

The Planning Coordination Group: Bureaucratic Casualty in the Cold War Campaign to Exploit Soviet-Bloc Vulnerabilities¹

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In a draft memorandum written two weeks after the establishment of the Planning Coordination Group (PCG) in March 1955, a staff member of the new agency, Colonel William Kintner, spelled out the challenge confronting the PCG within the Eisenhower administration:

The secret of selling the PCG will lie in the aura which surrounds it and in the attitude of mind which pervades the set-up. . . . If this new approach can be made to look, act and radiate as if it were the top level governmental planning group in an active shooting war, it has a chance to become one for the equally vital cold war. This calls for a psychological campaign in Washington, the success of which will depend upon personalities and props. Chairman Rockefeller and his PCG associates and staff must act like there is a war going on.²

Six months later, PCG Chairman Nelson Rockefeller drafted a memorandum recommending that President Dwight Eisenhower abolish the organization by the end of 1955, on the grounds that it had failed to meet its objectives.

This article addresses three fundamental questions. First, why was the PCG established, and what did it do during its short existence? Second, why did it fail to achieve its objectives? Finally, what insight does this assessment of the PCG provide into the overall nature and shortcomings of the Eisenhower administration's policies toward the Soviet bloc during one of the most critical

1. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

2. Nelson A. Rockefeller to General Theodore William Parker, 17 May 1955, Rockefeller Archives Center (hereinafter RAC), RFA Collection, Record Group (RG) 4, WDC Series, Box 2, Cold War Organization: Rockefeller Plan, December 1955 (hereinafter Rockefeller to Parker, 17 May 1955).

years of the Cold War? How does its fate alter our understanding of the broader historical literature on the evolution of the Eisenhower administration's security strategy? The evidence that has emerged over the last decade suggests that the PCG's problems and its unrealized potential were indicative of flaws in the administration's foreign policies that left Eisenhower and his staff no better prepared to respond to the unrest behind the Iron Curtain in 1956 than they were during the East German uprising in 1953.

The Formation of the PCG

The PCG's origins date back well before March 1955. In the years following the imposition of Soviet-style Communism in Eastern Europe, officials within and outside the U.S. government had called for an organization that could effectively wage psychological war against the Soviet bloc. The numerous problems encountered during the Truman administration—including bureaucratic turf battles, diffuse organizational responsibility, and the lack of clear objectives—had highlighted the need for reform.³ One of the most critical shortcomings identified was the lack of a high-level policy organization that could take the initiative and overcome bureaucratic obstacles. John Foster Dulles, among others, had advanced this proposal before and during the 1952 presidential campaign, arguing that the “planning of such activities ought to be centered in a high ranking authority.”⁴

The Eisenhower administration entered office determined to address these deficiencies. President Eisenhower immediately chartered two commissions to examine the multitude of problems affecting the country's Cold War efforts. The first commission—the Advisory Committee on Government Organization—was headed by Nelson Rockefeller and focused on the bureaucratic structure of the executive branch. The second was the president's Committee on International Information Activities, better known as the Jackson

3. The problems afflicting U.S. psychological warfare operations during the early Cold War are well documented. Gregory Mitrovich's *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 124–125; Peter Grose's *Operation Rollback: America's Secret War behind the Iron Curtain* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000); and Scott Lucas's *Freedom's War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union* (New York: NYU Press, 1999) are the most recent works in a body of scholarship that discuss these problems. See also John J. Yurechko, “From Containment to Counteroffensive: Soviet Vulnerabilities and American Policy Planning, 1946–1953” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1980); Scott Lucas, “Campaigns of Truth: The Psychological Strategy Board and American Ideology, 1951–1953,” *International History Review*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (May 1996), pp. 279–302; and Sarah-Jane Corke, “Bridging the Gap: Containment, Covert Action and the Search for the Missing Link in American Cold War Policy in Eastern Europe, 1948–1953” (paper presented at Society of American Foreign Relations Conference, Chicago, June 1996).

4. John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1957), p. 250.

Committee for its chair, William Jackson.⁵ Many of the changes recommended by these committees were quickly implemented. The Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) was disbanded on 2 September 1953, and its functions were vested in the newly created Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) of the National Security Council (NSC).⁶ Envisioned as a needed counterpart to the NSC's Planning Board, which drafted national-security policy papers, the OCB's primary responsibility was to coordinate and monitor the implementation of policy papers approved by the NSC. The OCB was chaired by the undersecretary of state and included the deputy secretary of defense, the deputy director for mutual security, and the president's Cold War special assistant. The OCB produced reports outlining the actions taken to execute a policy and evaluate the "policy's effectiveness, timeliness, and applicability." The OCB also was supposed to contain a small "think tank" that would "keep track" of psychological dynamics.⁷ Beyond the OCB, other institutional changes followed, including the creation of the United States Information Agency (USIA).⁸

Despite these measures, problems continued to afflict the Eisenhower administration's psychological and political-warfare programs. A November 1954 report to the NSC on planning and coordination of economic, psychological, and political warfare was blunt in identifying shortcomings. No central staff, it noted, "was responsible for reviewing the problems of a given country or region or broad problem area and attempting to work out a balanced program to reach an established objective, utilizing all of the facilities available to the Government."⁹ Although the report recognized that much "useful work" was being done in various places in the government, it emphasized the need for "a central directing force which will foresee such situations and imaginatively work out opportunities for effective action on a more coor-

5. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereinafter *FRUS*), 1952–1954, Vol. II: National Security Affairs (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), p. 1691n; and Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 24–26.

6. John Scott, *Political Warfare: A Guide to Competitive Coexistence* (New York: John Day, 1955), pp. 216–220; and *FRUS*, 1952–1954, Vol. II, p. 455.

7. For a discussion of the NSC and the OCB, see Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 93–95; and Anna Kasten Nelson, "The 'Top of Policy Hill': President Eisenhower and the National Security Council," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 7 No. 4 (Fall 1983), pp. 307–326.

8. Leo Bogart, *Premises for Propaganda: The USIA's Operating Assumptions in the Cold War* (Riverside: Free Press, 1976); and James L. Tyson, *U.S. International Broadcasting and National Security* (Ramapo: Ramapo Press, 1983).

9. White House Office (WHO), Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (OSANSA), Memorandum for the President, 24 November 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereinafter DDEL), Special Assistant Series, Presidential Subseries (Subs.), Box 2, President's Papers 1954 (5).

minated basis between agencies.”¹⁰ Finally, the report noted that an important feature of the original OCB arrangement was the inclusion in its membership of Eisenhower’s psychological-warfare representative, C. D. Jackson. This post had been vacant for six months, leaving an important gap in the Executive Office structure.¹¹

The need for coordination of American political, economic, and psychological-warfare measures became even more critical with the adoption of NSC Policy Paper 5505, “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities,” in January 1955.¹² While allowing for the continuation of measures pursued during the first two years of the administration, the paper represented a shift in the Eisenhower administration’s political-warfare strategy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. NSC 5505 called for the exploitation of discontent and other problems in the Soviet bloc to induce the Communist regimes and their peoples to choose “alternative lines of action which, while in their national interests, do not conflict with the security interests of the US.” This more subtle, less aggressive approach—as recognized in NSC 5505 itself—required that “measures for exploitation should be mutually consistent and should be directed toward specific US objectives which are within existing or potential US capabilities.”¹³

The PCG’s creation was directly linked to the passage of NSC 5505. Discussions involving President Eisenhower’s national security adviser, Robert Cutler, his newly appointed special assistant for Cold War affairs, Nelson Rockefeller, and Director Rowland Hughes of the Bureau of the Budget on 26 January 1955 provided the final impetus for its formation. All three recognized the need for a special committee led by Rockefeller that would be assigned responsibility for coordinating the implementation of NSC 5505.¹⁴ Even Eisenhower came on board, observing that while “we needed paper programs, we could not keep on planning indefinitely for the future. We must have prompt action.” Accordingly, he believed it was “right to give this paper to the Rockefeller group and have them report to the Council from time to

10. *Ibid.* Critics outside the government echoed similar concerns. David Sarnoff emphasized the need for the United States to orchestrate, finance, and coordinate its efforts: “The main weakness of our efforts to date . . . is that we have not always been consistent in what we had to say to them. . . . Nothing now underway needs to be abandoned. The problem is one of attaining the requisite magnitude, financing, coordination and continuity—all geared to the long-range objectives of the undertaking.” David Sarnoff, *Program for a Political Offensive against World Communism*, New York, April 1955, p. 27.

11. WHO, OSANSA, Memorandum for the President, 24 November 1954, DDEL.

12. WHO, OSANSA, NSC 5505/1, 31 January 1955, DDEL, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subs., Box 14, NSC 5505/1—“Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities (1)” (reproduced in *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Vol. XXIV, pp. 3–11, 20–22).

13. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.

time by way of informing the Council of what the Special Committee had been doing.” He ended by noting that he “was sure that Mr. Rockefeller was precisely the right man to chair this committee to implement NSC 5505.”¹⁵ Other key players, such as Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, voiced their support for the special committee and Rockefeller’s role.

The roles and functions of the special committee that would eventually be called the PCG were identified in a Budget Bureau paper entitled “Coordination of Economic, Psychological and Political Warfare and Foreign Information Activities.” This paper proposed the formation of a board or council that would “establish a clear and stable basis for necessary agency participation and assistance in the coordination of economic, psychological, and political cold war planning.” The council was to use existing machinery as fully as possible but would “make possible improved coordination and would encourage the stimulation of new ideas because of a better over-all knowledge of what was being done in this field.”¹⁶

The proposed charter for the PCG met significant opposition, however, from a number of quarters. The most widely held objection centered on the apparent duplication of the ongoing functions and efforts performed by the OCB and NSC Planning Board. As stated in a State Department evaluation, “Much of what is talked about in this document, instead of ‘clarifying, streamlining, and sharpening’ U.S. operations, can only lead to more confusion, duplication and interference with established procedures.”¹⁷ Even supporters like Robert Cutler objected to the specifics contained in the PCG’s charter, echoing State Department fears that “the creation of the proposed new board will add an additional committee, which would further confuse and complicate such arrangements.”¹⁸ The implementation of the Plans Co-

15. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

16. Draft paper, “Coordination of Economic, Psychological and Political Warfare and Foreign Information Activities,” 29 January 1955, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereinafter NA), File “PCG,” RG 59, Records Related to State Department Participation in the Operations Coordinating Board and NSC, 1953–1960 (hereinafter RRS DPINSC), Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, B. 126.

17. Memorandum from Carl McCardle to I. W. Carpenter, 3 February 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126. Others in the State Department expressed similar sentiments. See a memorandum from W. Park Armstrong and another from Loy W. Henderson to Carl McCardle, both dated 3 February 1955, in “File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126”.

18. Robert Cutler reviewed the proposal in light of three principles—change, integration, and psychological strategy. He concluded that the proposed draft memorandum “does not appear consistent with these principles.” Memorandum from Robert Cutler on “Draft Memorandum to the President Prepared by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget,” 4 February 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126 (hereinafter Cutler Memorandum, 4 February 1955). Livingston Merchant echoed Cutler’s sentiments in his 3 February 1955 memorandum to Carpenter, arguing that the establishment of the Rockefeller Group seemed inconsistent with the NSC’s “pyramid concept.” Memorandum from Livingston Merchant to I. W. Carpenter, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126, NA.

ordination Council, Cutler argued, “would weaken and destroy the OCB, a creation of this Administration.”¹⁹ From Cutler’s perspective it would be better to modify existing processes to accommodate the PCG mission rather than to create an additional organization.²⁰ He acknowledged that Rockefeller brought a lot to the job but added that it was “neither necessary nor desirable to create a new body in parallel with OCB, in order for Mr. Rockefeller to make the maximum contribution.”²¹ Others objected to the PCG on the grounds that it was a rehash of the old idea to create a “chief of staff for cold war” that had previously been floated and defeated.²² Security concerns also were raised over the Rockefeller group’s proposed role in coordinating and approving sensitive covert operations.²³

Yet the strongest objections came from the director of the Policy Planning Staff, Robert Bowie, who feared that the PCG would undermine or usurp functions performed by existing agencies such as the State Department. Bowie wrote:

I consider it imperative that every effort be made to head off the formation of any such board. . . . This board will . . . seriously impair the role of the Secretary of State and completely upset the present arrangements for the planning, conduct and political guidance of covert operations. . . . In short, this proposal seems to me the most ill-advised step to date in the tendency to fragment the authority for the conduct of foreign affairs.²⁴

Bowie’s views were echoed by others in the State Department who warned:

If we have another council or board engaged in generating ideas on how to improve our handling of foreign affairs, the new body will have its own staff which will dream up its plans. The experience of ‘coordination’ in the PSB and OCB during the last four years shows this. The Department will then spend even

19. Memorandum from Robert Cutler on “Feb 8/55 Proposal to Establish a Plans Coordinating Council,” 9 February 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126 (hereinafter Cutler Memorandum, 9 February 1955), underlining in original.

20. Cutler Memorandum, 9 February 1955; Memorandum from William Sebald to I. W. Carpenter, 3 February 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126; and Memorandum from Loy Henderson to I. W. Carpenter, 3 February 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126.

21. Cutler Memorandum, 4 February 1955.

22. Memorandum from Max Bishop to Loy Henderson, 4 February 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126; and Memorandum from I. W. Carpenter for the Under Secretary, 7 February 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126 (hereinafter Carpenter Memorandum, 7 February 1955).

23. Memorandum from John Jernegan to I. W. Carpenter, 3 February 1955, NA, RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126; and Carpenter Memorandum, 7 February 1955.

24. Memorandum from Robert Bowie to The Acting Secretary on Rockefeller Board, 4 February 1955, NA, RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66 D148, Box 126 (hereinafter Bowie Memorandum, 4 February 1955).

more of its resources 'pushing paper' instead of getting on with the job with which the Secretary of State is charged—the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States.²⁵

While opposing the PCG, Bowie, much like Robert Cutler, acknowledged an important role for Rockefeller, pointing out that Rockefeller's predecessor, C. D. Jackson, had kept an eye on psychological factors without a board and that Rockefeller could do the same.²⁶

The PCG proposal underwent a number of revisions in the six weeks before it was approved by President Eisenhower. Starting as an unnamed board, the PCG changed first to the Plans Coordination Council and then to the Planning Coordination Group.²⁷ The PCG's functions were likewise clarified following a 9 February 1955 meeting attended by Cutler, Rockefeller, and other key players.²⁸ By establishing the PCG within the framework of the OCB and requiring that it provide periodic reports to the president through the NSC, the revised charter addressed many of the earlier concerns over duplicative effort and unclear responsibilities.²⁹ Robert Cutler asserted that the revised product "avoided the errors in the old PSB and did not interfere in the line of responsibility between the President and his responsible Cabinet members." Equally important to Cutler was the retention of the PCG's mission to infuse "imaginative and dynamic ideas into coordinated agency planning" and provide "closer, high-level attention" to OCB and covert operations.³⁰ Yet State Department representatives remained concerned about several sections of the charter and continued their efforts to strengthen the OCB in its relationship with the PCG.³¹

25. Memorandum from Carl McCardle to I. W. Carpenter, 3 February 1955, NA, File "PCG," RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126.

26. Bowie Memorandum, 4 February 1955.

27. Memorandum pm "Major Changes in Hughes' Draft of 1/29/55 Made by the Draft of 2/8/55," February 1955, NA, File "PCG," RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148 Box 126.

28. Memorandum from Rowland Hughes for Herbert Hoover Jr., Allen Dulles, and Robert Anderson, 14 February 1955, File "PCG," RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126, NA.

29. Bishop Memorandum,, 16 February 1955.

30. Memorandum from Robert Cutler to Rowland Hughes and Nelson Rockefeller, 12 February 1955, NA, File "PCG," RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126.

31. State Department representatives were concerned that the draft still contained this key paragraph: "But there is a continuing need in government to infuse in such plans and programs dynamic, new and imaginative ideas, to diagnose precisely how best to meet the overall problems of a given country or area . . . to find ways effectively to utilize U.S. private organizations and foreign individuals and groups and foreign public and private organizations." The department continued to push language that strengthened the OCB in its relationship with the PCG. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had proposed changes as well. See Memorandum from Rowland Hughes for Walter Bedell Smith, 23 February 1955, NA, File "PCG," RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126; Memorandum from I. W. Carpenter for the Under Secretary, 24 February 1955, NA, File "PCG," RG 59 RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126; and Memorandum from I. W. Carpenter for the

President Eisenhower officially inaugurated the PCG on 10 March 1955.³² In creating the body, the NSC noted that the Special Committee mechanism was established in connection with NSC 5505 and NSC 5502 (“Russian Anti-Soviet Political Activities”) “because of the need for high-level, restricted attention to developing the sensitive programs, and the coordination of actions thereunder, called for by the above-mentioned national security policies.” The memorandum chartering the PCG also promised that the new body would aid in developing planning in both overt and covert fields and would “contribute greatly to the imaginative dynamic quality and the effectiveness of coordinated agency planning to carry out approved national security policies.”³³

The PCG and Its Agenda

Nelson Rockefeller was in many ways the perfect candidate to head the PCG. He was the president’s special assistant for psychological warfare, having replaced C. D. Jackson in December 1954.³⁴ Rockefeller also had previously served Eisenhower as chairman of his Advisory Committee on Government Organization. In that post Rockefeller had strongly supported removing overseas information programs from the State Department and establishing them under a separate government agency—the USIA.³⁵ But his political warfare experience began well before this. He had served as Franklin Roosevelt’s Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) from 1940 to 1944 and then as Truman’s assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs in 1944–1945. In each of these positions he developed a keen appreciation for the power and tools of psychological warfare. As CIAA, Rockefeller employed advertising, radio broadcasts, moviemaking, and a variety of academic and cultural exchanges to promote hemispheric unity and American interests.³⁶ Rockefeller’s involvement with the Rockefeller Foundation made him particularly conscious of the important political initiatives being conducted under private auspices.³⁷ His ideas on what was at stake and how the Cold War should be waged likewise made him well suited for the position. Like his predecessor,

Under Secretary, 25 February 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 126.

32. *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Vol. XIX: National Security Policy (Washington: GPO, 1990), p. 62.

33. Memorandum from Rowland Hughes for the President, 3 March 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 2, Cold War Organization: Establishment of PCG.

34. *The New York Times*, 8 December 1954, p. 1.

35. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, Vol. II, 1691n; and Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, pp. 24–26.

36. Carry Reich, *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller* (New York: Doubleday, 1996), pp. 184–234.

37. Medical, agricultural, and other activities conducted by the Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, the Far East, and Europe represented a substantial contribution to American political warfare. According

C. D. Jackson, Rockefeller did not envision the special assistant's advisory role narrowly. He perceived the Cold War as a conflict waged on many fronts, noting, "Defense, in and of itself, is not enough. There must be a positive force as well."³⁸ Rockefeller presented himself as a hard-liner willing to exploit Soviet and East European vulnerabilities; but that did not translate into support for either "rollback" or inciting revolution behind the Iron Curtain. Rockefeller saw American culture and economic power as the key means to blunt Communism's appeal in the Third World and to undermine its control at home.³⁹

Rockefeller's organization comprised a mix of government employees, contractors, and administrative assistants, reaching nearly thirty at its peak. His deputy was Brigadier General T. W. Parker, an Army artillery officer who had most recently served in Korea.⁴⁰ Colonel William Kintner was another key player in the PCG. A military intelligence officer with a Ph.D. in International Relations from Georgetown University, Kintner had served as the NSC's chief planner for covert operations from 1950 to 1952. A well-known contractor employed by the PCG was Charles Kersten, the former congressman from Wisconsin and author of the 1951 Mutual Security Act authorizing \$100 million to destabilize the Soviet Union. This hard-line former congressman had been the driving force behind the Volunteer Freedom Corps (VFC) proposal that was first floated in 1953.⁴¹ Other influential consultants included Frank Lindsay, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer who had led or been involved in numerous CIA covert efforts in Eastern Europe, and Max Millikan from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), a leading authority on vulnerability research.⁴² The PCG itself was housed in six rooms on the third floor of the Executive Office Building.⁴³

to some, "the operations of various branches of the Rockefeller Foundation and its personnel contributed substantially toward American prestige and popularity, particularly in Latin America." Scott, *Political Warfare*, pp. 219–220.

38. Quoted in Reich, *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller*, p. 554.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 562, 565.

40. Draft Announcement of PCG, 28 May 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 1, PCG Establishment, Functions and History; Memorandum from Nelson Rockefeller for Herbert Hoover Jr., 19 April 1955, NA, File "PCG," RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127; and Reich, *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller*, p. 561.

41. Reich, *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller*, p. 561. Reportedly, Kersten was hired using CIA funds and with strong backing from Vice President Nixon. See *Ibid.*, p. 594. For a recent, detailed discussion of the Volunteer Freedom Corps, see James Jay Carafano, "Mobilizing Europe's Stateless: America's Plan for a Cold War Army," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 61–85.

42. NSC Discussion, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 1, Development of Strategy and Plans to Change Course. Max Millikan, as the Director of MIT's Center of International Studies (CENIS), had led a group of academic experts who produced a classified study in July 1952 entitled "The Vulnerability of the Soviet Union and Its European Satellites to Political Warfare." This study was instrumental in shaping NSC 5505.

43. "PCG First Meeting, 23 Mar 55—Planning Coordination Group Agenda," NA, File "PCG," RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127.

PCG operations mirrored in many ways those of the NSC. For instance, the PCG held sessions with both “primaries” and “alternates.” The PCG primaries—Nelson Rockefeller, CIA director Allen Dulles, Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr., and Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert B. Anderson—met for the first time on 23 March 1955.⁴⁴ “Alternate” sessions supported and complemented the PCG primary sessions. Over the next few months PCG “alternates” met once a week. By June, however, PCG alternate sessions began to decrease, declining to twice a month until August when they were scheduled for once a month for the remainder of the PCG’s existence.⁴⁵ Notes and other documents from the meetings provide insight into the PCG’s agenda and focus during its short life span.

In accord with its 10 March charter the PCG attempted to coordinate overall U.S. economic, psychological, and political warfare efforts in support of NSC 5505/1 and 5502/1. This task ranged from serving as the coordinating agency for the preparation of relevant NSC policy papers to identifying and recommending how best to exploit Soviet-bloc vulnerabilities.⁴⁶ The PCG led the interagency effort, producing an initial compilation in May 1955 that identified 177 Soviet-bloc vulnerabilities in six areas: Discontents, National Problems, Economy, Political Structure, Ideological, and Defection Potential.⁴⁷ The PCG continued to coordinate and track the status of these vulnerabilities over the next seven months, submitting internal memoranda as well as a formal progress report to the NSC.⁴⁸ Besides NSC 5505 and NSC 5502, the PCG’s purview quickly expanded to include oversight of the NSC 174 working group. As pointed out by the State Department’s PCG representative, the future implementation of NSC 174—“United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe”—was directly affected by the policies set forth in NSC 5505/1. Consequently, the Planning Coordination Group

44. “Minutes of First Meeting, 23 Mar 55,” NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127. The PCG primaries actually met only five times: 23 March, 29 April, a special session on 10 August, 26 September, and a final meeting on 14 December. See “Planning Coordination Group Agenda for 14 December 1955,” NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127.

45. “Planning Coordination Group Agenda for 14 December 1955”; and “Planning Coordination Group, Mar–Dec 55,” NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127. The agency designees included Walworth Barbour from the State Department, Charles A. Sullivan and Colonel William R. Kintner from the Defense Department, and Frank Wisner and Richard Bissell from the CIA.

46. Memorandum from T. W. Parker for Elmer B. Staats, 16 December 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 1, PCG Establishment, Functions, and History.

47. WHO, OSANSA, Memorandum from T. W. Parker to Planning Coordination Group alternates re NSC 5505/1, 27 May 1955, DDEL, Planning Coordination Series, Box 1, #3 Soviet-Communist Vulnerabilities (7).

48. Draft Progress Report, 22 July 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 1, NAR—Progress, Status and Action Reports (hereinafter Draft Progress Report, 22 July 1955).

was assigned responsibility for coordinating the implementation of NSC 174 in addition to its other duties.⁴⁹ The PCG also had a role in advising and channeling support to major covert programs (NSC 5412/1, “National Security Directive on Covert Operations”), but the extent of this role is unclear given continuing limitations on access to classified memoranda.⁵⁰

Although the PCG’s focus was clearly on NSC 5505, it was involved in proposing or monitoring the full spectrum of measures considered or used in American efforts to roll back the Iron Curtain, ranging from detachment of East European satellites to initiating cultural exchanges.⁵¹ A 5 April draft list of fifteen problems meriting PCG attention included high-level Communist-bloc defections, the Volunteer Freedom Corps, Radio Free Europe (RFE), balloons for the distribution of leaflets, East-West trade, Soviet visits, and the detachment of Albania.⁵² A similar list compiled in July and another at the end of October mirrored the April focus.⁵³

Revamping the country’s peacetime and wartime nonmilitary warfare efforts was another major task handled by the PCG. Both President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles had recognized the need for an overall strategy that accounted for nonmilitary as well as military realities.⁵⁴ Eisenhower went one

49. Letter from Herbert Hoover Jr. to Nelson Rockefeller, 23 March 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127; and NSC 174—United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe, 11 December 1953, NA, RG 273 (National Security Council).

50. NSC 5412/1—National Security Directive on Covert Operations, 15 March 1954, NA, RG 273.

51. For a discussion of American efforts to roll back the Iron Curtain, Grose, *Operation Rollback*; Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin*; and James D. Marchio, “Rhetoric and Reality: The Eisenhower Administration and Unrest in Eastern Europe, 1953–1959” (Ph.D. diss., The American University, Washington, D.C., 1990).

52. “Draft List of Problems Which Might Merit PCG Attention,” 5 April 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 10, Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities, Development of Vulnerabilities Paper. The complete list of problems recommended for PCG consideration included: Soviet Vulnerabilities (NSC 5505/1), Russian Anti-Soviet Political Activities (NSC 5502/1), Soviet Satellites (NSC 174), Counter Soviet Efforts to Demoralize Emigration (NSC 86/1), Foreign Information and Psychological Warfare (NSC 127/1 and 59/1), Volunteer Freedom Corps (NSC 143/2), Militant Liberty, Soviet Visits, Agriculture—Soviet Orbit, East-West Trade, East Germany, Radio Free Europe and Balloons, Defections—High Level, Satellite Armies, and Albania. For further insight, see “Range of Subjects Discussed by PCG ‘Alternates’ as Reflected in the Minutes,” n.d., NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127; and “Planning Coordination Group, Mar–Dec 55,” n.d., NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 128.

53. Draft PCG Progress Report, 22 July 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 1, NAR—Progress, Status and Action Reports; and Letter from Nelson Rockefeller to President, 31 October 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 1, NAR—Progress, Status and Action Reports (hereinafter Rockefeller to President, 31 October 1955).

54. 209th Meeting of the NSC, 5 August 1954, DDEL, DDE Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 5; and Memorandum of Discussion, 6 August 1954, DDEL, DDE Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 5. John Foster Dulles argued, “We have been concentrating almost exclusively on preparation for a ‘hot war’ which may never come. Top policy decisions have been influenced too much by the military, whose duty it is to think primarily in terms of a shooting war. Meanwhile, we can lose the ‘cold war’ war.” Dulles, *War or Peace*, p. 176. See also Scott, *Political Warfare*, p. 9.

step further, suggesting in August 1954 that “perhaps we needed a director of unconventional or non-military warfare.”⁵⁵ The PCG and Nelson Rockefeller represented at least a partial answer to what Dulles and Eisenhower were seeking. A May 1955 PCG memorandum outlined the roles and missions of the Office of Non-Military Warfare. It stipulated that the office would advise the president on “national policy, plans and implementing directives relating to the employment of psychological, political, and economic warfare in achieving wartime and postwar objectives of US.” The office also was responsible for planning, directing and coordinating all U.S. psychological, political, and economic warfare functions, programs and activities of a nonmilitary nature.⁵⁶ A month later, during the Office of Defense Mobilization exercise OPERATION ALERT, Rockefeller was appointed the Adviser on Non-Military Warfare.⁵⁷ Efforts to identify and refine the roles and responsibilities of the Office of Non-Military Warfare culminated in the fall with the Lindsay and Dangerfield Report.⁵⁸

Of interest beyond what the PCG was being asked to do is the manner in which it sought to accomplish its tasks. Early in its existence, the PCG devised initiatives that seemed appropriate for real military contingencies, such as a proposal in April 1955 to establish a “Position Room.” The memorandum outlining this idea, drafted by Colonel Kintner, argued that “an effective marshaling of the facts concerning the cold war is an essential step in planning of operations against the Communist system.” The Position Room would display country analyses for the whole Soviet bloc and would be divided into three groups—one responsible for the enemy, another for plans, and a third for evaluations. Kintner envisioned that the Position Room would be the principal tool of the PCG and would also be available to the president and NSC and provided with round-the-clock security. Kintner’s proposal was raised at a PCG alternate session on 5 April and apparently discussed by Rockefeller and Parker on 5 May, but it never came to fruition.⁵⁹

55. 209th Meeting of the NSC, 5 August 1954; and Memorandum of Discussion, 6 August 1954.

56. Memorandum from Merrill Collett to Nancy Hanks, 26 May 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 3, ONMW—Assignments and Correspondence.

57. “ONMW—OPERATION ALERT.” OPERATION ALERT tested civil defense in a simulated thermonuclear bomb attack on the United States, including a mock application of martial law on a national scale by Eisenhower. See the coverage in *The New York Times*, 16 June 1955, pp. 1, 16–18; and *The New York Times*, 18 June 1955, pp. 1, 8.

58. Memorandum from T. W. Parker to Nelson Rockefeller, 11 October 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 3, ONMW—Assignments and Correspondence; Memorandum from Stacy May to T. W. Parker, 18 October 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 3, ONMW—Assignments and Correspondence; and Memorandum from Nelson Rockefeller for Secretary of Defense, State, Director Central Intelligence and Director USIA, 3 November 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 3, ONMW—Assignments and Correspondence.

59. I have not found any record of what transpired during this discussion or any indication that the

The PCG's Accomplishments and Failures

What did the PCG accomplish? Perhaps the most appropriate way to answer this question is to examine how successful the group was in executing its three core missions.

The PCG actively pushed for better coordination in the use of American economic, political, and psychological warfare. A May 1955 memorandum advanced a plan to develop an “orderly process by which [the] US can plan official position and action on upcoming world events.” The proposal called for USIA to provide the PCG with a list of significant worldwide events over the next six months from which the PCG would select events to be given full analytical treatment and emphasis for coordination.⁶⁰ Although the available evidence suggests that the PCG failed to get this process fully adopted, the historical record shows that the PCG was active in coordinating several proposed high-level statements, including reaffirming the principle of asylum.⁶¹

The PCG's coordination efforts were even more evident in developing the list of Soviet and East European vulnerabilities, a task that the PCG inherited from the NSC 174 Working Group. The PCG built on the working group's research and its December 1954 finding that “U.S. capabilities under present conditions are not sufficient to accomplish the detachment of any major Soviet satellite by means short of war.”⁶² This premise underlay NSC 5505/1 and drove PCG efforts to rethink the means and targets for American political warfare. Over a six-month period and several drafts the PCG was able to secure agreement from the Departments of State and Defense, as well as the CIA, on a list of “those vulnerabilities which are most exploitable and which deserve the highest priority of effort.”⁶³

Beyond developing a coordinated list of exploitable vulnerabilities, the PCG's efforts to oversee the spectrum of American political warfare highlighted the need to link and ensure consistency between actions considered

proposal was ever implemented. Memorandum from Nelson Rockefeller for T. W. Parker, 28 April 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 2, PCG—Position Room. The Position Room was raised at a meeting on 5 April 1955. See “Minutes of Alternates Meeting, 5 April 1955,” NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127.

60. Memorandum from Nelson Rockefeller for T. W. Parker, 16 May 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 2, PCG—Position Room.

61. Draft Progress Report, 22 July 1955.

62. *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Vol. XXV, pp. 4–5.

63. Rockefeller Memorandum on NSC 5505/1, 7 October 1955, DDEL, WHO, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–61, Planning Coordination Series, Box 1, #3 Soviet-Communist Vulnerabilities (1). The PCG memorandum stated that “the work to date has demonstrated the necessity for achieving a more integrated program for the exploitation of Soviet and Satellite vulnerabilities in the future.” This list was refined as a result of PCG staff work and departmental and agency representative discussions. See Memorandum from T. W. Parker on NSC 5505, 31 October 1955, DDEL, WHO, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–61, Planning Coordination Series, Box 1, #3 Soviet-Communist Vulnerabilities (1).

and taken under various national security policy papers. In a memorandum to the chairman of the OCB on 30 September 1955, PCG Chairman Rockefeller emphasized that “policy conclusions underlying US actions respecting the Soviet European satellites, including actions to exploit vulnerabilities, should be consistent with the policy and strategy outlined in basic national security policy.” This was of particular concern because the policies in NSC 5505 represented a “somewhat subtler strategy and different emphasis than the policy conclusions underlying NSC 174.” Rockefeller recommended that NSC 5505/1 and NSC 174 be reviewed in light of planned revisions to NSC 5501.⁶⁴ His emphasis on caution and better policy integration was reiterated three months later in the PCG’s NSC 5505 progress report to the OCB. The report noted that representatives of the various departments and agencies indicated a reluctance to proceed with the NSC 5505 outline plan until certain changes were made in the basic policy paper.⁶⁵ These concerns, as well as the lack of success in pursuing U.S. objectives in Eastern Europe, prompted the NSC to begin revising NSC 174 in March 1956.⁶⁶ PCG initiatives to facilitate more effective coordination were likewise evident with the country’s peacetime and wartime nonmilitary warfare structure. In its final act the PCG forwarded a report to the NSC on the “Coordination of Foreign Political, Military, Economic, Informational, and Covert Operations,” calling for organizational as well as policy changes to facilitate a “transition from conditions of political warfare such as exist today to conditions of general war.”⁶⁷

The PCG also contributed a good deal of advice to senior officials in the Eisenhower administration on how best to wage the Cold War. The PCG took its charge to propose new ideas for U.S. policy quite seriously. Nelson Rockefeller, for one, saw the mission to infuse American plans and programs with “dynamic, new, and imaginative ideas” as “probably the most important mission with which PCG [was] charged.”⁶⁸ Rockefeller and the PCG were in-

64. Memorandum from T. W. Parker for Nelson Rockefeller, 29 September 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 11, Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities, Policy Papers, RAC.

65. WHO, T. W. Parker Memorandum on NSC 5505/1, 20 December 1955, DDEL, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–61, Planning Coordination Series, Box 1, #3 Soviet-Communist Vulnerabilities (1). For the December 1955 progress report, see also Memorandum from J. D. Beam for the Acting Secretary, 13 December 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRSDPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 128.

66. *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Vol. XXV, p. 130.

67. WHO, OSANSA, Memorandum for National Security Council, 27 December 1955, DDEL, Special Assistant Series, Presidential Subs., Box 2, President’s Papers 1955 (1).

68. Rockefeller wrote: “To infuse in such plans and programs those to implement national security policies) dynamic, new, and imaginative ideas. . . . This is probably the most important mission with which PCG is charged.” Continuing, he postulated that the PCG would exploit multiple sources to “dig out the ideas required and then develop such ideas by discussion of the members or alternates . . . other ideas might be developed by a group of outside-of government personnel. . . . It seems to me

strumental in arranging the June 1955 brainstorming and strategy session held at Quantico, Virginia. The gathering drew together experts from outside the government to examine methods of exploiting Communist-bloc vulnerabilities. But more than ideas were exchanged: the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel made recommendations on “operational positions and actions the US might take vis-à-vis the USSR (as for example at the coming round of East-West conferences)” aimed at permitting the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities.⁶⁹

Rockefeller’s greatest success, in fact, came in July 1955 during the four-power conference in Geneva where Eisenhower announced the “Open Skies” disarmament proposal. As chronicled in several recent scholarly works, Rockefeller’s aggressive lobbying succeeded in convincing the president to adopt “Open Skies” despite the strong objections of John Foster Dulles and others within the administration. The proposal, calling for mutual aerial inspection of military installations in the Soviet Union and the United States, embodied what Rockefeller hoped to achieve on a regular basis—a bold psychological initiative that forced the Soviet Union onto the defensive and won acclaim for the United States around the world. That this innovative idea had originated outside any established department seemed to validate both the PCG’s purpose and its capabilities.⁷⁰

More significant than the PCG’s accomplishments were its failings. Despite all the high hopes and expectations that surrounded the PCG, some saw little return. An October 1955 handwritten note from Under Secretary of State Hoover asserted that the PCG had never made a report to the chairman of the OCB and had not yet submitted any papers, outlines, or reports.⁷¹ The PCG had been unable to generate either the aura or the mindset of an “active shooting war” that had been deemed critical to its success. The “props” integral to creating such an aura—like the “Position Room”—remained paper proposals only. Failure likewise marked its efforts to overcome bureaucratic

that the flexibility inherent in this type of operations could add greatly to the PCG’s ability to produce ‘dynamic, new, and imaginative ideas.’” Memorandum from Nelson Rockefeller for PCG Members, 8 August 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127 (herein-after Rockefeller Memorandum, 8 August 1955).

69. *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Vol. V, pp. 216–220; and Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin*, pp. 169–171.

70. Reich, *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller*, pp. 602, 604, 608; John Prados, “Open Skies and Closed Minds,” in Günter Bischof and Saki Dockrill, eds., *Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), pp. 215–233; and Michael J. Hogan, “Eisenhower and Open Skies: A Case Study in ‘Psychological Warfare,’” in Martin J. Medhurst, *Eisenhower’s War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994), pp. 137–155.

71. Untitled note by Herbert Hoover Jr., 5 October 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127.

logjams. As noted by its own chartered study group in November 1955, “proper emphasis and full governmental coordination are lacking in many areas.”⁷²

The PCG’s inability to exploit even its successes was particularly disheartening. Two weeks after the July 1955 Geneva summit, Rockefeller proposed a second Quantico panel to review and report on the psychological aspects of future American strategy. The panel’s detailed report reflected concerns over growing American vulnerability to Soviet nuclear attack, as well as the ideological challenges posed by Communism. Like its Quantico predecessor, this panel provided recommendations on how American policies and psychological strategies should be altered to address the Communist challenge. Yet none of the policy recommendations produced by the second Quantico Panel were accepted or pursued by the president.⁷³ Frustrated, Nelson Rockefeller acknowledged failure in the memorandum in which he recommended abolition of the PCG: “I am sorry to make this recommendation. However, it is clear after six months experience that this mechanism will not be able to accomplish the objectives set forth in the memorandum of 3 March 1955.” Although Rockefeller waged a futile rearguard action in hopes that the PCG’s stock might rise after Eisenhower recovered from his September 1955 heart attack, the PCG’s remaining three months were focused on completing work already begun and on ensuring a smooth transition of duties to the Operations Coordinating Board.⁷⁴

72. WHO, “Psychological Aspects of United States Strategy,” November 1955, DDEL, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–61, Planning Coordination Series, Box 2, #18 Psychological Aspects of US Strategy, Panel Rpt (1).

73. *Ibid.*; and Reich, *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller*, p. 622.

74. Letter from Nelson Rockefeller to Rowland Hughes, 13 September 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127; Memorandum from Walworth Barbour to Herbert Hoover Jr., 18 October 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127; Draft Memorandum from Nelson Rockefeller for Herbert Hoover Jr. Reuben Robertson, and Allen Dulles, 13 October 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127; Memorandum from Nelson Rockefeller for Herbert Hoover Jr., Reuben Robertson, and Allen Dulles, 13 October 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127; and Memorandum from T. W. Parker for Elmer Staats, 16 December 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 1, PCG Establishment, Functions, and History. For a discussion of who should carry out PCG responsibilities when it disappeared, see Memorandum from Herman Phleger for Herbert Hoover Jr., 25 November 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127 (hereinafter Phleger Memorandum, 25 November 1955); and Memorandum from Nelson Rockefeller for Herbert Hoover Jr., Reuben Robertson, and Allen Dulles, 9 December 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127 (hereinafter Rockefeller Memorandum, 9 December 1955). PCG recommended that NSC 5505/1 (as well as the related policy statement in NSC 174) be reviewed by the NSC Planning Board in the light of and subsequent to the pending revision of NSC 5501. “The group recommends that the President designate the OCB as the coordinating agency for the statements of policy in NSC 5505/1 and NSC 174 effective December 31, 1955.” Upon termination of the PCG, the OCB assumed responsibilities pertaining to NSC 5505/1. WHO, Parker Memorandum, 20 December 1955; and Reich, *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller*, p. 622.

Why Did the PCG Fail?

Probably the single most important factor in the PCG's demise was the lack of a clear mission that was accepted by all parties. At a special meeting on 10 August, five months after the PCG's charter had been approved by the president, the principals reviewed and discussed a third draft of a paper detailing how the PCG should function. They agreed that the PCG's missions fell generally into two categories: responsibility for action under NSC 5505, NSC 5502, and NSC 174; and responsibility for furnishing new and imaginative ideas.⁷⁵ The meeting ended after further discussion of PCG operations and Rockefeller's suggestion that the PCG continue in existence for a trial period of six months, after which they would determine whether the PCG should function permanently or be abolished.⁷⁶

The obstacles facing the PCG went beyond the lack of a clearly defined mission. The State Department, CIA, and Defense Department all had vested interests to protect, and they perceived the PCG as a threat to their resources and missions. This fear was manifested clearly on at least two occasions. The Quantico Vulnerability Conference was almost canceled when State Department "boys" convinced Herbert Hoover Jr. to intervene with John Foster Dulles. Only Nelson Rockefeller's personal appeal to the president saved the session.⁷⁷ The second occasion was when the PCG was abolished. In this case the State Department was so concerned that the PCG might reappear in another form that it delayed approval of Rockefeller's memorandum disbanding the PCG. The State Department representative on the PCG, Walworth Barbour, wrote, "I think it is clear from other evidence that Nelson envisages the establishment of some further mechanism outside the existing Departments and the NSC-OCB structure which we don't believe to be necessary and that Presidential approval of this phrase will be used by him to advance his campaign in that direction."⁷⁸ Although Rockefeller's resignation from his post as special assistant in December 1955 was attributed to "compelling per-

75. Special Meeting of the Planning Coordination Group, 10 August 1955, NA, File "PCG," RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127. A third mission involving "certain responsibility for covert activities" was identified. But this function was dismissed after Rockefeller and Herbert Hoover Jr. agreed that such responsibilities should be handled simply by individual members because of security restrictions. See Special Meeting of the Planning Coordination Group, 10 August 1955; and Memorandum from Robert Murphy to Herbert Hoover Jr., 17 August 1955, NA, File "PCG," RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127.

76. Special Meeting of the Planning Coordination Group, 10 August 1955.

77. Log from Quantico to Geneva, June–July 1955, DDEL, Jackson, C. D.: Papers, 1934–67, Box 56, Time Inc. File, Log 1955.

78. Memorandum from Walworth Barbour for the Acting Secretary, 8 November 1955. Other examples of State Department concern are found in Phleger Memorandum, 25 November 1955; Memorandum from Jacob Beam for the Under Secretary, 6 December 1955, NA, File "PCG," RG 59,

sonal responsibilities” related to family matters, press reports acknowledged that Rockefeller had been the loser in an ongoing bureaucratic struggle within the government over who would control economic aid to underdeveloped countries.⁷⁹

Bureaucratic struggles were intertwined with personal battles and a clash of egos. Nelson Rockefeller’s ambition and willingness to function as an independent operator made enemies of several key Eisenhower cabinet members, among them Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, Budget Director Rowland Hughes, Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr., and Hoover’s boss, John Foster Dulles. Even Rockefeller’s concerted efforts to cull favor with Eisenhower and Vice President Richard Nixon failed to offset the bureaucratic resistance offered by these powerful opponents.⁸⁰

The PCG had neither the structure nor the resources to succeed with its assigned missions. Nelson Rockefeller, in his self-assessment, acknowledged that the PCG was not well suited to diagnose precisely how best to meet the overall problems of a given country or area or to weigh all aspects of a national security problem and the resources available to solve it.⁸¹ An internal exchange over the seemingly trivial question of whether the formation of the PCG should be publicly announced further highlights that the organization and its authority fell far short of what was required to achieve its objectives. Although a public announcement was prepared for the PCG, it was never disseminated, largely because the PCG would have appeared “pretty weak” when compared with other proposals to improve Cold War coordination.⁸² Lastly, the PCG

RRSDPINS, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127; and Rockefeller Memorandum, 9 December 1955.

79. See, for example, reports in *The New York Times*, 20 December 1955, p. 1, 18; and *The New York Times*, 28 December 1955, p. 4.

80. James Desmond, *Nelson Rockefeller: A Political Biography* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 143; and Reich, *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller*, pp. 568–569, 575, 593, 619, 623, and 627.

81. Rockefeller Memorandum, 8 August 1955.

82. A public announcement of the PCG was postponed initially because of concern that the PCG would appear weak when compared to the Sarnoff proposal and because of what was considered an unfavorable international environment. For a PCG discussion of the Sarnoff proposal, see Memorandum from T. W. Parker and Stacy May for Nelson Rockefeller, 17 May 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 1, PCG—Establishment, Functions and History, (hereinafter Parker and May Memorandum, 17 May 1955). I have found no evidence that the PCG was ever publicly announced. A press announcement of its formation was prepared over more than two months after its formation; but it was not disseminated. See Draft Announcement of PCG, 28 May 55. Public calls for a high-level political warfare strategy board peaked during 1955. For a description of the Sarnoff and American Legion proposals, see “Meeting of the President and General Sarnoff,” 15 March 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 2, Cold War Organization: Sarnoff Plan and American Legion Plan; Memorandum from Don Irwin for Nelson Rockefeller, 12 April 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 2, Cold War Organization: Sarnoff Plan and American Legion Plan; and Parker and May Memorandum, 17 May 1955. Perhaps the most detailed proposal was made by David Sarnoff. In the April 1955 report Sarnoff had proposed “a Strategy Board for Political De-

did not have its own budget and was overly dependent on others for its staff. Two-thirds of its funds were supplied by the CIA, with the remaining third coming from the Department of Defense. Rockefeller's personal bankrolling of many PCG expenses did not overcome this lack of budgetary support.⁸³

The changing balance of military power and the international environment were other factors contributing to the PCG's short lifespan. One reason the PCG was never made—to use Colonel Kintner's words—“to look, act and radiate as if it were the top level governmental planning group in an active shooting war” was that a “shooting war” had become almost unthinkable, and even provocative nonmilitary warfare had lost favor. As documented by recent scholarship and newly declassified security memoranda, the Eisenhower administration had reevaluated the viability of the use of military force in 1954.⁸⁴ International events such as the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty in May 1955 and the summit meeting in Geneva two months later undermined support for aggressive Cold War policies. Negotiation, not confrontation, was the watchword of the moment. Reflecting this atmosphere, PCG efforts to push the Volunteer Freedom Corps were throttled. PCG Deputy Director General Parker's note of 21 May 1955 to Colonel Kintner reflected this sentiment in determining the fate of the VFC: “Just hold this, Bill, and keep an eye on developments. I don't believe we should take any PCG action now.”⁸⁵ The PCG exercised similar restraint in responding to Charles Kersten's provocative recommendations concerning the “Captive Nations,”

fense, the Cold War equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” See Sarnoff, *Program for a Political Offensive*, pp. 25, 40–41.

83. Max Bishop observed that “Nelson Rockefeller is evidently very exercised about his current budget situation and is requesting \$50,000 to keep him going until a basic decision is reached.” For PCG and budget issues, see WBM Note for Hoover, 8 August 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127; Memorandum from Walworth Barbour to Herbert Hoover Jr., 2 August 1955, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127; and Special Meeting of the Planning Coordination Group, 10 August 1955. Administrative support for the PCG was provided by the OCB, but the PCG desired to build up its own staff. See Memorandum from Max Bishop to the Under Secretary, 19 September 1955, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 127, NA. For Rockefeller's own financing of the PCG, see Reich, *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller*, p. 555.

84. Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin*, pp. 122–176; Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, pp. 158–201; and Robert J. McMahon, “The Illusion of Vulnerability: American Reassessments of the Soviet Threat, 1955–1956,” *International History Review*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (August 1996), pp. 591–619.

85. For PCG participation in the discussion of the Volunteer Freedom Corps, see Note from General Parker to Colonel Kintner, 21 May 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 11, NSC—Volunteer Freedom Corps; Memorandum from Stacy May for Nelson Rockefeller and T. W. Parker, 10 May 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 11, NSC—Volunteer Freedom Corps; and Memorandum from Stacy May to Nelson Rockefeller, 19 May 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 11, NSC—Volunteer Freedom Corps.

noting that the memorandum was “not consistent with the ‘Geneva atmosphere.’”⁸⁶

The PCG suffered as well from many of the problems afflicting the Eisenhower administration’s overall foreign policy. “Imagination bankruptcy,” as C. D. Jackson labeled it, was one such problem. Jackson recalled how the State Department’s Douglas MacArthur briefed Nelson Rockefeller’s assembled Quantico group on the department’s thoughts prior to the October 1955 foreign ministers’ meeting. Jackson said that MacArthur’s remarks revealed the “complete imagination bankruptcy and the standard DOS knee-quivering pre any meeting with the Russians.”⁸⁷ The Eisenhower administration’s problems were magnified by squabbles and jurisdictional disputes at upper levels of the bureaucracy. Highly placed department heads apparently were notorious for exercising “pocket vetoes” over ideas they opposed.⁸⁸ The sheer effort and time required for bureaucratic coordination undoubtedly hindered PCG initiatives. An exasperated John Foster Dulles put it best when he observed that “as things now are, there is almost too much necessity for consultation and coordination with so many people that the capacity for effective action is disappearing.”⁸⁹

Finally, the inability of the PCG to garner significant support from Eisenhower or senior cabinet members sealed its fate. C. D. Jackson wrote in his log: “Nelson had asked if I could help get President and Foster Dulles to pay attention Quantico findings, and overlook jealousy of departmental Indians—so wrote to President and Foster, receiving immediate favorable reply

86. Memorandum from T. W. Parker for Nelson Rockefeller, 4 August 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 28, Soviet Union—Policy Papers.

87. Letter to Harry Luce, 29 August 1955, DDEL, Jackson, C. D.: Papers, 1934–67, Box 56, Time Inc. File, Log 1955.

88. Letter to Harry Luce, 16 April 1956, DDEL, Jackson, C. D.: Papers, 1934–67, Box 56, Time Inc. File, Log 1956. The bureaucratic problems encountered by the PCG were not unique, nor did they disappear upon the PCG’s dissolution. On the ability of highly placed department heads to exercise pocket vetoes and pose other bureaucratic obstacles, see Letter to Harry Luce, 16 April 1956; and Memorandum of Conversation with W. D. Jackson, 6 April 1956, Mudd Library, Princeton University (hereinafter Jackson Conversation Memorandum, 6 April 1956), John Foster Dulles Files, General Correspondence & Memoranda Series, memorandum of Conversation Subs., B. 1 (J–K) (1). Nelson Rockefeller’s personality and leadership also may have been a contributing factor in the PCG’s problems. As an outsider to Washington and bureaucratic politics, Rockefeller was at an immediate disadvantage. But even a more effective insider heading the PCG probably would have met with the same results. As C. D. Jackson observed in 1956, “When Nelson Rockefeller used to beef to me about his problems down here, and named the personal roadblocks he ran into in State and other Departments, I usually discounted his reports quite heavily, because I knew that many of Nelson’s problems were self-induced. . . . However, that is not the situation in the case of Bill Jackson who knows the business, and Washington, much better than Nelson, and furthermore was prepared to find that most of what Nelson had told him about some of the local personalities was not true.” Letter to Harry Luce, 16 April 1956.

89. *Ibid.*; and Jackson Conversation Memorandum, 6 April 1956.

from both.”⁹⁰ Although Eisenhower intervened in this specific case, he never fully engaged his prestige or influence to overcome department jealousies and ensure the PCG’s success. In fact, in almost every conflict the president sided with his department heads not his special assistant.⁹¹ Eisenhower’s reluctance may be understood in part by what his expectations were for the PCG. In a letter to Rockefeller nearly five months after the PCG’s formation, Eisenhower summed up his hopes for the new body: “We want thinking and coordination and follow-up.” Eisenhower charged the PCG with establishing “splendid relationships with all concerned Departments so that new ideas can be examined from every viewpoint.” In addition, he directed that the PCG monitor “the probable or established effect of every governmental action upon our standing in the world,” as well as keep Eisenhower and other Departments informed of what each was doing.⁹² Such modest expectations probably correlate with the limited political capital and largely rhetorical support that Eisenhower expended in the PCG’s defense.

Key Judgments

What insights can be derived from the formation and failure of the PCG? The creation and demise of the group reflected the continuing problems encountered by the country’s new national security bureaucracy in waging political warfare. As in 1951 when the PSB was created, economic, political, military, and covert operations required coordination to maximize their effect and limit conflicting efforts. Indeed, as Colonel Kintner noted when the PCG was formed: “Washington has long recognized the need for a more imaginative and dynamic US program for winning the cold war.”⁹³ By 1955 interdepartmental cooperation was even more critical for American initiatives to exploit Soviet and East European vulnerabilities. Government and private efforts to use American ideology and culture to secure allies and vanquish Communism increased dramatically.⁹⁴ Yet the PCG’s psychological campaign to win high-level support failed. The PCG did not have the right personalities,

90. Log from Quantico to Geneva, June–July 1955.

91. Reich, *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller*, 612.

92. Letter to Nelson Rockefeller, 5 August 1955, DDEL, DDE Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 11, DDE Diary August 1955 (1).

93. Rockefeller to Parker, 17 May 1955.

94. Scott Lucas’ *Freedom’s War* and Walter L. Hixson’s *Parting the Curtain* emphasize the importance of culture and ideology in America’s struggle with the Soviet Union. This was particularly true as support for more aggressive measures to roll back the Iron Curtain diminished.

props, or aura, and its opponents proved quite adept at using bureaucratic tactics to stymie and eventually destroy it.

The PCG's creation and its agenda also highlighted the growing importance of pursuing means other than "hot war."⁹⁵ The PCG was a reflection of a larger strategic realization that nuclear weapons were making military force either unusable or, at the very minimum, problematic. The PCG's failure to create an "aura of waging war" was due in part to the recognition within the Eisenhower administration that even a nonshooting war could lead to conflict and potentially a catastrophic nuclear exchange. Moreover, a political environment marked by the "Spirit of Geneva," a renewed Soviet peace offensive, and a battle over neutral countries in the Third World made aggressive Cold War policies less acceptable.

At the same time, the PCG's creation, composition, and actions showed that an aggressive approach had not completely disappeared from the Eisenhower administration's agenda. The PCG provided a means to placate hard-liners and keep them as part of the Eisenhower team. The PCG also contributed to the image of an active—not passive—administration seeking to apply pressure and exploit Soviet and East-bloc vulnerabilities.⁹⁶

This case study likewise provides insight into the failings of the Eisenhower administration's policies toward Eastern Europe. The PCG reflected the contradictions in the administration's policies toward the Soviet bloc. The group was established to monitor and implement the new, more subtle strategy found in NSC 5505. But its membership and agenda often were geared more toward applying pressure. In that sense the PCG embodied the "conflicting approaches" strategy that the Eisenhower administration pursued toward Eastern Europe in 1955 and 1956.⁹⁷ The OCB's February 1956 prog-

95. Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin*, pp. 12–13, 158–160, 162. See also Ronald R. Krebs, "Liberation a la Finland: Reexamining Eisenhower Administration Objectives in Eastern Europe," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 1997), pp. 12–13.

96. The current secondary literature (Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin*, pp. 2, 122, 162–163; Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, pp. 158–177; and Krebs, "Liberation a la Finland," p. 19) generally overestimates the speed at which the Eisenhower administration completely abandoned "aggressive" Cold War policies and efforts to affect change in Eastern Europe. This process was much more gradual and not fully adopted by all organizations within the Eisenhower administration. The CIA and Joint Chiefs of Staff, in particular, continued to advocate "pressure" tactics and the importance of Eastern Europe throughout 1956 and even as late as 1958. For the proposed use of civil unrest and other provocative actions to influence Soviet behavior, see James D. Marchio, "Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives: U.S. Military Contingency Planning for Poland in the Wake of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising" (paper presented at the 2000 Society of Military History Conference); published in the *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 66, No. 3 (July 2002), pp. 783–812.

97. OCB Progress Report on "United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe," 29 February 1956, RG 273. See also James Marchio, "Resistance Potential and Rollback: U.S. Intelligence and the Eisenhower Administration's Policies Toward Eastern Europe, 1953–56," *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 1995), pp. 230–231; and James Marchio, "A New Look at

ress report on U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe openly acknowledged this strategic dilemma:

In the absence of a cold war climate, many of the courses of action would be difficult to pursue. For example, those intended to encourage anti-communist activities and passive resistance are somewhat incompatible with a *détente*. Likewise, efforts to bring about a basis for a negotiated settlement and to encourage evolutionary changes in satellite regimes, as proposed for existing policy (particularly under NSC 5505/1) are not always compatible with programs intended to keep alive the hopes and aspiration of the captive peoples. A reexamination of NSC 174 and NSC 5505/1 may offer some guidance as to the resolution in practice of such incompatible policies. It may be that the U.S. will have to undertake to follow simultaneously two policies with inconsistent courses of action, representing divergent approaches to the one objective.⁹⁸

The PCG struggled mightily to reconcile and transform these conflicting approaches into mutually supporting plans and programs. But it was impeded by the administration's policy of operating on both sides of the fence. At the same time that the PCG was conceiving and advocating psychological warfare and covert measures to foster Titoism, exploit vulnerabilities, and maintain the spirit of resistance behind the Iron Curtain, other departments and agencies within the administration were trying to assuage security fears and expand trade and diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe. The difficulties that the PCG encountered with the coordination and execution of NSC 5505 and other political warfare programs exacerbated these contradictions.

The PCG's failings also reflected a disconnect between the ends the Eisenhower administration sought in Eastern Europe and the means it was willing to use in their pursuit. Only two weeks after the establishment of the PCG the new body was briefed on the background and problems confronted by the NSC 174 working group. Although NSC 174 was described as "a 'lovely paper' contain[ing] objectives we would all like to see accomplished," the PCG was told that the working group had found "it almost impossible to implement [NSC 174] in a manner that would satisfy the OCB Board because of restrictions imposed by U.S. capabilities and other U.S. policy (primarily the 'kid glove' approach)." The PCG intended to overcome these restrictions. As Nancy Hanks relayed to Nelson Rockefeller, "This would appear to be a good example of the absolute necessity of considering 'capabilities', which you insist on in connection with NSC 5505/1." Rockefeller and the PCG staff made every effort to increase American political warfare capa-

the Eisenhower Administration and Eastern Europe" (unpublished paper presented at Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations Conference, Charlottesville, VA, June 1993).

98. *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Vol XXV, p. 126.

bilities and enhance—through better coordination and innovative approaches—the effectiveness of the country’s instruments of military, diplomatic, and informational power. Yet Rockefeller’s frustration and, ultimately, his decision to resign strongly suggest that the administration’s restrictions on U.S. policies toward the Soviet bloc remained in place, and perhaps increased, during the PCG’s short tenure.⁹⁹

Finally, the PCG’s ill-starred history casts doubt on Eisenhower’s support for psychological warfare.¹⁰⁰ Eisenhower’s relationship with the PCG demonstrates that at best he was inconsistent in his position. Psychological-warfare initiatives like “Atoms for Peace” and “Open Skies” highlight his interest and backing, but the president did not consistently support C. D. Jackson and Nelson Rockefeller in their efforts to make the “psychological” factor a central part of the administration’s programs abroad. As options for aggressive Cold War policies faded, so did Eisenhower’s enthusiasm for political warfare. Eisenhower never empowered the PCG or the OCB to wage the vigorous psychological warfare he rhetorically embraced. This may reflect his recognition that American options for psychological warfare were limited. It also may reflect his unwillingness to exercise a heavier hand in removing bureaucratic obstacles, just as he had been reluctant to engage in divisive partisan politics. Yet the need for an organization like the PCG did not disappear. In his final correspondence as PCG chairman, Nelson Rockefeller reemphasized this continuing requirement: “The PCG, which was established last March for the purpose of introducing more imaginative planning in the implementation of national security policies has not been successful in achieving these objectives—yet the need is even greater today than last spring.”¹⁰¹ This need, Rockefeller believed, could be met by the OCB in “cold and hot war,” but only if it were given the appropriate responsibility and authority.¹⁰²

99. Nancy Hanks to NAR, 24 March 1955, RAC, RFA Collection, RG 4, WDC Series, Box 11, Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities, Policy Papers.

100. Works such as Kenneth A. Osgood’s “Form before Substance: Eisenhower’s Commitment to Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy,” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Summer 2000), pp. 405–433 tend to overestimate the degree to which Eisenhower supported psychological warfare measures. Eisenhower’s support was usually only rhetorical and disappeared almost entirely after the 1956 Hungarian uprising.

101. Rockefeller to President, 31 October 1955. The continued need for coordination and the continued interest in psychological warfare were likewise evidenced in a proposal to create a National Psychological Warfare Academy in 1956. This academy apparently was to be attended by personnel from the State and Defense Departments, the CIA, USIA, and other federal agencies and would study and plan psychological warfare operations. Memorandum for Under Secretary Hoover from U/OP-Landreth M. Harrison, Subject: “OCB Psychological Warfare Matters,” 20 January 1956, NA, File “PCG,” RG 59, RRS DPINSC, Entry 1586, Lot 66D148, Box 128.

102. WHO, OSANSA, Memorandum for National Security Council, 27 December 1955. This report contains recommendations on what should follow the PCG, highlighting the problems and limitations of the OCB. The report noted: “In the establishment of the OCB, the concepts stated above

The Eisenhower administration's failure to replace the PCG with an effective strategic planning group for political warfare proved unsound. Despite filling Rockefeller's special assistant post with the very capable William H. Jackson, the administration's overall policies toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suffered significantly the following year. NSC 174, NSC 5608 (the successor to NSC 174), and NSC 5505 were all premised on the administration's ability to monitor and maintain "the fine line" behind the Iron Curtain "between exhortations to keep up morale and to maintain passive resistance, and invitations to suicide."¹⁰³ Unrest in Poland and Hungary in 1956 required careful and continuing attention to orchestrate American actions; but without the PCG or a similar organization the Eisenhower administration's response was disjointed and unimaginative. Although a more coherent and, integrated strategy of political warfare on the part of the United States would probably not have deterred Moscow from launching its all-out "second invasion" of Hungary on 4 November 1956, it is clear that the Eisenhower administration's actions and rhetoric were not fully coordinated or even in accord with its stated policies. Inflammatory RFE broadcasts during the Hungarian revolution were the most notable departure, but other elements of the administration's response were out of step as well. Eisenhower's staff secretary, Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, later recalled that the president had "never ridded himself of some feeling that our government, elements in our government—and specifically the CIA—had gone beyond their authority and in fact had carried out a line of propaganda of their own which was not in accord with his policy."¹⁰⁴

With the demise of the PCG a year before the upheavals of 1956, the Eisenhower administration was no better situated to respond to the unrest in Hungary and Poland than it had been in June 1953 during the East German uprising. The administration was not even able to exploit the psychological

were considerably modified and the Board was not made responsible for discharging these functions but rather was made responsible to 'advise with the agencies concerned respecting these functions.' Consequently, in the two years of its existence, the OCB has not fulfilled the functions envisaged by the President's Committee. This is primarily because it has lacked the authority originally recommended, and, as a result, has become instead an interdepartmental advisory committee with no direct responsibility or authority. It is also because the OCB does not have a general and continuing responsibility but is limited to only those NSC actions specifically referred to it. Increasingly, interdepartmental activities in this field are being set up outside the OCB. . . . Thus, while it is possible to define psychological warfare, it is not possible to assign responsibility to a specific agency for carrying it out. In addition, it should be given the responsibility for: (a) assuring the development and coordination of plans and preparations for non-military warfare and for coordinating military and non-military war plans."

103. NSC 174—"United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe," 11 December 1953; NSC 5608/1—"US Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe," 18 July 1956, NA, RG 273.

104. Andrew J. Goodpaster, interview by Thomas Soapes, 11 October 1977 and 16 January 1978, DDEL, OH-378, transcript.

victories offered by the Soviet army's brutality in crushing the revolution. As C. D. Jackson lamented in a telegram to the White House at the height of the Hungarian crisis, "More I think about it more I am convinced Hungarian situation requires big dramatic action repeat action by President, and regret to say there is absolutely no popular sex appeal in writing letters to Bulganin."¹⁰⁵

The violent suppression of the popular rebellion in Hungary in November 1956 convinced the president and his top advisers of the dangers of political warfare pursued without tight control and oversight. This assessment and Eisenhower's unwillingness to create an independent body for psychological-warfare played a significant role in reshaping U.S. policies toward Eastern Europe and ensuring that neither the PCG nor a similar organization was resurrected. The passing of the PCG and the bloodshed in the streets of Budapest helped force the Eisenhower administration to abandon its strategy of "conflicting approaches." By 1958 the administration had embraced an evolutionary strategy that would guide U.S. policies toward Eastern Europe for the next thirty years.

105. Message to William H. Jackson, 5 November 1956, DDEL, Jackson, C. D.: Papers, 1934–67, Box 52, Time Inc. File, Jackson, Wm. H.