


## The impact of COVID-19 on the gender division of childcare work in Hungary

Éva Fodor<sup>a</sup>, Anikó Gregor <sup>b,c</sup>, Júlia Koltai<sup>b,d</sup> and Eszter Kováts<sup>e</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Department of Gender Studies, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary;

<sup>b</sup>Department of Social Research Methodology, Faculty of Social Sciences, ELTE University, Budapest, Hungary; <sup>c</sup>Free University, Berlin, Germany; <sup>d</sup>Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Excellence, Budapest, Hungary; <sup>e</sup>Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Law, ELTE University, Budapest, Hungary

### ABSTRACT

As most other EU countries, Hungary implemented severe lockdown measures during the pandemic, including the closure of the schools and childcare facilities. This meant that for several months a vastly increased volume of childcare had to be supplied by individual households without much institutional help. In the end of May 2020, we conducted a representative survey in Hungary to find out how the pandemic affected the gendered division of these childcare duties. We found that on average, in relative terms, men have increased their contributions at roughly the same rate (by 35 percent) as women. But given that women had been doing a lot more childcare work before the pandemic, in absolute terms, women's contributions grew significantly more than men's and the gap between men and women has increased in absolute work hour terms. This was particularly so among a specific group of women: middle class, highly educated city-dwellers. Our data suggest that in Hungary the pandemic increased gender inequality the most among the highest educated.

**ARTICLE HISTORY** Received 25 July 2020; Accepted 22 August 2020

**KEYWORDS** COVID-19; Hungary; childcare work; care crisis; division of household labour; gender

### Introduction

My husband and I are both working from home ... or we should be. We fight over the minutes in front of the computer. We have two sons: Dani just turned 8 and the Gergő is 5 and a half. They are both pretty energetic kids who are used to roaming around the playground every day for hours after school with my mother. Now we are all stuck in our apartment ... My older child has online school, but someone has to sit by his side while the teacher is explaining the math problems or else he completely tunes out ... and another person

**CONTACT** Anikó Gregor  gregor@tat.elte.hu  ELTE, Budapest, 1056, Hungary

 Supplemental data for this article can be accessed <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2020.1817522>

© 2020 European Sociological Association

simultaneously needs to entertain Gergő, who also wants to be “playing on the computer”. We spend their waking hours devoted to keeping them alive and fed and the apartment more or less intact, and start working once they are in bed. Luckily, my job is really flexible and my department chair is in the same situation so he is quite understanding ... (Móni, age 42, professor, living with her partner in Budapest)

The above quote from April 2020 reflects the experience of a large number of middle-class parents during the lockdown months of the pandemic. In Hungary, as in most other EU countries, schools and childcare facilities closed practically overnight in the middle of March 2020 (Hungarian Government 2020a). Simultaneously, grandparents and other elderly relatives, who may have helped out with children earlier, needed support themselves as they came to be identified as the most likely victims of the disease. Families were left to their own devices to take care of all household and childcare duties, including those previously taken for granted or outsourced. For many this meant a more than full day of teaching, entertaining and grooming children while trying to work on- or offline in typically more demanding or unusual work schedules.

The pandemic made visible what social scientists have been describing as the ‘crisis of care’ for over a decade (Rosen 2007; Fraser 2016): the internal and intensifying contradictions between the current financialized capitalist mode of production and the logic of reproductive work (e.g. childcare, elderly care, housework), dedicated to maintaining and reproducing life itself (Laslett and Brenner 1989). Women tend to experience this contradiction most intensively as they are the ones who typically shoulder the double burden of intensive, paid, profit-generating work while simultaneously providing personalized care for children, the sick and the elderly on a sustained daily basis (Hochschild and Machung 1989).

In line with the expectations and personal testimonies people shared widely during the months of the lock-down measures, our analysis shows that the volume of childcare provided by families increased significantly in Hungary. Did this upward change in the *volume* of this specific type of reproductive work trigger a change in its *gendered allocation*? Are women shouldering a disproportionately larger segment of the increased childcare burden? Or are men stepping in and taking over duties they had shunned before? How does the labour market context, especially newly emerging work arrangements, such as the ubiquity of the home office, influence the division of childcare duties at home?

We explored these questions by asking a representative sample of Hungarians (*Inequalities during the Coronavirus in Hungary Survey Research*) about the changes in the domestic division of labour, including childcare, in their households in May 2020. In line with the few available preliminary empirical analyses about the effect of COVID on the gender division of childcare work in the US (Carlson *et al.* 2020), Canada (Shafer *et al.* 2020), Australia (Craig and Churchill 2020; Craig 2020) and Israel (Herzberg-Druker *et al.* 2020), we found that in Hungary men, on average, have increased their contributions to at roughly the same *rate* as women did. However, given that women had been putting in many more hours of childcare work than men before the pandemic, their workload, and especially the workload of highly educated mothers, grew significantly more than men's resulting in a widening of the childcare gender gap after March 2020.

### 'Unstall' the revolution?

While in recent decades women have been making great advances into previously male dominated fields in the labour market, men's participation in domestic and childcare work has not increased proportionately (Hochschild and Machung 1989; England 2010). Nevertheless, slight shifts towards more gender equality in care work have been noted in at least a few developed countries (Bianchi *et al.* 2012). The degree of these changes, however, has been uneven over time and space. In European nations, Altinas and Sullivan (2016) observe a closure of the gender gap up to 2011. However, this trend seems to be particularly evident in countries where women had been doing an especially large share of domestic work (some of the post-socialist countries, such as in Poland and in the post-Yugoslav region; *ibid.*). Yet, the shift towards equality has been slowing – as if countries were reaching the limit of what can be achieved given their socio-economic institutions – even in Anglo-Saxon and Nordic societies (*ibid.*: 464). At the same time, Ashwin and Isupova (2018) observe a large and persistent gender gap in the distribution of reproductive work in Russia. Importantly, numerous studies have demonstrated that the division of labour varies by the social policy context and the characteristics of the household, (Fahlen 2016) as well as by how couples think about men's and women's roles in society (Pedulla and Thébaud 2015).

These findings already suggest a complex, multilevel decision-making process going into how and why domestic work, including childcare is divided. Yet, these conditions – especially those related to workplace

and state policy support – changed radically in the spring of 2020 in the aftermath of the introduction of lockdown measures, the proliferation of home office and switching to distance learning and digital education in schools and kindergartens. How do families with children deal with this situation? Could the unprecedented economic crisis (World Bank 2020) followed by the abovementioned involuntary and forced changes in everyday practices usher in a period of more extensively shared care? Or will the health crisis deepen existing gender inequalities in childcare?

Previous economic crises certainly have not jolted men into action in this respect, whether or not paid employment changes favoured women (Espey et al. 2010; Rubery and Rafferty 2013). Yet, this crisis is different from the previous ones for at least two reasons which are significant here. First, the COVID pandemic represents a more radical shift in the volume of care work than ever due to the closure of childcare facilities and schools and the increased need for elderly care. Second, at least a segment of the population started to be working out of their own households or were required to either take time off or were laid off and thus stayed at home. With children in the household, the concept of work-life balance takes on an altogether different meaning in such a situation.

Before we start with the analysis a few words about the specific Hungarian context are in order.

### Gender relations in post-socialist Hungary

On balance, our expectation was that gender inequality in childcare work was likely to increase in Hungary during the pandemic due to the following reasons. First, studies have consistently found that compared to the state socialist period and to citizens of other East European countries, Hungarians hold rather conservative views towards gender roles (Fodor and Balogh 2010), especially regarding childcare and the household division of labour. While during the past decades both Hungarian men and women have become more permissive towards mothers' working for wages (Makai 2018), 8 out of 10 Hungarians agree with the claim that 'the most important role for a woman is to take care of her home and family' (European Commission 2017). Second, these attitudes are reflected in the actual division of labour, at least as evidenced by time-use surveys. Mothers of small children spend over twice as much time on household duties (330 vs. 142 min/day) and 2.2 times more on childcare (96 vs. 44 min/day) compared to fathers (Harcza 2014: 34). Although fathers too increased the time they devote to childcare between 1986 and

2009 (Harcza 2014), the gender gap remained stable or closed only slightly in a few specific social strata, such as the wealthier middle- and upper-classes. In these groups, some researchers have already noted emerging patterns of intensive and caring fatherhood (Takács 2019).

Third, culturally constructed prescriptions of labour-intensive mothering (or 'intensive mothering', Hays 1996; Ennis 2014) have become widespread in Hungary in recent years (Csányi and Kerényi 2019). Mothers are expected to devote more and more time to their children's physical and mental well-being in order to improve their cognitive skills and their chance of a 'successful' career. The above mentioned time-use surveys reflect these shifts in public expectations (Harcza 2014) as do widely held justifications for staying at home with children for three years after birth (Blaskó 2011). Studies among elite Hungarian couples have also confirmed that many of them rely on the narrative of intensive mothering to simultaneously justify the predominance of women's parenting responsibilities yet maintain the importance of the value of domestic gender egalitarianism (Csurgó and Kristóf 2018).

Fourth, research has extensively shown that the social and political context has an important impact on the division of care labour. Arguably, Hungary experienced the harshest neoliberal restructuring after 1990 of all post-communist countries (Fábry 2019) followed by further austerity measures introduced after the economic crisis of 2008/2009. As a result, in the past three decades Hungary has moved from a socialist to a domesticated neoliberal gender regime, where the importance of family and family values serve as increasingly extensive replacements for the social welfare safety net (Gregor and Kováts 2019). Indeed, in the past decade the Hungarian government introduced a long list of pronatalist measures aimed at supporting childbirth especially in white, middle class families. While openly professing the virtues of motherhood, these measures and the related government propaganda do not preclude but in fact build on women's simultaneous labour market participation (Szikra 2019). At the same time, men's responsibility for the care of their children or households is not mentioned at all by the policies. To wit, Hungary offers new fathers a fully paid 5-day paternity leave, one of the shortest such provisions within the European Union.

In sum, for reasons related to domestic policies, the existing gender division of childcare duties, and wide-spread conservative gender role attitudes we expect gender inequality to increase in Hungary during the months of the pandemic. We expect this to be the case even though

women's paid jobs often represent a non-negligible portion of the family's budget and – at least during the 4 months of the closure of childcare institutions – more men than ever were spending more time at the same location as their children.

## Data and methods

The *Inequalities during the Coronavirus in Hungary Survey Research* aimed at mapping the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on different aspects of social inequalities in Hungary, including gender inequality and with a special focus on changes in allocation of reproductive work (childcare, elderly care and housework). The research was conducted between May 26 and 29, 2020 by CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing) methodology among 18–65 year old Hungarians. Our survey was fielded during the 11th week of the lockdown measures, hence it is reasonable to assume that the respondents had already worked out their new daily routine and were able to report them reliably. With a size of  $N=1,900$  the sample is representative of the relevant cohort of Hungarians along the dimensions of gender, age, education, type of settlement and administrative regions.

The goal of our paper is to examine gender differences in childcare related activities under the changed circumstances caused by the coronavirus. Thus, the dependent variable is the difference of time spent on these kinds of activities before and after the restrictive measures introduced due to the pandemic. We asked respondents the following questions: 'Before the coronavirus epidemic, how many hours a week did you spend in total on parenting activities such as playing, storytelling, learning, talking, dressing, feeding?' and 'During the restrictive measures introduced as a result of the coronavirus epidemic, how many hours a week did you spend on parenting activities?' These questions were only asked from respondents who were living with at least one child aged 18 years of age or younger. The change between the pre- and during-lockdown periods was measured by the difference between the two responses.

Studies aimed at comparing perception-based and time-scale diary-based estimations of time spent on household/childcare activities highlight that while both men and women tend to overestimate their contributions, men tend to do so to a larger extent than women (Lee and Waite 2005). The direction of this gender difference in precision in fact strengthens our results as it suggests a possible underestimation of the emergent gender gap in care responsibilities. Nevertheless, the

**Table 1.** Distribution of the main and control variables in the whole sample and among parents of children under 18.

	Percentage in full sample	Percentage among parents
Women	50.3	54.2
Age 45 and up	45.9	30.5
Basic education or less	24.0	19.7
Vocational education	18.1	23.1
Secondary education	34.5	32.3
College education	23.4	24.9
Lives in a city (county capital and above)	39.1	34.4
Has a paid job	65.1	66.7
White collar	33.9	34.5
Lives with partner	64.2	87.3
Has child under 12 in household	27.2	82.2
More traditional gender role views	35.7	39.1
Works in home office	17.4	17.8
Parent of child under 18	33.0	100.0
N	1,900	627

Note: All variables are binary.

respondents' estimations were treated as subjective assessments of time spent on childcare tasks.

The main independent variable is the gender of the respondent, measured by a binary variable with the categories of male and female. We further control for age (18–44 versus 45–65 years old), education (college degree versus less), domicile (city versus smaller settlement), employment status (with or without a paid job), working in a white collar job, living in partnership, having a child younger than 12 in the households, gender role attitudes<sup>1</sup>, and working in home office during the pandemic.<sup>2</sup> For gender role attitudes, we constructed a scale measuring conservative or liberal/egalitarian beliefs based on the average level of agreement with five statements on a 1-to-5 scale. In order to examine the impact of extremely conservative gender role attitudes, we defined respondents with a mean score of 4 or higher as 'more conservative' and contrasted them to everyone else. In separate models we assessed the impact of occupation (blue or white collar) among those who had paid jobs and also if they worked in a home office or not.

To further explore the relationship between gender and some of the other variables of interest we created interaction terms between gender

<sup>1</sup>Details on variable construction can be found in the supplementary material.

<sup>2</sup>Only those respondents have valid value on the home office variable who were either worked at home during the effect of lockdown measures or worked at the workplace or on the premises. Those respondents who were legally still employed during the effect of lockdown measures but were on a paid or unpaid forced leave have missing values on the home office variable.

and education, gender and workforce status, and gender and working in a home office (Table 1).

## Findings

Of our sample of 1900 people, 627 were living with children under 18 years of age during the pandemic and it is this group we asked about the hours they dedicated to childcare before and after the introduction of the lockdown measures. On average, these parents claimed that they were spending a whopping 9 h *more* per week on childcare than before the pandemic. Women claim to have dedicated 11.4 h more to childcare in contrast to an extra 6.8 h that were reported by men. Based on the accounts of our respondents, the gender gap in childcare calculated as the gender difference in the average number of hours spent on this type of work *increased* during the lockdown by close to 5 h (see Table 2).

There are, however, important differences in this gap across social groups as demonstrated by our univariate analysis (data available upon request). As it is evident in the literature, the gender gap is larger among people of childbearing age. Education and social class (occupation) are very important factors in Hungary: the gender gap in the change in hours is the largest among college educated and white-collar parents. Similarly, the gap is larger in big cities, possibly due to the fact that more rigorous measures were imposed in the capital city, Budapest, than in the rest of the country and the prevalence of nuclear households is higher there compared to smaller settlements. Men who didn't have paid work seem to have increased their childcare hours much more than those who did have paid employment, suggesting that men are willing to pitch in, at least temporarily, if they do not have other forms of daily responsibilities. This is not the case for women: they increased their childcare hours similarly whether or not they were working for

**Table 2.** Weekly average hours spent on childcare by gender and the significance of changes.

	Men	Women	Gap	Total
Mean hours/ week spent on childcare before lockdown	19.3	32.4	13.1 (0.000****)	26.3
Mean hours/ week spent on childcare during lockdown	26.1	43.8	17.7 (0.000****)	35.6
Mean change in hours/ week	6.8 (0.000****)	11.4 (0.000****)		9.3 (0.000****)
N	287	336		623

Notes: Significances of F-tests in parentheses. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .



**Table 3.** Linear regression models on change in hours dedicated to childcare during the pandemic lockdown.

(a)			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3 (among those working)
Women	4.64** (1.24)	4.67** (1.39)	4.69** (1.63)
Age 45 and up		-1.29 (1.45)	-1.52 (1.68)
College grad		3.36** (1.57)	3.53+ (1.99)
Lives in big city		3.54** (1.42)	2.09 (1.72)
Employed		-2.18 (1.46)	
Lives with partner		4.69** (2.30)	2.00 (3.01)
Has kid under 12		3.85** (1.76)	2.98 (1.97)
Gender role conservative		-0.62 (1.32)	-0.03 (1.69)
White collar			1.18 (1.78)
Home office			5.26** (1.91)
Constant	6.79 (0.91)	-0.80 (3.33)	-3.02 (3.69)
R squared	0.02	0.08	0.17
N	623	591	273

Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. +  $p < 0.10$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

(b) (Models with interaction terms.)			
	Model 4 Gender*college	Model 5 Gender*employment	Model 6 Gender*home office (among employed)
Women	2.51+ (1.50)	1.43 (2.92)	2.12 (2.13)
Age 45 and up	-1.12 (1.44)	-1.39 (1.45)	-1.71 (1.69)
College grad	-0.92 (2.11)	3.45** (2.31)	4.24** (1.92)
Lives in big city	3.84** (1.42)	3.46** (1.43)	3.07+ (1.71)
Employed	-2.22 (1.45)	-5.23** (2.82)	
Lives with partner	4.17** (2.29)	4.84** (2.31)	1.12 (2.91)
Has kid under 12	3.90** (1.75)	4.02** (1.77)	2.64 (1.94)
Gender role conservative	-0.43 (1.31)	-0.59 (1.33)	0.41 (1.67)
Home office			3.11 (2.22)
Women* college grad	8.58** (2.85)		
Women*employed		4.17 (3.31)	

(Continued)


(b) (Models with interaction terms.)			
	Model 4 Gender*college	Model 5 Gender*employment	Model 6 Gender*home office (among employed)
Women*home office			6.38** (3.22)
Constant	0.64 (3.35)	1.64 (3.86)	-1.35 (3.65)
R squared	0.09	0.08	0.19
N	591	591	279

Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

wages. Finally, working in a home office compared to going out to work meant a larger number of hours dedicated to childcare for both men and women, and the presence of children under 12 also mattered.

In order to test whether or not these differences confound gender differences, we ran linear regression models to predict the size of the change in hours dedicated to childcare on gender and the control variables described above. The main finding is that gender is significant in each of the models, no matter what control variables we used. Net of all other factors, women on average spent about 4–5 h more than men on childcare. But other variables, too, are significant. College graduates dedicated more time to children, as did those living with a partner and with kids under 12 (see Model 2 in Table 3a). When we restrict the model to those who are working for wages, we note the importance of home office work: those who work from home tend to spend a lot more time on childcare. *None of these factors, however, affect the size of the gender gap.*

Finally, we wanted to explore the interaction between gender and the main variables of interest: college education, employment and home



**Figure 1.** (a) and (b) Predicted values and 95% confidence intervals of change in hours dedicated to childcare during the pandemic lockdown by gender in the case of significant interactions (Model 4 and Model 6)

office work. This is where the most striking aspect of the story emerges. [Table 3b](#) describes the full models with the two statistically and substantively significant interaction terms.

Finally, [Figure 1a](#) and [1b](#) below present a visualization of the significant interactions. The central finding is that women with college education dedicate significantly more hours to childcare than men with similar degrees (as well as compared to both men and women with less education). Similarly, women working from home, spend many more hours with their children than men in home offices (or men and women going out for work.)

## Discussion and conclusion

We set out to explore the gender division of childcare related labour during the pandemic, especially potential changes in the distribution of the increased volume of childcare demanded of parents during the lockdown. Elsewhere we found that college educated men felt that they were contributing larger than their usual share of childcare work (Fodor *et al.* 2020). When we asked a representative sample of men and women in May to specify the actual number of hours spent on caring for children men indeed claimed that they were doing 35% more childcare work than before the pandemic (just like women, in fact). But given that women were putting in more hours in absolute terms, a 35% increase for both meant that women devoted a significantly larger number of hours to children than before and much more compared to men. The gender gap in the absolute number of hours has increased. Therefore, we can conclude that the upward change in the volume of childcare work have triggered a change in its gendered allocation: it has increased the burden of women even though men have also increased their contribution on the average.

The gender difference in hours spent on childcare is obvious even if we control for variables typically affecting the gender division of reproductive labour: age, education, urban contexts, children's age, gender role attitudes, partnerships, employment relations. Women's disadvantage is stable. Yet not all women are equally overburdened: those with college education, and those working from a home office reported a significantly larger share of work, even or especially compared to similar men. We found evidence that the newly emerging working arrangements, like the home office, might deepen unequal patterns of the division of childcare labour.

The ultimate conclusion from the data is that the pandemic has increased gender inequality among the highest educated the most, partly because they were the most likely to be working from home. Yet even among college educated men and women both doing their jobs from a home office, women tended to dedicate much more time than men to childcare.

There are a number of reasons why this may be the case. In Hungary, educational homogamy is relatively strong among college educated people (Domański *et al.* 2018), and the gender pay gap is the largest among professional and managerial workers (KSH 2017), therefore women with a degree may be more likely to have high flying, career-oriented partners, whose jobs would pay for the bills and it is thus rational to be protecting that more than that of women's. Employers too, may have been more sensitive to the needs of mothers than fathers, as studies about Hungarian workplace practices have revealed: flexible working conditions are likely to be granted for higher educated women (Oborni 2018). As a result, mothers may have been more willing or felt obliged to pick up the childcare tab, in order to make sure that household finances remain viable. Furthermore, although it requires further investigation, it is reasonable to assume that as a consequence of the spatially unequal distribution of the childcare facilities in Hungary (KSH 2019), urban, college educated women were supposedly more likely than those living in the countryside to have lost external childcare support, for which they seem to be substituting themselves. Finally, as previous research has, highly educated women are more likely than their less educated counterparts to combine the principles of intensive mothering with egalitarian gender role attitudes and, as a result, to dedicate themselves to labour-intensive motherhood should the need or opportunity arise shown (Csurgó and Kristóf 2018). Concerted cultivation, namely a certain parenting style of the middle- and upper-class that actively seeks to foster children's skills, talents and pays enormous attention to the educational attainment (Lareau 2003), plays a particular role in performing intensive mothering (Vincent and Maxwell 2016). Consequently, higher educated women may also feel (or are held) more responsible for and worry more than men about their children's development and the possibility that they may be left behind, should they not substitute for the work typically done by school teachers and paid childcare workers.

In sum, during the pandemic even more than at other times, gender inequality in the amount of time dedicated to childcare increased, especially among college educated, urban parents, and among parents

working from home. This suggests that even when men are physically present in the household, even if the burden of reproductive work increases suddenly and significantly, women are expected to shoulder a larger share.

These results are particularly worrisome as current government policies are unlikely to cushion the effects of the changes. To the contrary, as the Hungarian government is preparing for a possible second wave of the pandemic in fall 2020, and in the process they are planning to make employment (even) more flexible and further extend home office work arrangements (Hungarian Government 2020b). Addressing the true nature of the crisis of care, the role of fathers, employers or social institutions or the growing gender inequality in care work is not on the policy agenda.

### Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

### Funding

The research was funded by the Budapest Office of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. The fieldwork was conducted by the Szinapszis Market Research and Consulting Ltd. The work of Júlia Koltai was funded by the Premium Postdoctoral Grant of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The work of Anikó Gregor was supported by the Academy in Exile program of University of Duisburg-Essen, and hosted by Freie Universität, Berlin.

### Notes on contributors

*Éva Fodor* is a sociologist teaching in the Department of Gender Studies at the Central European University.

*Anikó Gregor* works as a sociologist at ELTE University, Budapest, Faculty of Social Sciences. In the academic year of 2019/2020 she was a research fellow at Freie Universität Berlin (Academy in Exile program).

*Júlia Koltai* is a researcher at the Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence and Assistant Professor of Sociology at ELTE University. Currently she is a visiting professor at the Central European University.

*Eszter Kováts* is a PhD student in Political Science, ELTE University, Budapest.

### ORCID

*Anikó Gregor*  <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4133-9361>

## References

- Altinas, E. and Sullivan, O. (2016) 'Fifty years of change updated: cross-national gender convergence in housework', *Demographic Research* 35: 455–470.
- Ashwin, S. and Isupova, O. (2018) 'Anatomy of a stalled revolution: processes of reproduction and change in Russian women's gender ideologies', *Gender & Society* 32(4): 441–468.
- Bianchi, M. S., Sayer, L. C., Milkie, M. A. and Robinson, J. P. (2012) 'Housework: who did, does or will do it, and how much does it matter?', *Social Forces* 91(1): 55–6.
- Blaskó, Z. S. (2011) "'Hároméves kor alatt mindenképp megsínyli?" Interjú kutatás kisgyermekes anyák körében', in I. Nagy and Pongrácz, T. (eds.) *Szerepváltozások 2011*, Budapest: TÁRKI, pp. 156–170.
- Carlson, D., Petts, R. and Pepin, J. R. (2020) 'US couples' divisions of housework and childcare during COVID-19 pandemic', *SocArXiv*. doi:10.31235/osf.io/jy8fn
- Craig, L. (2020) 'Coronavirus, domestic labour and care: gendered roles locked down', *Journal of Sociology*. doi:10.1177/1440783320942413
- Craig, L. and Churchill, B. (2020) 'Dual-earner parent couples' work and care during COVID-19', *Gender, Work & Organization*. doi:10.1111/gwao.12497
- Csányi, G. and Kerényi, S. Z. (2019) 'A "jó anya" mítosza Magyarországon a reprodukív munka és a piac globális történetének szempontjából', *Replika* 24: 134–160.
- Csurgó, B. and Kristóf, L. (2018) 'Narrative identities and the egalitarian norm among Hungarian elite couples', *Journal of Family Issues* 39(7): 2107–2130.
- Domański, H., Przybysz, D. and Pokropek, A. (2018) 'Patterns of spouse selection in European countries 2002–2015', in F. Sztabiński, H. Domański and P. Sztabiński (eds.), *New Uncertainties and Anxieties in Europe*, Berlin: Peter Lang, pp. 189–226.
- England, P. (2010) 'The gender revolution: uneven and stalled', *Gender & Society* 24(2): 149–166.
- Ennis, L. R. (2014) 'Intensive mothering: revisiting the issue today', in L. R. Ennis (ed.), *Intensive Mothering: The Cultural Contradictions of Modern Motherhood*, Bradford: Demeter Press, pp. 1–26.
- Espey, J., Harper, C. and Jones, N. (2010) 'Crisis, care and childhood: the impact of economic crisis on care work in poor households in the developing world', *Gender and Development* 18(2): 291–307.
- European Commission (2017) *Gender Equality 2017*. Eurobarometer No. 465. Summary Report.
- Fábry, Á (2019) *The Political Economy of Hungary: From State Capitalism to Authoritarian Neoliberalism*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fahlen, S. (2016) 'Equality at home – a question of career? Housework, norms, and policies in a European comparative perspective', *Demographic Research* 35: 1411–1440.
- Fodor, É and Balogh, A. (2010) 'Back to the kitchen? Gender role attitudes in 13 East European countries', *Journal of Family Research* 22(3): 289–307.
- Fodor, É, Gregor, A., Koltai, J. and Kováts, E. (2020) 'Revolution unstalled?: The impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the domestic division of labor in Hungary', *Gender & Society blog*. May 28. <https://gendersociety.wordpress.com/2020/05/28/revolution-unstalled-the-impact-of-the-covid-19-crisis-on-the-domestic-division-of-labor-in-hungary/>.

- Fraser, N. (2016) 'Contradictions of capital and care', *New Left Review* 100: 99–117.
- Gregor, A. and Kováts, E. (2019) 'Work-life: balance? Tensions between care and paid work in the lives of Hungarian women', *Socio.hu* 9: 91–115. [https://socio.hu/uploads/files/2019eng\\_labour/2019eng\\_gregor\\_kovats.pdf](https://socio.hu/uploads/files/2019eng_labour/2019eng_gregor_kovats.pdf).
- Harcza, I. (2014) *Családi kohézió*, Budapest: KSH.
- Hays, S. (1996) *The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Herzberg-Druker, E., Tali, K. and Yaish, M. (2020) 'Work and families in times of crisis: the case of Israel in the coronavirus outbreak', *SocArXiv*. doi:10.31235/osf.io/foxs64
- Hochschild, A. and Machung, A. (1989) *The Second Shift: Working Families and the Revolution at Home*, Avon Books: London.
- Hungarian Government (2020a) 'Students cannot go to school from Monday; ten task forces set up', *Website of the Hungarian Government*, <https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/students-cannot-go-to-school-from-monday-ten-task-forces-set-up>.
- Hungarian Government (2020b) 'Number of registered job-seekers on decrease for five weeks', *Website of the Hungarian Government*, <https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-for-innovation-and-technology/news/number-of-registered-job-seekers-on-decrease-for-five-weeks>.
- KSH (2017) *Nők és férfiak Magyarországon 2016*, Budapest: KSH.
- KSH (2019) 'A gyermekek napközbeni ellátása, 2018'. *Statistikai Tükör*, April 12, Budapest: KSH.
- Lareau, A. (2003) *Unequal Childhoods*, Berkley: University of California Press.
- Laslett, B. and Brenner, J. (1989) 'Gender and social reproduction: historical perspectives', *Annual Review of Sociology* 15: 381–404.
- Lee, Y. and Waite, L. J. (2005) "'Husbands' and wives" time spent on housework: a comparison of measures", *Journal of Marriage and Family* 67(2): 328–336.
- Makai, Z. S. (2018) 'The family support system and female employment', in J. Monostori, P. Őri and Z. S. Spéder (eds.), *Demographic Portrait of Hungary 2018*, Budapest: KSH, pp. 85–105.
- Oborni, K. (2018) 'A részmunkaidő karriert támogató szerepéről a magasan képzett nők körében', *Szociológiai Szemle* 28(3): 87–113.
- Pedulla, D. S. and Thébaud, S. (2015) 'Can we finish the revolution? Gender, work-family ideals, and institutional constraint', *American Sociological Review* 80(1): 116–139.
- Rosen, R. (2007) 'The Care Crisis', *The Nation*, March 12. <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/care-crisis/>.
- Rubery, J. and Rafferty, A. (2013) 'Women and recession revisited', *Work, Employment and Society* 27(3): 414–432.
- Shafer, K., Milkie, M. and Scheibling, C. (2020) 'The division of labour before & during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Canada', *SocArXiv*. doi:10.31235/osf.io/24j87.
- Szikra, D. (2019) 'Ideology or pragmatism? Interpreting social policy change under the "system of national cooperation"', in J. M. Kovács and B. Trencsényi (eds.), *Brave New Hungary: Mapping the "System of National Cooperation"*, London: Lexington Books, pp. 225–242.

- Takács, J. (2019) 'How involved are involved fathers in Hungary? Exploring caring masculinities in a post-socialist context', *Families, Relationships and Societies*. doi:10.1332/204674319X15592179267974
- Vincent, C. and Maxwell, C. (2016) 'Parenting priorities and pressures: furthering understanding of "concerted cultivation"', *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education* 37(2): 269–281.
- World Bank (2020) 'Saving lives, scaling-up impact and getting back on track. World Bank Group COVID-19 Crisis Response Approach Paper', June 2020, <http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/136631594937150795/pdf/World-Bank-Group-COVID-19-Crisis-Response-Approach-Paper-Saving-Lives-Scaling-up-Impact-and-Getting-Back-on-Track.pdf>.