

INTRODUCTION: IN/SECURITY IN OUR TIMES

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On 16 August 2016, I-Kiribati athlete David Katoatau successfully lifted 204 kilograms of weight, good for fourteenth place in the Olympic 105 kg weightlifting competition. Then, he danced. Katoatau has become known for his post-lift dance moves, through which he seeks global attention for Kiribati, under threat from anthropogenic climate change. As he told a Reuters reporter in Rio de Janeiro, “Most people don’t know where Kiribati is. I want people to know more about us so I use my weightlifting, and my dancing, to show the world.”¹ At stake for I-Kiribati like Katoatau is their very existence as a people on the verge of losing their archipelagic homeland to rising sea levels. In a 2015 open letter to the world, Katoatau described the insecurity that his people face “everyday [. . .] as their homes are lost to the rising sea levels” and begged for assistance, noting that a *tebuia* (or hut) that he built for himself with money earned from winning a gold medal at the 2014 Commonwealth Games had been washed away in a cyclone. Explaining that Kiribati “will be wiped off the face of the earth in less than 30 years,” Katoatau admits that he has never “felt so helpless in [his] life.” The letter concludes: “in the not too distant future we will all drown.”²

On the same day that David Katoatau danced for Kiribati in a Rio gymnasium, Donald J. Trump, Republican candidate for the United States presidency, spoke at a rally in the predominantly white community of West Bend, Wisconsin. Echoing the central theme of his nomination acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention, Trump condemned the unrest in nearby Milwaukee, sparked by the fatal police shooting of Sylville Smith on 13 August 2016, as “an assault on the right of all citizens to live in security and to live in peace.”³ Having promised to “lead our country back to safety, prosperity, and peace,”⁴ he insisted on the need to restore “law and order [. . .] for the sake of all.”⁵ Throughout his campaign, Trump has sought to mobilize, through spectacularizing, the range of insecurities—economic, bodily, rhetorical, reputational, affective, geopolitical—to which, he suggests, Americans are daily subject. Although he has at times included “law-abiding African-American citizens” in his list of the lamentably victimized⁶—preyed upon, he asserts, by other African Americans as well as by their predilection for Democratic policies and politicians—his campaign has gained traction through framing native-born, presumptively white, working- and middle-class Americans as existentially threatened by (among other things) Muslims, Mexicans, refugees, illegal immigrants, the Black Lives Matter movement, bad trade agreements, outsourcing, taxation, political correctness, the War on Christmas, Obamacare, and, of course, Hillary Clinton. At the time of our writing (September 2016), Election Day is still

two months away; Trump may or may not win sufficient votes on 8 November 2016 to attain the presidency. Regardless, his polling numbers suggest the extent to which his apocalyptic vision of the nation and promise to “make America safe again” resonate for millions of Americans.⁷

In juxtaposing David Katoatau’s performance, which seeks to foreground the ecological insecurities besetting his homeland, with the politically inflammatory rhetoric Donald Trump deploys to warn of American national insecurity and decline, we do not mean to suggest that they are alike. For one thing, the joyful fluidity of Katoatau’s dancing, a deliberately embodied expression of vulnerability, seems diametrically opposed to Trump’s relentless assertions of fleshy presence and masculine hardness. For another, Katoatau’s and Kiribati’s predicament points to the insidiously uneven ways in which nativists’ demands for their fortified security persist in (re)distributing insecurity to other populations. It is not only far-right-wing politicians like Trump and their supporters who find it difficult to contemplate the possibility that they might bear some responsibility for the condition of peoples like the I-Kiribati who are being displaced by climate change. In September 2015, New Zealand deported Ioane Teitiota and his family back to Kiribati, having denied their bid for permanent legal status as climate refugees.⁸ If the operations of empire and racial capitalism have shaped not just where and how anthropogenic climate change is felt most urgently, but the economies of attention according to which “most people” can get away with not knowing “where Kiribati is,” they also conspire to make (temporary) redress for its victims, through migration, for example, difficult to achieve.⁹ The very different invocations of insecurity of 16 August 2016, then, move us to a set of reflections that animate this special issue as a whole: on the pervasiveness and ubiquity with which questions of security and insecurity circulate today, reaching far beyond the halls of academia to the public sphere at large and applied to radically diverse domains; on the tensions that organize and stem from this discursive generalization of insecurity, making it important that we ask whose insecurity, or which insecurities, matter where, how, when, and to whom; on the conflicting claims of security for some that sometimes produce insecurity for others; on what is to be done. Can insecurity be expressed—*danced*—and redressed without being displaced elsewhere, onto other vulnerable bodies?

The essays in this special issue enquire into the forms and discourses through which the phenomena of security and its correlate, insecurity, have been experienced, apprehended, and expressed, both historically and in the world today. In doing so, they seek to make sense of the different ways in which these phenomena have structured broader geopolitical conditions as well as more intimate subjectivities and practices. As Itty Abraham observes, the term “security” today has taken on an almost “parasitic” character, seeming to have “attached itself to every scale of human activity, from the individual to the international, even to outer space; from comestible (food security), natural (environmental security), financial (security/securities), and territorial (homeland security) to virtual (cyber security); to forms of community, from Social Security to collective security, which is the principle behind the United Nations.” And as he further argues, neither can security be understood apart from its constitutive and “inseparable shadow”—insecurity—which haunts every usage of the

term.¹⁰ Of course, the contemporary preoccupation with security and its opposite might simply confirm Michel Foucault's well-known argument that we have been "societies of security" ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the juridico-legal mechanisms of sovereignty (exercised over territories) and the institutional technologies of discipline (exercised over individuals) were subordinated to the logic and practices of security (exercised over populations) as the West's dominant mode of governance.¹¹ This is surely indisputable. But does Foucault's genealogy of the present sufficiently explain the radical inflation of in/security talk in our contemporary moment—say, since the beginning of the new century—which, if nothing else, testifies to a global acceleration, intensification, and proliferation of experiential and structural fears of insecurity and the concomitant desires to mitigate them through securitization? How might we account for this historical shift, if, indeed, one has occurred at all?

The political theorist Isabell Lorey suggests that a fundamental shift in the rationality of governance is precisely what has taken place: whereas states had historically operated through a security compact—the implicit promise of protection for its citizens, which undergirds the social contract—states under neoliberal regimes govern through the production of social insecurity by "regulating the minimum of assurance while simultaneously increasing instability"; "precarization has [thus] become an instrument of governance," rendering mass insecurity the new normal of our time.¹² Lauren Berlant more skeptically adds that the phenomenon of insecurity itself is far from new. What is new, rather, are its targets: the previously secure middle classes who now find themselves buffeted by the same economic, ecological, or social vagaries that used to—and still—beleaguer the poor. Thus, increasing concerns about insecurity in both the political and public spheres simply reflect how "ordinary contingencies of material and fantasmic life associated with proletarian and labor-related subjectivity [only] bec[ome] crises when they hit the bourgeoisies."¹³ With the advent of a new political rationality that normalizes insecurity across populations historically insulated from it, we can further isolate another feature that might tie our different and disparate contemporary fears of insecurity together: to wit, the increasing difficulty, if not impossibility, of imagining an ongoing and sustainable future. If security, as Foucault puts it, "works on the future"¹⁴—and here Foucault adopts Jeremy Bentham's earlier formulation that "[a]mong the objects of the law, security is the only one which embraces the future"¹⁵—it might be this systemic foreclosure of the future that underlies our manifold fears of insecurity today. From the studies that suggest millennials in the global North will be the first modern generation to be worse off than their parents¹⁶ to the acute rise in income inequality¹⁷; from failing political states resulting in mass exoduses of refugees¹⁸ to increasing global outbreaks in infectious diseases; from increased racialized state violence to the prospect of the wholesale extinction of the species through climate change: what accompanies these various crises of insecurity is a breakdown of traditional governmental aims for the future—of social mobility, national prosperity, developmental progress, intergenerational continuity—that renders optimism for the future, even a cruel one, difficult to sustain amongst populations with precarious lives.¹⁹ The affective state of insecurity is thus one where futurity is perpetually in jeopardy.

If “security” and “insecurity” are terms that have proliferated to describe multiple areas of human life, there is no less a proliferation of cognate terms that accompany them—precarity, vulnerability, risk, uncertainty, dangerousness—which the contributors to this special issue likewise draw on and explore. Although many of these words are frequently used interchangeably, especially in everyday parlance, they also have distinct but overlapping theoretical genealogies and material histories. For instance, “security” is more likely to refer to the technologies of state governance, not just as a consequence of Foucault’s influential work, but also in light of the institution of “security studies” as part of the field of international relations during the postwar era, originating from the “twin stimuli of nuclear weaponry and the cold war.”²⁰ If the “precarious,” on the other hand, tends to describe the target or the object of these governmental technologies that distribute security unevenly, the “precariat” has also recently become a nomenclature used to designate a new political subject- or class-in-the-making, a platform from which to mobilize political action, as seen in the EuroMayDay protests occurring each year on 1 May.²¹ Alternatively, many of these terms have at different times been used to describe both ontological and affective states, to gesture at bodily vulnerabilities that might potentially ground social relations or human rights.²²

It is not our intention to provide an exhaustive definition of these terms—if such a thing were even possible—and still less to adjudicate between them. We might, however, make two observations from the terminological slippages that frequently occur in analyses of in/securities. First: the difficulty of a precise vocabulary reflects the ongoingness of our inquiry into what counts as in/security; that is to say, these multiplicity of terms might be understood as indexing disparate and sometimes conflicting ways of grasping the phenomenon, with some parsing in/security as a form of affective life, some as a technocratic mode of governmental rationality, some as a popular idiom for mobilizing collective political identities. These various terms hence designate various ways of apprehending and mapping the conceptual terrain of what we understand by in/security. So do the diversity of texts, genres, and cultural artifacts taken up in this issue. Second, this terminological plurality is not just reflective of different theoretical endeavors, but symptomatic of the messiness of our lived experiences of in/security, which might best be understood by recourse to what Raymond Williams described as “structures of feeling.” Williams uses this term to describe a “specificity of present being,” a “practical consciousness [of] what is actually being lived”—that is to say, affective modes of apprehension that may be structurally tied to changing material and social conditions, but that have not yet been fully codified or defined; a “structure of feeling” is rooted in concrete historical relations, but its ephemerality lies in its attempt to capture experiences and moments of immediacy for which no conceptual framework has yet been articulated.²³ The contributors to this issue attempt precisely to capture the fact of in/security as a contemporary structure of feeling: as something that, on one hand, marks the shared and changing structural conditions of existence of our time; but that, on the other, is a phenomenon lived, experienced, and grasped differently by different populations and that manifests itself differently in different contexts.

Appropriately, then, our special issue is bookended by two topical clusters—each comprising a set of shorter position papers—on “In/Secure Environments”: the first, “Capitalism,

Colonialism, Ecology," focuses on environmental degradations in the age of the anthropocene as they are shaped by the legacies of racial capitalism and colonialism; while the second, "Precarity and the University," focuses on how contemporary processes of neoliberalism have restructured institutions of higher learning and transformed conditions of labor and employment. The term "environment"—etymologically traceable to the French *environnements*—simply denotes "the state of being encompassed or surrounded"²⁴ and thus, as one critic puts it, can seem "too vague—for it means, ultimately 'everything.'"²⁵ In juxtaposing the environment as ecology with the university as an environment and placing both under the same rubric, we are interested in a socio-centric (rather than bio-centric²⁶) definition of the environment that parses out the reciprocal relationships between individuals, populations, and their surroundings. In this sense, the environment is akin to what Foucault has described as the *milieu*: "a set of natural givens—rivers, marshes, hills—and a set of artificial givens—an agglomeration of individuals, of houses, etcetera. The milieu is a certain number of combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in it [...It is] the materiality within which they live." And it is precisely the milieu—the environment—that becomes the target of securitization as governmental technologies seek to perennially shape and regulate our conditions of existence: "The apparatuses of security work, fabricate, organize, and plan a milieu."²⁷ The papers in our two clusters explore the effects of such modes of securitization on our ecological environments (the world in which we live) and the environment that grounds our scholarly endeavors (the world in which we work).

In the essay that opens the cluster on "Capitalism, Colonialism, Ecology," Lindsey Dillon and Julie Sze reflect on the phrase repeated by Eric Garner as he lay dying on a New York City sidewalk, his airways fatally constricted by NYPD officer Daniel Pantaleo's chokehold, on 17 July 2014: "I can't breathe." Garner's dying words did not only communicate his extreme bodily distress, they argue, but indicted the entangled histories of racial and environmental violence that rendered it impossible for him to breathe: breath is, in Dillon and Sze's words, an "intimate geography" (20), one that manifests how racism constrains "life choices and opportunities, [as well as] the environmental conditions of life itself" (19). Neel Ahuja likewise invites us to (re)consider the relationship between race and environmental precarity as this shapes, in particular, the global movement of people "fleeing [carbon-fueled] war, economic crisis, and climate disaster across North Africa and South and West Asia" (25). For Ahuja, it is crucial that we attend to not just the perniciously unequal ways in which anthropogenic climate change is felt across differences of race, nation, and class, but the histories of imperial rule and capitalist development that have precipitated climate change and inform the uneven distribution of its "death-dealing effects" (27). Articulated histories of environmental disaster and colonial state-building are at the heart of the third essay in the cluster, by Alutiiq scholar Thomas Swensen. Here, Swensen enquires into the genealogies and reverberating effects of the 1964 Good Friday Earthquake, which devastated Indigenous communities throughout southern Alaska, bringing them into uneasy partnership with the colonizing American state. And finally, Thomas S. Davis asks how art registers, represents, and responds to the ongoing emergency of the anthropocene as it manifests in, and acts on, the oil- and gas-rich extraction zone known as the Bakken.

The closing cluster on “Precarity and the University” shifts our attention from the global scale of ecology to the institutional scale in which our research and teaching takes place, and the material conditions that enable, shape, and constrain this work. The first essay, by Casse! Busse, draws on an experience of an unexpected funding cut to reflect on the neoliberal economy that precarizes graduate study, not only by making teaching assistantships more uncertain but also by precipitating a decline in secure, tenure-track positions. Reflecting on the history of labor struggles, Busse argues for the necessity of understanding academic labor—in particular, graduate teaching—“*as work* [...] that needs to be acknowledged and compensated by the institution as such” (164). Subarno Chattarji next reminds us that the impact of neoliberalism is global, equally visible in the halls of higher education in India. There, the marketization of higher education has not only eroded the university’s role as a vehicle for social advancement and public good—resulting in the under-enrollment of minority groups such as Dalits—but has forced upon faculty and teachers a “Code of Professional Ethics” that undermines faculty autonomy for nationalistic purposes. The third and fourth essays—by, respectively, Alyssa Mt. Pleasant, a scholar of Tuscarora descent, and Nadine Attewell, a scholar of mixed-race Asian descent—turn to the affective labor expended by faculty of color in the academy, given their scarcity of numbers and the institutional racism that frequently attends even everyday encounters. Noting that “Indigenous scholars [...] account for less than 0.5 percent of the PhDs granted” (176) between 2006 and 2009, Mt. Pleasant observes that being (all-too-often) the only Indigenous scholar in the room results in the extensive emotional labor of having to continuously counter the silencing logics of settler colonialism that still inhabit our pedagogic and scholarly practices. Likewise, Attewell draws attention to the affective labor involved in “diversity work” that faculty of color, especially women, are made to shoulder, from the work of caring made more and more necessary as institutions shift this burden onto faculty and staff to the performance of niceness to keep institutional peace even in the face of racially-charged encounters. The final essay of the cluster, by Bennett Carpenter, Laura Goldblatt, and Lenora Hanson—who have been involved in organizing the MLA Subconference each year as a venue for thinking about “alternative professional, social, and political possibilities”²⁸—examines how gentrification has driven the pursuit of “safe spaces” at both the University of Virginia and Duke University, producing “zones of exclusivity [that] require [...] increasingly violent policing and structures of surveillance” (191).

The longer essays in this special issue continue to illuminate different environments of insecurity, paying particular attention to how race, gender, class, and even geographical location shape experiences within such environments. Our first two essays, Sarika Chandra’s “The Urban-Rural Imagination: The Politics of Subsistence in India” and Denielle Elliot’s “When Obama Visited Kenya: (In)Securities and Graduated Sovereignty in Nairobi,” locate us in the global south, in India and Kenya, respectively. In beginning here, we aim not just to draw attention to the “global south” as defined by the Brandt Line—as an empirical distinction between wealthier and poorer economies such that precarious existences are likely to be more prevalent in the latter—but also to the “global south” as a conceptual and heuristic device that, as Matthew Sparke suggests, makes visible “the intersection of entangled political geographies of dispossession and repossession” which secure some lives while leaving others insecure.²⁹

Sarika Chandra's essay continues the ecological concerns of our opening cluster, analyzing the wave of farmer suicides that have recently occurred in India as a consequence of crises in agrarian food production, brought on by a capitalist rationalization that has rendered rural life fraught with insecurity through increasing debt burdens, land dispossessions, and environmental degradations. Reading a contemporary Marathi novel, *Baromaas* (2004) by Sadanand Deshmukh, Chandra argues that Deshmukh draws on a longstanding tradition of Indian realism to dramatize the contemporary predicament of peasant life: blocked from both older traditions of subsistence living and modern possibilities of social mobility through urban migration, the farmer-protagonist faces a bleak futurelessness, a casualty of capitalist forces that have rendered "the ability to reproduce ourselves ... threatened beyond repair" (49). By exploring how the socioeconomic conditions of rural life affect sexual and gender relations, the novel shows how the realms of social and biological reproduction are intertwined, both thrown into crisis now that farming as a means of subsistence and livelihood has become increasingly unsustainable. Yet the novel ends on an optimistic vision of a collective politics that imagines the possibility of social reorganization.

Denielle Elliott draws on fieldwork carried out during Barack Obama's 2015 visit to Nairobi to offer an anthropological account of the way transnational technologies of securitization are mobilized in Kenya, shaped variously by "histories of imperialist and colonial policing, national urban anticrime and gentrification programs, and transnational antiterrorist military interventions" (63). As she suggests, these various modes of security dovetail in different ways to target Somali refugees (and Muslim communities, more broadly), constructing them as potential terrorists that undermine urban safety in Nairobi, national (Kenyan) security, and U.S. homeland security. Drawing on Aihwa Ong's notion of "graduated sovereignty"—in which citizenship rights are fragmented across different demographics while transnational actors shape national policies—Elliott compellingly shows how certain populations, such as Kenyan-born Somalis, are deprived of civil and political rights while others—including expatriates and, most notably, Obama, the visiting President of a foreign country—are afforded rights and privileges frequently unavailable to Kenyan citizens. The essay highlights both the territorial mobility and sovereign flexibility of contemporary security practices, made especially visible in the way the U.S.-led war on terror has intersected with and constituted local and national concerns in Nairobi and Kenya.

In "The German Refugee 'Crisis' After Cologne: The Race of Refugee Rights," Beverly Weber shows how, in the wealthy north no less than in the postcolonial south, the impulse to secure redistributes vulnerability to the margins, hindering the development of more just forms of sociality that work across difference. Weber considers the German parliamentary response to a spate of attacks on women at the Cologne train station that were attributed to refugees, reflecting on the reasons for which, and consequences with which, refugee and women's rights to mobility and German space have been framed as discontinuous. During the debates that are Weber's focus, most politicians expressed strong anti-racist commitments rooted in post-Holocaust projects of redress. But they also called for increased levels of police surveillance as well as further limits on the right of asylum, elaborating a rights discourse structured by racial and other exclusions. Since the institutions most often charged

with securing rights, “such as the nation-state and the police, participate in deeply racialized forms of exclusion” (89), it is imperative, Weber argues, that we rethink personal and collective security in terms of justice, as part of a new human rights imaginary.

In the essays that follow, Jason Puskar and Alissa Karl investigate a structure of feeling that is difficult to reconcile with the fear of insecurity to which, for example, the Bundestag seeks to respond through additional policing and tighter border controls: that is, the *desire* for insecurity seemingly manifest in a variety of risk-taking behaviors. Entitled “‘Hazardous Business’: Nella Larsen’s *Passing* and Risk Racialization,” Puskar’s essay turns to Nella Larsen’s novel *Passing*, two of whose African American protagonists regularly engage in the perilous business of passing for white in Jim Crow America, to reflect on the complex and shifting racialization of early-twentieth-century American cultures of risk. Once associated with racially coded forms of degeneracy, risk avidity acquired new cachet around the turn of the century as a way for (some) men to avert the threat that too encompassing a sense of security was thought to pose to white masculinity. For Puskar, then, the riskiness of Clare Kendry’s passing is not ancillary to, but rather a central component in, her performance of whiteness, which the novel opposes, at least initially, to her black bourgeois friend Irene Redfield’s anxious commitment to risk management. But the pursuit of insecurity too proves unevenly dangerous and unequally profitable, as neither Clare’s nor Irene’s risk-taking endeavors succeed in unsettling a white supremacist national order, not even in how it distributes social and other goods.

Moving us from the early 20th to the early 21st century, Alissa Karl’s essay on “The Extra-Capitalist Extreme” notes the immense popularity of reality television shows about extreme survivalism set in the anachronistic past. Like Larsen’s protagonist’s desire for and pursuit of risk, these shows demonstrate a “cultural fascination with corporeal insecurity ... [with] imperiled bodies ... often conjured in places and times beyond the viewer’s here and now” (107). On one hand, Karl suggests, this fascination is driven by the sense of ethical responsibility and sympathy that secure, First-World viewers feel for those bodies located elsewhere (in the Third World) routinely subject to violence, disease, and risk. Although problematic, such sentiments may nonetheless emerge from an apprehension of the shared ontological precarity that grounds corporeal life. On the other hand, the location of insecure zones at both a temporal and geographical distance from our “contemporary capitalist present” (113) reinscribes a seemingly stable binary between security and insecurity that, first, implies that there is no life worth living outside of capitalism; and second, masks the way our own ostensibly “secure” conditions in advanced neoliberal economies are equally “susceptible to the whims of the markets” (119). As Karl notes, then, alongside Weber’s essay, an ethical approach to justice and solidarity entails recognition of “our mutual insecurity and exploitation” (121), rather than an epistemological divide of secure lives from insecure ones that ends up reinforcing exclusions produced by uneven world systems.

Such intuitions are fleshed out in the concluding pair of essays, which attend to projects for living despite, with, and after the precariousities of the present. A sense that cultural production and critique remain powerful, if compromised, mediums for political thought and action also

suffuses Nicole M. Guidotti-Hernández's essay "#ICEoutofGA: Undocumented Millennial Activists Against Policing in the New South," in which the struggles of undocumented migrants in the southern United States take center stage. Here, Guidotti-Hernández reflects on the ways in which undocumented Latinx and Asian millennials reckon with the sense of uncertainty, unsettlement, and suspension through which their status as "illegal" and therefore deportable makes itself affectively as well as materially known. Drawing on her experiences teaching critical American studies at Freedom University (established following Georgia's 2011 ban on enrolling undocumented students at its public universities), Guidotti-Hernández asks how millennials' performances of gender and sexual identity in activist and educational spaces at once register the violence of state projects of belonging and articulate alternatives. Although suspicious of the university's alignment with state and other disciplinary projects, she takes heart, ultimately, from the efforts of profoundly precaritized subjects to revitalize the university as a site for empowerment, activism, and multidirectional learning in the face of worsening conditions for immigrant and racialized peoples nationally.

Finally, in her essay, Églantine Colon takes up French writer Antoine Volodine's literary oeuvre as a meditation on the problematic of care, which she describes as at once a technology of biopolitical governance and an indispensable practice of repair. Invoking a parallel universe "through which [Volodine's] characters traverse diverse scales of insecurity from post-genocidal traumas to ecological disasters, from post-industrial decay to pre-insurrectional confusion" (142), Volodine's writings are bound together by a metanarrative that identifies them as the work of a group of incarcerated authors who have been indefinitely detained for their radically egalitarian politics. What interests Colon are not just the gestures of care that Volodine's characters are represented as undertaking for one another, but the gestures of care that are enacted by and through writing itself, or what she calls "formal care." In post-exotic literature, she suggests, "the inventive renewals of fragile forms of life" cannot be separated from "the subversive creation of literary form" (141); aesthetic form proves generative in even the spaces most fortified against insurrection.

Our two final essays, then, gesture toward what we might think of as the ongoing work of art and the humanities today. In the face of the pressures that, as our closing cluster variously documents, tear at the humanities from within and without, we are reminded that imaginative and pedagogical endeavors remain crucial to the search for ways of thinking, feeling, and seeing otherwise. We began this introduction by describing David Katoatau dancing in spite of—and because of—Kiribati's impending disappearance. His aesthetic response conjoins insecurity as both a material condition and as an affective state: it is at this intersection that art, pedagogy, and the humanities must find room to work in our age of in/securities.

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NOTES

- ¹Brian Oliver, "Pacific islander dances to raise climate change awareness," Reuters, August 15 2016.
- ²David Katoatau, "Save Our Country," August 2015, <http://www.climate.gov.ki/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ANNEX-2-David-Katoatau.pdf>.
- ³Donald Trump, qtd. in Yamiche Alcindor, "Trump, Rallying White Crowd for Police, Accuses Democrats of Exploiting Blacks," *New York Times*, August 16 2016.
- ⁴"Donald Trump 2016 RNC draft speech transcript," *Politico*, July 21 2016.
- ⁵Donald Trump, qtd. in Yamiche Alcindor, "Trump, Rallying White Crowd for Police."
- ⁶Donald Trump, qtd. in Yamiche Alcindor, "Trump, Rallying White Crowd for Police."
- ⁷"Donald Trump 2016 RNC draft speech transcript," *Politico*, July 21 2016. It is worth noting that Trump's ascendancy appears to many commentators to be in line with political tendencies in other parts of the world. They invoke as examples Rodrigo Duterte's victory in the May 2016 Philippines presidential election, after running on a viciously punitive law and order platform, or Britons' vote to exit the European Union in 23 June 2016, as evidence that the rhetoric and experience of insecurity have become—newly—politically potent across the global North-South divide. Indeed, the links between the Trump campaign and some elements of Brexit's Leave campaign are logistical as well as ideological: not only has former United Kingdom Independence Party leader Nigel Farage, who helped to make the case for Leave, stumped on Trump's behalf, but Trump himself recently suggested that "they will soon be calling me MR. BREXIT," on the strength, presumably, of his plan to build a wall along the US-Mexico border (Donald Trump, Twitter post, August 18 2016, 5:11 a.m., <https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump>). Meanwhile, pundits and politicians alike have ascribed the strength of the Leave and Trump campaigns to the enthusiasm of (white) working-class voters who have been left without the security of stable employment, affordable housing, or reliable welfare, thanks to the depredations of global capital and the neoliberal state—a flawed narrative that yet has proved broadly compelling. See, as an example of the genre, an essay that was written just prior to the EU referendum vote on June 23 2016, John Cassidy, "What do the Brexit movement and Donald Trump have in common," *The New Yorker*, June 23 2016.
- ⁸Shabnam Dastgheib, "Kiribati climate refugee told he must leave New Zealand," stuff.co.nz, September 21 2015.
- ⁹In his important essay "Our Sea of Islands," the Tongan scholar Epeli Hau'ofa points to the "world of difference" that obtains between "viewing the Pacific as 'islands in a far sea,'" removed from the centers of power, and approaching the Pacific as "a sea of islands" (*The Contemporary Pacific* 6.1 [Spring 1994], 152). Incidentally, he also offers a sympathetic critique of the kind of hopelessness to which David Katoakau subscribes in his open letter, asking "what kind of teaching is it to stand in front of young people from your own region, people you claim as your own, [. . .] and you tell them that our countries are hopeless" (150-151), reminding us of the importance of recognizing the diversity of strategies that peoples struggling for their continued survival may take up at different points in time.
- ¹⁰Itty Abraham, "Segurança/Security in Brazil and the United States," in *Words in Motion: Toward a Global Lexicon*, eds. Carol Gluck and Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), pp. 21-22.
- ¹¹Foucault's account of this shift can be found in his published lectures, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2007). Foucault insists, however, that these stages should not be read as neat historical sequences, since juridical, legal, and disciplinary mechanisms remain, but are reactivated differently under a regime of security.
- ¹²Isabell Lorey, *State of Insecurity: Government of the Precarious*, trans. Aileen Derieg (London: Verso, 2015), p. 2.

¹³Jasbir Puar, Lauren Berlant, Judith Butler, Bojana Cvejić, Isabell Lorey, and Ana Vujanović, "Precarity Talk: A Virtual Roundtable with Lauren Berlant, Judith Butler, Bojana Cvejić, Isabell Lorey, Jasbir Puar, and Ana Vujanović." *TDR: The Drama Review* 56.4 (Winter 2012): p. 166.

¹⁴Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, p. 20.

¹⁵Qtd. in Colin Gordon, "Government Rationality: An Introduction," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller. (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1991), p. 19.

¹⁶See <<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/jul/18/millennials-earn-8000-pounds-less-in-their-20s-than-predecessors>> for a typical account, only one of many that saturate the media.

¹⁷The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) published a report in 2015, *In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All*, which notes that "income inequality has risen in most OECD countries, reaching in some cases a historic high." <<http://www.oecd.org/social/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all-9789264235120-en.htm>>

¹⁸The Fund for Peace has been producing a yearly report on the "Fragile States Index" (previously called the "Failed States Index") ever since 2005.

¹⁹The reference here, of course, is to Lauren Berlant's *Cruel Optimism* (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 2011).

²⁰David Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War" in *World Politics* 48 (October 1995): p. 119. Indeed, we might mark its legal, governmental, and institutional emergence with the passing of the National Security Act on 26 July 1947 in the United States, which created the National Security Council, the Pentagon, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

²¹The EuroMayDay website has for its slogan: "MAYDAY! MAYDAY! no borders, no precarity, let's defeat the new inequality!" <<https://www.euromayday.org/about.php>> For the precariat as a new class (distinct from the older working class), see Guy Standing, *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011).

²²See, for instance, Judith Butler's *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso, 2004) or Bryan Turner's *Vulnerability and Human Rights* (College Park: Penn State Univ. Press, 2005).

²³Raymond Williams, "Structures of Feeling," in *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 128, 131.

²⁴*Oxford English Dictionary*, "Environment," Def. 1.

²⁵Timothy Clark, "Derangements of Scale" in *Telemorphosis: Theory in the Era of Climate Change*, Vol 1., ed. Tom Cohen (Michigan: Open Humanities Press, 2012) <<http://quod.lib.umich.edu/o/ohp/10539563.0001.001/1:8/--telemorphosis-theory-in-the-era-of-climate-change-vol-1?rgn=div1;view=fulltext>>

²⁶This distinction is made by Lawrence Buell in distinguishing between first and second-wave ecocriticism; whereas the first-wave concerned itself with the environment as the natural world ("biocentric"), the second-wave is more interested in a "sociocentric" perspective that encompasses people, urban landscapes, and environmental justice concerns. See Lawrence Buell, *The Future of Environmental Criticism: Environmental Crisis and the Literary Imagination* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005).

²⁷Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, p. 21.

²⁸"Who We Are," *MLA Subconference* <<http://mlasubconference.org/who-we-are/>>

²⁹Matthew Sparke, "Everywhere But Always Somewhere: Critical Geographies of the Global South," in *The Global South* 1.1 (2007): p. 117.