

between 1987 and 1990, undertaken by the so-called *carapintadas* (painted faces, because of the battle makeup they used to distinguish themselves). These army rebellions against elected presidents Raúl Alfonsín and Carlos Menem created wide publicity for their leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico and Colonel Mohammed Ali Seineldín. Although none of the efforts succeeded, they demonstrated that segments of the armed forces were unreconciled to a return to democracy. A major reason for the army's refusal to accept recent governments can be ascribed to more than half a century of praetorianism, which the military is loath to relinquish.

The author's primary objective is to apply a concept of "democratic consolidation" to Argentina over the past decade. How well have civilian regimes persuaded the military to give up interventionism? For this purpose, Norden uses Guillermo O'Donnell's interpretation of "bureaucratic authoritarianism," which characterized the armed forces' control during the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (1976–83), to show a growing split between a professional stance and a political mission. She examines divergences in terms of infantry and cavalry rivalries, competing rightist philosophies, and intense personal loyalties. While the carapintada elements refused to accept subordination to civil authority, general officers showed their commitment to professionalism.

Most revealing are the author's statistics indicating why the military threat has diminished: the relentless cuts in personnel and budgets have made institutional survival the major consideration. In a final section, these changes are compared with other contemporary military-civilian relationships in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. Readers familiar with the long, dismal record of army intervention in Argentina may remain skeptical about the consolidation of democracy and the final sheathing of the sword.

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The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1962–1973: From Frondizi's Fall to the Peronist Restoration. By ROBERT A. POTASH. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. Photographs. Tables. Bibliography. Index. xv, 547 pp. Cloth. \$55.00.

Among the historians who have studied the Latin American military, Robert Potash ranks high indeed. His works on Argentina detailing the political role of the army in politics during the better part of this century are models of scholarship. His use of military sources allows him to reveal the military side of the profession's relations with the rest of society, its place in modern Argentine history.

The present volume carries the saga of Argentine military-civilian relations from the ouster of Arturo Frondizi in 1962 up to the point when the aging Juan Perón was restored to power, in 1973. It serves as both the concluding volume of Potash's trilogy and the introduction to a possible new era of military-civilian relations worthy of scholarly attention. Perón's restoration was short-lived, but his military successors proved more unacceptable, because of the harshness of their rule, than any previous

military leaders. The *guerra sucia* at home and the Falklands-Malvinas campaign in the South Atlantic cost the armed forces more dearly than had any past political action. This book makes clear just how much further work needs doing.

Historians who aspire to study the post-1973 years will not only need to consult Potash's work for necessary background, they will have to pay attention to the ways in which he assembled his documentation and used it. They will need to know the army the way Potash has come to know it since he began his trilogy some three decades ago.

Eleven years is not a very long time as history goes, but as politics goes, it can be an eternity. In Latin America, a lot can transpire between armed forces and civilians in a very short time, especially if the military dominates politics for most or all of it. In nine intense chapters, Potash takes his readers from 1962 to 1973 without missing a detail of the intricate, intra-institutional negotiations and confrontations between military and political leaders that produced the overthrows and restorations, or the compromises and dissension, that characterized this brief and critical segment of Argentine history. A brief tenth chapter treats some of the issues important to those who will chronicle the recent period.

Potash's intimate knowledge of the Argentine army and his acquaintance with many of its leaders allow him to see clearly all facets of military-civilian relations. His documentation is thorough, and he avoids, for the most part, appearing to lean toward institutional explanations of the armed forces' actions. Not many chroniclers of Latin American military-civilians have enjoyed the access to official sources that Potash displays in this fine book. It is a fitting conclusion to Potash's saga of the army and politics in Argentina.

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Combatiendo al capital: crisis y recomposición de la clase obrera argentina (1985-1993). By PABLO A. POZZI and ALEJANDRO SCHNEIDER. Buenos Aires: El Bloque Editorial, 1994. Tables. Notes. Bibliography. 221 pp. Paper.

This book is one of the few historical analyses of the most recent period in Argentine history. The text covers the years 1985 to 1993 (though the reason for the periodization is unclear), and will surely contribute to the debate about the present state of the Argentine working class.

For the authors, the axis of discussion is whether the Argentine working class is still the fundamental pole of contradiction with the bourgeoisie. The answer is rather obvious, because the authors consider the working class still to have revolutionary potential, although currently such potential seems defeated. This is a great paradox: the working class is always active and constantly defeated, although its members recognize that the present crisis has imposed a mandatory recomposition of their practices and traditions.