

doubt that after the 1976 military takeover, nearly all the bishops foolishly sided with the military; they even blessed the farcical Malvinas invasion. For that reason, Raúl Alfonsín raised the divorce issue and proposed the separation of church and state.

These accomplishments notwithstanding, Burdick's study could have been better. First and foremost, it needs far more analysis of the colonial era and the nineteenth century. This is basically a twentieth-century study, which provides only 25 pages for the pre-1900 period. Although cogently written, the discussion is largely political rather than intellectual or cultural, thereby giving the narrative a somewhat brittle tone. The use of a model introduced early is inconsistent and not particularly original. A comparative context also would have helped in gauging Catholic sentiment in other Latin American countries. The research is adequate, but not overwhelming. The primary sources are largely periodicals or organizational files, along with interviews. The book's scope is limited: it places far too much emphasis on the MTSM to the exclusion of mainstream Catholicism. Moreover, it strays from religious themes when discussing post-1974 events.

Some of the author's conclusions are debatable. For one thing, it is inaccurate to portray Perón's regime as totalitarian. Certainly, the statement that under Juan Carlos Onganía, "for the first time religious orthodoxy became a unifying factor" (p. 128) overlooks the past. When discussing the "Catholic monopoly of the right" (p. 219), Burdick forgets the military. Finally, the book lacks a precise conclusion about MTSM involvement in the revolutionary process of the early 1970s; Burdick states that such a crucial factor is "unclear" or "ambiguous" (p. 168).

DOUGLAS W. RICHMOND, University of Texas, Arlington

*Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation.* By DEBORAH L. NORDEN. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996. Map. Tables. Figures. Notes. Bibliography. Index. 242 pp. Cloth, \$35.00. Paper, \$17.50.

Ever since Leopoldo Lugones, the famous Argentine poet, essayist, and right-wing nationalist, declared in 1924 "The Hour of the Sword," the military of his country has heeded his message that officers were better than politicians. Deborah Norden has updated this long and tortuous legacy as it has unfolded in the late 1980s and early 1990s and has brought to it a political scientist's perspective on civil-military relations.

The background to this subject has been studied carefully and skillfully by such eminent authorities as Robert Potash and Alain Rouquie. Almost half of this book reviews the same history of military intervention, from José F. Uriburu's 1930 uprising through the military repression of the "Dirty War," the debacle of the Falklands-Malvinas conflict, and the return to civilian rule. Most of this material is based on secondary sources, and it contributes little to a familiar narrative, except for the addition of some interviews the author conducted.

Norden's unique research is an examination of four attempted military revolts

between 1987 and 1990, undertaken by the so-called *carapintadas* (painted faces, because of the battle makeup they used to distinguish themselves). These army rebellions against elected presidents Raúl Alfonsín and Carlos Menem created wide publicity for their leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico and Colonel Mohammed Ali Seineldín. Although none of the efforts succeeded, they demonstrated that segments of the armed forces were unreconciled to a return to democracy. A major reason for the army's refusal to accept recent governments can be ascribed to more than half a century of praetorianism, which the military is loath to relinquish.

The author's primary objective is to apply a concept of "democratic consolidation" to Argentina over the past decade. How well have civilian regimes persuaded the military to give up interventionism? For this purpose, Norden uses Guillermo O'Donnell's interpretation of "bureaucratic authoritarianism," which characterized the armed forces' control during the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (1976–83), to show a growing split between a professional stance and a political mission. She examines divergences in terms of infantry and cavalry rivalries, competing rightist philosophies, and intense personal loyalties. While the carapintada elements refused to accept subordination to civil authority, general officers showed their commitment to professionalism.

Most revealing are the author's statistics indicating why the military threat has diminished: the relentless cuts in personnel and budgets have made institutional survival the major consideration. In a final section, these changes are compared with other contemporary military-civilian relationships in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. Readers familiar with the long, dismal record of army intervention in Argentina may remain skeptical about the consolidation of democracy and the final sheathing of the sword.

RONALD H. DOLKART, California State University, Bakersfield

*The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1962–1973: From Frondizi's Fall to the Peronist Restoration.* By ROBERT A. POTASH. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. Photographs. Tables. Bibliography. Index. xv, 547 pp. Cloth. \$55.00.

Among the historians who have studied the Latin American military, Robert Potash ranks high indeed. His works on Argentina detailing the political role of the army in politics during the better part of this century are models of scholarship. His use of military sources allows him to reveal the military side of the profession's relations with the rest of society, its place in modern Argentine history.

The present volume carries the saga of Argentine military-civilian relations from the ouster of Arturo Frondizi in 1962 up to the point when the aging Juan Perón was restored to power, in 1973. It serves as both the concluding volume of Potash's trilogy and the introduction to a possible new era of military-civilian relations worthy of scholarly attention. Perón's restoration was short-lived, but his military successors proved more unacceptable, because of the harshness of their rule, than any previous