



# CHANGING PALESTINE–ISRAEL ECOLOGIES: NARRATIVES OF WATER, LAND, CONFLICT, AND POLITICAL ECONOMY, THEN AND NOW, AND LIFE TO COME

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**ABSTRACT** Three forms of narrative heuristics are identified and explored in the search for political inclusiveness, robustness, and legitimacy: (1) environmental topics: toxics and the need for second-order or reflexive institutions of modernization; water and the need for getting beyond zero-sum games; urban public goods and infrastructures; medical services and distributed care; animals and biodiversity and the need to pay attention

to feedback that signals our inability to achieve perfect control and hence dependence on one another; (2) perspectival topoi: *single-eyed stories* of identity, ownership, interest, and mastery; *double-voiced stories* of mutual recognition, sub-versions, and alternative realities; and *triangulated stories* of polyvocal, interactive, risk-taking experimentalism; (3) processual narratives of structural transformation: *political economies* (agrarian, industrial, and postindustrial), *second-order modernization* and *biopolitical* forms of governance from societies of discipline to societies of control or regulation (by codes, flows, distributed feedback, desubjugated knowledges, and capillaries of micropower); *ecological feedback systems*; and new *grammars of multitude* or modes of enhanced self-organized civil society coordination that can either work around governments and bureaucracies or can create public spheres from which to address and pressure government.<sup>1</sup>

### I: 1, 2, 3: ONE-EYED, DOUBLE-VOICED, AND TRIANGULATED NARRATIVES



My challenge as an anthropologist – to explore narratives as deeply held meaning structures in the way people talk about the environment – provides one end of a continuum of social-science tools. At the other end are reductionist social-science tools, useful for targeted instrumental purposes, such as economic models (or more generally rational models against which unruly reality can be measured), and social survey instruments which all too often give only the answers already embedded in the questions, but sometimes can track changes in public opinion and locate differentials among population segments, and are often powerful creators or shapers of new public conventional opinions and bureaucratic social facts). Anthropologists are more interested in how the questions of survey instruments are formulated in the first place, what they exclude, and how, if they were formulated otherwise, they might generate different outcomes or senses of the world. Instrumental models, such as those of the best economic models (which examine possible outcomes if variables or dimensions are modified), will fit as one among several kinds of resources in what I will call triangulated narratives.

I want to suggest that it might be useful to think of three kinds of narratives about the land, environment, water, pollution, toxic-waste disposal, ownership and use, which I will call one-eyed, double-voiced, and triangulated (or narratives involving single, double, and at least three perspectives).

Let me begin by drawing an analogy with three forms of autobiographical writing that explore ethnic identity, modern religious challenges, and scientific work (see further Fischer 1986, 1994, 2003: ch. 6). Ethnicity in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s suddenly became the subject of rich autobiographical writing that challenged earlier sociological paradigms of immigration (first generation

speaks broken English but insists second generation Americanize, and third generation feels nostalgia for the culture that the second generation disparaged and failed to pass on). Instead, the 1960s autobiographies were ones of finding *identity* through hybridizing mixed heritages. Written in the first person, these were narratives of self-struggle with an identity that comes unbidden, often in an unwelcome way, which one often would just as soon have avoided. While such autobiographical forms use many narrative devices (talk stories of puzzling through fragments one was told by parents as in Maxine Hong Kingston's *Woman Warrior*; transference patterns of behavior as in Michael Arlen's *Passage to Ararat*; bilingualism as in Chicano/a and Mexican American writing; or irony as in Gerald Vizenor's Native American modern trickster tales), ethnic autobiographies are told from a single perspective, in a single voice, attempting to bind together one's different cultural heritages into a bearable and communicable *identity*.

Religions, too, are undergoing epochal change, and a series of major biographies have been published that break with traditional homiletic hagiographies. Instead, these are double-voiced texts, set in double historical horizons, each a liminal phase between two eras, in which the author and the subject of the biography both struggle psychically and socially to exercise leadership acceptable to themselves and to followers. The historical subject is not an exemplar or model, but a parallel torn soul, a doubled screen of struggles, failures, and ongoing legacies. Such double-voiced texts include the Jain social worker and former Gujarat State Minister of Education, Navalbhai Shah's biography of the Gandhian Jain monk and social worker Santabalji (1975); the Roman Catholic Henri Massignon's four-volume biography of the early Islamic mystic and martyr, al-Hallaj (1975); Gershom Scholem's biography of Shabbatai Zvi (1973), and Arthur Green's biography of Rabbi Nachman of Bratislava (both depicting manic depressive personalities who stood in the maw of transitions toward modernity) (1979); and Fuad Ajami's biography of Imam Musa Sadr (the Shi'ite leader of Lebanon who disappeared in Libya) (1986). Each author sees his own life in that of his subject yet plays a quite different if also influential social role. These are double-voiced and stereoscopic texts.

Scientists' autobiographies provide yet a third model. They do not give up the search for identity, and they often incorporate a double-voiced relation with a key mentor or earlier scientific figure, but they are also profoundly interpellated or incorporated into a collective project of more than three voices and perspectives. Indeed it is fascinating how often scientists narrate their lives in ways formally isomorphic to those they use to narrate the history of their science. Mathematicians and geodesists, for instance, use metaphors of iterative mapping (using their letters, journals, and writings as data points), while biologists use metaphors of blind Darwinian excess, competition, failure, and survival.

I will suggest that it might be useful to think of environmental narratives analogously: There are one-eyed, single-voiced, often single-cause, stories of mastery, possession (or rightful ownership), and identity. These are stories that obsessively circle around tales of “then.” Second, there are double-voiced, stereoscopic narratives of mutual recognition, sub-versions, and alternative realities. These are stories that are rooted in the struggles of “now.” Third, there are triangulated, interactive, polyphonic, and polyvocal stories of three or more actors, stories of coevolution, cooperation, and experimentalism, which allow for, and protect, multiple channels of information, perspective, and institutional possibilities. These are stories of worlds to come, of possible and alternative futures worth struggling to bring into being; struggling against the inertial limitations of exclusive single-voiced or merely stereoscopic narratives and perspectives, and struggling for environmentally sound regional synergies, sustainable feedback, collective welfare, and building infrastructures of governance beyond the zero-sum games of nationalist competitions, even open to multiple nationalisms (and histories) in shared spaces.<sup>2</sup>

At issue throughout are the narrative structures that buttress or rewire accounts of scarcity and zero-sum conflict, versus abundance through cooperation and mutualism, and particularly those that deploy ecological or systems-thinking that links together complex factors into useable maps, scenarios, plans, and future-oriented projects that are inclusive rather than exclusive. These single, double, and triangulated narratives are themselves not mutually exclusive, but may fold or subordinate one another into themselves. All narratives are embedded in the power relations of their enunciation or deployment, and thus the challenge is to remain alert to subordinations, erasures, and disempowerments that narrative can naturalize. The trick, as in topologies of maturation, is to allow the folds to enrich rather than impoverish not just social, cultural, and psychological life, but also, crucially in the present context, their entangled political possibilities.<sup>3</sup> To simplify my own narrative, I will situate the two main parts of the paper as each bifocal or liminal: looking backwards and forwards, on the limen between regimes of knowledge, power, and expectation, the first part between past and present, the second between present and future.

## II: FACTS ON THE GROUND BEYOND THE TWO STATE SOLUTION: OR ONE-EYED AND TWO-EYED STORIES

*I am beginning to think that a two state solution is impossible... Israel has prevailed in presenting its narrative. At the same time we have to fight against authoritarianism. I just returned from a fight this morning in the Legislative Council trying to prevent the destruction of our best law, the NGO law: they want to imprison people who [work for independent NGOs]...*

Relations with Israel now are like those of the Mandate with mukhtars. All decisions are in Israeli hands.

Mustafa Barghouti, June 9, 2005, Ramallah

It is often said, with “fear and trembling,” that it is too late for a two state solution: Sometimes this is said by Palestinians, pointing to a period of Israeli dominance that will be succeeded by a Palestinian demographic dominance and eventual Palestinian political sovereignty.<sup>4</sup> (Of course, population explosion without sufficient economic growth, and under competing patrimonial rather than strong unified state political conditions, can bring its own intensification of social and political problems.) Sometimes the model of South Africa is invoked: that apartheid will eventually be overthrown, and with luck there will be a leader such as Nelson Mandela who can manage the transition without mutually assured bloodshed and destruction. Such demographic stories, told either from the Palestinian or the Israeli perspective, are one-eyed or single-perspective stories, both in terms of their nationalistic justifications for natalist, immigration, or right-of-return policies, and in terms of their privileging of a single causal factor in a multicausal evolution of the political ecology. (It is worth recalling, further, that Israeli Palestinian, and Jewish orthodox parties in the Knesset joined together to pass generous welfare provisions to encourage large families, a measure that had little actual effect, thanks to the subsequent erosion of the finances of the welfare system of the Israeli state under the second intifada, but nonetheless it is a tiny reminder that one-eyed stories while powerful and motivating are often simplistic, even if intentional and “strategically essentialist,” and that reality often produces confounding effects.)

Another more stereoscopic story invokes the frequent Palestinian assertion of fighting for a double revolution: against Israeli occupation, and for internal political reform. In this story Palestinian agency, independence, and identity can proceed despite contested sovereignty. In tracking the evolution of Palestinian civil society (*al-mujtama' al-madani*) and NGOs (*munazzamat ahliyya* or *munazzamat ghayr hukumiyya*), Nathan J. Brown draws analogies with political development elsewhere in the Arab world, particularly with Egypt, where political institutions were created in a long-drawn out period of contested sovereignty.<sup>5</sup> This story, Brown points out, has a double feature: on the one hand it recognizes important parallels and models for Palestine from the wider Arab world (including the administrative and legal legacies of the periods of Jordanian and Egyptian rule of the West Bank and Gaza); on the other hand it recognizes the insistence by Palestinian nationalists that authoritarianism be resisted, that Palestinian struggles for democracy can be a model and leader for the Arab world (Brown 2003: 9). Mustafa Barghouti, the physician, civil-society leader, Madrid delegate, and recent presidential candidate,<sup>6</sup> notes that “a process began of self-organizing, fostering of feelings

of self-reliance, and building civil society – beginning in the 1970s. Eventually in 1988 *'intifada'* was the name given to this process. It wasn't just throwing rocks, but it was this process of self-reliance, and civil society building. If the PLO had not spoiled the process, by now we would have had a state."<sup>7</sup> He and other members of the Third Democratic Alternative, or the Palestinian National Initiative, insisted that democratic elections precede negotiations because agreements between two democratic entities are stronger than with a nondemocratic one. Equally important in this struggle institutionally was the Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (AMAN), a coalition of six NGOs against corruption in government, a local chapter of Transparency International, led by Azmi Shuaibi, member of the Palestinian Parliament for Ramallah, and chairman of the budget committee in parliament. His faction in parliament was instrumental in pushing to create a prime minister two years before the Americans added their pressure (thereby also tainting the move as one directed from the outside), and in supporting a series of reform efforts of the American-trained Minister of Finance, Salim Fayyad, including paying security forces through direct bank deposits making the security forces and their funding more transparent and accountable (instead of by secret cash patronage).<sup>8</sup>

A parallel Israeli struggle is between democracy and an orthodoxy-disciplined theocratic unity. This struggle is riven on the one hand by class and ethnic conflicts intensified by vigorous parliamentary horse-trading among voting blocks over the passage of budget measures.<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, while from an external perspective one would expect the secular democratic forces in both the Palestinian and Israeli Jewish communities to be allies, the structure of conflict between the two national and state (or quasi-state) entities with their outside supporters seems continually to undo such possibilities (of which the near collapse of the Israeli peace lobby as a function of the second intifada is a tragic case in point, albeit determined efforts by small groups to reach across the divide continue, keeping channels open for when they can become growth points for a different kind of politics). The struggle might be called a struggle over *sovereignty* in precisely the sense of Carl Schmidt, the tragic constitutional lawyer of Weimar Germany who was co-opted into the Nazi project. Schmidt's life as a constitutional lawyer was dedicated to the questions of how constitutional democracies can incorporate and withstand forces that wish to undo them, and specifically how at moments of threat to their existence, states of exception can be invoked without those states of exception becoming permanent or normalized (Kennedy 2004).<sup>10</sup>

I will primarily use the idea of a *two-eyed story* as one that invokes at least perspectives of both Palestinians and Israelis, but obviously there are two-eyed or stereoscopic stories (which hold in sight two or more perspectives) also within Palestinian and within Israeli narratives. An important locus of the logic of the double

Palestinian revolution is in the self-organizing capacities of a society which has both a long history of working around external authorities (Ottoman, Jordanian, Israeli), and a recent history of struggle within and against the PNA leadership. Such self-organizing in Palestinian civil society bespeaks of a more complex, multistranded, history of social resources and coping mechanisms than is often recognized in news accounts or policy summaries. The Italian philosopher Paolo Virno refers to the future potentials of this logic as the promise of the virtuosity, creativity, and experimentalism of the *multitude* in contrast to older more aggregated and disciplined Hobbesian ideas of a singularized relation between state and *voice of the people* (*vox populi*) (Virno 2004). The renewed narratives of the multitude are responses today to the notions of *biopolitics* that Michel Foucault suggested arose with the development of social statistics in the eighteenth century and the growing ability of governments to regulate bodies and populations. The philosopher Adi Ophir has developed these Foucauldian ideas in observing how humanitarian efforts in the West Bank and Gaza have become regulating mechanisms for keeping populations just this side of a humanitarian crisis (a variant on the US doctrine of “low intensity conflict” [Hippler 1998]). Indeed, a recent head of the USAID mission told me quite explicitly (perhaps in frustration) that his mission was only to repair the damage to infrastructure in order to prevent such a crisis (and that was why the Israeli government allowed his office to operate).

He was willing, however, to pass me on to another US agency down the hall, the Geological Survey, which defines its mission quite differently: as building the future basis for technical capacity and cooperation among the Palestinian National Authority, Israel, and Jordan. I will refer to these narratives of cooperation, coevolution, as well as the experimentalism of the multitude as triangulation narratives (ones, that is, that hold together more than two agonistic perspectives, and more than two causal factors).

The narrative question I want to excavate here is whether we can attend to deep structural *processes* that proceed underneath or despite the frames of daily news: processes that are real and multifaceted, and that can be accounted for in narrative formats that are realistic. That is, can we construct useful, pragmatic stories that account for eventualities in other than zero-sum game terms? Non-zero-sum frames can allow the virtuosity and creativity of experimentation to increase. The Palestinian state in formation will remain for a time weak and dependent both on Israel and on the Palestinian diaspora.<sup>11</sup> But a growing civil rights movement led by Palestinians, supported by Israeli allies (the importance of such groups as B’Tselem should not be discounted), might be important resources toward the institutionalization of equal rights, accountability in governance, care for a fragile ecology, production of public goods and of social welfare, economic and entrepreneurial opportunity, and mutual recognition, respect for, and restraint in propagating

multiple religious and secular perspectives (in both Palestine and in Israel). These last, from a social-science perspective, are among the important indexes of the different interests at play that must be incorporated into a second-order (or reflexively modern) set of social institutions that might evolve from and replace the overly brittle institutions of early or first-order modernization (which included such inequalitarian structures as colonialism, the Palestinian Mandate, and dictatorial controls, both official and informal, against social disorder).<sup>12</sup>

Salim Tamari has in recent years spoken of the need to increase the size of the political pie, possibly by admission into the European Union.<sup>13</sup> As a practical matter, admission into the EU will depend upon first the admission of Turkey, which slowly will happen in the next decade, and then upon the admission of Palestine as a precondition for the admission of Israel. But as a *conceptual matter*, Tamari's idea is similar to the one just expressed above: the need to create new social, institutional, and governance forms that take advantage of contemporary tools, and which create mutually supportive infrastructures for life not just for Palestinians and Israelis but also for the many currently antagonistic factions within each of those polities.

Care for the ecologies and environment of Palestine-Israel is both a sine qua non for the future and a space that perhaps can be maintained as a demilitarized zone in this difficult, embattled, transition period. The Palestinian-Israeli agreement of February 2001 to keep the water infrastructure out of the cycle of violence is a hopeful beacon,<sup>14</sup> even while activist-scholars such as Jad Isaac keep the pressure on to recognize the compounding inequalities and injustices of that infrastructure. Demilitarized, of course, does not mean depoliticized, and the *icons of ecology*, more generally, operate in political narratives as potent symbols. *Olive groves* are a rallying point of Palestinian indignation and nationalism: As Jad Isaac and colleagues have noted, "In an attempt to protect their lands from Israel's self-proclaimed right to confiscate uncultivated lands, many Palestinians planted large areas of grazing land with olive, nut and fruit trees."<sup>15</sup> Much of the increased crop, Stuart Schoenfield notes (2005: 15), goes unsold, or is marketed only to supporters as a symbolic means of showing solidarity, *a sharp contrast and nostalgic legacy of a commercial agrarian regime in the nineteenth century* when olive oil and olive oil soap was a major commodity exported from Jabal Nablus (Doumani 1995: 14). Indeed, olive oil soap made in Nablus has been made for the last forty years from olive oil imported from Italy, caustic soda from Belgium, and salt from the Dead Sea.<sup>16</sup> These observations do not mitigate or condone the unnegotiated tearing out of thousands of old olive trees or the taking of olive grove land to construct the new "separation barrier" (fence or wall) on West Bank village land, but only to address the construction of narratives exclusively around the olive tree. *Factories* are likewise potent symbols of nineteenth-century-like class subordination, and



twentieth-century-like colonial division of labor: these are crystallized today in the oppressive conditions of Palestinian labor for Israeli capital (even when Palestinian capital is also involved) in existing and planned *industrial enclaves along the Green Line*, themselves temporary and liable to be shifted to even cheaper labor markets in Asia.<sup>17</sup> For Israelis the symbol is *computer technology* through which it has forged a postindustrial economy and niche in global markets. *These three types of economy* – agrarian, industrial, postindustrial (with their differing social relations of class, law, and politics) – *also have their ecological or environmental concomitants*. Population pressure alone is a contributing force toward intensified land use: from some 350,000 people in the early nineteenth century, half a million at the beginning of the twentieth century, to some 10 million now, with doubling rates accelerating for the moment (McCarthy 1990). And while each mode of economy could provide richer material and meaningful lives than it currently does, few scenarios have been developed with realistic strategies to prevent renewed sharpened relations of domination for the impoverished villager or laborer in a more peaceful world when capital flows in again (as it did during the Oslo Agreement period) from abroad or is mobilized by local brokers, investors, landowners, and the like. Such scenarios should be triangular in contrast to one-eyed “olive narrative” and “two-eyed” factory narratives (two-eyed insofar as they draw upon either solidarity of workers across ethnic lines, or recognition of the use by capitalism to divide labor by creating and reinforcing ethnic inequalities).

### III: FROM ONE-EYED STORIES OF MASTERY, POSSESSION, AND IDENTITY TO DOUBLE-VOICED STORIES OF RECOGNITION

One-eyed narratives are often romantic and nostalgic claims to an identity of land and people, grounded in agrarian worlds of putative origins.<sup>18</sup> Not only is the discourse of origins often a modernist technique of purification,<sup>19</sup> but, as Stuart Schoenfeld points out, nation-building narratives that deploy nostalgic environmental discourses are also often internally contradictory, wanting both nationalist development and preservation of the environment.

From a narrative point of view there are three important things to be said about such environmental narratives. First, one needs to show how these narratives essentialize and falsify, sometimes intentionally for legitimate strategic reasons, but often thereafter falling into ignorant misrecognition of complex realities. The accusations by Palestinians that Israelis are polluting their lands, and by Israelis that Palestinians are not doing enough to protect the land can both be true, and still miss the fact, as Alon Tal points out in *Pollution in a Promised Land*, that Israel as the wealthier and more powerful party itself has not developed much of a green consciousness (see also Weintheil and Parag 2003). The narratives of smuggling and corruption are highly relevant here as hybrid narratives between the

discourses of legality and illegality (i.e. of governance) and those of economics (or of black markets wherever white markets do not work). As important as it is for the Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem (ARIJ) to track where Israelis illegally dump toxic waste in the West Bank, it is equally important to know the economic incentives – that it costs \$65 to hire a driver to dump a five-ton truckload of chemical waste in Azzun, when it would cost \$11,000 to dispose of the same waste in Ramat Hovay (the only approved dump site for toxic chemicals in Israel).<sup>20</sup> Gidon Bromberg of Ecopeace notes that as dumps are being closed in Israel, the incentives to dump in the West Bank rise.<sup>21</sup> Indeed more generally, green consciousness in one country tends to imperialize surrounding territories, and thus requires regional and even global green consciousness.

Second, one needs to analyze how one-eyed narratives are strategically deployed. The anthropological linguist William O. Beeman argues (provocatively) that Iranian and American diplomats have enmeshed themselves in structures of cultural miscommunication, constructing mythic images to demonize the other and then fulfill the worst expectations of the other. Mythologies of the other are ideological filters, and they are reinforced by asymmetric and mutually misunderstood communicative structures.<sup>22</sup> In the case of Iran and the US, he argues (again provocatively), although there are real consequences, in fact neither is really a threat to the other, it is all for the moment mainly highly symbolic, but no less upsetting for all that.

I want to be clear here: I do not intend in any way to discount the stakes, injustices, or cynical geopolitics in the Middle East. What I mean to do is highlight the consequential nature of the narratives that are deployed in the conflict, some of which intentionally and some of which unintentionally block communication with the other. And here it is important to map the language games, the myths, and the strategic interests at play in the agons of one-eyed stories, as Itay Greenspan does so brilliantly in his account of regional environmental meetings (Greenspan 2005). It is quite stunning in a Freudian way to recognize that when Israelis speak of environment as a regional issue that needs transnational cooperation, they can ignore the Palestinians, and look to the Mediterranean states; and the Palestinians in parallel fashion can claim to be looking to Arab states, ignoring the Israelis. I think of this as a quasi-Freudian scene, not because it is inconceivable that the separation wall could in time turn the West Bank to have to look economically to Amman rather than Tel Aviv, but because for the immediate future – to stick with the toxic-waste issue – “the West Bank is suffering the overspill of a profound Israeli ecological crisis.”<sup>23</sup>

To fashion a narrative that says only that Israel is poisoning the West Bank is to ignore for example the highly publicized collapse of the Yarkon River bridge in July 1997 in which four Australian athletes died from the toxic water, or the concerns about the Kishon River near

Haifa that Greenpeace has tried to publicize.<sup>24</sup> It is to ignore that as Israel begins to enforce rules against pollution, incentives rise to push factories from Israel to cheaper and under-policed sites in the West Bank (see n.12).<sup>25</sup> (Parallel to toxic-waste disposal stories.)

Just as in the nationalist romantic narratives there are contradictions, the effort to create either accusatory or victim narratives deprive the narrators of checks against sloppy use of statistics. (Even Jad Issac and ARIJ – whose work I very much value, not only their mapping, but also the sleuthing, and tracking of toxic dumping, species destruction, etc. – can say on the same page that in November 1947 the Arabs rejected the partition plan that granted the Jews who represented 7 percent of the total population 52 percent of the land; and that in 1936 there were 348,000 Jews and 978,000 Arabs. He can give the impression that when the Israelis stripped the trees off Abu Ghnam outside Beit Sahour, near Bethlehem, they were destroying the primary or primordial growth of the hill, but at the same time he can say that those hills were planted with 72,000 trees only in 1967–1972 by the Israeli and Jordanian governments.<sup>26</sup> The struggles become more complicated as one includes not just competitive forestation, arson by Palestinian militants, destruction by Israel for development and security fences, but also planting by Israel of monocultural pines, and destruction of olive and other fruit orchards.) My point is not to take issue with Jad Isaac, but to assert a claim for more comprehensive mapping, more polyphonic narration, more mis-en-scène vision with room for multiple points of view, not for neutral balance, but to give us a pragmatic handle on how to intervene effectively, which means also enrolling more allies.

The third thing to be said about one-eyed narratives is that simply playing them off against one another, as in the dueling videos, the Palestinian *Jenin, Jenin*, and the Israeli *Jenin, Massacring Truth*, does not really help achieve much of a useful stereoscopic view, since each is so one-eyed.<sup>27</sup>

The narrative justifications for *naming, mapping, and photographing*, as well as the selective preservation of archeological digs, are mythic in their power and subject to one-eyed, two-eyed, and triangular use. Photography can partake of the narrative power of depicting things as if there were only one lens through which to see. On the other hand, while photographs can become conventionalized clichés, and increasingly can be edited and manipulated to convey misleading impressions, *photographs of destruction and ruins, and double views of past and present* can be used to recapture a sense of how the double relations of possession and dispossession operate, as well as how new modes of production replace older ones in both their beauty and their violence. Similarly, while the remapping of the land with Hebrew names – as Meron Benvenisti outlines in *Sacred Landscapes: The Buried History of the Holy Land Since 1948* – was explicitly a nationalist taking of possession and assertion of identity, as were the counterefforts by Israeli-Palestinian geographer Shukri 'Arraf and

Palestinian scholar Mustafa al-Dabbagh and others (including the Israeli Yeshayahu Press in his *Topographical-Historical Encyclopedia of the Land of Israel*) to record and map the thousands of Arabic names of villages, shrines, and other geographic names, only the combined mapping of the two begins to approach doing justice to the history of the land (work being continued today by the activist Israeli group *Zukhronot*, fem. pl. for “memories”). Both Hebrew and Arabic claims to *identity* are rife with efforts to deny the close cognate borrowings across Aramaic, Greek, Latin, Hebrew, and Arabic, as well as to chart the new names introduced into various overlays of the rich and dense palimpsest of history.<sup>28</sup> Take only as a minor example, the names Palestine, Philistine (Palestina, name of a Roman province, from Greek Palaistina in Herodotus), Hebrew Pelesheth, Egyptian *prst* or Peleset.<sup>29</sup> Philistia was the coast from Jaffa south to Gerar, occupied by Avims from Cush, who were conquered by “strangers” or Philistines, one of the Sea Peoples that invaded from the Aegean, Anatolia, or possibly further West. The Philistines established five cities: Gaza, Ashdod, Askelon, Gath, Ekron along the Stella Maris, the caravan route between Egypt and Assyria. The Greek port, dating back to the eighth century BCE was called Anthedon.

Viewing these identity processes together may help move toward a double- or multiple-voiced process of mutual recognition from which a viable future can be built. Mutual recognition is not some easy touchy-feely process. It is all too often a quite painful opening to the experiential resources and ghosts of the past, in the hope that they can work themselves out productively, rather than developing into encrypted and repressed land mines that will become destabilizing and unexpectedly eruptive in the future. This is not only a utopian formulation, but also a psychiatric one, indebted to the work and insights of Eyyad el-Sarraj on the interacting traumas of Palestinians and Israelis, and to his heroic steadfast example that through addressing these matters, mutual recognition can become a way out of the cycles of violence toward forging more bearable worlds to come.

One might here read the changes from the Ottoman period to the present of the Palestine hill country, Palestine–Israel aquifer, Jordan Valley, and coastal plain wadi systems using Jad Isaac’s maps, Samer Alatout’s work on the building of the water infrastructure in the Ottoman and Mandate periods, and Benjamin Kedar’s book of aerial photos between the First World War and today.<sup>30</sup> These maps, infrastructures, and photographs might be supplemented with the narratives of historical landscapes by Benvenisti, archeological framings by Abu al-Haj, and several travelers, including perhaps the trope used by the *Boston Globe*’s correspondent Charles Sennott of retracing the sites of Jesus’ life today in order in part to track the decline of Christian communities (Sennott 2001), the travel of filmmakers Michel Khleifi and Eyal Sivan across Palestine–Israel in 2002 on “Route 181,” and perhaps even for a long view, Steven Mithen’s account of earliest settlement and archeology (2004).

#### **IV: FROM STEREOSCOPE TO TRIANGULATION: NARRATIVES OF COEVOLUTION, BIOPOLITICS, AND THE CREATIVITY OF MULTITUDES AND REFLEXIVE SECOND- ORDER MODERNITIES**

One way to construct double-voiced and stereoscopic narratives is to focus on environmental problems on both sides of the Green Line that confront both Palestinians and Israelis: these include toxic-waste stories, water stories, stories about urban environments, medical and epidemiological stories, and animal and biodiversity stories. To integrate such stories into fuller triangulation frameworks requires attention to larger formats and historical structural processes. By larger formats, I am thinking of such analytic devices as maps, tableaux, scenario or virtual modeling, temporal understanding of structural processes, and rhythmic temporalities of storytelling. By historical and structural processes I mean the narratives of political economy (the shifts from agrarian to industrial to postindustrial modes of production), of biopolitics and sovereignty, ecology (the rule that you cannot change only one thing), the sociological or organization shifts to second-order modernization and grammars of the multitude or civil-society experimentalism, and the shifts from stories of zero-sum game societies of scarcity to non-zero-sum game stories of societies of affluence.

*Toxic-waste stories* are particularly good narratives for bringing together political economy, the history of citizen organizations, and health concerns (such as cancer clusters). The history of major toxic-waste and industrial accidents (Minamata, Love Canal, Bhopal, Chernobyl, Woburn) is a history that highlights the necessity for grassroots organizing, sustained over decades. In almost all these cases the pattern is quite similar: citizens recognize health problems, ask for government epidemiology, government and corporations deny that anything wrong could have happened, citizens are forced to collect their own scientific evidence that is good enough to hold up in court. In Minamata the struggle went on for thirty years; in Bhopal new charges were being filed in 2004 on the twentieth anniversary. In the case of the West Bank and Gaza, and Israel, a key component of the story involves the black market, smuggling, and corruption (Abu Issa 2004; Almog 2004), which is only to say that the problem is more complicated than simply pointing fingers at governments or regulators. One of the virtues of good journalism and good social history is tracing out the networks of who is involved and what the (rational or not) incentives are.

*Water stories* bring together a different combination of factors. Here the terrain perhaps is one of a gradual shift between stories of fixed resources to stories of trade goods. Any account of environmental and ecological issues must deal centrally with whether or not this is a case where, as some economists claim, cooperative planning can in fact expand the overall availability and efficiency of use of water for domestic, agricultural, and industrial purposes (Fisher 2004;

Allan 1996 n.d.), and whether “trading water as an alternative to engineering it” is not already a fact (since the 1970s almost all Middle East countries have ceased to feed themselves) (Allan n.d.).<sup>31</sup> Indeed Allan and Karshenas argue that while we are often warned that water will run out in the near future, it has already in fact run out “two or three decades ago” in the sense of providing water for all uses and food self-sufficiency (1996: 121). On the one hand, predicted wars over water have not happened because “virtual water” can be, and is being, substituted via imports of water-intensive food staples. On the other hand, this allows the seriousness of the water issues to be underestimated: of the five countries of the Jordan water catchment basin, only Lebanon has not experienced severe water deficits since the 1960s; and the problem intensifies if one assumes that the population will at least double in the coming thirty years.

Three sorts of water-management stories triangulate beyond one-eyed stories of ownership and water rights,<sup>32</sup> or two-eyed stories of drought: (a) scenarios of aquifer management and desalination under conditions of a doubling of population in the next thirty years and under the demand of equal provision of minimal water requirements per capita of 100 cmc per year; (b) demand management including new technologies of water reuse, conservation infrastructure retrofitting, and reduction of allocation to agriculture; and (c) the Karshenas model of transition from primary resource exploitation to a diversified economy in which costs can be shifted (Allan and Karshenas 1996). This last does not require, but could be helped by including the Coase theorem (Coase 1960; Fisher 2004), which suggests that use can be cooperatively allocated in a way that expands benefits to all, while ownership remains contested.

At issue are the efforts by Israel to cut water allocations to agriculture not only during droughts, but also below aquifer replenishment levels (as was not the case before 1990), the efforts to reclaim and reuse wastewater, and to introduce demand management (water conservation technologies).<sup>33</sup> Israel has long been a leader in eliminating gravity irrigation in favor of drip systems and measuring incremental contributions to yields, as well as a leader in municipal wastewater reprocessing and reuse.<sup>34</sup> One-eyed stories that (correctly) point out that well over half of Israeli water use goes to agriculture (contributing only 2 percent of GDP) often fail to acknowledge (two-eyed) that across the region 80 percent of water goes to agriculture and contributes some 20 percent of GDP. The stories are one-eyed insofar as they are part of Palestinian claims that they should be getting a larger share of the water; and two-eyed insofar as Israel's usage patterns are compared to those in other countries in the region. Although it had been acknowledged for some time that Israel had been withdrawing more water than the aquifers could replenish, the severe droughts of the late 1980s made it politically possible to overcome the agricultural lobbies and for the Water Commissioner not only to make temporary cuts in allocation for irrigated agriculture but

also to publicly announce a goal of reducing annual water allocation to agriculture by 65 percent, thereby increasing pressure for reuse of cleaned wastewater. Israel has achieved a 25 percent reduction of water allocation to agriculture. This is what would be predicted in general by the Karshenas model of transition from a phase of overexploitation of “environmental capital” and into a diversified economy, which can institute a sustainable model of environmental resource use. As Palestinians argue, Israel is not a lone party to the water resources of the Jordan catchment basin or the mountain aquifer, and there are inequities of per capita domestic water use of the order of 100 cmc (Israel) versus 30 cmc or below (West Bank and Gaza). Shual does some rough calculations of what the water balance would look like in 2025 under conditions of continued population growth with equitable minimal water requirements of 100 cmc for all in the region, and comes up short even if all surpluses are transferred to deficit nations. This sort of scenario is the justification for invoking the Coase theorem, which separates ownership from cooperative use, allowing multiplier effects of cooperation to proceed even while ownership might be contested. Water desalination costs continue to come down below the half dollar per cubic meter level, and plants are beginning to be built in Gaza and elsewhere.<sup>35</sup> (Compare the calculated real cost of delivery of water for irrigated farming of 65 cents, and the subsidized cost to Israeli farmers in 1994 of 20–25 cents.) Strange results can abound: Saudi Arabia has become the sixth largest world exporter of wheat thanks to desalinated water (Kurbusi 2005).

While one-eyed Palestinian stories of rights to water originating in the West Bank are both practically, and by international law, overdrawn (the water naturally flows out in springs on Israeli territory; international law does not recognize exclusive control by origin, and in fact recognizes prior use as a valid claim to water rights as well as claims for minimal water requirements by all parties to shared transborder waters), so too are former Israeli Minister of Agriculture Raphael Etan’s 1990 public assertions that Israel could not give up control of any West Bank territories for fear that Palestinians would claim all water originating in the West Bank to be theirs and their goal of returning large numbers of the Palestinian diaspora to the West Bank would further deplete water resources, potentially cutting off 300 million cmc/year and thereby imperiling the physical existence of Israel.

One reading of the Harvard model (Fisher 2004) is that it fits too neatly with Israeli assertions of sovereignty and disallows Palestinian insistence that water ownership rights need to be equitably settled first before any cooperation. Another reading is that since Israel insists it will not endanger its existence by giving up control, one could create new cooperative conditions that in the longer run would allow Israel to be less rigid, and that would build upon the fact that the two populations and nations are inextricably intertwined in their

dependence, rights, and ability to tap the water, as well as enmeshed in wider ecologies of the Jordan River watershed and beyond.<sup>36</sup>

Jan Selby (2003) points out, in his account of how Israel maintains control over water, that the real politics is in the infrastructure, not so much in overall water scarcity, that settlers in the West Bank systematically have access to continuous water through large pipes, while Palestinian villages have much smaller pipes often connected in ways that ensure that the settlers get water when supplies are low, and that the Oslo Agreements which estimated new water sources in the Eastern aquifer have proved to be wildly overstated. But in his account too, the complications of a weak Palestinian state (i.e. the Palestinian Authority) are not trivial in being unable to control local patrimonial or clan structures, factional politics, or the demands of private contractors working for international donors.

In any case, what is moderately encouraging is that at least in this area, expert models, international law, and practical agreements (such as the agreement to keep the water infrastructure out of the current cycle of violence, and USAID access to support repair of infrastructure) provide one, however fragile, basis for triangular narratives that are not one-eyed, single-cause, or zero-sum games.

### **Urban stories: Jerusalem, regional cities, and refugee camps**

Jerusalem is often said to be among the most Gordian of knots in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and yet it is also a model of complications, negotiations, and pressures that will not go away, and that will thus be part of an ongoing fabric of urban development. The searing and disturbing account by Amir S. Cheshin, Bill Hutman, and Avi Melamed of the failure of the Jerusalem municipality to provide services to East Jerusalem Arab neighborhoods provides important materials in the search for useable narratives, because they identify the ways in which people do survive, and how, with mobilization, change might be made to occur (see also the very useful compilation of statistics and institutions on Palestinians as well as Israelis living in Jerusalem in Khamaisi and Nasrallah 2003). Together with the several joint Palestinian-Israeli drafts for ways to exercise joint, dual, or divided co-sovereignty over an undivided city, these provide another potential basis for triangular narratives that are not one-eyed, single-cause, or zero-sum games. The existence of a Palestinian parliament building in Abu Dis, like that of the Knesset building in West Jerusalem outside the Old City, could be revived as a way of recognizing the separation of modern governance on the one hand, and religious sacrality and historical attachments on the other hand.<sup>37</sup>

The struggles for a viable governance of Jerusalem might be seen in tandem with what Salim Tamari has outlined as the shifts in the politics and poetics of the Palestinian movement since 1976 and 1987 more generally. “The assertion of national identity by Palestinians in the Galilee on Land Day 1976,” he writes, “established



the struggle for equality within Israeli society as a legitimate and recognized current within Palestinian politics” (Tamari 1999: 4). In parallel fashion, the intifada of 1987 “redressed the imbalance in the hegemony of the Palestine Liberation Organization over the ‘forces of the inside’” (ibid.). This is a struggle that was openly in evidence during the presidential elections of January 2005 after the death of Yasser Arafat. As Tamari says, the politics and poetics of exile were so dominant before 1987 “that the conditions, aspirations and outlook of those Palestinians who remained in Palestine (almost half of the total number of Palestinians) were virtually forgotten” and “rendered an abstract object of glorification” (ibid.). The intifada and the subsequent establishment of the Palestinian National Authority after 1994 leveraged structural shifts in West Bank and Gaza Palestinian politics from localism toward a more national community, and in the PLO from social bases rooted in refugee camps outside Palestine and in the mercantile and professional classes in the Gulf (and Jordan) to social bases within the West Bank and Gaza. Here the refugee camps, Tamari notes, were more “continuous with the peasantry of the Palestinian highlands and their regional elites ... whose power, wealth, and prestige derived from networks of kinship and putative identity rooted distinctively in Nablus, Hebron, Jerusalem, and Bethlehem” (ibid.: 6). It was with the 1996 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Assembly that these regional identities with their distinctive dialects and patronage began to shift toward the election of candidates with a more national consciousness. He credits the return of the exiled PLO with not only helping an initial state formation but also with integrating regional identities within a larger national formation, something that had been impossible during the previous twenty-nine years of Israeli rule. By the same token, the PLO ideology had to shift from the pre-1987 strategy of liberation (“redemption through return”) to a strategy of independence through compromise and dialogue.

This account puts the urban stories of not only Nablus, Hebron, Jerusalem, and Bethlehem, but also Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqiliya, Ramallah, Jericho, Gaza, and especially the refugee camps associated with them into a pragmatic and evolving social context.<sup>38</sup> The refugee camps, as Helene Seren’s important work attests, are urban in everyday life, while still structured by a politics and poetics of exile and redemption through return. The stories of violating the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) rules against multistorey buildings, and of the progress in street paving, clean water, and sewage-pipe provision, and of, in many places, the inability of an outsider to tell where city ends and camp begins, are expressions of the pragmatics of everyday life.

### Medical stories

Health and environment are closely related. The human side of this is the pulling apart of the Israeli and Palestinian medical systems,

and the struggle within the Palestinian medical system for a more decentralized health-care system. The story of the Palestinian health-care system is itself a complex one, depending initially upon *waqf* (religious foundation, property dedicated for the support of a shrine, educational establishment, or other specified purpose) and philanthropic private hospitals as the focal apex of referrals from primary care. Many Palestinian physicians during the Cold War were trained in the Soviet Union and returned with an ideology of distributed, decentralized care at odds with the centralized ideology of both the private philanthropic system and the emergent new Palestinian National Authority's Ministry of Health. With the outbreak of the second intifada, there was an effort at disengagement from the Israeli health-care system (though referrals to the Hadassah Medical Center continue, and the latter remains firmly and proudly committed to care for Palestinians through the worst moments of conflict), but furthermore the exigencies of checkpoints imposed at some 700 sites in the West Bank by the Israeli military administration worked in favor of the ideology of decentralized care coming to fruition (Barnea and Husseini 2002). Among the most important of the Palestinian efforts at coordination of more local clinics is the Medical Relief Association headed by Dr Mustafa Barghouti, supplemented by more peripatetic efforts of the weekly work by Israeli and Palestinian doctors and nurses through Physicians for Human Rights. But of equal interest is the informal network of midwives (the subject of a dissertation study by MIT STS graduate student Livia Wick) whose contribution to distributed care is bolstered in the classic struggle between midwives and physicians over control of prenatal, birthing, and neonatal care.

### **Animal and biodiversity stories**

Flora and fauna are not only important in their own right, but are also ecological-environmental sensors and signals of profound changes in the overall system. Here ecological stories could provide both practical indexes and conceptual models for triangulated worlds of entanglements, interactions, and implications, and the impossibilities of achieving “perfect control.” The work of the Palestine Wildlife Society, directed by Imad Atrash, is important here. The story of the draining of the Hula wetlands and later efforts to restore part of it is a cautionary exemplar, but I am aware of relatively few such narrative efforts. Current projects to study water basins across the Green Line from the West Bank highlands to the Mediterranean, including that of the Middle East Environmental Futures Project (MEEFP) to study the wadi systems from Hebron (al-Khalil) to Beersheva to Gaza, may help provide such triangulated narratives, and historical aerial photography such as that provided in Kedar may help provide temporal dimensions.

The recent Iranian film, *The Canary*, written and directed by Javad Ardakani-Movagati, with a Palestinian cast, and set in Gaza, treats this

in an affecting, if somewhat clichéd, way,<sup>39</sup> as did the news photos of the Gaza zoo destroyed by an Israeli army incursion against tunnels of arms smugglers.<sup>40</sup> The trope of zoos destroyed is an old one from the Second World War, the Balkans, and elsewhere; it is a trope of innocence exposed to a war-torn world, and one kind of caged care exchanged for abandonment and constraints of a different kind. These are one-eyed stories, but they are a start.

## V: AND LIFE TO COME

I have attempted to show the utility of three kinds of narrative heuristics. Environmental topics provide one kind or set of stories. In order to expand its (explanatory, normative, or contestatory) power, each of these topics, domains, or spatial terrains is open toward more triangulated framings (represented sometimes as multiple map overlays). These terrains include: toxics and the need for second-order or reflexive institutions of modernization; water and the need for getting beyond zero-sum games; urban public goods and infrastructures; medical services and distributed care; animals and biodiversity and the need to pay attention to feedback that signals our inability to achieve perfect control and hence dependence on one another as well as the environments we create around us.

A second cross-cutting set of stories or narrative heuristics are what I've called: *single-eyed stories* of identity, ownership, interest, and mastery; *double-voiced stories* of mutual recognition, sub-versions, and alternative realities; and *triangulated stories* of polyvocal, interactive, risk-taking experimentalism utilizing such devices as tableaux, maps, scenarios, virtual models, and historical palimpsests. Voicings, perspectives, and modes of mapping are, sociolinguistically speaking, matters of pragmatics and metapragmatics: they articulate relations of power, and their forms can fold into one another. Triangulated stories can be open, labile, and reconfigurable, but they can also be made frozen or closed, making claims to a higher level of overview and grasp of reality ("if only you gave up your claims, everyone would benefit," "experts and planners know best"). So too, one-eyed stories can be strategic reminders that someone's perspective has not been adequately attended to; they can be disempowering perspectives that block communication, negotiation, and sympathy from others; or they can be quite intentional strategic ploys to play "hard ball." Double-voiced, stereoscopic stories sociolinguistically can merely index the relative power of players secure enough to at least see or acknowledge the other side's point of view and anxieties; but two-eyed stories can also work as genuine dialogue or exchange of knowledges.<sup>41</sup> Paying attention to the number of voices and perspectives, interests and structural forces, and to their pragmatic deployments, helps keep these narrative forms open and useful.

A third set of cross-cutting stories contains *processual narratives of structural transformation*. These include *political economies* (agrarian, industrial, and postindustrial modes of production), *second-order*

*modernization* (institutions, modes of accounting, regulatory infrastructures), or *biopolitical* forms of governance from societies of discipline to societies of control or regulation (by codes, flows, distributed feedback, desubjugated knowledges, and capillaries of micropower);<sup>42</sup> *ecological feedback systems* (you cannot change only one thing); and new *grammars of multitude* or modes of enhanced self-organized civil-society coordination that can either work around governments and bureaucracies or can create public spheres as spaces from which to address and pressure government from civil-society constituencies.

Samer Alataout (2005) provocatively speculates about the narrative disjunction between Palestinian obsessions with *sovereignty* (control of territory) and Israeli obsessions, vis-à-vis Palestinians, with *biopolitics* (control of populations or quality of life). In my schema this could be either a difference between one-eyed narratives or a difference (as Foucault might have suggested) between phases in the processes of structural transformation from sovereign power to disciplinary power to regulatory power. These are not relations of replacement, but supplementation, extension, and reworking; and the latter two forms of power spill across national territories. Control of territory, Baruch Kimmerling notes, citing Ottoman legal precedents, can have to do with any of three factors: presence, ownership, or political sovereignty (Cohen 1993: 5). Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem does not lessen the productivities and contestations of various kinds of biopolitical apparatuses and desubjugated knowledges arising from the Palestinian populations of East Jerusalem. Inversely Israeli concern with control of subaltern labor, the movement of hostile militants, black markets in everything from drugs to guns, and the “demographic threat” is expressed through an insistence over border and territorial control (and sovereignty) without thereby lessening the economic need for subaltern populations and the challenges they bring to control.<sup>43</sup> Triangulated narratives (in which multiple perspectives are constantly “in play,” in contestation, and negotiation, revising and reframing one another) can direct attention to the instabilities in deadlocked positions, allowing them to surface, reconfigure alliances, and creatively open new social possibilities (as well as no doubt new conflicts).

In films such as *Arna's Children*,<sup>44</sup> and *Divine Intervention*,<sup>45</sup> and *West Bank Brooklyn*,<sup>46</sup> there are hints of possible worlds to come. Cooperation and communication happens not only through NGOs like Friends of the Middle East, not only through such institutional mechanisms as the Joint Water Committee (however rickety), nor only through academic and professional connections such as that supported by the US Geological Survey, or in workshop efforts such as the Middle East Environmental Project. All these together in their differences must build into multitudes that are part of growing a civil society that insists on transparency, accountability, and pragmatic problem solving, as well as the needs for basic security and for

civil rights and justice. But perhaps there is an even simpler, more courageous, and more powerful appeal of the various films cited as cultural ambassadors (not just performing cultural critique): the ability to use humor about the undersides, foibles, and real contradictions of one's own people to humanize them to the other, to desubjectivize oneself from one's own ideological defenses and armor in order to make both the call of one's own "face" and that of the "other" available to one another.

## NOTES

1. An early version of this paper was presented at a MEEF (Middle East Environmental Futures) workshop at York University (Schoenfeld 2005), and I am grateful for the feedback of the participants, particularly those of Samer Alatout, Tariq Talameh, Yaakov Garb, and Dan Rabinowitz. A later version benefited from a workshop at the University of California, Irvine, hosted by Kaushik Sunder Rajan, and particularly from the suggestions and close reading of Joe Dumit.
2. Heterotopia, suggested by some readers, is only an approximate term. Technically in radiology and in Michel Foucault's usage, heterotopias are isolated spaces. In radiology, gray-matter heterotopias are collections of nerve cells in abnormal locations, often associated with structural abnormalities and sometimes with such behavioral disorders as seizures. Similarly Foucault (1967) illustrates his notion of multiple overlapping times and spaces as relatively isolated loci such as museums, libraries, festivals, cemeteries. They can function to represent and contest other aspects of society, much as Adorno's notion of art, or Benjamin's dialectical images, or Bakhtin's carnivalesque, heterogeneous chronotopes, or internal conversation and speech registers. Such heterotopias do already exist for environmental studies in Palestine and Israel: the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies is an example where Palestinians, Jordanians, and Israelis live and study together struggling with their different narratives, points of view, and environmental imperatives. But here I am interested in the methodological processes beyond isolated spaces of inserting variables and points of view that systematically engage other variables and points of view. The geodetic analogy of triangulation seems more methodologically apt than a summary term like heterotopia.
3. The language of "folds" and "topologies" is developed in the work of Lacan for thinking about how psychological processes grow over time, both separating earlier understandings from later phases and also continuously building upon those earlier paradoxes, inabilities, failures of understanding, and limited perspectives in both conscious and unconscious ways (displacement, secondary revision, etc.). This essay is not the place to develop these possibilities further, but they might provide the connection between the

more “macro” narrative elements explored here and the richness of complex individual actions and justifications, more usefully explored through life histories, vignettes, anecdotes, and parables. On topologies in this sense, see especially Ellie Ragland and Dragan Milovanovic (2004).

4. Saeb Erekat, June 9, 2005, Jericho; Omar Barghouti, January 5, 2004, Jerusalem FFIPP Conference. The latter believes in a single democratic secular state; the former sees it also as something that many in the Palestinian leadership are beginning to argue is a *de facto* outcome of Israel's policies. In a different vein, but similarly, the Israeli writer, Meron Benvenisti, January 5, 2004, Jerusalem, argues that although many organizational and political formulations are possible, the social and demographic reality is an intertwined unity. Hanan Ashrawi (June 9, 2005) still argues that a two state solution is the only viable political resolution for the foreseeable future, both because Israelis are committed to a Jewish state, and Palestinians do not want to give up their aspiration for sovereignty. Mustafa Barghouti, of course, in the above comment foregrounds the agency of narrative frames themselves, a kind of triangulation whereby he is himself potentially absorbed by the hegemonic or naturalizing power of a narrative. While he no doubt would be in favor of Omar Barghouti's position in the long run, in the short run he espouses the position articulated by Hanan Ashrawi.
5. “Like Israel in the West Bank and Gaza, Great Britain never annexed Egypt even as its presence became increasingly intrusive . . . When Britain decided to withdraw from Egypt – partly in response to a popular uprising in 1919 – it subjected its 1922 acceptance of Egyptian independence to four reservations (involving the Suez Canal, foreigners, foreign and security policy, and the Sudan). Full British acceptance of Egyptian sovereignty took over a decade to negotiate, and British troops remained in the country until the 1950s. The French acceptance of Syrian and Lebanese independence was less drawn out, but it was equally complicated . . .” (Brown 2003: 15).
6. A physician trained in the Soviet Union, with an MBA from Stanford, and founder and President of the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC), he is more recently a cofounder and Secretary of the Palestinian National Initiative, a democratic opposition movement. In the 2005 presidential elections, he ran a distant second to Fatah unity candidate, Muhammad Abbas (Abu Mazen).
7. January 7, 2004, at the Ramallah offices of the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees.
8. January 7, 2004, Ramallah. Under the prime ministership of Abu Mazen, a National Committee for Reform was established, following the issuance of a formal report on corruption by a four-member committee including Shuaibi and Hannan Ashrawi; and

Arafat agreed in 2002 to being made responsible to the Palestinian Legislative Council.

The leadership of the secular democratic wing of the second intifada comes from the young professors at the time of the first intifada (1987–1992): Hanan Ashrawi, Azmi Bishara, and Qasim al-Khatib were professors at Bir Zeit, and became respectively the first Palestinian Minister of Education (and spokesperson for the Madrid Peace Conference), Knesset Member, and Minister of Labor; Sari Nusseibeh was a professor at Bethlehem University and became president of Al-Qods University; Abdel Satar Qasim was a professor at Al Najah University in Nablus and became a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and the challenger to Yasser Arafat in the 1989 elections. Marwan Barghouti, slightly younger, was a leader of the Shabiba Student Mvmt at Bir Zeit (Fatah slate). The members of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid negotiations were largely from the universities, and those negotiations were the result of the first intifada, bringing that phase to a close. The number of university students has continued to grow from 22,750 in 1993 to over 60,000 in 2000.

9. For a lively cinematic presentation, see Avi Neshet's 2003 film, *Turn Left at the End of the World*; for a more scholarly presentation, see Shafir and Peled (2002), and Shafir (1996). Neshet's film portrays the immigration of middle-class Moroccans and Indians into development towns where they have no choice but to work in factories in impossible labor conditions. Neshet says, as does Ra'anan Alexandrowicz about his film about an African immigrant caught in the shadow world of undocumented workers, that each generation of immigrants is screwed by the previous wave of immigrants. Both have intertextual references to Ephraim Kishon's *Sallah Shabati* (1964) about Moroccan immigrants in the 1950s. One of the central motifs in Alexandrowicz's film is the drive not to be a frayer (a sucker), and how that trope, fear, and survival mentality, can be corrosive of friendship and other humane values.
10. Rather than in the sense of Agamben, whose adaptation of "sovereignty" and "states of exception," while derived partly from Schmidt and partly from Walter Benjamin's "states of emergency" in an attempt to revise Foucault's *biopolitics* for the Second World War and after, has been usefully criticized by Malcolm Bull (2004).
11. Despite the efforts to use guest workers from elsewhere in the world, the Israeli and Palestinian economies remain intertwined. Meron Rappaport reports that in 2001, a year after the second intifada began, 86 percent of imports to Palestine came from Israel and 64 percent of exports went to Israel. Moreover, the Palestinian Authority was Israel's third most important trade partner after the EU and the US (*Le Monde Diplomatique*, June 4, 2004, pp. 6–7).

12. I take the notions of first- and second-order modernization from Ulrich Beck (1986), and the discussion this has sparked among Beck, Anthony Giddens, Scott Lash, John Urry, and others (see also Fischer 2003).
13. Tamari, Salim. FIPP Conference, Tel Aviv University, June 2003.
14. Joint Declaration for Keeping the Water Infrastructure out of the Cycle of Violence (see [www.us-israel.org/jsource/Peace/jtwater.html](http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Peace/jtwater.html)).
15. Schoenfeld (2005: 15) quoting a 1992 ARIJ report (Hosh, Miller, and Isaac).
16. In June 2005, there were only three soap factories left in Nablus, and exports to Amman and Damascus were hampered by the intifada-induced closures, curfews, and permission denials by the Israeli army.
17. After the 1993 Oslo Accords, Israeli and Palestinian officials agreed to create nine industrial estates along the Green Line from Jenin to Rafah to provide some 100,000 jobs for Palestinians. The industrial estate near Eretz on the Gaza border is an example, providing 4,500 jobs in 200 factories. An effort to establish a similar industrial estate at Tulkarem was attacked early in the second intifada, but still operates with 500 jobs; the largest of the factories at Tulkarem is a chemical and pesticide factory, relocated from Netanya, which the PA has demanded be removed from nearby population centers (an “environmental justice” struggle over where to locate toxic production). According to *Le Monde Diplomatique*, with the construction of the separation wall, the plans for these industrial estates have been revived, the idea being that Palestinians can enter from the West Bank side but not into Israel, so both security and economic goals can be pursued. The Palestinian construction magnate, Abdel-Malek Jaber – owner of the Palestinian Estate Development Company (Pedco), who claims to also be close to the PA Minister of Industry Maher al-Masri – is one of the key players in this effort. Work has begun at Jalama, north of Jenin, opposite Irtah, funded jointly by Israeli and Palestinian entrepreneurs. Five hundred dunams of Irtah were confiscated and are now on the Israeli side of the fence, and Jaber says he purchased land from Palestinians on the other side. He says he has identified other sites near Bethlehem, Rafah, and Tarkunia near Hebron. Each of these sites should provide 15,000 jobs. He points out that just for the current unemployment levels to be maintained, the Palestinian economy would have to grow at 7–8 percent a year (Rappaport, Meron, “Israel: industrial estates along the wall,” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, June 4, 2004, pp. 6–7).
18. On the misrecognitions of “beginnings” and “origins” discourse see Edward Said (1985) and Michel Serres (1991).
19. On modernity as a vain effort at purified concepts and institutions, see Bruno Latour (1993).



20. [www.amenusa.org/isr31.htm](http://www.amenusa.org/isr31.htm).
21. It may well be that in some cases, there are Israeli settlers who deliberately pollute the West Bank as a tactic of “soft transfer” (the effort to make life so miserable that Palestinians will just leave), but in the case of larger-scale commercial dumping of toxics, it would seem that the economic incentives and disincentives provide more powerful dynamics.
22. For instance, Beeman (2005) writes, after the fall of the Shah, the Islamic Republic of Iran didn’t play by the communicative routines of diplomacy inherited from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European diplomacy disseminated by colonial powers (face-to-face communication between equivalent ranks), but instead had a highly original view of the way in which new forms of communicative technologies could be used in international relations.
23. For a fuller discussion see Tal (2002).
24. In May 1995, Greenpeace swimmers, supported by two Israeli fishing vessels, tried to block the *Aribel* from dumping a load of arsenic and sludge of heavy metals from factories along the Kishon River. The worst polluter is said to be Haifa Chemicals, which allegedly dumps into both the river and into the Mediterranean (see <http://archive.greenpeace.org/majordomo/index-oldgopher/9505/msg00012.html>). In 1998 a similar action was reported by Greenpeace involving both the *Aribel* and the Danish ship, *Skandia* (owned by Nordic Stone and Gravel Company) (see <http://archive.greenpeace.org/majordomo/index-press-releases/1998/msg00230.html>).

A 1994 criminal suit by IUED against Haifa Chemicals and Deshaim Ltd resulted in a settlement requiring instalment of antipollution technology and the funding of research on pollution. The Shamgar Commission of July 2000 was one of several initiatives to try to gain leverage on the pollution, as was the launching of the Ministry of Environment’s vessel SVIVA-1 to monitor seawater pollution in the Mediterranean. For an account of the difficulties of controlling toxic pollution along Israel’s coast, see Weintheil and Parag (2003).

25. Haaretz April 11, 2005 has a report on more quasi-official Israeli dumping which it claims is the first time since 1967 that Israel has decided to transfer garbage into the West Bank. The action, however, is called “illegal” not just by Palestinian and Israeli protestors who together attempted to block garbage trucks, but also by Yossi Sarid, former Minister of the Environment and current Member of the Knesset, and by Iche Meir, the Director of the Union of Samaria (i.e. of the Israeli settlements). As reported by Haaretz, the plan is to dump 10,000 tons of garbage a month from the Dan and Sharon regions of Israel into the Abu Shusha Quarry near Nablus, thereby not only dumping garbage but also blocking Palestinian use of one of their largest quarries (see [www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/563634.html](http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/563634.html)).

26. See also Shaul Cohen (1993) on the competition over tree planting, arson, and uprooting.
27. Muhammad Bakri, the filmmaker of *Jenin, Jenin*, funded by the Palestinian Authority, apparently has now admitted in court to numerous inaccuracies and fanciful stagings in his film (see [www.worldnetdaily.com/news/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLE\\_ID=42404](http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLE_ID=42404)).
28. Benvenisti provides a short history of the efforts in the nineteenth century (e.g. E.H. Palmer's 1881 *Arabic and English Name Lists*) and under the British Mandate to systematically collect geographic names and to provide accurate mapping. He singles out the American scholar Edward Robinson's 1860 *Biblical Researches in Palestine*, as beginning to sort through the varied claims for identifying the ancient geography of Palestine. For anthropologists, folklorists, and cultural historians, equally important are collections of the many stories attached to place names, particularly those places with multiple stories, such as the Sea of Galilee, Lake Kinneret or Ginasaur, or Lake Tiberias (Wachsmann 1990, 2000) and the multiple stories from the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions which attach to Jerusalem (Makiya 2001).
29. <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?l=p&p=1>.
30. Dan Rabinowitz has done a useful reading of Kedar against Walid Khalidi's book of photographs of a disappeared middle-class Palestinian community. Rabinowitz emphasizes the ideological uses to which these two books contribute if read within their nationalist frames. This is, of course, a reading of which one should be aware. On the other hand, as Rabinowitz himself admits, the more knowledge one brings to the picture the more informative it can be. I am interested in bringing a rich knowledge to the reading of the pictures, readings that replace the simplifying ideological frames by more complicated histories, sleuthing out the clues in the aerial photographs of the changes in the land (or sleuthing out the social histories of hierarchies, stratifications, and extractions in the family photographs). I am reminded of Edward Said in *After the Last Sky* waxing lyrical about the way in which an unnamed small girl posed against shadows evokes in him speculations about how she represents the loss and agony of the Palestinians, unnamed, and with erased context or history. I'm a bit impatient: he could have asked the photographer who posed the image, or her, or her father himself. It is he, in this instance, who is doing the erasing, creating the simplification. Not that this instance detracts from other more brilliant observations such as the passage on bodybuilding as a personal resistance to disempowerment.
31. Allan argues that rather than thinking only in terms of water sharing, one should think about developing institutions for trade in scarce water-intensive commodities such as staple foods. He calls this sort of calculation "virtual water."

32. There is an emerging international law on groundwater rights as well as surface water: in both cases no nation can claim exclusive rights to water just because it originates in its territory, and by the same token every state on a shared body of water has a right to minimal water needs of domestic uses required for its survival.
33. Water-conservation kits retrofitted in homes (including toilet-flush reduction, two-volume flushing, regulated shower heads, flow regulators in kitchen and bathroom sink taps, leakage control, and improved garden park irrigation) have led to demand reduction of 10–20 percent (sometimes 20–40 percent). Arlosoroff (in Allan and Court 1996) invokes the experiences of Singapore, California, and Boston, and surveys the experiences of Israel, citing for instance the retrofitting of 3,500 apartments in Eilat as reducing demand by 16 percent and in other developments by greater and lesser amounts. He claims that despite increases in GDP/capita, standards of living, modern appliances, area of parks and gardens, urban water consumption per capita has declined in the last ten years.
34. Seventy percent of municipal wastewater is recycled, Tel Aviv's reusable water for the moment going to irrigation in the Negev, but the standard is clean enough to drink (Selby 2003: 37).
35. Regionally, in 1996 there were twenty-nine desalination plants in Saudia Arabia, producing 795 mcm per year. This is 30 percent of all desalinated water in the world. The six Gulf Cooperation Council countries account for over half of the world's desalination capacity.  
Jordan is building, with Japanese help, a brackish water desalination plant in the South Jordan Valley (putting the brine into the Dead Sea).
36. In the immediate practical political scheme of things, a minor example but nonetheless an indicative reminder of inter-connections is the decline in sand brought to the coastline of Gaza and Israel since the building of the Aswan dam in Egypt.
37. Both the 2003 Geneva Accords (led by Yasser Abed-Rabbo and Yossi Beilin), and the more recent modified proposal for Jerusalem by Shaul Alieri, provide for both access to all parties to the old city, and for a contiguity of territory between Bethlehem and East Jerusalem.
38. On the struggles between Palestinian and Jewish communities for hegemony in planning and development of Haifa and Yaffa-Tel Aviv in the first half of the twentieth century, see Seikaly (1995), and Levine (2005).
39. A Christian priest gives Fares, a young Muslim boy, his canary in a cage, to calm the boy after his father has been taken away by Israeli soldiers who have invaded the house. The instructions are that the bird will only sing if the environment is quiet, and, moreover, it is critical for the future of Palestinians that

such a delicate creature and its song be preserved. So Fares becomes obsessed with creating a calm environment amidst the explosions and house demolitions of Israeli raids and armed resistance, the noise of the city, and the obsessive watching of television in the house by the old grandfather and older brother (the gendered house is artfully detailed). News comes that the father has escaped, and Fares is taken to visit him briefly between being shuttled from foster home to home with his canary. In the end the child is martyred in the cross fire of an Israeli raid as he tries to go back to defend his canary, but as a last gesture releases the canary into freedom.

40. The destruction of the zoo owned by Muhammad Ahmed Juma occurred on May 20, 2004. A bird seller, he had brought in many birds from Israel and Egypt, some ostriches from an Israeli kibbutz, four monkeys acquired on the black market from a Russian circus troupe, a pony for children to ride, two pythons, and eventually many other animals, reptiles, and birds. The zoo officially opened in 2002–2003, after a number of years of collecting, and was a place where children could not only see animals but also pet some, hold birds and snakes, and ride the pony. After thirteen Israeli soldiers were killed by Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip, the army rolled in seeking tunnels used by arms smugglers under the Rafah–Egyptian border, claiming the bulldozers were needed to get their tanks and personnel carriers into position. A photographer caught a forlorn-looking ostrich wandering amongst the ruins, and achieving its day of international fame on the front page of the *New York Times* and other newspapers. Juma said in the immediate aftermath, of eighty animals only seven remained, though where the jaguars, foxes, and wolves went was said to be a mystery. For a few pictures of the idyllic zoo in 2003, see photographer Laura Junka's website: <http://laurajunka.net/index.html>.
41. Dialogue etymologically means a play across (dia) arguments (logos), though in English the word is often used as if it meant exchange of two speakers.
42. The formulation of societies of discipline versus societies of control is from Deleuze (1992[1990]); that of societies or governances of discipline (of bodies) versus those of regulation (of populations), as well as desubjugated knowledges, multiple genealogies of struggle (as an object of the archeological method in order to generate tactical resources) is from Foucault (2003).
43. Two recent Israeli films about these needs and corruptions are Ra'anán Alexandrowicz's *James' Journey to Jerusalem* (2004) about a Christian Zulu pilgrim who gets caught in the net of undocumented workers, part naïf-comedy, part searing indictment of exploitation and crass commercialism, part satire of the Jerusalem syndrome of believing one is living in a biblical

- world; and Eitan Gorlin's *The Holy Land* (2003) about a Russian prostitute, a yeshiva student, and a former American war photographer turned bar owner. In both films, there is a role for the Palestinian middleman, caught in and exercising (subaltern) power (and occasionally revenge), explicit in *Holy*, implicit in *James* (where the middleman is diageetically Jewish, but played by an Arab actor).
44. A documentary about a Jewish director who dedicates herself to providing a theater venue and training for Jenin refugee-camp children.
  45. Elia Suleiman's wonderful 2003 satirical film shot at the checkpoint between Jerusalem and Ramallah, with balloons carrying Arafat's face that float across, a femme-fatale, ninja-style woman warrior whose beauty makes the Israeli checkpoint collapse (both figuratively and literally) and whose Hongkong-style acrobatics overcome Israeli firepower.
  46. This delightful, low-budget film by Ghazi Albuliwi (shot in 2001), son of Jordanian immigrants in Borough Park, Brooklyn, New York, is a lively reminder of the diaspora settings of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, providing refractions of both frozen displacements and forms of working through: pragmatic negotiations, as well as the passage and nonpassage of time from generation to generation.

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