

ON CULTURAL CAPITAL AND TASTE

Cultural field in a Turkish city in historical perspective

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ABSTRACT: Through the application of Bourdieu's ideas of culture and cultural capital to a specific city located in Southeastern Turkey, this article identifies the forms of cultural capital, including education and consumption, that became important in class formation since the end of the nineteenth century. The article identifies changes in the historical forms which symbolic and cultural capital have taken. In this city, as non-Western pre-capitalist culture was abandoned, partly due to forced modernization, previous patterns of hierarchies that generated the social groups/relations began to transform. While a nuanced set of practices were distinguishing features of social life, the whole set of practices of generosity, kindness or politeness was filtered through the prism of paternalist domination. From the end of the nineteenth century onwards, however, a symbolic struggle involved questions of taste and culture. Drawing on the struggle between the 'old' and 'new' wealth, this article scrutinises the role of cultural capital in class formation from a historical perspective in relation to family, embodiment and education.

Key words: cultural capital; symbolic capital; education; paternalism

1. Introduction

In her important study, Fatma Müge Göçek (1996) draws on Weber to examine the rise of the bourgeoisie in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. Tracing the use of Western goods and the adaptation of Western modes of behaviour among the Ottoman bureaucratic class, she points out the increased significance of consumption and the emergence of a bourgeoisie class. A series of historical studies has also pointed to the role of western taste as a social marker of distinction, establishing new social divisions, and creating new social status groups in which modernization became another sign for labeling people (Göle 1997: 86). Indeed, Duben and Behar argue that the Europeanization of the Ottoman

upper and middle classes created a split between the *alaturka* and the *alafranga*, as ‘coarse’ and ‘refined’ were redefined (Kandiyoti 1997: 119). Through Westernization, everything that was *alafranga* (the European way) was accepted as proper and valuable, anything *alaturka* (the Ottoman-Turkish way) was deemed negative and somehow inferior (Göle 1997: 85). While these historical studies have pointed to the significance of culture and consumption in the social formation of the middle class in Turkey since the nineteenth century, they do not draw on Bourdieu in their examination. The purpose of this article, then, is to explore the application of Bourdieu’s ideas of culture and cultural capital to understand social change in the early twentieth century Turkish context.

Although most of Bourdieu’s concern in *Distinction* (2000a [1979]) and *The State Nobility* (1998 [1989]) is placed on the reproduction of class inequality, his model also highlights the cultural dimension of modern society. In fact, Bourdieu’s ideas have influenced many studies that invoke it to explore socio-cultural change, namely the debates about the rise of ‘post-modern’ culture, new forms of consumerism, and the declining significance of class (Savage and Bennett 2005: 3). However, as Savage and Bennett (2005) argue, even though Bourdieu was pointing out the ‘new’ cultural intermediaries, he was mainly concerned with exploring the bond between cultural capital and class inequality, hence, the reproduction of class inequality. Furthermore, contrary to the debates about the fragmentation of ‘class’ in the late twentieth century, Bourdieu’s ideas are also used in a series of historical studies that point to the significance of culture and consumption in middle classes in nineteenth-century England (Savage and Bennett 2005: 6). It is indicated that culture and consumption became important in the social formation of middle class identity in England before the 1970s (Gunn 2005).

The purpose of this article is to examine how the application of Bourdieu’s arguments can unveil the salient aspects of the historical relationship between the social formation of middle class in the Turkey and forms of cultural capital since the nineteenth century. Even though the consumption of foreign goods was limited by the sumptuary laws in the eighteenth century, foreign goods became part of daily life during the nineteenth century along with Ottoman integration with Europe. In the classical Ottoman neighbourhood, the poor and the rich had the same consumption patterns. With the spread of western goods and habits, in Bourdieu’s terms, a classified and classifying public culture became part of the social order in the big cities. While looking at window displays and walking through the streets became leisure activities, the homogeneous life cycle in traditional neighbourhoods was transformed (Durakbaşa and Cindoğlu 2005 [2002]: 87).

Indeed, an arena of struggle that encompassed eating habits, body language, and taste was emerging. Likewise, in this Southern Turkish city, the entry of European objects and the modes of behaviour led to a change in social relations. The struggle between ‘old’ and ‘new’ wealth in the city clearly outlines the arena of the battle for being the ones engaged in the most prestigious activities. ‘Old’ wealth families’ history dates back to the Ottoman Empire. These families engaged in trade or work as officials – most of them were members of the *ulema*¹ class – and invested in land during the decline of the *timar*² system. Contrary to the landowners, ‘new’ wealth families did not have land, and their family businesses were dependent on trade nor did they have a genealogy to call upon. In fact, their family history is more recent as they became visible in the city during the Republican Period. Even though no good data are available to find the answers of how and when ‘old’ wealth families in my sample had come into possession of their land, family albums, local historians and research on the city give us an overall view about this. According to the available data, while some of the families had already been visible in city life before and during the eighteenth century, a few of them can be traced only to the nineteenth century. Indeed, according to Islamic court and deed records three families had been at the top of the social hierarchy during the sixteenth century (Peirce 2005 [2003]: 75). One of the three families was in my sample. And only three respondents’ families have rather recent success stories. In fact, these three respondent’s parents became known in the city after the establishment of the Republic (1923).

The city Gaziantep³ is situated on a valley surrounded with hills and its location makes it relatively in between Mediterranean and East Turkey. During the Ottoman rule and Republican regime the majority of the country’s population was engaged in agriculture. The majority of the settlers in Antep were farmers as well. They owned large or small scales of land, and land was the chief form of property in the city. Eastern Anatolia was less affected by the world-market-induced commercialization of agriculture than was any other region during the nineteenth century. Because of the absence of railroads until the early 1910s, agricultural

1. The religious class.
2. The grant of lands or revenues by the Ottoman sultan to an individual for his services.
3. Before the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the city was called Antep-Ayintab. The founder of Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal, had given the title ‘Ghazi’ (Muslim warrior fighting for Islam) to the city to reward their success in fighting the French army during the First World War. Therefore, in the following pages, where the Ottoman period is discussed, the city is called Antep (Ayintap). Additionally, it is still very common among the city dwellers to call the city Antep. In fact, in most of the recollections respondents refer to the city as Antep.

produce of the region could not be directed towards long-distance markets on a regular basis. However, there was a considerable amount of commodity production for local urban markets (Pamuk 1987: 191, 194). In fact, during those years Antep supplied fruits and vegetables for Aleppo (Günyol *et al.* 1983: 2993). Moreover, local weaving had an important role in the city's economy. By the nineteenth century, Urquhart had listed some of the articles which had been circulated in the country throughout an extensive internal trade such as cotton thread and cloth from Mosul and Mardin (in southeastern Anatolia) cotton cloths from Izmir, Urfa, Antep, Kilis and Malatya (Inalcik 1987: 379).

Generally Armenian city dwellers and few Muslim Turks controlled the agricultural production in the city until the beginning of the twentieth century (Günyol *et al.* 1983: 2993). It was a feature of the Ottoman Empire that most of those who engaged in the commercial and industrial activities were Armenians, Greeks and Jews (Keyder 1988). Indeed, during the Ottoman period, the Armenians, including Jews and Greeks, who held property financial capital and property, had carried out most of the commercial activities in the city (Günyol *et al.* 1983: 2993; Miller and Miller 2006 [1999]: 60). It appears that in addition to Armenian landowners, broadly 10 Turkish Muslim landowner families controlled much of the land in the region of the city during that time. However, in 1915 the Committee of Union and Progress issued the Deportation Law in order to expel 'untrustworthy' Christian communities. Indeed, local Armenians were deported in Antep by the implementation of this law (Miller and Miller 2006 [1999]: 128, 130). Most of the immobile possessions such as houses and fields of local Armenians had been transferred to local Muslim merchants. Respondents mentioned that some of the local Muslims had seized the possessions of local Armenians. There are also a small number of respondents whose grandparents had lived in the former Armenian houses. These respondents mentioned that their grandparents had bought the houses from local Armenians. Nevertheless, many of these properties were sold at low prices (Marashlian 1998: 136–7). In deed, as Keyder (1988) mentioned a national bourgeoisie was created through the capital transfer from non Muslim minorities. Hence, deportation of the Ottoman minorities from Anatolia created a national middle class.

This research is based on a qualitative approach. I used partly documentary sources, family histories, archive materials and photographs, but mainly oral history data compiled through in-depth interviews. This primarily involved an interview guide design, and in-depth semi-structured interviews with a sample of 30 people, of 11 males and 19 females.

This article is structured in the following way. The first part of the article shows how the paternalist order regulated 'old' wealth's lives and in general social relations among the city dwellers. The second part of the article discusses how the order of distinctions replaced the regulation of old hierarchies and how interest in culture and consumption formed new hierarchies, thus, becoming important in the formation of 'old' and 'new' wealth's class identities.

2. Paternalism as a way of living – 'people used to work for us because they wanted to help us'

Bourdieu's early work in Algeria outlines the contrast between pre-capitalist and capitalist life along with the new forms of domination associated with modernity. The son of a postman, living in a village with a late capitalist society, Bourdieu personally experienced some of the contrasts between pre-capitalist and capitalist life. His childhood experiences living in the peasant area of Bearn and working as an anthropologist in Kabylia (Algeria) shaped his studies into what could be seen as a comparative analysis of pre-capitalist and capitalist societies (Fowler 1998: 1, 13). Bourdieu pointed out that in traditional Algerian societies, such as the peasants of Kabylia, the motivations behind actions were regulated by the logic of social honour or symbolic capital rather than the accumulation of money; while in *Distinction* (2000a [1979]), he indicates the significance of cultural capital and consumption in late capitalist France. In this section, I am particularly interested in Bourdieu's early studies in Algeria to identify historical changes in the forms of symbolic capital in Turkey since the end of the nineteenth century. In this context, tracing the daily practices of families with 'old' wealth in a Southern Turkish city would provide us with valuable insights.

The coordination of actions of 'old' wealth was achieved primarily through a web of personal relationships, each of which was played like a highly nuanced game. The same agents were linked to each other in a variety of fields where kinship and economic production went hand in hand. Households with 'old' wealth were economically and spatially divided into household units, and married sons maintained a joint economic relationship with their father. As landowner families produced offspring, the separate dwellings of married sons tended to be located in the same courtyard as the natal house. After their marriages, daughters left the natal household to join the household of their husband, whereas sons were expected to remain with their parents within their natal house. At the death of the father, sons

established their separate houses. E.O.'s recollection indicates the joint extended characteristic of an 'old' wealth household:

... The house where my father was born had been my grandfather's house. It was a very big house. After my grandfather had died; my grandfather father had ... seven children. When his children had married they had divided that large house and they had lived there. They had divided and all the family used to live together. We were living there and my uncles were living there too. They were all living together, but everyone had their own house (Kapilari ayriydi). There was a big courtyard ... When my grandfather had been alive there was only one courtyard (Evvel birmis dedemin zamanında). But, later each child had his or her own part and they had divided it. They had their own doors. When you went into the street you saw that all houses had their own entrance. In 1960 we moved. We moved to a new house. After the military coup in 1960 we moved there. Later, during the time we lost our elders their children started to sell the houses (Büyüklerimiz öldükçe sattılar).

'Old' wealth family members have recollections of their fathers or grandfathers who enjoyed life and had fun. None of them describe their father as being busy or a workaholic; on the contrary, they have recollections about how their fathers or grandfathers were generous people. Work, then, was not a calculative competition and their actions were not oriented around a pure money economy; instead, they were regulated by a vigorous sense of dignity and reputation. This world cannot be conceived of as a money based economy. Since some of the 'old' wealth families owned land, they had contact with the peasants. Their relationship with the peasants and the organization of agriculture on their land also reflects the paternalistic practices that contributed to the perpetuation of hidden domination. This is why social relationships, such as those observed by Bourdieu in Kabylia, were maintained only if there was generosity and dignity in their relations with the peasants (Bourdieu 2000b [1972]: 190).

'Old' wealth's recollections of farming their land during the end of the nineteenth century reflect a rather traditional organization of agricultural production on their land. Indeed, they did not attempt to increase efficiency or undertake any innovations in the techniques of farming until the entrance of tractors in the 1960s. Landowner families were not market oriented towards their own land, nor towards the labour, which they employed. They advanced cash loans or maize to poor families and claimed payment through subsequent labour. V.G explains how her grandfather organized the farming of his land:

V.G: Yes, we had workers. Peasants were our workers. We gave them seeds. In those years, there was not any fertiliser; there was not any inorganic fertiliser. The owner of the land used to give seeds and the peasants sowed and reaped the product. The owner subtracted the price of the seeds; no actually they didn't subtract the seed. For example, the owner and the peasants shared the profit and the owner again gave the seeds. The sharer again sows them. The profit was very little due to the lack of fertilisers. They only got 1/3 of product. They owned large amounts and due to this, landowners got a large amount of crop. My grandfather had been a very good farmer, and he had all this money from farming.

As the above recollection indicates there was not a real labour market. Thus, the relationships with the landowner and the peasant did not only depend on material but also symbolic power. The philanthropy of 'old' wealth had constructed mosques, schools, fountains and baths for the city. This gift giving and caring for the poor were part of the complex strategy of ensuring the reproduction of the established order. It was through this set of paternalist practices of distributing generosity kindness or politeness to their subordinates that 'old' wealth acquired and maintained symbolic power. As Bourdieu asserted, when the task of domination is not driven by objective mechanisms, it is by lavishing generosity, kindness, or politeness on his charwoman that the dominant perpetuates the relationship of domination (Bourdieu 2000b [1972]: 189–90).

In fact, the strong sense of respect, reputation and dignity was a central feature of 'old' wealth's collective identity. This world was comprised of a set of practices that suggested provident fostering care of 'old' wealth to their subordinates. This relationship also gave peasants a degree of political power for their support of the 'old' wealth in his external political activities. Nevertheless, it was not a kind of exchange between the equals but rather a practice, which demanded symbolic profit through practices of disinterestedness of power. It is such an imminent practice that members of these families see themselves as the representatives of peasants. Similarly, these families dominated the local political field for generations. For instance, O.E's family had villages and his relatives were active in politics. O.E himself was a deputy. One of his uncles was a minister and the other one was a deputy and one of his cousins was the last member of the family who became a deputy. He talks about his families' political faith:

O.E: I was born in 1946 and the Democrat Party was established in 1942 or 1944. My father was the one who established a branch of this party in Antep. I do not want to talk about those years because it was the single party years. It was forbidden and they did not allow us to prepare election forms because it

was the single party period. Anyway, I do not talk about this. In 1950, the Democrat Party won the elections and they asked my father to be one of the MP candidates. My father was a free-spirit like me and he told them 'If you want somebody to be MP in our family you should ask my cousin. He also finished college like me'. Then, my uncle became a candidate and he was elected in 1950 and he worked as an MP for 10 years . . . We were active in politics until the 1980s. This is my family's political life story. When people talked about politics, they used to mention our family because my family members were the founders of the Democrat Party in the city. And they all worked in various positions of this party.

Thus, the reproduction and the continuity of symbolic power were due to the 'old' wealth's relationship with the workers and the peasants, which was mainly based on caring and gift giving practices. It was through paternalist practices that the 'old' wealth managed and legitimized exploitative relationships. Paternalism here for Bourdieu, as Fowler (1998: 5) indicates, was the typical magical form of enchantment of inequalities. In fact, this system had an important role in defining and confirming relationships. As an 'old' wealth family member, E.O's recollection clearly indicates how 'old' wealth's interest in gaining symbolic profits is beyond the reach of their consciousness:

E.O: Now I really feel bad when I pay to buy grapes or watermelon (Zoruma gidiy agirima gidiy). We had a farm. After sowing the wheat we used to collect melon and watermelon to let the land lie fallow. We had grape fields as well. They (peasants from their village) used to bring watermelons and grapes on the camels. It was very disgraceful for us to sell them. We did not sell them. They used to bring us and we used to give them to the people who lived in our neighbourhood and who couldn't effort to buy those things. We gave it during the night because we didn't want them to be seen and looked down on by the other people (Etraftan gören olur da hoslanmasin kimse diye). We used to distribute all of it . . . As a farm owner can you sell water melon or melon? We used to give them to our helpers and they used to work for us and help us sincerely. And, during the religious festivals we used to buy clothes for them and we used to cut 5 or 10 meters of cloth for each person and give it to them. Those were good days (Hani öyle bir güzel havaydı o zamanki havalar).

Hence, the social world of 'old' wealth can be conceived through the multiplexity of relationships, whereas the synchronization of actions was achieved primarily through a web of personal, direct relations. As Bourdieu (2000b [1972]: 191) described the relations with the master and his *khammes*, 'old' wealth also considered not only the peasants but also the people who worked for them as to whom they entrusted their

house and their honour. One of the 'old' wealth family member's recollections explicitly reveals the world and its regulation:

C.T: Because my father and my brother used to stay in the village, and additionally I was away, a man used to help my mother. We had a man who used to sell our products in the city. This man used to come to our house everyday because he earned money through our economic relations. My father gave all the products from our village to him and this man used to sell our products. Also, he used to keep our money because my father didn't have any account in a bank. This is very interesting. For example after my father's death this man gave us 80 thousand lira. If he denied this we couldn't prove that he had our money. My brother took this money. This man used to come to our house in the morning. We called him Mehmet agha, sarikli Mehmet agha. He used to shop for us . . .

M.K: Did you pay for him?

C.T: No, because we were very helpful to him . . . People used to work for us because they wanted to help us.

Paternalist logic also shapes 'old' wealth's member's perception of the social hierarchy and their own position in it. Indeed, the universe of paternalism and traditionalism, which governed their practices, does not allow 'old' wealth to explicitly differentiate themselves from their subordinates. Bourdieu (2000b [1972]: 191) indicated that when the domination is exercised between one person and another it must be disguised. In fact, in pre-capitalist societies symbolic violence was needed to maintain the relations of domination and the strategies that were oriented towards the establishment of relations of domination were disguised.

During the interviews, it was very difficult for the respondents to acknowledge the contradictions lived between them and the peasants. Certainly, this does not mean that there was not any class division or contradictions; rather, it was a world that had egalitarian discourse over non-egalitarian objective conditions in which they described their class situation in non-class language. They did not even use the word 'class' (*sinif*); instead of class they preferred to use 'strata' (*tabaka*).

While non-Western pre-capitalist culture was abandoned, paternalist practices gave way to new hierarchies. Indeed, culture and consumption became significant in the formation of upper and middle classes since the end of the nineteenth century especially in the form of adaptation of Western life styles and behaviours. 'Old' wealth followed the same path and welcomed the lifestyles associated with European cultures. These changes were not simply a refashioning of tastes, but they were also symbols of social status. In fact, the struggles and jockeying of 'old' wealth

for domination of the field of taste and lifestyles indicates the arena of the battle for being the ones who were engaged in the most prestigious activities in that symbolic struggle involving questions of culture. In the following section, the strategies of social pretension will be unveiled along with the discussions on Ottoman and Turkish modernization.

3. Struggle in the field of taste

Throughout *Distinction* Bourdieu (2000a [1979]: 6) shows how taste and preferences are not simply a matter of like or dislike as taste classifies and it also classifies the classifier. Hence, what Bourdieu (2000a [1979]: 479) termed ‘the classification struggle’ took place in the field of taste. In Turkey, social relations involved new hierarchies with the Westernization process. While culture and taste became significant in the symbolic struggle, classifications were made according to the ‘correct’ type of Westernization.

The modernization process had begun in the late nineteenth century and spread throughout the country after the Second World War (Özbay 2000: 138). The Ottoman perception of material culture was embedded in the Islamic maxims that goods were meant to be an end, to support oneself and one’s dependents without burdening others. The Koran often took issue with the use to which these goods were put and the interpretations attached to them. According to the Koran the goods had to be used piously, with modesty for the benefit of society. The Koran suggested modesty in the use of goods to decrease the potential of the goods in creating social inequalities among Muslim believers.

In fact, the Ottoman legal opinion on cases involving the consumption of goods used the Koran to instigate modesty in consumption. However, social groups have always employed goods to demarcate and increase their social positions within their societies, and the Ottomans were no exception. The Ottomans followed the Koran maxim mostly in defining what comprised luxury. The Ottoman conception of luxury was that it was the display of the lifestyle of a social group higher than one’s own. This definition called for strictly specified consumption patterns for all social groups so that any deviation from such patterns was interpreted as luxury. The sultan introduced sumptuary laws limiting the consumption of foreign goods. These laws focused specifically on fashion and its disruptive blurring of social stratification among Ottoman social groups (Göçek 1997: 37–9).

Hence, the Ottoman sultan was wary of people crossing the social boundaries. People from different social groups dressed differently and people from lower classes were prohibited from wearing the clothes that

the rulers had (Mardin 1995: 101–2). In the Ottoman Empire, indeed, rank, origin and ethnicity could be read clearly in the costumes (Kandiyoti 1997: 122). When one group imitated the other the Sultan speedily tried to control any such attempts to blur social distinctions. Thus, self presentation was restricted. However, from the later nineteenth-century onwards culture played an important role in the social order. An interest in cultural pursuits and taste in the field of culture became part of the Ottoman upper- and middle-classes. The spread of the use of Western goods and the adaptation of Western modes of behaviour and preferences clearly indicates how culture and taste became significant among the Ottomans daily lives. At the turn of the nineteenth century, European clothing fashions, having pet dogs, taking piano and French language lessons, attending operas, dances, and balls become a part of Ottoman social life. Many of the old objects used in daily life started to disappear, and exported products replaced them.

Literary topics also included Western ideas; new concepts of the individual, the idea of freedom, women's right and social justice, education abroad, fashion and foreign languages. While the employment of Western literary forms such as the novel, short story, and newspaper had an effect in creating new visions of Ottoman society and the individuals living within it, they often criticised types of 'incorrect' Westernization. (Göçek 1996: 119). In fact, the 'Europeanization' of the Ottoman upper- and middle-classes created a split between the *alaturka* (the Ottoman-Turkish style) and the *alafiranga* (European 'frankish' style). While *alafiranga* (the European way) was accepted as proper, *alaturka* (the Ottoman-Turkish way) was rejected as inferior (Göle 1997: 85). Thus, an interest in cultural pursuits became part of Ottoman upper class and in the search for respectability Ottoman upper classes adopted *alafiranga* life styles in their daily lives.

By the end of the nineteenth century, culture and society became mutually interpenetrating. 'Old' wealth and the non-Muslim population were the people who first adopted *alafiranga* (the European way) lifestyles in the city and slowly it became widespread among other city dwellers. However, 'old' wealth did not have close relations with non-Muslim families of the city. None of the respondents mentioned a name of a non-Muslim city dweller as their parents' or grandparents' friends. Except for one respondent, the others were all living in Muslim neighbourhoods before the 1920s. Even this respondent's recollection indicates that they were not close friends with non-Muslim families and they were visiting each other only during the festivals:

K.K: After the Antep War, this side of the road had been a Muslim neighbourhood and the other side had been an Armenian neighbourhood.

And, all our neighbours were Armenian . . . Armenian houses surrounded our house. There were Armenian houses on the left and on the right side of our house. My grandfather was a very respectful man . . . They were good with their neighbours. For example, they had visited each other during Ramadan. All our neighbours were Armenians. We had only one Muslim neighbour . . . Armenian neighbours had visited us during religious festivals.

On the other hand, respondents have detailed recollections about American missionaries in the city. As the missionaries were seen as the representatives of Western life styles, being friends with them was one of the prestigious activities in the field of taste. In fact, respondents were proud to mention those missionaries' names as their parents' friends. They have recollections about missionaries who taught their parents how to play piano. Female respondents commonly mention one of the missionary doctors as giving birth to their children or teaching them child care techniques.

Changes in life styles were not simply a refashioning of tastes, but they were also insignia of social status (Kandiyoti 1997: 119). Being 'modern' or 'Westernized' was entwined and mutually interpenetrated with the definition of high (sublime, elevated, pure) and low (vulgar, low, modest), fine (refined, elegant) and coarse. Therefore, one could be at the top of the status hierarchy only by welcoming and adopting Western lifestyles. The growth of modernization also strengthened the position of 'new' wealth families as they were quick to adopt such changes of modernization. Unlike 'old' wealth families, 'new' wealth evolved in the city during the Republican period and its success did not depend on inherited property or wealth. While, they became visible in the city life after the 1930s, they did not have a genealogy to call upon. These families all had acquired prestige, and reached the top of the local property-owning hierarchy during respondents' fathers' generation. Their success in acquisition of prestige was undoubtedly a result of their many activities.

Both 'old' and 'new' wealth used clothing made in European fashion, took piano and French language lessons, and attended balls. Indeed, recollections of both 'old' and 'new' wealth outline the arena of the battle for being the ones who were doing the most prestigious activities. All these changes were clearly made to make public a certain status as one of the members of an 'old' wealth family explains how other city dwellers were surprised to hear that they sleep on bedsteads. Similarly, it is very common in 'old' and 'new' wealth families to have recollections about their parents or grandparents who were 'reformists' and who were the first ones to adopt new lifestyles along with clothing or educating their children in modern schools:

A.Y: My grandfather had died when he was very young, and he had been a reformist (çok yenilikçi bir insanmış). My grandfather had been the first person who had registered my father and the others to a school. My father used to tell us that he had been among the ones who had first started to wear a trench coat in the city. He told us that they were also the first ones who had lamp and electric in the city. My grandfather had liked innovations.

Like the male members, female members were also referred as 'reformist'. Respondents were all proud to say how their grandmothers, mothers or aunts were the first ones who put on the hat and attended the balls in the city. During those years, even though women's participation in public activities was still limited, there were few women to be seen on the streets, in leisure centers or in parks (Özbay 2000: 143). Those women were mostly members of upper class. In deed, Pierce (2005 [2003]: 207) indicates that class and gender had overlapped in Antep during the sixteenth century. At that time, upper class women had supported men who had been active in the city's political life, and they had also made investment decisions on their own. Similarly, an 'old' wealth family member talks about her mother and she again proudly explains how her mother was one of the first women in the city to organise a musical event for women.

M.K: How about your mother, was she talkative?

T.T: She was a reformist (Çok yenilikler getirmiş). She was a lady who organized a concert in her house. She hired Hamiyet⁴ to give a concert in her house. She had tea parties at home. She had been a smart woman of her time. She had worn her hat, and had gone out to visit her friends. She started using scarfs later. My parents were sweet people.

Such women attended concerts, receptions and balls where their presence elevated the status of the gatherings. These women were the gate-keepers of the field of taste and they were arbiters of distinction. In fact, Göle discussed how women were the symbol and the actors of the modernization process as their presence in social and political spheres formed a modernist public arena (Göle 2000: 24). Here, the role of women in the transmission of cultural capital is striking. As Gunn (2005: 55) states it is a point largely overlooked in much of the literature, including the work of Bourdieu. It is in *Masculine Domination* that Bourdieu indicated the role of women to ensure the maintenance of social relations and the prestige of the family (Bourdieu 2001 [1998]: 97). However, in *Distinction* (2000a [1979]) and *The State Nobility* (1998 [1989]), while the family and

⁴ Hamiyet was a nationwide famous singer of those years.

education system are seen the main sites for the accumulation and transmission of cultural capital, the role of women in the transmission of cultural capital is not highlighted. In the British context, while arguing the significance of women in the transmission of cultural capital, Gunn (2005: 55) indicates that women, especially married women from the middle class, represented embodied cultural capital in the second half of the nineteenth century. As the above recollection indicates, those women were not just attending or organizing gatherings but they were also embodying cultural capital in their own person, their dress and their behaviour. If we remember that the hat was identified as a symbol of Westernization during those years, it would not be difficult to estimate how much prestige it brought to its bearers.

At this point, the family of A.G indicates another aspect of women being a stable source for the transmission of codes through their investment in formal schooling. Bourdieu argued that family and education systems are effective in the transmission and the accumulation of cultural capital (Bourdieu 2000a [1979], 1998 [1989]). The family of origin, where primary socialization takes place is very important in understanding how the social trajectories of individuals are shaped. Indeed, Bourdieu's theory concerning higher education was part of a more general theory of cultural transmission which linked knowledge, power, socialization, and education. Through socialization and education, cultural dispositions are internalized; and these, in turn, structure individual and group behaviour which tends to reproduce existing class relations (Swartz 2000: 208). Hence, as Bertaux and Wiame (1997: 65) indicate the children who grow up within these micro-climates internalise and embody these differences.

As an 'old' wealth family member, V.G's recollection of his mother indicates the significance of women as inspirations to their children to be educated. V.G belongs to a landowner family. He had lost his father when he was very young and even though both his father and his mother came from land owning families, they had to pay his father's debts after his death. At first, they sold the family house and later other properties that they had. His mother started knitting and some relatives also supported them.

Here, the mother has an important influence in determining her children's trajectories in that she took an essential part in the transmission of cultural capital. The mother's father was from a landowner family, but he had also been a poet and she knew some poems by the famous poets of her decade by heart. She used to tell them her dream of her children becoming educated, and she succeeded in inspiring three of her sons. All her sons finished university; one worked as an officer, the other one was a doctor and V.G was a journalist who was also active in politics as a

minister and MP for many years. Her daughter married one of the 'old' wealth family members of the city. Is it a mere coincidence that V.G always repeats the importance of 'cultural nobility' during the course of our interview?

V.G: She was incredible; she knew Baki, Nefi and Fuzuli's poems. She knew Ziya Pasa's poems by heart . . . She was an incredible woman. This is a social heritage. That is there are not only biological genes, but there are also social genes; cultural genes. Notable families have these (O iste büyük ailelerde var). Nobility is not important for me but there is a social gene. This woman had heard poems from Mesnevi; her father had read it to her before she learnt to read. Family is important . . . Family is like a school. I do not mean racial nobility, I mean cultural nobility (En büyük mektep aile. Yani irka dayali bir soyluluk degil kültür soylulugu).

Indeed, women played an important role in the transmission of accepted behavioural norms and cultural values. These values were intersected with modernist values, and to be 'modern' was associated with the body, social class and consumption patterns. Being modern, which implies representing and fashioning the body through certain practices or organizing and attending gatherings, and following certain consumption patterns, functioned in the city as a gate keeping mechanism through which only with the correct dispositions, taste and styles could pass. The use of western implements in house interiors was also one of the indicators of the 'modern' and contained the sense of expressing, in Bourdieu's term, 'distinction'. Compared to big cities like Istanbul 'old' wealth families were rather late in adopting westernized house interiors. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 'old' wealth houses had multi-functional rooms based on gender segregation. During the Ottoman period, the living room was called *harem*. It was the place where 'back-stage' living was carried out, and was also used for sleeping, eating and cooking. *Harem* was a women's space and female guests were accepted in these rooms. Men of the family could enter this room to rest, eat or to be with their women only if there were no other women present.

Men's living space was called the *selamlık*. Men ate their food apart from women and children and they entertained male visitors in the *selamlık*. At night, the *selamlık* would also be used as a sleeping room. Except to carry out domestic services, women were not allowed in this room when the men were at home. According to some of the respondents' recollections, male guests were also served from a revolving cupboard, which was between the kitchen and the *selamlık*. This system could prevent females from being seen by the males. One of the participants,

D.C, told me how they used to play in this closet when they were children, the same closet that was once used for serving meals to male guests:

D.C: ... And opposite to this room there was another room for the male visitors. This room was called the *selamlik*. We have not seen the house during the time that they were using the *selamlik* room because we were not born; this is what they told us. I can remember that there was a closet, which we could turn. They used to put the things in this closet and for example they turned it so that the person who was on the other side could take the things. When we were children we used to get into this closet and we used to play there.

As Ozbay (2000: 140) emphasises, these spatial delineations symbolise the way gender segregation was based on unequal rights. After the establishment of the Republic, shifts in daily home-life became obvious. One reflection of such changes was the transformation of the harem to the *oturma odasi* or living room and the *selamlik* to the *misafir odasi* or reception room (Ozbay 2000: 143). However, in 'old' wealth households and the other houses in the city, living and reception rooms were still used for eating, sleeping and entertaining after the demise of the Ottoman Empire.

In the English context, Davidoff and Hall (1997 [1987]) show that 'backstage' functions started to be separated from polite social intercourse after productive work was banished from the domestic area, and eventually, each function had a special place in the house (Davidoff and Hall 1997 [1987]: 359). In 'old' wealth houses the same room was used for different functions until the 1960s. However, there was always a public and private distinction. In fact, in 'old' wealth houses the reception room was regarded as public space, which must be kept tidy while some of the other functions were thought of as 'back stage' functions and they were separated from polite social intercourse.

One of 'old' wealth family members, B.B, had lived with her two widowed aunts, and their children and her grandmother up to the 1960s. The family had given the reception room to their aunt because she had a young daughter and 'young girls could keep the room tidy and ready for the guests':

B.B: We had our meals in aunt L's room because she had a young daughter and her son was a student in the medicine department so that he was away. My grandmother's and aunt V's rooms were upstairs for we could not carry food there and also, we were children and our room was small. We had our meals in aunt L's room ... Even when we had guests we were always having our meals in this room, for this room was always very tidy. My cousin was a young girl for

their room was always tidy and clean and it was always ready for our guests, and it was ready for having meals too.

However, 'new' wealth families had adopted Western lifestyles much earlier. In fact, in 'new' wealth houses, each room was differentiated according to its function so that children and parents had their own bedrooms, meals were served in the dining room, and they entertained their guests in the reception rooms. 'New' wealth had more thoroughly westernized house interiors and styles in contrast to that of 'old' wealth. These preferences in fashion, furniture, entertainment, and general aesthetics outline a complex topography of status. In fact, not all 'old' wealth people were close family friends with the 'new' wealth group. One of the 'old' wealth family members' recollections emphasises these different lifestyles when she talks about a member of a former status group:

S.M: When we were young V used to visit us and I used to visit her. In those years, my father was not living a life of luxury. She was a daughter of a factory owner. Oh my god, they had a very big garden. There was a wall in their house which divided the guestroom into two. Her mother used to stay on one side of the room. On the other side there were rooms and gorgeous furniture ...

Compared to 'new' wealth such homely shifts in daily lives of 'old' wealth members were eclectic. Indeed, recollections indicate, on the one hand, conspicuous modernity, and on the other hand the insecurity of 'old' wealth about their own modernity. Like the home's arrangements, the recollections about eating habits also reflects 'old' wealth's insecurity as they all want to show that they were the first ones in the city who started to eat in the *alafranga* style. It was more difficult for 'old' wealth to shift dining habits learned in childhood, they indicated. Eating in the *alafranga* style involved new rules. Mealtimes become more regular, and these new rules of etiquette involved that women be served first which was a total reversal of Ottoman proprieties (Kandiyoti 1997: 119). Some 'old' wealth members started having their meals in *alafranga* (Frankish) style during the 1950s which was a rather late date compared to big cities like Istanbul. After stating that they were the first ones who started to have their meals on the table, A.D, a member of 'old' wealth family, dates back the shift in their eating habits even after 1950s.

M.K: Can you remember when your family started to have meals on the table?

A.D: I was born in 1953, and we started to have our meals on the table ten years later.

M.K: 1963?

A.D: Yes, that is we were very young. Actually, we had a small circle table they

called it something but I forget it. My mother used to open a cloth under this small table, and then she used to put a tray on it. Later, everybody started to have dinner on the table, and now we cannot have our food without serving on the table. We got used to it.

V.G, another 'old' wealth family member, who was born in 1928, seemed to remember a date closer to the mid-1940s, which was earlier than A.D's recollections. And, according to T.D, who was born in 1926, his family started having meals on a table around 1946.

T.D: One room was used as a living room, and the other one was used as a reception room, and one was used as bedroom. When I was a child we used to have our meals on the floor. We started to have our meals on the table during the years I started university.

Indeed 'old' wealth family members started having their meals in *alafranga* (Frankish) style in the 1950s, yet they all tried to show themselves as more 'modern' than they were. 'New' wealth families, however, adopted *alafranga* style of having meals earlier than 'old' wealth. They have detailed recollections about how meals were served. One of the 'new' wealth family members even mentioned how her father employed a male cook in their house but fired him after a little while due to the fact that 'there should not be a male worker at home when her father was away during the day.' Gradually, such changes in the practices led 'old' wealth families to move from their old family houses to flats which gave a prestigious address in offering a Western lifestyle, and which were the outstanding indicators of modern living. To this end, the 'classification struggles' Bourdieu refers to took place between 'old' and 'new' wealth and it indicates that symbolic capital was not any more gained through extravagant generosity but rather taste and culture became part of the struggle for symbolic capital. It is partly this which makes the study of culture and cultural categories inseparable with class in Turkey.

4. Concluding remarks

Bourdieu's application to the Turkish middle class would be fruitful to elucidate the neglected aspects of that history. Bourdieu argues that class is not only a matter of objective structures but also a matter of 'classifications' and that culture and cultural capital have been of special importance in his theory (Gunn 2005: 61). A historical perspective in understanding the workings of the middle class in Turkey shows that distinctions of taste, hence culture in its various forms, were constitutive elements of their

class identity. The history of Westernization in Turkey clearly indicates that cultural categories and consumption played an important role in the constitution of middle classes. Westernization and/or western taste were social markers of distinction and having a western lifestyle and taste were considered to be distinctive and functioned as a mechanism to maintain social position. Then, no wonder the struggles between the 'old' and 'new' wealth were also lived in the field of taste.

Cultural categories are also embodied. In the Turkish context the transmission of cultural capital in terms of embodiment mechanisms has been largely overlooked. I have sought to indicate how women played an important role in the transmission of class values and behavioural codes by embodying them. But, this historical perspective also brings new questions to the study of cultural capital. Are there changes in the forms of cultural capital? Are the 'institutionalized' forms of cultural capital becoming constitutive of the identities of the middle classes? Hence, Bourdieu sets a new agenda for research on cultural capital in Turkey.

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