other government financial institutions. These two were founded by a constitutionally elected government while the rest were not, a major difference the author is unwilling to appreciate. The statistics displayed clearly show that the banking and financial agencies established after the Batista coup issued the lion's share of credit. When the author argues that the financial easing that took place during this period brought disastrous consequences for Cuba's external sector, he does not exonerate the more than two years of sound banking and credit by the BNC and the BANFAIC under the democratically elected Prío government. This is just one instance of oversight among many in a monograph whose main purpose is to discredit any Cuban regimes preceding the present one. That

includes the well-respected founding presidents of the BNC and the BANFAIC, Felipe Pazos and Justo Carrillo, who resigned their posts when Batista took power in 1952.

Another major deficiency of this book is the author's lack of economic expertise, particularly in market economics. He has chosen to be led in his appraisal of the 1950–58 period by self-trained economists of the old Cuban Communist party, other international Communist and Marxist-Leninist writers (including Marx and Lenin themselves), and even Fidel Castro and Che Guevara (bibliography, p. 191). The author does not know that one of the frequently cited *obras*, the *Informe del Ministerio de Hacienda del Gobierno Revolucionario al Consejo de Ministros* (1959), was written by a team of economists led by Antonio Jorge (and including this reviewer), practically all of whom have long since broken with the Castro regime. The only commendable part of this book is the statistics. But even those should be taken with a large grain of salt.

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International

Vichy et la France libre au Mexique: guerre, cultures, et propagande pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. By DENIS ROLLAND. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1990. Photographs. Illustrations. Tables. Figures. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. 443 pp. Paper.

This book investigates competition in diplomacy, cultural matters, and propaganda between the Vichy and Free French governments to win influence with Mexico during the first three years of World War II. Denis Rolland, professor of contemporary history at the Ecole Normale, studied under Professors François Chevalier, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, François-Xavier Guerra, and Frédéric Mauro of the University of Paris. His book is related to a larger project that will examine Spanish and French relations with Latin America.

Rolland notes that Franco-Mexican relations were rather distant and inactive in 1939, yet the Mexicans were shaken and incredulous when the European war broke out. Initially, however, the French government's position on responsibility for the war was aided by two groups of European colonists in Mexico.

The Mexican government had accepted 450,000 Spanish refugees after Barcelona fell to General Francisco Franco's forces in 1939. These Spaniards were determined foes of Nazi Germany and fascism. In addition, six thousand French people, led by the French consular official and military attaché in Mexico, Jacques Soutelle, and the sojourning professor of hispanic studies Gilbert Médioni, resided in Mexico when the war broke out. The two Frenchmen led a propaganda and political campaign to counter Vichy activity and to align Mexico with the Free French movement of General Charles de Gaulle. Mexico did not break relations