

International

Imperio de papel: acción cultural y política exterior durante el primer franquismo. By LORENZO DELGADO GÓMEZ-ESCALONILLA. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1992. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. xxi, 512 pp. Paper.

The support of artists and intellectuals for the Spanish Republic, both in Spain and throughout the Western world, is comparatively well known and frequently publicized outside Spain. Much less known are the cultural support the Franco regime received from a somewhat smaller portion of the Spanish intelligentsia and the regime's counterrevolutionary cultural program, which it hoped to project more broadly across the Luso-Hispanic world. The Franco dictatorship's original goal was not merely to defeat the Left militarily and politically but to carry out a thorough cultural and religious counterrevolution, restoring the primacy of Catholicism and traditional values. This thoroughly researched dissertation by Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla does not seek to examine the substance of that policy in any detail, but simply to study its relationship to foreign policy and to describe the concrete measures undertaken to further cultural activity abroad during *el primer franquismo*, or approximately the first decade of the Franco regime.

Delgado begins by describing the evolution of official Spanish cultural policy abroad during the latter years of the monarchy and under the Republic before the civil war of 1936. He then turns to the development of the Franco regime's policies in this regard during the war years, finding the early measures limited and comparatively ineffective, chiefly because of the absence of resources. An effort was made to broaden the government's program after the end of the civil war, giving primary attention to western and central Europe and Latin America (particularly Argentina, Brazil, and, to some extent, Chile), while lesser attention was paid to Morocco and the Islamic world. In the Western Hemisphere, Spanish cultural activity was attuned to the regime's right-wing theories of neotraditional "Hispanidad" and was anti-North American in emphasis. Resources nonetheless remained limited, more than a little internal bureaucratic conflict took place, and the general achievements were not impressive.

A major change developed in 1943–44, when it became apparent that the Axis powers were losing World War II and the regime would require redefinition and metamorphosis. Ambitions for a rightist cultural hegemony in Latin America were abandoned in favor of a more cooperative version of "Hispanidad" that now emphasized good relations with the United States, and cultural activity received greater priority in foreign policy than ever before.

There are no major surprises here, and this lengthy account ends soon after the conclusion of World War II, well before the new cultural offensive was fully

played out. The study is well researched in official primary sources and thoroughly grounded in the now-extensive secondary literature. Though occasionally sardonic, the text is objective and reliable, providing the first detailed account of the evolution of official Spanish cultural policy abroad during the first half of the twentieth century.

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Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas norteamericanas. By BERNARDO VEGA. Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1992. Notes. Bibliography. Index. 520 pp. Paper.

This book should be of major interest to anyone concerned with the twentieth-century history of the Dominican Republic. The Trujillo dictatorship was one of several installed after the occupation of Caribbean countries by U.S. troops in the first decades of the century. Bernardo Vega traces in great detail the continuous relationship between this regime and the U.S. armed forces from Rafael Trujillo's assumption of power in 1930 until his death in 1961.

The first chapter deals with Trujillo's rise in the U.S.-organized Dominican National Guard and his relations with several Marine officers involved in the Dominican government during the occupation. The next 12 chapters examine Trujillo's relations with the U.S. military after he seized power, and the final one presents Vega's conclusions.

Several themes pervade this study. One is Trujillo's continuing admiration for and sentimental association with the U.S. Marine Corps. He maintained personal contact with a number of officers he had first met during the occupation. He steadfastly sought to get the United States to send a military (Marine) mission. And in 1939, he was lavishly entertained by his former Marine comrades during a visit to Washington and Quantico. A second theme is the role of Major Thomas Watson during the early consolidation of the Trujillo regime and afterward. Soon after he joined the National Guard, Trujillo came under the command of Major Watson, beginning a long friendship between the two men. Following the hurricane that leveled Santo Domingo shortly after Trujillo seized the presidency in 1930, the dictator requested a mission to help with relief and reconstruction, and suggested Major Watson to be in charge. Although no mission was dispatched, Major Watson was sent for about a year as naval attaché in the U.S. embassy to oversee U.S. relief efforts. Watson's office, however, was in Trujillo's National Palace.

Vega notes that during this stint, Watson's functions were highly political, trying to defend Trujillo against the official attitude of the U.S. government. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Cutts, a close friend of Watson who in 1930–31 was serving in the U.S. occupation of Haiti, also strongly supported Trujillo and helped organize Marine efforts in Haiti to spy on refugees from the Dominican regime.