"To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All"

The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947

Timothy Snyder

The end of the Cold War has opened new opportunities to study the early postwar period. During the Cold War, historians focused mainly on states: the superpowers in the first instance, their allies and satellites on the margins. Until very recently, the voluminous literature on the immediate postwar years devoted relatively little attention to ethnic and national groups within states.1 That pattern has changed in the post–Cold War era, when scholars have begun looking far more closely at national questions. In this regard, the first few years after World War II are important not only as the time when Europe and Asia were divided into opposing blocs but also as the moment when several European national groups were deported en masse.2 This article thus concerns not the choices of states, but the fate of nations.

The shift of attention to nations, rather than states, raises problems of method. If the aerie of geopolitics is too distant from events, the rough ground...


of each nation’s historiography is too close. Territory and nationality are among the most powerful sources of bias. The establishment of political and ethnic boundaries is such a defining event that people in all countries are apt to forget just how it was achieved. This is particularly true in countries plagued by violent ethnic conflict. Ethnic cleansing always involves mutual claims, enabling each side to present itself as the innocent defender of legitimate interests while portraying its opponents as savage nationalists. An important example is the ethnic cleansing of Galicia and Volhynia in the 1940s. It is indisputable that (on top of the direct losses from the Holocaust and the Second World War) approximately 50,000 to 100,000 Poles and Ukrainians were murdered and approximately 1.5 million Ukrainians and Poles were forced to leave their homes between 1943 and 1947. It is also incontestable that the territories now constituting western Ukraine were cleansed of their large Polish minority, and the territories now constituting southeastern Poland were cleansed of their large Ukrainian minority. Behind these general statements, however, stand two apparently contradictory accounts of what happened and why.

Today, both Ukrainians and Poles believe that their claim to Eastern Galicia and Volhynia in 1939 and 1945 was legitimate. Both assert that the other side collaborated with organs of the Nazi and Soviet occupiers in Galicia and Volhynia during and after the Second World War. Both believe that the other side’s partisans killed their civilians and that hundreds of thousands of their own were expelled or dispersed through ethnic cleansing after the war. Although in practice these beliefs are often held to be mutually contradictory—because one accusation is usually met with another—logically speaking, they are not. Indeed, all of these beliefs, in various measures and with various qualifications, have their basis in fact.

The first three sets of propositions are factual, and one of the tasks of this essay will be to propose an empirical study of the ethnic cleansings perpetrated by Ukrainians upon Poles and by Poles upon Ukrainians in the 1940s. The essay will focus mainly on the homogenizing policy of the Polish Communist regime from 1944 to 1947, but it will begin from the premise that some understanding of the cleansing of Poles by Ukrainians from 1943 to 1944 and of the Second World War in Galicia and Volhynia is necessary for an explanation and assessment of that Polish policy. The final set of propositions concerning legitimacy is of an ethical nature, and its adjudication requires the application of prior ethical beliefs to the facts. Although this essay will not be chiefly concerned with ethical debates, its presentation of the facts will bear upon the ethical conclusions of those who wish to adhere, as faithfully as possible, to the facts.

As a matter of historical method, it is also useful to point out that the different interpretations of events offered by Ukrainians and Poles stem from
opposing claims to the territories of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. By Eastern Galicia and Volhynia, I mean the interwar Polish województa of Lwów, Stanisławów, Tarnopol, and Wołyń, which (with the exception of the far west of Lwów województa) were incorporated into Soviet Ukraine in 1945, and which now constitute the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil’, Volhynia, and Rivne provinces (oblasti) of independent Ukraine. For Poles today, Eastern Galicia and Volhynia in 1939 and 1945 were the legitimate territories of the Polish state. They were included in Poland by international treaty after the First World War, and they were governed legally by the Polish state for more than twenty years. This political-legal conception of legitimacy is consistent with both ethnic and civic forms of nationalism: Some Poles viewed the Ukrainian minority as demographic material to be ethnically assimilated, whereas others saw them as citizens of another nationality to be included within the polity. For Ukrainians today, Eastern Galicia and Volhynia in 1939 and 1945 were a legitimate part of Ukraine. This view is based on the simple ethnographic fact that Ukrainians outnumbered Poles in these lands by two to one (approximately five million to just over two million) during the interwar period.3 (See Map One and Map Two.) This majoritarian-ethnographic idea of legitimacy also embraces both ethnic and civic forms of nationalism: Some Ukrainians view Volhynia and Eastern Galicia as Ukrainian because they are inhabited by the “Ukrainian nation,” whereas others contend that a majority of the individuals living there would have preferred, if asked, to live in a Ukrainian state.4

This disagreement about territorial legitimacy was acute in the 1940s, when it affected the actions of both sides. It continues to the present day, and it shapes interpretations of past actions. For political activists at the time as well as for historians today, the idea of legitimate rule has powerfully influ-

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3. The proportions on the basis of 1939 Polish statistics by województa: Wołyń 68.4 percent Ukrainian and 16.2 percent Polish, Stanisławów 68.9 percent Ukrainian and 22.4 percent Polish, Lwów 34.3 percent Ukrainian and 57.7 percent Polish, Tarnopol 45.5 percent Ukrainian and 49.3 percent Polish. These figures overstate the Polish presence, but they do convey the important difference between Volhynia, which was predominantly Ukrainian, and Eastern Galicia, which was more of a classical ethnographic borderland. The other large minority was the Jews, who dominated small towns. The Jewish population was all but eliminated by the Holocaust.

4. The point is not that particular ideas of legitimacy inhere in nations. There is nothing inherently Ukrainian about a majoritarian-ethnographic notion of legitimacy, nor anything particularly Polish about a political-legal conception of legitimacy. Rather, ideas of legitimacy are largely situational. Between the world wars, west Ukrainian patriots who lacked a state were confronted with Polish political and cultural power and predictably embraced the ethnographic idea. Between the world wars, the Polish state included western Ukraine, and so—not surprisingly—Poles were inclined to a political idea of legitimacy. In other situations, other ideas of legitimate rule of territory will prevail. Today’s independent Ukraine relies on a political notion of legitimacy in its treatment of the Crimean peninsula, where Russians are a majority. In 1830, 1863, and 1905, Poles sought to change borders that had been recognized by treaty and the great powers of the day.
enced conclusions about the reasonability of minority aspirations and the justice of state policies. The Molotov–von Ribbentrop pact and the partition of Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia in 1939–1941, the German occupation of Ukraine in 1941–1943, and the second Soviet occupation in 1944 activated Polish-Ukrainian conflicts rooted in these differing notions of legitimacy and thereby created thornier problems of interpretation for later scholars. The Second World War in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia will be treated in the next section. It is initially important to note ten factors relating to the war and its later interpretation.
First, invasion and occupation by foreign troops seemed to open historical possibilities (for Ukrainians) or to threaten the end of historical eras (for Poles). The Molotov–von Ribbentrop pact was the height of treason for Poles, whereas for Ukrainians it was—and still remains—the moment when western Ukraine joined the Ukrainian state. Likewise, the German invasion...
of 1941 seemed to offer the Ukrainian nationalists who joined the OUN (Orhanizatsiya Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) a chance to establish an independent Ukraine. For Poles, this (failed) attempt to exploit the cover of German power in order to establish Ukrainian institutions was tainted by fascism.

Second, these opposing ideas of legitimate rule made it all the easier for both occupiers to pursue a policy of divide and rule in areas of mixed Ukrainian and Polish settlement.

Third, the occupations offered horrible temptations. The first Soviet occupation in 1939–1941 decapitated Polish society through the mass deportation of Polish elites to Siberia and Kazakhstan. This left Polish society a more tempting target for Ukrainian nationalists in 1943. The German occupation of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia in 1941–1944 offered Ukrainians a chance to persecute Poles as officers of the state and then later gave the Poles a chance to do the reverse in 1943–1944.

Fourth, the occupations set precedents for (and offered training in) attacks on civilians for reasons of national identity, culminating in the genocide perpetrated by the German occupiers. The Holocaust of the Jews set a precedent for the elimination of an entire nation.

Fifth, collaboration was rendered all but inevitable by the factors already mentioned (the opening of territorial issues, the policy of divide and rule, and the temptation for persecution), by the overwhelming power of the occupiers, and by local conditions, which required the protection of local communities against partisan activity. But each side regarded collaboration by the other side to be intolerable and inexplicable, whereas it saw its own collaboration as unavoidable and forgivable. Evaluations, then and now, of what constitutes necessary compromise and what constitutes unforgivable collaboration—and of the difference between aggression and self-defense—depend on differing conceptions of legitimacy.

Sixth, during World War II, new actors emerged, spreading Polish and Ukrainian ideas of legitimate rule in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. The legitimate bearers of authority on both sides were no longer political institutions such as parties or governments, but were instead partisan armies. In interwar Poland, the Ukrainian nationalist OUN was a far smaller party than the moderate UNDO. When Poland was partitioned in 1939, the UNDO’s policy of compromise lost its main interlocutor and the party was quickly pushed aside by the OUN. In 1943, the OUN guerrillas under Stepan Bandera formed the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrains’ka Povstans’ka Armiya, or UPA). In Eastern Galicia and Volhynia during the war, the Polish government (in exile in London) was represented de facto by its Home Army (Armia Krajowa, or AK).
Seventh, the fog of war denied Poles and Ukrainians time to understand each other's positions, and provided plenty of pretexts and opportunities to Poles and Ukrainians who were willing to escalate the conflict. In particular, war made it much easier to conflate the actions of particular groups with the intentions of entire nations.

Eighth, and related to the previous two points, wartime conditions meant that the behavior of individuals was evaluated in terms of loyalty or treason, reinforcing the exclusivist ethnic conception of national identity. The OUN was committed to ethnic homogeneity, and its program gained supporters and coherence during the war. It would be an exaggeration to say that the OUN policy of eliminating the Polish presence in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia (1943–1944) enjoyed general support, but without wide backing from local Ukrainians the policy could never have been carried out.

Ninth, the enormous suffering of war and occupation seemed to provide further justification (in the view of western Ukrainians) or even less justification (in the view of eastern Poles) for the westward shift of the Polish state border in the wake of the Red Army's advance through Ukraine and Poland in 1944–1945.

Tenth, for west Ukrainians and especially for Poles, the experience of total war clearly delineated who the enemy was and who was not, and this clarity was exploited by the Communist regimes as they implemented policies of ethnic cleansing. Thus, the new Polish Communist regime's war against its Ukrainians could be fought by soldiers from Volhynia in 1945–1946, and its policy of eliminating the Ukrainian presence in Poland in 1947 could enjoy popular support.

These ten factors are not sufficient conditions for the events that occurred later. The presentation of opposing ideas of legitimate rule and the ten ways they were exacerbated by war is meant to serve both an explanatory and a

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methodological purpose. In the narrative description of events that follows, these factors should cast some light on what might otherwise seem to be the obscure motivations of ethnic cleansers. At the same time, they should offer clues as to how (not) to interpret Ukrainian and Polish sources and memories. National historiographies and personal recollections offer starting points, opportunities for comparison and revision, and foundations for a description of ethnic cleansing as a crucial episode in postwar European history. At the same time, an adequate historical account of ethnic cleansing would, in turn, serve as a basis for comparison with national memories of the events in question. This essay relies on a wide array of materials and aims to provide such an account. The cleansing of Ukrainians from southeastern Poland from 1944 to 1947 is the primary focus, but, to provide an appropriate context, the article begins with the cleansing of Poles from western Ukraine in 1943.

**Ukrainian Partisans Murder Polish Civilians (1943–1944)**

The Molotov–von Ribbentrop pact, as amended in September 1939, brought 85 percent of Ukrainians from prewar Poland under Soviet rule (see Map Two). Although Soviet power was not generally desired in and of itself, the division of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union meant for west Ukrainians the unification of Ukrainian lands within one political unit and the end of the Polish state. For patriotic Ukrainians, this signified the end of centuries of Polish domination. Although the Soviet occupation of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia in 1939–1941 was brutal, it seemed at first to offer opportunities for Ukrainian nationalism. The Soviet Union deported roughly 200,000 Poles to Siberia and encouraged revenge against Polish landholders and state officials. Between 1939 and 1941, tens of thousands of Poles fled from Soviet west Ukraine for the Nazi “General Government.” From the point of view of west Ukrainian nationalists, with their program of “Ukraine for the Ukrainians,” this was a positive step.

Then Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, seemed to present Ukrainian nationalists with a far better opportunity. The OUN had been founded in 1929 with the goal of forming an independent Ukraine that would include Polish, Soviet, Romanian, and

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Czechoslovak territories. For such an endeavor, Germany was the only plausible ally. As the Germans quickly occupied Ukraine in the summer of 1941, the OUN–Bandera forces sought to use the umbrella of German power to create institutions of autonomous statehood. Although the Germans would use Ukrainians as soldiers, policemen, bureaucrats, and finally Schutzstaffel (SS) troops, the Ukrainians’ aspiration to independent action was rapidly suppressed. Ukrainian nationalists were also disappointed by the German effort to split Ukrainian lands between the General Government and the Reichskommissariat of Ukraine, and by the German decision to exploit Ukraine for its resources and Ukrainians as forced labor. Treating the Germans as occupiers rather than allies was a difficult and traumatic process for the OUN, but, from about mid-1942, the OUN-Bandera took an anti-German orientation (although the Germans were never the OUN’s chief enemy).  

In early 1943, just as the tide of war was turning against the Germans at Stalingrad, the strongest group of Ukrainian nationalists, the OUN–Bandera, brought together partisan groups—henceforth called the UPA—to defend the country from every occupier: Polish, Soviet, and German.

Why did the UPA choose to direct its attacks against Poles in 1943? Why, in other words, did the national goal of winning independence from powerful occupiers appear to Ukrainian nationalists as an ethnic problem concerning Poles? Even as German and Soviet armies battled each other in Russia, west Ukrainians knew that Poles and Ukrainians were the historical claimants to Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. Most UPA soldiers and nearly all of the organization’s leaders were west Ukrainians. Some were veterans of organized terrorist attacks against Polish colonizers and landholders in the east, and a few had participated in assassination attempts against Polish officials. 

Although the UPA (and west Ukrainians generally) now regarded the interwar Polish state to be defunct, Poles in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia were determined to restore their state. They did not believe that German or Soviet aggression justified a change in Poland’s eastern frontier.
ers apparently assumed that the Second World War would end with the exhaustion of both Germany and Russia and that Ukraine’s final enemy would be a resurrected Poland unwilling to abandon its eastern lands. Accordingly, Ukrainians believed they had to strike during the war, before a revived Poland could transfer forces and settlers from central Poland. The temptation for preemptive action was heightened by expectations of a Polish offensive.

As Ukrainians knew or suspected, the Polish government in exile and the Polish underground considered this chain of events most likely and had planned to carry out just such an offensive. From the Polish point of view, the defeat of both Germany and Russia would open the field in the east. As early as 1941, the Poles understood that a future rebellion against German power would involve a war against Ukrainians for Eastern Galicia and probably Volhynia as well, and they wanted to achieve a quick “armed occupation.” The plans of the Armia Krajowa for a rebellion, as formulated in 1942, anticipated a war with Ukrainians for the ethnographically Ukrainian territories that fell within Poland’s prewar boundaries. By 1942, the formation of sizable Polish partisan units in the east could not but remind Ukrainians of Polish territorial claims.


15. Meldunek 89, Radiogram No. M.89, L.dz. 78/42, “Meldunek specjalny—Sprawa Ukraińska,” Rowecki to Sikorski, 15 November 1941, Oddział VI, sygn. 3.1.1.1.1, Studium Polskiej Podziemnej, London. The version in volume two of Armia Krajowa w Dokumentach is missing some important lines on p. 142. Rowecki to Central, 22 June 1942, “Meldunek Nr. 132 Postawa wobec Rosji i Nasze Możliwości na Ziemiach Wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej,” Armia Krajowa w Dokumentach, Vol. II, pp. 277–278, and, most importantly, Rowecki to Sikorski, “Plan Powstania,” 8 September 1942, ibid., pp. 329–330, 337–338. Documents such as these are cited as examples of the true attitudes of the AK leadership in their communications with one another. The UPA was not privy to these discussions. But lower-level conversations between Polish and Ukrainian partisans were frequent, and neither side hid its general convictions about these matters.
Ukrainian cooperation with Nazi Germany had discredited Ukrainian partisans as potential allies for the Poles. The AK, as defenders of the pre-war frontiers of Poland, had nothing to offer to Ukrainians. The government in exile and the AK were prosecuting the war to restore the Polish Republic, an aim taken for granted by Polish soldiers and supported by promises from the other Western allies. Cooler heads in London discussed ways to cooperate with Ukrainians, but even when the Polish government in exile made its most generous overtures in the spring of 1943, it offered no more than autonomy within prewar borders. The advent of the UPA and its attacks on Polish civilians in 1943–1944 killed any spirit of compromise on the Polish side, although it should be noted that the main reaction in London was of confusion and frustration, and the first reaction of the AK was to attempt to cooperate with Ukrainian nationalists to prevent anarchy. The crucial matter, however, was the basic disagreement between Ukrainians and Poles over the legitimate control of particular territories, sharpened by the Poles’ uncompromising belief in their continuing right to lands populated by Ukrainians and their fear of making concessions in time of war.

Why did the UPA target Polish civilians? Why did the Ukrainian insurgents’ strategic problem, conceived in ethnic terms, lead to mass murder? Unlike the German and Russian occupiers, the Polish enemy was represented by very large numbers of civilians, who dominated Lviv and other cities (the Jews were most highly represented in small towns), constituted more than a third of the population of Eastern Galicia, and, although less numerous in Volhynia and in villages, were present everywhere. Under Polish rule, in the lands of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, Poles totaled more than...
two million in 1939, down to perhaps 1.6 million in 1943. In the minds of many patriotic West Ukrainians, this Polish presence was an illegitimate occupation, symbolized most powerfully by “colonies” (the official term) of Polish settlers established in the 1920s and 1930s. The OUN (and thus the UPA) accepted a totalistic form of integral nationalism, which linked Ukrainian freedom with ethnic homogeneity. The Polish enemy could therefore be defeated only by the removal of Poles from Ukrainians lands. Soviet and German troops had begun the task: the Soviet Army by deporting Poles between 1939 and 1941, the Germans by providing examples of (and training in) genocide after mid-1941. Many of the UPA’s fighters were former German policemen, soldiers, or Waffen-SS troops; and more generally the example of German nationality policy must have demoralized the Ukrainian population (as it did civilian populations elsewhere, including in Poland.)

One hallmark of the beginning of large-scale UPA operations was the decision in March 1943 by five thousand Ukrainian policemen to abandon the German-backed regions and form guerrilla units in the Volhynian forests. The Ukrainian partisans threatened to liquidate Polish villages if the Poles took over the posts that the Ukrainians had just relinquished. Making good on this threat, they eliminated entire villages in April 1943 on grounds of Polish collaboration. (This induced the Poles to form self-defense units, and thus to ask the Germans for arms, which confirmed Ukrainian suspicions of Polish collaboration, and so prompted further attacks.) Ukrainian nationalist collaboration continued in some forms as well, however. Even as Ukrainian nationalists in Volhynia were threatening Poles with death for collaboration, Ukrainian nationalists in Eastern Galicia in May 1943 were joining the new Waffen-SS Division “Galizien,” despite official OUN–Bandera opposition. The hypocrisy of all this does not exclude its sincerity. Ukrainian nationalists saw their own co-

22. Peter Eberhardt, who has devoted the most attention to such demographic estimates, proposes the figure of 2,065,000 for 1939. See Przemiany narodowościowe na Ukrainie XX Wieku (Warsaw: Obóz, 1994), p. 150.
26. “In the village of Kuty, in the Szumski region, an entire Polish colony (86 farms) was burned down, and the population was liquidated for having cooperated with the Gestapo and the German authorities . . . In the Werbski region the Polish colony Nowa Nowica (40 farms) was burned down for having cooperated with the German authorities. The population was liquidated.” “Zvit pro boiowi dii UPA na Volyni,” [April 1943], reproduced in Volodymyr Serhiichyk, OUN-UPA v roky vtiny: Novi dokumenty i materialy (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1996), p. 311.
operation with the Nazis as a justified means to the legitimate end of creating a Ukrainian state, but they regarded Polish cooperation with the occupiers as outright perfidy. This double standard derived from a basic sense of entitlement to Eastern Galicia and Volhynia and from a complete refusal to accept the Poles’ rights to these lands. It was rooted in the same basic disagreement about legitimate rule over territory, sharpened perhaps by the demoralizing effects of occupation, probably by the German policy of divide and rule, and certainly by the OUN’s integral exclusivist nationalism.

By February 1943, the OUN began what appears to have been a deliberate policy of murdering Polish civilians to help resolve the Polish question in Ukraine. The attacks started in Volhynia, where the Polish presence was weakest. It is as yet unproven, but certainly plausible, that the murderous violence unleashed against Poles was meant to be general. It is clear that, from its beginnings in March 1943, the policy of liquidating Poles was popular within the UPA and that it found support among (often land-starved) Ukrainian peasants in Volhynia. Ukrainians in ethnically mixed villages and towns were offered material inducements to join in the slaughter of their neighbors (although Polish recollections indicate that a large number of Ukrainians risked and sometimes lost their own lives by warning or sheltering Poles instead). UPA partisans and Ukrainian peasants nevertheless

28. Consider the judgment of the congress of the OUN, issued as the Polish presence was being eradicated from Volhynia: “The Polish imperialist leadership is the lackey (vysužnyk) of foreign imperialisms and the enemy of the freedom of nations. It is trying to yoke Polish minorities on Ukrainian lands and the Polish national masses to a struggle with Ukrainian nationalism, and is helping German and Soviet imperialism to eradicate the Ukrainian nation.” Political Resolution 13, Third Extraordinary Congress of the OUN, 21–25 August 1943, reproduced in OUN v svitli postavne Velyký Zhbit; Konferentstii ta studijsk dokumentte z borot’by 1929-1955 r. (Toronto: OUN, 1955), pp. 117–118.


31. Examples of such courageous generosity drawn from Volhynia in 1943 and Galicia in 1944: Wspomnienia II/17 (older Ukrainians hid Poles while younger ones destroyed their houses), II/63t (a Ukrainian priest tries to protect Poles and is killed himself; UPA soldiers give arms to Poles for self-defense), II/1914 (local Ukrainian man shelters a mother and children from a UPA attack), II/1250/kw (Ukrainian neighbors warn a Polish family to flee), II/2110 (Ukrainian family shelters Polish family afraid to sleep at home; later, the survivor told by a Ukrainian to flee after family is caught at home and killed), II/1061 (Ukrainian neighbors warn of UPA attacks), II/1286/kw (parents saved by wife of UPA officer, although father later caught and killed). These individual recollections serve as reminders of the limits of inevitable generalizations about the behavior of national groups. It is, of course, also worth repeating that the UPA was always a regional organization whose membership was at its peak 0.1 percent of the Ukrainian population. One Polish woman (II/1265/2v), a courier for a partisan group, was aided at various points by Ukrainian relatives of a friend (indirect warnings of coming attacks), a German (who felt betrayed by Ukrainians), and a Czech. The theme of courageous Czechs, interestingly enough, appears repeatedly, for example in II/1914. All records in the Archiwum Wschodnie, Ośrodek Karta, Warsaw.
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killed at least 40,000 Polish civilians in Volhynia in the spring and summer of 1943. On a single day, 11 July 1943, the UPA attacked at least 80 localities and killed approximately ten thousand Poles. Ukrainian partisans burned homes, shot or forced back inside those who tried to flee, and used sickles and pitchforks to kill those they captured outside. In some cases, beheaded, crucified, dismembered, or disemboweled bodies were displayed to encourage the remaining Poles to flee.

Thousands of Polish men and women escaped to the Volhynian marshes and forests in 1943, joining Soviet partisan armies fighting the UPA and the Wehrmacht. At the same time, some Poles took revenge on Ukrainians who had been serving as German policemen. The majority of Poles who survived simply fled west, bringing news of the slaughter to Chełm, Lviv, and Przemyśl. For the Polish government in exile in London, the tragedy was both incomprehensible and a distraction from its own war planning. (Although local Polish units would take matters into their own hands, there is no evidence that the Polish government contemplated a policy of general revenge against Ukrainian civilians.) Polish partisans of all political stripes attacked the UPA, assassinated prominent Ukrainian civilians, and burned Ukrainian villages. UPA attacks on civilians in the winter of 1943–1944 were frustrated by the Polish self-defense units. By this time, the AK had initiated a national uprising known as Operation Burza, which was understood locally as an attempt to consolidate the Polish presence in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. In January 1944, the AK formed the 27th Infantry Division of Volhynia, consisting of 6,558 troops who were supposed to engage the UPA and then the Wehrmacht. That spring, the division fought its way through

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32. A responsible Polish estimate is 50,700 total civilian deaths in Volhynia and Galicia, of which 34,647 have been documented. See “Komunykat polsko-ukraiński,” from the conference “Polscy i Ukraińcy 1918–1948: Tradycje i pytania,” held at Podkowa Leśna, 7–9 June 1994. Researchers who wish to learn the names and fates of several thousand Polish civilians in Volhynia and Galicia could begin with the Wspomnienia section of the Archiwum Wschodnie.


34. This episode is forgotten in Poland and was denied by Khrushchev to Stalin. It is proven by personal recollections of Poles in the Archiwum Wschodnie, documented in AK reports in Studium Polskiej Podziemnej in London, and will be discussed on the basis of Soviet sources by Jeffrey Burds in his forthcoming book.

German lines and UPA attacks to join the Red Army, only to be dissolved by the Soviet commanders.36

Throughout the spring of 1944, the AK and UPA battled intermittently for control of Eastern Galicia and its crown jewel, Lviv. The UPA attacked Polish civilians, but Polish preparations and Ukrainian warnings limited the deaths to perhaps ten thousand.37 In July 1944, the Red Army (aided by the AK) drove the Germans from Lviv. AK units were then dissolved under pressure from the Soviet Secret Police (NKVD) and the Red Army. Ukrainian partisans had already escaped to the mountains, where they would begin a desperate struggle against Soviet rule.38 From mid-1944, the main enemy of the OUN and the UPA was not the Poles but the Soviet Union. The Soviet occupation of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in July 1944 put the ethnic cleansing and the Ukrainian-Polish war into depressing perspective. The AK was wrong to think that Operation Burza could save Lviv for Poland; the UPA was equally wrong to think that Polish civilians stood in the way of Lviv’s incorporation into Ukraine.39

Soviet and Polish Communist Regimes Deport Poles and Ukrainians (1944–1946)

The Soviet-sponsored Polish Committee of National Liberation was installed in Lublin shortly after Soviet troops entered eastern Poland in July 1944. As Ukrainian and Polish partisans fought desperately and separately to preserve their influence over territory, Stalin and his chosen Poles moved quickly to alter political and demographic frontiers. Their idea of exchanging Polish and Ukrainian populations was not new. Stalin had of course been deporting entire nations and ethnic groups within the Soviet Union in the 1930s and during the war.40 But there was a Polish tradition as well. Even before the war, Polish nationalists in the tradition of Roman Dmowski’s National Demo-
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crats (Endecja) had dreamed of expelling every Ukrainian from Poland.41 After July 1943, some political thinkers of other orientations also concluded that expulsions were the only alternative to granting the Ukrainians all the territory east of the San and Bug rivers. This would have meant expelling approximately five million Ukrainians east of Poland’s prewar borders beyond the Zbruch river and taking ethnic Poles in return from the Soviet Union or an independent Ukraine.42 In some versions of this idea, Ukrainians who managed to escape deportation could be dispersed throughout the country.43 As early as 1943 and 1944, Polish Communists eerily dropped language about the rights of minorities from their programmatic documents.44

The removal of Ukrainians was one of several examples of Polish Communism’s appropriation of Polish ethnic nationalism and wartime suffering, as well as its betrayal of the more tolerant traditions of the Polish left voiced even during the worst hours of the war. In any case, by the summer of 1944, Stalin’s preferences mattered more than Polish traditions of any kind. The population exchanges were preceded by, and based on, a Soviet-Polish border accord that no Polish nationalist (and few Polish Communists) found acceptable. A secret agreement of 27 July 1944 shifted the Soviet border to the west once again, as in 1939, thereby removing 85 percent of Ukrainians from Poland, leaving only about 700,000. Most of Poland’s prewar Ukrainian minority thus left Poland without physically moving at all.45


45. “Porozumienie między Polskim Komitetem Wyzwolenia Narodowego a Rządem ZSSR o polskiej-radzieckiej granicy państwowej,” Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), PKWN, XIV/17, k. 15–21, as reproduced in Eugeniusz Misioło, ed., Repatriacja czy deportacja? (Warsaw: Archiwum Ukraińskie, 1996), pp. 17–18. Ukrainian communists were denied the Chełm (Kholm) region, which they had pressed for as the front advanced. A week before the secret agreement, Khrushchev wrote to Stalin asking that these territories be added to the Ukrainian SSR. This would have brought Khrushchev’s wife’s birthplace into the Soviet Union. See “Chełmska SSR,” Gazeta Wyborcza (Warsaw), 18 February 1998; “Sentymenty Chruszczowowej,” Gazeta Wyborcza (Warsaw), 23 February 1998, p. 2. Given the unbelievable brutality of Khrushchev’s pacification of western Ukraine, it is hard to evaluate these sentiments.
Within the borders envisioned by the Soviet-Polish agreement, ethnic Ukrainians constituted only around three percent of Poland’s population, but, after a few weeks had passed, Soviet leaders demanded that the Ukrainians be removed. The agreement on “evacuation” signed on 9 September 1944 by Nikita Khrushchev, as People’s Commissar for Ukraine, and Edward Osóbka-Morawski, head of the “Polish Committee of National Liberation” installed in Lublin, was part of a general Stalinist (and Allied) policy of the relocation of peoples. It mandated that Poland evacuate “all citizens” of Ukrainian background who wished to resettle in Soviet Ukraine, and that Soviet Ukraine do the same for Poles and Jews. 46 The Poles in Eastern


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Galicia—the fiercest advocates of the total expulsion of Ukrainians from Poland to the Soviet Union—now found themselves in the Soviet Union, among the perhaps 1.3 million Poles left in the enlarged Soviet Ukraine. Most of the Galician Poles moved to Poland within its new borders, thereby effectively ending hundreds of years of Polish settlement in western Ukraine. 47 (See Maps Three and Four.) Roughly 250,000 had already fled from Volhynia to escape the UPA, and approximately 788,000 preferred “repatriation” to life in a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. 48 In general, they were not forcibly deported,

47. For a sense of the mood, see Obszar Lwów do Centrala, 11 September 1944, Armia Krajowa w Dokumentach, Vol. VI, p. 419. Among other consequences, this severely weakened NKVD operations against Ukrainian partisans, as most informers had been Poles. See Burds, “Agentura,” pp. 118–119.

48. A far higher proportion of Poles in Ukraine were willing to be “repatriated” than Poles in
but they were effectively coerced by the prospect of Stalinist rule and the
memory of Ukrainian nationalism.

The Soviet-Polish “evacuations” encountered greater problems on the
Polish side of the new border. Ukrainians were less willing to leave their an-
cestral lands in southeastern Poland (or, from the Ukrainian point of view, the
“territory beyond the Curzon line”—“Zakerzons’kyi krai”) and to come under
Soviet rule. Some villages of Lemkos chose resettlement in 1945, but that was
mainly because they tended to be Russophiles.49 Otherwise, it was only dur-
ing the first few months of the operation, in late 1944, that Ukrainians who
departed truly did so of their own volition. In early 1945, the Polish state be-
gan to exert pressure. Ukrainians were denied the right to land and saw their
schools closed.50 Orders went out to arrest all young men who had not regis-
tered for repatriation.51 The Polish regime’s internal security forces and new
army, both of which were controlled by the Communists and the Soviet
NKVD, began to launch fierce attacks against Ukrainian villages, killing civil-
ians in a new round of atrocities.52 UPA forces and spontaneous Ukrainian
self-defense groups replied by destroying Polish communities.53

Lithuania and Belarus. Also, Poles in western Ukraine, the site of UPA attacks, were more likely
to leave than Poles in central Ukraine. These are reasons to believe that the acceptance of “repa-
triation” was a result of wartime experience, and in this sense a result of the UPA’s ethnic cleans-
ing. Polish recollections support this interpretation. See Wspomnienia II/2266/p, II/1914, II/2375,
II/1286/kw, Archiwum Wschodnie. It is telling that even the émigré organizations lobbying for
a revision of the border with Ukraine did not counsel Poles to return to their former homesteads
in western Ukraine. See “Biuletyn — No. 62,” Związki Ziem Wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej, 15
Polskiego.

49. Some Lemkos were disappointed that their lands were not simply absorbed by the Soviet
Union. Said one, “We thought that we, together with our Russian [rus’kyi] land, would find our-
selves in the boundaries of the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union would turn our Lemko re-
gion into a beautiful Switzerland.” Cited in Serhiichyk, Etnichni Mezhi i Derzhavni Kordon
Ukrainy, p. 143; see also “Informacja z prasy ukraińskiej nr. 2,” zesp. A.9.V., tecz. 9, MSW,
Oddział Narodowościowy, Archiwum Muzeum Polskiego. Some Lemko villagers were apparently
convinced by NKVD officers that a far worse fate awaited them in postwar Poland. Wspomnienie
II/2196/p, Archiwum Wschodnie.

50. “Zarządzenie ogólne wojewody rzeszowskiego,” 22 February 1945, Centralne archiwum
Ministerstwa spraw wewnętrznych (CA MSW), X/15, k. 137, reproduced in Misio, Repatriacja,
pp. 83–84.

135, reproduced in Misio, Repatriacja, p. 90.

52. Report of OUN regional leader Włodzimierz Kit, 20 February 1945, CA MSW, X/36, (4395), re-
produced in Misio, Repatriacja, pp. 81–82; Report of Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego
battalion commander Szopiński, 24 March 1945, CAW, Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego,
1580/75/147, k. 2, reproduced in Misio, Repatriacja, p. 94; and Report of Korpus Bezpieczeństwa
Wewnętrznego battalion commander Szopiński, 6 April 1945, Centralne archiwum wojskowe.
(CAW), Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, 1580/75/147, k. 10, reproduced in Misio,
Repatriacja, pp. 104–105.

53. See the announcements of revenge for particular attacks in Centralne Archiwum MSWiA,
OUN, sygn. IX/63.
Afterward, Polish Communist propaganda tended to conflate the cleansing of Volhynia in 1943 with the battles in southeastern Poland of 1945, to avoid reminding Poles of the eastern lands lost to the Soviet Union. The differences are important. In 1943, Volhynia was the center of UPA operations. In 1945, UPA units in Poland probably never numbered more than two thousand troops (along with perhaps three thousand OUN members). It is true that Ukrainians were a demographic majority in many areas along a long border strip running from Chełm almost to Kraków, and the UPA soldiers were at first better organized than the Polish soldiers they confronted. Moreover, the UPA did continue to kill Polish civilians and to destroy Polish property. But this was now part of a more or less proportional response to attacks by Poles: Polish soldiers, Polish security forces, Polish partisans, Polish security forces dressed as partisans, or indeed Polish partisans disguised as soldiers. In Poland in 1945, it is likely that more Ukrainians were killed by Poles than were Poles by Ukrainians. In both cases, a rough estimate would be in the low thousands. The crucial difference between 1943 and 1945 was that of state power. In May 1945, the Polish state founded its internal security troops (Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego) and by July had begun exercising control of its borders, which had been formally recognized by the Allies at Yalta that month. In Volhynia in 1943, Ukrainians and Poles had used the German authorities in their fight with one another, whereas in southeastern Poland in 1945 the newly formed state was, if not exactly on the side of the ethnic Poles, certainly set decisively against the ethnic Ukrainians.

In the spring of 1945, the inexorable shift in the balance of power forced Ukrainians to leave. When Polish soldiers burned their villages, many Ukrainians saw no recourse but to accept “repatriation.” Continued attacks by nationalist partisans had the same effect. In one particularly horrific case, Polish nationalist partisans (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne) posing as soldiers returning from the German front entered the village of Wierzchowiny, and killed 197 civilians. A local official charged with organizing the expulsions from the Przemyśl area complained that Ukrainians fleeing Polish attacks were overwhelming his office. “There are cases,” he wrote, “of Ukrainian populations...
abandoning whole villages, escaping as they are, and reporting en masse to the Soviet plenipotentiary, demanding immediate evacuation.\textsuperscript{57} Although this extreme intimidation was less direct than the means adopted in the months to come, it clearly affected the calculations of many of the 208,000 Ukrainians who left Poland during the first eight months of 1945.

From the beginning, Ukrainian partisans of the OUN and UPA had urged Ukrainians in Poland to remain at home, regarding the “Zakerzons’kyi krai” as part of western Ukraine, and “repatriation” as a device to exterminate Ukrainians in Soviet camps and thereby destroy the Ukrainian nation.\textsuperscript{58} UPA soldiers set to work blowing up train tracks and locomotives, destroying bridges, assassinating officials charged with “repatriation,” and setting traps for Polish Army units overseeing the transfers.\textsuperscript{59} They also fatefully decided to burn depopulated Ukrainian villages to prevent them from being resettled by Poles. This created a sense of general chaos and desperation that Polish Communists exploited.\textsuperscript{60}

During the first half of 1945, Ukrainians and Poles in southeastern Poland still had some margin of maneuver. The consolidation of Communist rule encouraged the UPA to cooperate with the anti-Communist descendants of the AK (dissolved in January 1945), Polish partisans known from September 1945 as Wolność i Niezawisłość (AK–WiN). The UPA and Polish partisans reached a truce in the spring of 1945, which reduced attacks on civilians.\textsuperscript{61} Also, by the spring of 1945, “repatriated” Ukrainians were returning to Poland (often by claiming to be ethnic Poles and thus re-“repatriating”), bringing with them horrifying accounts of Soviet Ukraine. Ukrainian civilians now organized for the right to remain. In July 1945, a delegation of Ukrainians defended their constitutional rights in Warsaw at a meeting at the Ministry of Public Administration. A sample of the replies they received suggested that worse was to


\textsuperscript{59} For relevant UPA reports from spring 1946, see Centralne Archiwum MSWiA, UPA, sygn. X/40.

\textsuperscript{60} For the UPA’s attempt to explain the policy of burning, see “Polacy przesiedleńcy,” December 1945, Centralne Archiwum MSWiA, UPA, X/81.

\textsuperscript{61} There was even some, very limited, cooperation. See Grzegorz Motyka and Rafat Wnuk, \textit{Pany i rezuny: Współpraca AK-WiN i UPA 1945–1947} (Warsaw: Volumen, 1997), pp. 76–193.
come. “Although the Citizens are unanimous in wishing to remain here, I think that this will be impossible,” said the delegate from the Council of Ministers. “After the understanding reached with the Soviet Union to establish an ethnographic frontier, we aim to become a national state (państwo narodowe), and not a state of nationalities (państwo narodowościowe). We do not wish anyone harm, but we do wish to remove the problem of national minorities.” As the west Ukrainian Communist Mykola Korolko concluded: “If Poland is to be a national state, there is no alternative to resettling Ukrainians to Ukraine.”

Ironically, Korolko was a representative of Lublin.

In the late summer of 1945, the Polish authorities officially renounced the legal fiction of the “voluntary” character of “repatriation.” After the Soviet plenipotentiary for repatriation affairs, Mykola Podhornyi, requested the use of force, Polish leaders on 3 September 1945 ordered three infantry divisions to use all means necessary to resettle the remaining Ukrainians to the Soviet Union. These forces were already in the area, having been stationed there since May 1945 to destroy the UPA. They had enjoyed no great success in their military operations, but the use of them against civilians proved effective and brutal. The ranks of two of the three divisions were filled by ethnic Poles from Volhynia, some of whom now exploited their positions as soldiers of the state to exact personal revenge. Polish soldiers killed hundreds of Ukrainian civilians as they forced approximately 23,000 to evacuate the country in late 1945.

Just as the Polish state was harnessing the desire of some of its ethnic Polish citizens for revenge against the UPA, the state’s policies were driving ethnic Ukrainians in Poland into the UPA’s arms. At this point, the UPA took on the mantle of the defender of the Ukrainians’ right to remain in Poland. But, despite increasing public support, the organization’s position was grim. The UPA in Poland could resist direct attacks for only a limited time. Public support meant little if the Polish state could count on help from the ethnic Poles in the region. UPA troops were ordered to perform their final duty for their homeland. The organization prepared comprehensive measures to resist the expulsions, including agitation directed at Polish soldiers, the assassination of Polish “repatriation” committees, and the burning of abandoned villages. In principle, the measures did not include attacks on Polish citizens.

In April 1946, the Polish authorities organized the three infantry divisions and other army formations, border troops, and security forces into Operational Group Rzeszów, which was supposed to complete the expulsion of Ukrainians from Poland. Villages that had earlier resisted expulsion were now violently pacified. In a rush to fulfill quotas, the operational subgroups moved from village to village, forcing inhabitants into convoys bound for Soviet Ukraine. Roughly 252,000 more Ukrainians were deported between April and June 1946. During the entire period of “repatriations,” between October 1944 and June 1946, 482,000 Ukrainians departed for the Soviet Union. In rough terms, 300,000 were forced to do so, 100,000 were effectively coerced by nearby violence or homelessness, and the rest moved voluntarily.

**The Polish Communist Regime Disperses Ukrainians: Plans (1947)**

After Operation Rzeszów in late 1946, the Polish Politburo and General Staff believed that the Ukrainian problem had been resolved. By early 1947, when it became clear that more Ukrainians than expected had escaped deportation, the Polish General Staff asked the Politburo for authorization to eliminate the “remnants.”66 Because the Soviet Union was no longer interested in population exchanges, Deputy Chief of Staff General Stefan Mossor recommended “resettling these people by individual family and dispersing them throughout the entire area of the Recovered Territories” of northern and western Poland, which until 1945 had been under German rule.67 Proposals along these lines were considered by the Polish Politburo in March 1947. After Deputy Defense Minister Karol Świerczewski was assassinated on 28 March (probably by the UPA), the Polish Politburo moved immediately to “resettle Ukrainians and mixed families in the regained territories (especially in southern Prussia), without forming any tight clusters and no closer than 100 kilometers to the border.”68 Świerczewski’s death was probably a pretext. Even though military and

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intelligence reports were streaming in about the decay of the UPA—and it was known that the UPA was rarely attacking Polish units—the Politburo in late March began a propaganda campaign treating Ukrainian partisans as Nazi units, whose threat to the security of the state justified extraordinary measures.

There is every reason to believe that the Polish plan had explicit Soviet approval. In an unusually short time, Lieutenant Colonel Wacław Kossowski, one of many Soviet officers serving on the Polish General Staff, was sent to investigate Świerczewski’s assassination on the very day it happened. Kossowski concluded that the identity of the assailants was impossible to determine, but he nevertheless provided a rather definitive policy recommendation on 11 April: “As soon as possible, an Operational Group should be organized, to form a plan for the complete extermination of the remnants of the Ukrainian population in the southeastern border region of Poland among other things.”

The next day, 12 April, the State Security Commission (Państwowa Komisja Bezpieczeństwa), the central organ charged with eliminating organized resistance against the Communist regime, initiated just such a policy. The Commission approved a laconic report delivered by Stanisław Radkiewicz, minister for public security. Radkiewicz was a long-time Polish Communist who had spent the war in the Soviet Union and fought in the Red Army. He was charged with internal security the moment the Red Army crossed into Poland, and he remained head of the secret police through 1954. Also present was the Polish National Defense Minister and Marshal Michał Rola-Żymierski, another dependent of Stalin. Żymierski had served in Piłsudski’s Legions and earned the rank of general in the interwar period, but had been dismissed on a corruption charge. He joined the Soviet-sponsored Polish Army during the war, and owed his advance to Stalin. He had led the Polish divisions originally designated to engage the UPA in May 1945.

Polish military planners thought that the “remnants of the Ukrainian population” amounted to 74,000 Ukrainians, but in fact there were still some 200,000 Ukrainians in Poland (approximately 0.8 percent of Poland’s population). The absolute numbers are high enough to suggest the scale of suf-

ferring that forced relocation would bring, whereas the relative numbers are low enough to call into question the official notion that Ukrainians, no matter what they did, could threaten the Polish state. It is true that many of these Polish citizens of Ukrainian nationality supported the UPA, and that this support became widespread as Ukrainians were deported from their ancestral lands in 1945 and 1946. It is also true that the main goal of the UPA was to establish an independent Ukrainian state, and that its soldiers were willing to fight against overwhelming odds to resist Polish Communist rule. Although OUN and UPA leaders now concealed their final goals and limited their attacks to Polish troops rather than civilians, there can be no doubt that the basic conflict of interest between the UPA and the Polish state was rooted in opposing ideas regarding legitimate control of territory.

Even so, the idea of “complete extermination” cannot be understood simply as an attack on the UPA, or even on its civilian base as such. Resettlement was considered worthwhile in its own right, apart from the destruction of the UPA. One of the army’s two main operational tasks, as defined by the formal order of the State Security Commission, was to “destroy the UPA bands.” The second task was to carry out “an evacuation of all persons of Ukrainian nationality from the region to the northwestern territories, resettling them with the widest possible dispersion.”

Defenders of what was christened Operation Wisła sometimes contend that the second objective was merely a means to the first, and that the dispersion of the entire Ukrainian population was simply a part of military operations against the UPA, indeed a necessary part. But, in fact, this was not how Polish commanders (including those reporting to Moscow) understood the operation. Resettlement was to continue to the last Ukrainian, even if the UPA was quickly neutralized. Resettlement was designed to ensure that Ukrainian communities could never arise again in Poland.

Operation Wisła was a policy of ethnic “cleansing” (the word appears occasionally in official documents) designed to redraw the ethnic geography of the new Polish state. The Polish authorities decided to resettle “every person of Ukrainian nationality.” Communities that had not supported the UPA, mixed families, Lemkos returning from Red Army service, loyal Communist party members trained in the Soviet Union, and Communists who had helped “repatriate” Ukrainians in the previous wave were all forcibly resettled—all-
though it must be said that Communist dignitaries were helped in transporting their property.\footnote{“Instrukcja Państwowej Komisji Bezpieczeństwa nr. 0340/III,” CAW, Gabinet Ministra Obrony Narodowej, IV:110, t. 135, k. 212–213, reprinted in Misio, \textit{Akcja ‘Wisła’}, pp. 382–383.} As with the “repatriations,” nationality was decided not by individual choice, but by blood, religion, and (most frequently) by the presence of the letter “U” in the \textit{Kennkarte} that Polish citizens received from the Nazi occupation regime during the war.\footnote{Kersten, “The Polish-Ukrainian Conflict,” p. 147.}

The Polish Communist regime stood to gain popular support by identifying itself with the Polish nation and combating “Ukrainian nationality.” The attempt to co-opt the idea of the nation had been the major goal of Communist propaganda from 1943. The genius of excluding the UPA from the national amnesty of February 1947, of prosecuting Ukrainian partisans under laws different from those applied to Poles, and finally of Operation Wisła in the summer of 1947 was that such actions defined the Ukrainian national community starkly and plainly. The totalizing aspirations of the policy (to be applied to “every person”) confirmed that Polish leaders desired a clean break with the multinational past and that the “national state” was the endpoint of the proletarian revolution. The initial plan for Operation Wisła, drafted by Mossor and presented to the Polish Politburo by Defense Minister Żymierski and Minister of Public Security Radkiewicz on 16 April 1947, began with the words “to resolve the Ukrainian problem in Poland once and for all.”\footnote{“Projekt organizacji specjalnej ‘Wschód’,” Archiwum Urzędu Ochrony Państwa, Gabinet Ministra Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, 17/IX/140, reprinted in Misio, \textit{Akcja ‘Wisła’}, p. 93.}

\section*{The Polish Communist Regime Disperses Ukrainians: Practice (1947)}

Leadership of Operation Wisła was entrusted to General Stefan Mossor, who joined the Communist party only in 1945. Mossor had been a soldier in Piłsudski’s legions, a military planner in interwar Poland (he correctly foresaw defeat in two weeks if the Germans attacked in 1939), and a German prisoner of war, having been arrested after eleven days of battle. He had joined the Soviet-sponsored Polish Army in 1945, and, by the end of the year, he had risen from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general. In reports from the field in southeastern Poland in early 1947, Mossor had pushed for dispersion of Ukrainians. (His ostensible confidence must have hidden a good deal of fear: In 1941, he had written that Soviet defeat in the Second World War was inevitable, and, in 1943, he led the Polish officers within the Red Cross com-
mission that investigated Katyn at the invitation of Germany). The military operations against the UPA and the army’s role in resettlement were apparently planned by two Soviet Poles: Colonel Michal Chilinski, chief of staff of the operation, and Lieutenant Colonel Wacław Kossowski, the Red Army officer who had reported on the Swierczewski assassination and who was now detailed to head the staff’s operations section. Wisła joined five infantry divisions with some security forces from the KBW into a force of roughly 17,940 men.

Mossor, Kossowski, and Chilinski were concerned in the first instance with the destruction of the UPA. When operations began in late April in the Rzeszów area, Mossor was unimpressed by the performance of his soldiers in battle: “All unit leaders seem to be hypnotized by the evacuation action, and have forgotten the first and main task, which is the struggle with UPA bands.” However, as Mossor, Kossowski, and Chilinski soon realized, resettlement meant that the days of the UPA were numbered, even though the organization remained difficult to destroy in direct combat. Once calls to die for history’s sake and desperate dreams of Anglo-American air support took the place of clear plans in UPA reports, Kossowski and Chilinski calmly drew the operational lessons from Rzeszów and issued orders for the next round of attacks. Their communications reflected a thorough familiarity with Soviet protocols of antipartisan warfare. They carefully explained how

77. The Politburo learned of this in July 1947. Mossor was imprisoned in 1950, and released in 1956. He died of a heart attack the following year.

78. By Soviet Poles, I mean an individual of Polish descent who spent the interwar period in the Soviet Union serving the Soviet state. The Polish term is ‘pełniący obowiązki Polaków’, or ‘popy’ for short, which means ‘those fulfilling the obligations of Poles.’ All of the organs of the Polish state that carried out Operation Wisła were thoroughly penetrated at this point by Soviet agents and plants.

79. Kossowski returned to the Soviet Union in October 1948. According to the final (and Russian-language) report on his service as an officer in the Polish Army, he was reassigned to the Red Army because of his dealings with ‘loose women’ and his contacts with people who had relatives sentenced to death for contacts with England and America. These behaviors apparently came to light (or were fabricated) in the summer or fall of 1948. See his “Sluzhebnaya Karakteristika,” 15 October 1948, but also his “Charakterystyka - Szubowa,” 31 March 1948, teckza personalna ppk. Wacława Kossowskiego, CAW.


to destroy the reinforced bunkers where UPA soldiers took shelter, how to use police dogs to trace retreating partisans through the forest, and the like.84

Meanwhile, the dispersion action proceeded smoothly, first in Rzeszów province, then in Lublin and Kraków provinces (Map Five). Between 28 April and 28 August 1947, Operational Group Wisła moved some 140,000 Ukrainians from southeastern to northwestern Poland. Operation Wisła perfected tactics that had first been used in Rzeszów: Initially, a settlement was enclosed and protected from UPA intervention, then a list of names of those to be resettled was read. These people were given a few hours to pack, and were then relocated to intermediary sites.85 Operation Wisła also repeated Rzeszów’s abuses: needlessly pacified villages, brutal beatings, occasional killings. It was distinguished from its predecessor by the more complicated role played by the security services. At intermediary sites, as Ukrainians waited without shelter to board trains, the security police (Urzę́d Bezpieczeństwa, or UB) would select individuals for particular attention, and pass a general judgment about the final destination of the group. Ukrainians were packed into trains for Lublin or, more often, Oswiecim (Auschwitz), where they were rerouted to their new places of settlement. The final destination and degree of dispersal of groups was determined by the judgment of the intelligence officers, whose colleagues were waiting to receive their instructions in sealed envelopes at the end of the line.86

Individuals singled out could be judicially murdered or sent to a concentration camp. Military courts, empowered to judge civilians, sentenced at least 173 Ukrainians to death on the spot for collaborating with the UPA.87


86. Their unhappy fate in postwar Poland is beyond the scope of this essay. They found themselves surrounded by Poles, some of whom were “repatriates” from the east who spoke worse Polish than they. See Wspomnienie II/2196/p, Archiwum Wschodnie.

87. According to one calculation, 573 of the 2,810 death sentences carried out in Poland between 1944 and 1956 were against Ukrainians. Because Ukrainians constituted less than 1 percent of the population, this proportion is high indeed. Misiło, Akcja ‘Wisła’, p. 30. Misiło has collected the relevant documents in UPA v svitli pols’kykh dokumentiv (Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1992). For accounts of several Ukrainians sentenced to death and executed before 1947, see Maria Turlejska, Te pokolenia zalokami czarne: Skazani za śmierć i ich sędzieowie, 1944–1954 (London: Aneks, 1989), pp. 331–337.
Most of these sentences were carried out the same day. A total of 3,936 Ukrainians, including 823 women and children, were taken to the Jaworzno concentration camp, a wartime affiliate of the Auschwitz-Birkenau complex. There, routine torture was accompanied by typhus epidemics and extreme shortages of food and clothing. Several dozen Ukrainians died in Jaworzno, including two women by suicide.

The success of the resettlement operation paved the way for the final military defeat of the UPA in Poland. Soviet NKVD and Czechoslovak regu-

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88. This is the conclusion of the investigation of the Polish procurator in 1997. See Leszek Gołowski, “Dokumenty Javozhna” (excerpts from procurator’s report of treatment of Ukrainian prisoners in Jaworzno concentration camp, 1947), Nasze Słowo (Warsaw), 28 January 1996, pp. 1, 3. For further details of the camps’ conditions, see the memoir of a Polish woman, a returnee from Siberia, who was held on the accusation of sheltering an UPA soldier from the Red Army: Wspomnienie II/53, Archiwum Wschodnie.
lar army troops had sealed the frontiers, leaving Ukrainian partisans trapped in their confrontation with the Polish state. From exaggerated Polish reports, it is difficult to say how many UPA and OUN partisans were killed in the engagements of 1945–1947: on the order of one to two thousand, compared to 3,100 Polish soldiers and functionaries. Some Ukrainian partisans fought their way across the sealed borders, whereas others allowed themselves to be resettled in northwestern Poland. The UPA’s activity in Poland ceased on 17 September 1947, when OUN commander Jaroslav Starukh perished in his bunker.89 With Starukh dead, UPA commander Miroslav Onyshkevych released his soldiers from their oaths.90 The Polish state had already criminalized the Uniate Church, and it now set about redistributing the properties seized from resettled Ukrainians in the southeast. Thus ended one thousand years of continuous Ukrainian settlement, and thus—after the Holocaust of the Jews, the expulsions of the Germans, and the passivity of the remaining Belorussians—arose the Polish “national state.”

**Conclusion: The Issue of Polish Responsibility (1939–1999)**

It may seem hard to disagree with the Ukrainian author of a July 1943 UPA appeal to Poles. “It is a strange and incomprehensible fact,” he wrote, “that today, when the Polish nation groans under the yoke of the German aggressor, and when Russia too plans a new occupation of Poland, Poland’s imperialist leaders once again declare war on the Ukrainian nation, denying it the right to its own independent existence.”91 He was right that Poland, like western Ukraine, was occupied by an aggressive foreign power, Nazi Germany. He was right that in Poland, as in western Ukraine, German power would be supplanted by an even more stubborn occupier, the Soviet Union. And he was right that the attitudes of Poland’s government in exile, especially its underground military leaders, were imperialistic, at least in the narrow sense that few of them understood that Ukrainians were a nation just as Poles were, deserving of the same right to independence.


90. In late 1947, three more small Operational Groups had to be formed to rout partisans who continued to fight, and, over the next few years, the army continued to resettle Ukrainians who had somehow escaped or been passed over.

But the “fact” of Polish hostility to Ukrainians was not as “strange and incomprehensible” as this suggests. At the very moment when this appeal was issued, its author’s comrades in arms were carrying out one of the most terrible acts of the Second World War. Precisely in July 1943, the UPA’s fearsome campaign of comprehensive atrocities to end the Polish presence in Volhynia reached its zenith. At the moment the author was claiming that Poles would be entitled to remain in a future free Ukraine as equal citizens under the law, terrified Poles were fleeing the slaughter in Volhynia in the hundreds of thousands. The stories they brought west—and the humiliation they brought to the ranks of the AK—ensured that Polish-Ukrainian armed cooperation was all but impossible throughout the rest of the war. The experience also guaranteed that there would be minimal sympathy for the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians who a few years later would themselves be forced to leave their homes. Operation Wisła was the single bloodiest action of the Polish Communist regime against its own citizens, but the link with Communism is not uppermost in the minds of Poles. To this day, Polish memory links Operation Wisła to the slaughter in Volhynia, and, to this day, Polish public opinion fears Ukraine more than any other neighbor.92

The author of the 1943 UPA appeal began a Ukrainian tradition of asking for Polish sympathy without mentioning the reasons it was lacking. The main focus of Ukrainian attention on Operation Wisła has been the question of Polish responsibility. It is clearly unsatisfactory for Ukrainians to draw attention to the dispersal of Ukrainians by the Polish state in 1947 without referring to the murder of Polish civilians by Ukrainian nationalists in 1943. At the same time, it is simply mistaken to claim, as some Poles have, that state policy in 1947 was merely a result of UPA actions in 1943.

The preceding sections allow us to make four relevant distinctions. In the first place, it is true that the Polish regime had more influence over the course of events in 1947, when Ukrainians were dispersed in Poland, than in 1945 and 1946, when they were expelled to the Soviet Union. It was apparently the Polish regime—not the Soviet regime—that perceived the need for

92. This is confirmed by opinion polls throughout the 1990s. On the spread of national memory and fear of Ukrainians after the war, see Andrzej Zięba, “Ukraincy w oczach Polaków (wiek XX),” Dzieje Naczarnosze (Warsaw), Vol. 27, No. 2, (1995), pp. 95–104. The necessary supplement, explaining the role of propaganda, is Józef Lewandowski, “Polish Historical Writing on Polish-Ukrainian Relations During World War Two,” in Peter Potchyn, ed., Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), pp. 231–246. For three books published by the Polish Ministry of Defense, see Feliks Sikorski, Kabawcy w Akcji Wisła (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1989); Jan Gerhard, Łuny w Bieszczadach (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony, 1974); and Ignacy Blum, Z dziejów wojska polskiego w latach 1945–1948 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1960). The first was published in the regime’s last year; the second was authorized for use as a textbook; the last set the official line early on.
another resettlement. If Stalin had agreed that Ukrainians posed a grave threat to the security of his most important new satellite, he presumably would have agreed to take them forcibly into Soviet Ukraine. In particular, it was General Mossor, the interwar Polish officer, who in early 1947 first advocated resettling the Ukrainians who had escaped the “repatriations.” His reasoning was precisely that because Stalin no longer wanted to accept Ukrainians, and because the main Soviet NKVD forces were withdrawing from Poland in the spring of 1947, the Polish state must finish the job for itself. It is true that approximately forty percent of the Polish officer corps in the late 1940s consisted of Soviet officers, and that Soviet personnel dominated the Polish security forces. Nevertheless, Mossor’s opinion was shared by other indisputably Polish officers who took part in the forced resettlement of Ukrainians, such as the young Captain Wojciech Jaruzelski.

Still, this increasing leeway for maneuver on the part of the Communist regime is very different from the sovereignty of Poland, and the presence of Poles such as Mossor is very different from the legitimacy of the Polish government. A second distinction must therefore be made between “Poland” and the Polish Communist regime. The Polish Communist party could not have won free elections in postwar Poland. (Indeed, the Polish army’s attacks on the UPA slowed in the winter of 1947 because soldiers were busy falsifying the results of parliamentary elections.) Even if the Polish regime enjoyed some margin of freedom on Ukrainian policy, it does not follow that the policy was “Polish” in the sense of reflecting the expressed wishes of a majority of Polish citizens.

That said, a third distinction must be introduced, this time between kinds of reasoning. The fact that Poles did not choose their regime does not render the ethical question of Polish responsibility irrelevant. Not everything that undemocratic governments do is unpopular. The massive expulsion of ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia that took place from 1945 to 1946, with far greater violence and bloodshed than the operations in Poland, demonstrates that democratic regimes can be just as enthusiastic as dictatorships in carrying out ethnic cleansing. Recall that Edvard Beneš, the president of Czechoslovakia, used language in 1945 very similar to that used by Mossor in 1947: “We have decided to eliminate the German problem in our republic once and for all.” But whereas Beneš returned from London after the war to govern Czechoslovakia for more than two years, there was no such period of democratic rule in Poland, and so there is no way of knowing what a Polish democratic regime would have done. Although there was general agreement

93. Documents may yet be found in Soviet archives that force another interpretation.
among Polish democrats (and Communists) to expel the Germans, neither Stanisław Mikołajczyk, Beneš’s Polish analogue, nor the ministries of the Polish government-in-exile seem to have formulated plans to resolve the Ukrainian question. The main dispute between Mikołajczyk and his rivals was whether to accept Poland’s new boundaries, a question that in point of law and from distant London seemed more pressing than the fate of minorities. Although Polish political thinkers and local political activists formulated plans for the massive resettlement of Ukrainians, confusion rather than a desire for revenge was the dominant reaction at the highest levels of authority.

This leads to a fourth and final distinction. A democratic regime in Poland after the war would have been far more sensitive to public opinion than was the government-in-exile in distant London, which was trying to prosecute a war. In the context of 1947, the dispersal of Ukrainians was certainly a popular policy: “The activity of the authorities was in harmony with the attitude of the majority of Poles.” To repeat, this popular desire for revenge did not in fact guarantee that the resettlements would occur, since Poles could not choose their leaders. But it did mean that Polish Communists, acting on motives of their own, had a strong current of opinion to exploit. It was their goal to create an ethnically pure “national state,” but so long as this goal resonated with broad sectors of Polish opinion, the question of Polish responsibility will have a solid foundation.

If the best argument for not dismissing the question of Polish responsibility is that Poles might well have approved of ethnic cleansing in 1947 if asked, then it is quite right to ask why this was the case (and impossible not to refer to 1943 in the answer). Of course, a Ukrainian would not be wrong to point then to Polish colonialism during the interwar period, the history of Polish domination of ethnically Ukrainian territories, and so on. Further arguments and counterarguments can be made. The distinctions presented here provide some contours to the dispute, but they cannot, in the nature of things, prevent it from going full circle, and then round and round again.

97. Since this essay concerns mainly the cleansing of Ukrainians by Poles, the conclusion does not consider the question of Ukrainian responsibility. Such a consideration would proceed along similar lines. Although it is absurd to identify the UPA with the Ukrainian nation as a whole, the question of Ukrainian responsibility is well founded insofar as Ukrainians identify with the UPA as part of the national tradition.

Good policy can have a much greater immediate effect on such disputes than good historiography. The genius of Polish and Ukrainian policy since the two states regained their sovereignty has been to treat these matters within the categories of international politics, rather than in the categories of personal memories. Polish and Ukrainian national memories are not in accord, nor indeed are the accounts of leading national historians. Yet, even as disagreements remain regarding who owes whom an apology and local conflicts persist over property lost after the Second World War, relations between the Polish and Ukrainian states are excellent.\(^98\) Poland was the first state that officially recognized Ukraine in 1991, and the two states quickly agreed to a treaty on good relations in 1992. Although Polish eastern policy has sometimes disappointed Ukrainians, it has consistently recognized Ukraine as an equal sovereign state with the pertinent rights and responsibilities. Ukraine has come to treat Poland as a dependable partner, at least so long as its foreign policy remains oriented toward the West.

If agreement about the events of 1943–1947 had been thought a necessary condition for rapprochement, Polish-Ukrainian relations would be in a far worse state.\(^99\) The truth is probably the opposite: Improved political relations create the conditions for mutual discussion of diverging memories.\(^100\)

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99. Awareness of the political preconditions of historical reconciliation is evident in the statements of both Polish and Ukrainian presidents. Interview with President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Warsaw, 16 May 1999; Leonid Kuchma, “Commemoration of the 80th Anniversary of the Proclamation of the West Ukrainian Republic,” Lviv, 1 November 1998. For numerous examples of other policy makers, see the sources cited in the next footnote.

The priority given to politics over history in the early 1990s and the achievement of political reconciliation in the mid-1990s cast disagreements about memory in an entirely different light by the late 1990s. Local politicians who recall old grievances have little hope that their gestures will force the hands of national authorities while those national leaders find the way open to grand gestures. Among other achievements, the presidents of sovereign Ukraine and Poland have signed a declaration of mutual reconciliation that mentions both the slaughter in Volhynia and Operation Wisła. In the 1940s, unwise policy led to tragedies that are well remembered. Wise policies in the 1990s have given rise to the hope that, with a bit more time, these memories will be relegated to dusty books and footnoted articles.

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