

While the memoir is full of useful factual detail, much of the analysis is very old-fashioned history, in which heroic and pure individuals do battle against those of base motives. It makes scattered references to the larger social and economic forces at work, but its principal focus is microscopic: the ideas and daily actions of a small group of students, politicians, military leaders, and North American diplomats.

Despite his form of analysis, Carrillo acknowledges that the DEU remained separate from the majority of its generation and even more so from the “popular sectors.” Still, he attributes the dissolution of the DEU, in September 1933, to naiveté or irresolution rather than to lack of political influence.

Carrillo and his allies in 1933 might be called radical, democratic nationalists. At various points in the book the author claims that the DEU’s program of state-directed capitalism and pro-American (that is, anti-U.S.) nationalism could have won the day in 1933 and spared Cuba from six decades of militarism, corruption, and Communism. This possibility certainly sounds attractive. Yet even Carrillo suggests that one factor lacking in the 1933 student debacle was one or more charismatic leaders who could have transformed university-based manifestos into powerful appeals to agricultural, government, and urban workers, to small businesspeople and landowners. Because Carrillo is, as one would expect, a strong anti-Communist, it does not seem to occur to him that Castro may have played such a role in 1959. Carrillo vigorously assails Castro as a power-hungry authoritarian but avoids the question of how a “pure” democratic movement like the DEU could have brought forth a powerful leader who would not monopolize power. It would seem natural for the author to examine the 26th of July Movement, to see if it could have led a social revolution (and the DEU in its day did not shrink from such rhetoric) without someone like Castro.

The democrats of Carrillo’s generation might have something to teach those Cubans (inside and outside the island) who will one day hold power in a post-Castro nation. Unfortunately, this memoir confines itself to refighting the revolution of 1933 and, as a result, sheds little light on how anti-Communist Cubans might contribute to a future regime loyal to a pre-Castro conception of Cuban nationalism.

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*La ofensiva empresarial: industriales, políticos, y violencia en los años 40 en Colombia.* By EDUARDO SÁENZ ROVNER. Santafé de Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1992. Photographs. Tables. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. 279 pp. Paper.

In the current revision of Latin America at midcentury, it is passing strange that Colombia has not received greater attention. Neither David Rock’s recent volume on the 1940s nor Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough’s earlier studies of the

postwar era discuss what has long been regarded as an idiosyncratic case of partisan violence and social breakdown. This neglect surprises, given the key role of this period in Charles Bergquist's influential *Labor in Latin America* (1986) and Herbert Braun's masterly study of the era's political culture, *The Assassination of Gaitán* (1985).

Eduardo Sáenz Rovner's book should do much to rectify this indifference. The author argues that in the decade and a half after 1929, Colombian industrialists chafed under Liberal administrations favoring both coffee exporters and trade unionists. With the election of Conservative Mariano Ospina Pérez to the presidency in 1946, owners of large textile factories and other manufacturing firms seized the opportunity to remake the national economy on their own terms. Sáenz Rovner shows how the industrialist lobby, ANDI, joined with Laureano Gómez and other Conservative extremists to checkmate moderates in both traditional parties and the coalition of agricultural, labor, and other interests led by the populist tribune Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. The industrialists marshaled support from technocrats, politicians, and the press to secure protective tariffs and repressive labor policies from an increasingly dictatorial Conservative regime.

This novel interpretation stands solidly on a critical reading of secondary works, along with a careful use of Colombian and U.S. government archives and previously unexamined materials from major business associations. Sáenz Rovner takes on the big questions of Colombia's midcentury transition and boldly challenges the dominant liberal and Marxist historiography. Unfortunately, his analysis downplays the powerful crosscurrents of partisan politics, gives short shrift to the coffee lobby, and exaggerates the separation of manufacturing from other elite interests. Nevertheless, it is likely to set the standard for Colombia's business and economic history for some time.

Sáenz Rovner helps locate Colombia's midcentury experience squarely in Latin America's economic and social transformations after World War II. But perhaps more significant, his tale suggests that those triumphant elites, with industrialists at the helm, presaged the authoritarian capitalism linked to foreign capital that arose elsewhere in the region decades later. The Colombian bourgeoisie successfully manipulated public opinion; swept aside populist, labor, and nationalist alternatives; and cut deals with the U.S. government and corporations. Moreover these industrialists and their political partners helped midwife an official terror during the late 1940s and early 1950s, thereby undermining constitutional rule, thwarting serious reform, and making coercion a mainstay of elite domination for the rest of the century. This compelling study reveals Colombia in this period not as a historical anomaly but as an early and unhappy example of the violent origins of contemporary Latin America.

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